START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000985 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTATIONS, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 27, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-034. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG) for this session was held at the Russian Mission on October 27, 2009. This was the fifth meeting of the MOU WG overall. U.S WG Chair, Mr. Trout, provided the U.S.-proposed MOU joint draft text (JDT), Sections I through VI, with copies both in English and Russian. Russian WG chair, General Orlov, provided a Russian-proposed JDT of Annexes D through I. ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation clarified several issues in the U.S.-proposed MOU text provided early last week. They questioned why the United States did not provide non-deployed launcher data, why the United States wanted to include warhead data, why the United States specifically referred to the warheads as "nuclear" warheads, and queried how much MOU data would reside in the first tier and what data could be moved to the third tier. ¶5. (S) The sides reviewed the MOU JDT, Sections I through III, and were able to establish agreement in several areas. Much of the meeting, however, was consumed by the Russians arguing against special treatment of mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers in the U.S. proposals. ¶6. (U) Subject Summary: Perceived Discrepancies; Levels Upon Levels of Data; The U.S. Has Already Covered That; Mobiles Again; The Returned Missile; What TMOM?; and, Houston...We Have Agreement. -------------- PERCEIVED DISCREPANCIES -------------- ¶7. (S) General Poznihir opened the meeting and noted that the Russian Delegation had discovered a few discrepancies in the U.S. MOU JDT text that raised many questions which they would elaborate upon in a presentation. Poznihir stated that the proposed U.S. text duplicated much information in the ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber (HB) sections that already existed in Section I of the MOU, adding that these duplicate sections provided no benefit except to lengthen the document. ¶8. (S) Poznihir described the second issue that the U.S. proposal did not include, the Russian-proposed category of "non-deployed launchers," except for mobile launchers. In addition to the fact that the U.S. provision would single out mobile launchers, the Russian side was concerned that only one specific missile is attributed to one specific launcher, even when that missile is removed from its respective launcher. Poznihir argued that the concern should be the number of missiles actually in, or on, launchers rather than the association of a given missile and a given launcher. If a launcher contains a missile, the Russian side argued, it is deployed. If it does not, then it is non-deployed. With reference to the data reported in the MOU six-month update, it would contain actual data, not virtual data and, therefore, would be of more use to each Party. ¶9. (S) Poznihir turned to the issue of providing warhead data in the MOU. First, this was an issue for HBs because the Russians stored their long-range nuclear ALCMs differently from the United States. He also contended that the U.S. proposal poses verification issues. Principally, there is no way to determine if more weapons are stored at another facility that is not associated with a base, because such a facility would not be inspectable, yet warheads from such a facility could still be used to upload HBs quickly. Second, Poznihir argued that reporting warhead load-out data for ICBMs and SLBMs would pose problems because the load-out on these missiles could change between six-month updates, resulting in differences between load-outs given to inspectors upon arrival at facilities and the load-outs listed in the MOU. Under the Russian proposal, individual warhead data would not be reported in the MOU; only at the ICBM and SLBM base level would the aggregate number of deployed warheads be declared for ICBMs and SLBMs at that base. ¶10. (S) Poznihir turned to the treatment of mobile systems in Section II of the U.S.-proposed MOU and stated that such "unilateral restrictions are not acceptable" and U.S. arguments on the topic had not been "convincing." Following this statement, Poznihir pointed out several areas within the draft text where the United States had singled out mobile ICBMs and launchers. ¶11. (S) On the issue of identifying submarine "names" in the data exchange, Poznihir acknowledged that the Russian side understood that this data had been offered by the U.S. side to increase transparency. He also agreed with the U.S. analysis that there might be a different number of SLBMs and warheads on each SLBM for each submarine. Poznihir did not, however, express a Russian position on the proposal. ¶12. (S) Poznihir, on the display of data in MOU Section I, acknowledged that the two sides have agreed to record the aggregate number of deployed delivery vehicles and deployed warheads, while continuing to differ with respect to limits and the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. He proposed the title of "Aggregate Number of Strategic Offensive Arms Limited Under the Treaty" as the title for Section I of the MOU, while Section II could be titled "Additional Aggregate Numbers Not Limited by the Treaty." -------------- LEVELS UPON LEVELS OF DATA -------------- ¶13. (S) Poznihir concluded his presentation by proposing that the aggregate limits declared in Article III, as well as the aggregate numbers for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs should be placed in tier two, while the rest of the data (i.e., START Annexes D-J) were merely technical data and could be placed in tier three, as that level would not be subject to ratification. Trout pointed out that tier three would be submitted for ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Inspection Protocol Working Group was considering which tiers were appropriate for such information. Orlov questioned why ratification of the third tier was necessary as it was just technical data. He expressed concern in particular over the release and review of sensitive data by the U.S. Senate during the course of ratification. Trout responded that the U.S. Senate would require ratification of all levels of documents and all classified data would be appropriately protected. -------------- THE U.S. HAS ALREADY COVERED THAT -------------- ¶14. (S) Trout pointed out that many of Poznihir's questions had already been answered by the U.S.-proposed JDT, at which point he passed the U.S.-proposed JDT to Orlov. Trout then proceeded to go over the JDT with the Russian Delegation. Trout explained that Section I, paragraph 1, should only contain Article III central limits, while Section I, paragraph 2 should contain all of the other limits and data. ¶15. (S) Trout asked why the Russian Delegation had omitted the category of test and training launchers for ICBMs, ICBM launchers, and warheads on ICBMs from Section II. Colonel Pischulov responded that this was deleted because it contained special limits on mobile launchers. He further stated that Russia had not yet made a decision on the Article IV provisions, but opposed unique limits and restrictions on mobile systems. Pischulov asked why the United States proposed a limit of 15 test launchers in Article IV. Trout responded that the question was a counting rules issue to be decided elsewhere. He added that the current discussion should focus only on the headings of data within the MOU. ¶16. (S) Orlov questioned Trout why mobile test and training launchers were listed separately and why fixed launchers of these types were not mentioned. Trout responded by asking whether Russia would propose listing both fixed and mobile categories. Orlov pushed Trout to remove all references to mobiles and to include mobile test and training launcher numbers under headings for test launchers and training launchers for each respective sub-section. Trout reminded Orlov that U.S. Article IV referred to this data in this way and that the MOU should reflect what is in the articles. Unable to reach agreement, both sides agreed the text would remain bracketed. ¶17. (S) Orlov asked Trout why it was necessary for both sides to list warhead data for each ICBM base and quipped "...and in your answer please don't talk about transparency." Orlov referred to Poznihir's presentation reinforcing the analysis that the data listed in the MOU would almost never match what would be given to inspectors at the beginning of an inspection. He also noted that this data was very sensitive, again expressing concern that the data would show up on the internet. Trout reminded Orlov that all data would be classified properly and that the United States had similar concerns, but was willing to provide the data in the interest of openness. Orlov noted that warhead load-out data had nothing to do with the treaty's central limits and, therefore, doubted the need for such details. He joked that, while Russia did not agree with placing this information into the MOU, they would not object if the United States wanted to declare this information unilaterally. Trout reminded Orlov that under the Russian proposal there would only be five U.S. inspections per year allowed. Since both Parties possessed more than five bases subject to inspection, this data would be the only insight into a particular base for possibly over a year. Both sides agreed to keep the text bracketed. -------------- MOBILES AGAIN -------------- ¶18. (S) As Trout began reviewing the MOU section on mobile systems, Orlov announced that all data exchange elements concerning mobiles was unacceptable. Trout noted the comment, but asked for a clarification between the former term of "re stricted area" and the new Russian-proposed term "basing area." After some initial information that was somewhat contradictory, Orlov responded that the Russian side would provide a briefing on this topic at the next WG meeting. ¶19. (S) Orlov asked the U.S. side why fixed structures were specifically identified in the MOU. He stated the subject of the treaty was launchers and warheads and not structures. Since data on the number of bases, launchers, and warheads was already known, he asked what was the purpose of declaring a structure on that particular base. Trout explained that inspectors required this information when inspecting mobile launchers. Also, under the current U.S. Conversion or Elimination (CorE) provisions, fixed structures were accountable items and, as such, were required to be eliminated. Therefore, these items needed to be listed in the MOU. Poznihir heatedly replied that buildings at an eliminated base should be able to be used for other things not inconsistent with the limits of the treaty. ¶20. (S) Poznihir reviewed U.S.-proposed text on SLBMs and ICBMs and asked why the United States did not request a unique identifier (UID) for each SLBM on every submarine. Trout mentioned that Mr. Siemon had made a presentation that same day, during the Plenary, explaining why submarines were different. Trout also reiterated that both sides began using UIDs 15 years ago and that the United States and Russia agreed at the time there were unique measures associated with mobiles. He concluded by stating that the importance of tracking mobile missiles was no less important today. Orlov stated he was well aware of the history and said two-thirds of the treaty was associated with mobiles and, yes, Siemon had an interesting presentation, but he could prepare an even more interesting presentation on submarines. Orlov said he was more concerned with the present, as "...every day I read reports...there are three submarines in the Atlantic, and the (launch) preparation time is minimal." He stated that Russia is unable to track U.S. submarines and is uncomfortable with the idea that there are 1300 warheads floating around just outside Russia. He added that if a Russian submarine was able to track a U.S. submarine for even three minutes, it was a great victory. He surmised that SLBMs should then contain UIDs and be tracked, since they were a much greater threat than Russian road-mobile ICBMs. He concluded the discussion by saying the Russian Delegation would clarify their position on UIDs at the next meeting. -------------- THE RETURNED MISSILE -------------- ¶21. (S) Trout asked why Russia had not included any data under production facilities. Pischulov responded that Russia would not have treaty-accountable missiles at a production facility, since the missiles would not become deployed until after they had left the facility. Trout asked the Russian side how it planned to deal with missiles returned to the production facility for maintenance. Orlov replied that his side had not given consideration to this issue. Trout then emphasized that, under the U.S. proposal, once the United States had been given the 60-hour notification prior to a missile departing a production facility, the missile would become non-deployed at that time and, therefore, would become a non-deployed missile. Orlov agreed to look at the issue, but stated provisionally that he believed they would have no problems adding this category for both "production facilities" and "production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs." -------------- WHAT TMOM? -------------- ¶22. (S) Trout asked why, under several of the ICBM and SLBM areas, Russia had deleted references to the category of Training Models of Missiles (TMOMs). Pischulov responded that Russia had no TMOMs at production facilities and, therefore, would declare none. Trout noted that the Russians had removed the TMOM data category from the test range and training facility sections, where the United States knows Russia currently locates TMOMs today. Orlov responded that if Russia had TMOMs, they would declare them at the time of inspection, but cautioned the Russian side still needed to discuss the category. He said they would have a full answer for the U.S. side at the next meeting. -------------- HOUSTON...WE HAVE AGREEMENT -------------- ¶23. (S) The two sides reached agreement on text for storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, production facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test ranges; however, some bracketed text remains in the actual data to be listed under the listed facilities. Both sides agreed not to address the HB section of the U.S. JDT until the next meeting. ¶24. (S) Trout, citing the U.S.-proposed Annex J, reconfirmed that sensitive information would not be released to the public, adding that two paragraphs of Annex J had been moved to the treaty text and were being discussed at the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group. Colonel Ilin raised concern as to what Trout meant by his use of the term "the public." Trout explained the term meant the news media. Ilin said that Russian law forbids the release of aggregate numbers and that further discussion was needed. ¶25. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, dated October 27, 2009. - Russia: -- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text for Annexes D-I, dated October 27, 2009. ¶26. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Trout Lt Col Blevins Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Mr. Coussa Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dwyer LT Lobner Mr. Bennett (Int) RUSSIA Gen Orlov Col Ilin Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Leontiev Col Novikov Col Pischulov Gen Poznihir Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Gayduk (Int) ¶27. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS