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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) U.S. DELEGATION NON-PAPER REGARDING COUNTING RULES FOR
DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-048.


2. (S) Paragraph 3 contains the text of a U.S. Delegation
non-paper on "Counting Rules for Deployed Heavy Bombers
Nuclear Amaments." The non-paper, marked for Ambassador
Antonov, was delivered to the Permanent Mission of the
Russian Federation in Geneva on November 2, 2009. The
non-paper contains a potential method for counting nuclear
armaments associated with heavy bombers under the START
Follow-on Treaty.


3. (S) Begin text:

Counting Rules for Deployed Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments

Russia proposes to count towards the central limit on
warheads only those nuclear armaments that are loaded on
deployed HBs. It is not current practice for either the U.S.
or Russia to load their HBs with nuclear armaments on a
day-to-day basis. Therefore, adopting the Russian approach
would mean that, for the approximately 150-200 HBs deployed
by both Parties, the number of declared nuclear warheads
would be zero. In our view, this would present a false
picture that would be heavily criticized. It is well
understood that both Russia and the U.S. maintain hundreds of
nuclear bombs and nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles
stored at their bomber bases, which could be loaded on their
bombers in several hours. A follow-up Russian proposal to
attribute an agreed number of nuclear armaments to each HB is
unrealistic and would not capture the actual number of
deployed nuclear warheads likely to be maintained by both
sides within the overall limit on deployed strategic nuclear
warheads.

The U.S. understands that Russia's method of storing
nuclear armaments differs from the method employed by the
U.S. It is our understanding that Russia stores its nuclear
warheads for its deployed long-range nuclear air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs) in nuclear warhead storage sites
(NWSS) near their bases, separate from the nuclear armament
weapon storage areas (NAWSAs) located on the bases that
contain long-range nuclear ALCM airframes which would be used
to deliver the warheads. In contrast, the U.S. stores its
long-range nuclear ALCMs fully assembled with the nuclear
warheads inserted in the long-range nuclear ALCMs.

For purposes of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty, the
U.S. proposes that each nuclear armament loaded on a deployed
HB and stored in a NAWSA associated with each AIR base where
deployed HBs are based shall be considered to be one nuclear
warhead for inclusion in the aggregate limit on strategic
nuclear warheads. This means that each long-range nuclear
ALCM and nuclear gravity bomb would count as one nuclear
warhead for purposes of the SFO limits, regardless of whether
the long-range ALCM contains a nuclear warhead within it.
The U.S. side considers this to be an appropriate approach
because it is the long-range nuclear ALCM or nuclear gravity
bomb body that delivers the nuclear warhead when it is
released from the deployed HB during a mission.


Consequently, under the U.S. proposal for counting
nuclear armaments on deployed HBs, each Party would count the
following at each AIR base for deployed HBs:

- The number of HB nuclear armaments loaded on the
deployed HBs present at that AIR base

- The number of HB nuclear armaments (long-range
nuclear ALCMs and nuclear gravity bombs) located
in the NAWSA associated with that base

The U.S. recognizes that this method of counting HB
nuclear armaments would require Russian inspectors to enter
NAWSAs on U.S. HB bases to count either nuclear gravity bombs
or long-range nuclear ALCM airframes, the majority of which
will be mounted on weapon pylons or on a rotary launcher and
stored in the NAWSA. Some long-range nuclear ALCMs will be
located in the maintenance area undergoing routine
maintenance. At Minot AIR FORCE Base, Russian inspectors
would count the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs stored in
the NAWSA and any nuclear armaments actually loaded on the
B-52Hs based there, whereas at Whiteman AIR FORCE Base, only
nuclear gravity bombs located in the NAWSA and any such bombs
that are loaded on the B-2As would be counted.

The U.S., in turn, would have the opportunity to conduct
similar inspections in the NAWSAs on Russian bases for
deployed HBs to count the long-range nuclear ALCMs stored
there, which will likely not have nuclear warheads within
them. Under this approach, the U.S. would not need to
separately count the number of nuclear warheads for the
long-range nuclear ALCMs stored in the separate NWSS.

In order to meet SFO warhead limits, the U.S. expects to
reduce its inventory of deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs
stored at Minot AIR FORCE Base to a fraction of its present
size. It will do so by removing each nuclear warhead from
its associated long-range nuclear ALCM and moving the nuclear
warheads to a central storage facility that is located far
from the nearest B-52 AIR base. The long-range nuclear ALCM
airframes will, in turn, be removed from the pylons or rotary
launchers on which they are presently stored and placed in
storage containers. The large number of now non-deployed
long-range nuclear ALCM airframes in these containers will be
moved to a separate central storage facility located far from
any HB base. Some of these non-deployed long-range nuclear
ALCMs will be drawn upon to replace long-range nuclear ALCM
airframes consumed in flight tests, as a source of spare
parts, or to replace deployed missile bodies that fail.
Furthermore, neither weapon pylons nor rotary launchers will
be located at the ALCM central storage facilities. The
storage facility containing the non-deployed long-range
nuclear ALCM airframes would be a declared facility and would
be subject to inspection.

In summary, the U.S. approach would permit both Parties
to count and report the number of deployed nuclear armaments
directly associated with their HB bases and to count these
warheads within the SFO Treaty aggregate nuclear warhead
limit while maintaining their current practices for storing
nuclear armaments at deployed HB AIR bases. In addition,
this approach would create a separate group of non-deployed
long-range nuclear-capable ALCMs, which would be stored in


canisters at a central storage site or sites, located far
from the HB bases. These long-range nuclear ALCMs would be
stored separately from the nuclear warheads for the missiles,
which would be maintained in a centralized nuclear weapons
storage depot, hundreds of miles from the central storage
facility for nuclear-capable ALCMs. The U.S. side encourages
the Russian side to handle its deployed and non-deployed
nuclear ALCMs in a similar manner.

The U.S. side believes this approach would contribute to
strategic stability because any attempt by either side to
reactivate these non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs, and
to redeploy them to the HB bases, given the time and
distances involved, would be quite visible and detectable.
This would discourage either party from undertaking such an
extraordinary move, unless the Party was in the process of
abandoning the SFO Treaty.

The U.S. side notes that, in discussions in Geneva, the
Russian Federation has stated repeatedly that even were the
U.S. side to move many of its long-range nuclear ALCMs to
distant storage areas, it could easily return them to the
deployed HB AIR bases and upload them onto the B-52s. The
U.S. agrees this would be possible, but points out that
storing the warheads and long-range nuclear ALCMs at a great
distance from the deployed HB AIR bases presents ample
opportunity for the Russian side to monitor U.S. actions and
thereby avoid strategic surprise. Under the Russian approach
of maintaining unlimited numbers of nuclear long-range
nuclear ALCMs at the relevant HB bases, these same long-range
nuclear ALCMs would be readily available, at the highest
standards of operational maintenance, for rapid upload on the
B-52s.

In closing, the U.S. requests further clarification
regarding why the Russian side would not embrace such a
significant transparency proposal, particularly since, in
addition to resolving a critical counting rule for SFO, it
would set the stage for addressing the large inventory of
non-deployed warheads on both sides, during the next round of
strategic arms reduction negotiations.

End text.


4. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS