START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000980 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) U.S. DELEGATION NON-PAPER REGARDING COUNTING RULES FOR DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-048. ¶2. (S) Paragraph 3 contains the text of a U.S. Delegation non-paper on "Counting Rules for Deployed Heavy Bombers Nuclear Amaments." The non-paper, marked for Ambassador Antonov, was delivered to the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation in Geneva on November 2, 2009. The non-paper contains a potential method for counting nuclear armaments associated with heavy bombers under the START Follow-on Treaty. ¶3. (S) Begin text: Counting Rules for Deployed Heavy Bomber Nuclear Armaments Russia proposes to count towards the central limit on warheads only those nuclear armaments that are loaded on deployed HBs. It is not current practice for either the U.S. or Russia to load their HBs with nuclear armaments on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, adopting the Russian approach would mean that, for the approximately 150-200 HBs deployed by both Parties, the number of declared nuclear warheads would be zero. In our view, this would present a false picture that would be heavily criticized. It is well understood that both Russia and the U.S. maintain hundreds of nuclear bombs and nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles stored at their bomber bases, which could be loaded on their bombers in several hours. A follow-up Russian proposal to attribute an agreed number of nuclear armaments to each HB is unrealistic and would not capture the actual number of deployed nuclear warheads likely to be maintained by both sides within the overall limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The U.S. understands that Russia's method of storing nuclear armaments differs from the method employed by the U.S. It is our understanding that Russia stores its nuclear warheads for its deployed long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) in nuclear warhead storage sites (NWSS) near their bases, separate from the nuclear armament weapon storage areas (NAWSAs) located on the bases that contain long-range nuclear ALCM airframes which would be used to deliver the warheads. In contrast, the U.S. stores its long-range nuclear ALCMs fully assembled with the nuclear warheads inserted in the long-range nuclear ALCMs. For purposes of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty, the U.S. proposes that each nuclear armament loaded on a deployed HB and stored in a NAWSA associated with each air base where deployed HBs are based shall be considered to be one nuclear warhead for inclusion in the aggregate limit on strategic nuclear warheads. This means that each long-range nuclear ALCM and nuclear gravity bomb would count as one nuclear warhead for purposes of the SFO limits, regardless of whether the long-range ALCM contains a nuclear warhead within it. The U.S. side considers this to be an appropriate approach because it is the long-range nuclear ALCM or nuclear gravity bomb body that delivers the nuclear warhead when it is released from the deployed HB during a mission. Consequently, under the U.S. proposal for counting nuclear armaments on deployed HBs, each Party would count the following at each air base for deployed HBs: - The number of HB nuclear armaments loaded on the deployed HBs present at that air base - The number of HB nuclear armaments (long-range nuclear ALCMs and nuclear gravity bombs) located in the NAWSA associated with that base The U.S. recognizes that this method of counting HB nuclear armaments would require Russian inspectors to enter NAWSAs on U.S. HB bases to count either nuclear gravity bombs or long-range nuclear ALCM airframes, the majority of which will be mounted on weapon pylons or on a rotary launcher and stored in the NAWSA. Some long-range nuclear ALCMs will be located in the maintenance area undergoing routine maintenance. At Minot Air Force Base, Russian inspectors would count the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs stored in the NAWSA and any nuclear armaments actually loaded on the B-52Hs based there, whereas at Whiteman Air Force Base, only nuclear gravity bombs located in the NAWSA and any such bombs that are loaded on the B-2As would be counted. The U.S., in turn, would have the opportunity to conduct similar inspections in the NAWSAs on Russian bases for deployed HBs to count the long-range nuclear ALCMs stored there, which will likely not have nuclear warheads within them. Under this approach, the U.S. would not need to separately count the number of nuclear warheads for the long-range nuclear ALCMs stored in the separate NWSS. In order to meet SFO warhead limits, the U.S. expects to reduce its inventory of deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs stored at Minot Air Force Base to a fraction of its present size. It will do so by removing each nuclear warhead from its associated long-range nuclear ALCM and moving the nuclear warheads to a central storage facility that is located far from the nearest B-52 air base. The long-range nuclear ALCM airframes will, in turn, be removed from the pylons or rotary launchers on which they are presently stored and placed in storage containers. The large number of now non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCM airframes in these containers will be moved to a separate central storage facility located far from any HB base. Some of these non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs will be drawn upon to replace long-range nuclear ALCM airframes consumed in flight tests, as a source of spare parts, or to replace deployed missile bodies that fail. Furthermore, neither weapon pylons nor rotary launchers will be located at the ALCM central storage facilities. The storage facility containing the non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCM airframes would be a declared facility and would be subject to inspection. In summary, the U.S. approach would permit both Parties to count and report the number of deployed nuclear armaments directly associated with their HB bases and to count these warheads within the SFO Treaty aggregate nuclear warhead limit while maintaining their current practices for storing nuclear armaments at deployed HB air bases. In addition, this approach would create a separate group of non-deployed long-range nuclear-capable ALCMs, which would be stored in canisters at a central storage site or sites, located far from the HB bases. These long-range nuclear ALCMs would be stored separately from the nuclear warheads for the missiles, which would be maintained in a centralized nuclear weapons storage depot, hundreds of miles from the central storage facility for nuclear-capable ALCMs. The U.S. side encourages the Russian side to handle its deployed and non-deployed nuclear ALCMs in a similar manner. The U.S. side believes this approach would contribute to strategic stability because any attempt by either side to reactivate these non-deployed long-range nuclear ALCMs, and to redeploy them to the HB bases, given the time and distances involved, would be quite visible and detectable. This would discourage either party from undertaking such an extraordinary move, unless the Party was in the process of abandoning the SFO Treaty. The U.S. side notes that, in discussions in Geneva, the Russian Federation has stated repeatedly that even were the U.S. side to move many of its long-range nuclear ALCMs to distant storage areas, it could easily return them to the deployed HB air bases and upload them onto the B-52s. The U.S. agrees this would be possible, but points out that storing the warheads and long-range nuclear ALCMs at a great distance from the deployed HB air bases presents ample opportunity for the Russian side to monitor U.S. actions and thereby avoid strategic surprise. Under the Russian approach of maintaining unlimited numbers of nuclear long-range nuclear ALCMs at the relevant HB bases, these same long-range nuclear ALCMs would be readily available, at the highest standards of operational maintenance, for rapid upload on the B-52s. In closing, the U.S. requests further clarification regarding why the Russian side would not embrace such a significant transparency proposal, particularly since, in addition to resolving a critical counting rule for SFO, it would set the stage for addressing the large inventory of non-deployed warheads on both sides, during the next round of strategic arms reduction negotiations. End text. ¶4. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS