START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000979 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 30, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-042. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 30, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the October 30 Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting, Dr. Warner led a review of the first seven paragraphs of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol (IP): "Inspections of Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and the Nuclear Warheads on Them," dated October 27, 2009. Warner introduced the possibility of combining nuclear warhead inspections with data update inspections for deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA). The Russian Delegation was receptive, but noncommittal, to the idea. Both sides agreed that further study was needed. The Russian Delegation maintained its objection to the term "nuclear warhead" in the name and purpose of inspections. The two sides also disagreed on the total number of inspections and the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs that would be inspected. ¶4. (U) Subject summary: Inspection Types; Paragraph One - Purpose; Paragraph Two - Rights; Paragraph Three - Number of Missiles; Paragraph Four - Pre-Inspection Restrictions; Paragraph Five - Duration of PIMRs; Paragraph Six - Arrival at Inspection Site; and, Paragraph Seven - Completion of Pre-Inspection. -------------- INSPECTION TYPES -------------- ¶5. (S) Warner opened the review of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of Section VI of the IP, "Inspections of Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and the Nuclear Warheads on Them," dated October 27, 2009, with a short discussion of what he called the substance of inspection types, explaining that the Parties were contemplating different constructions of inspection activities. Warner said that, for convenience, he would call one set of inspections under this new construct simply as Type 1 inspections. These would be inspections of deployed SOAs and the nuclear warheads on them. Warner explained that this section of the IP was devoted to ICBMs and SLBMs, but not to heavy bombers. There was a sufficient difference in the character of those inspections to divide Type 1 inspections into two parts. Technically, all Type 1 inspection procedures could be combined into one section of the IP, but it would be a very large section that would have to be sub-divided in any case. Therefore, it was reasonable to have separate sections for strategic ballistic missiles and for heavy bombers. In this section there would be no inspection activity or information provided on non-deployed elements, this type of inspection focused on deployed elements and counting warheads on ballistic missiles. ¶6. (S) Col Ilin responded that, in principle, he agreed with Warner's statement. The inspection activities regarding strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers could be in different portions of the text. He added that the Russian Federation would likely accept the U.S.-proposed title for Section VI of the IP except for the term "Nuclear Warhead." The Russian side had not yet agreed to use that term and that, until it did, the term "nuclear" must be bracketed. He suggested that we simply delete the term and have an agreed text, taking into account the recent U.S. package proposal. Warner commented that the Russian side had not yet accepted the package and, therefore, the term "nuclear" had to remain in U.S. brackets. Warner asked Ilin to confirm that he agreed to have separate sections of the IP on missiles and bombers. Ilin confirmed agreement on that point but stressed that all ICBMs, both silo-based and mobile, should be treated the same. Warner pointed out that there were times when one must distinguish the inspection activities for mobile launchers of ICBMs from silo launchers of ICBMs. Ilin agreed that there would have to be some differences, but noted that at this point they were discussing only the title of this section. -------------- PARAGRAPH ONE - PURPOSE -------------- ¶7. (S) Warner explained that the United States had reversed the order of paragraphs one and two from the Russian text so that the section first established the right to conduct the inspection and then described the nature of the inspection. Warner said that, in light of Russia's position, the United States would continue to bracket "nuclear" in the phrase "nuclear warhead." He then explained that the United States had added a sentence at the end of the paragraph that stated the specific purpose of this section. Ilin said that he had some flexibility on the order of the first two paragraphs but, since Article XI of the treaty already specified the purpose of the inspection activity, there was no need to repeat it in the IP. Warner replied that, while Article XI described the purpose of inspections in broad terms, the individual sections of the IP would need to describe the specific purpose of each type of inspection. In this case, Section VI is a sub-category of Type 1 inspections. Warner added that the United States was exploring the concept of combining Type 1 inspections with the provisions of data update inspections that apply to deployed SOA and that such a combination would have to have its purpose described in the first paragraph of this section of the IP. He added that the U.S.-proposed heavy bomber inspections were already similar in character to a combined inspection. If the sides agreed to combine the nuclear warhead and data update types of inspections at operational bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, then Section VI would certainly need to be more explicit regarding its purpose. ¶8. (S) Ilin said that he understood Warner's point and that "nuclear warhead" would have to remain bracketed. For the moment, he would agree to keep the purpose of the inspection in paragraph one, but he failed to see how it would be different from the text in Article XI of the treaty. In his opinion, the purpose of the inspection should be in the treaty text, but if there were differences that need to be further described within certain types of inspection activities, those differences could be identified in the IP. Nevertheless, the overall purpose should not be simply repeated in the IP. Warner said that we would keep the purpose of the section bracketed and, as the sides proceeded with the review of Section VI, would have to recognize that changes will be needed if the sides agree to combine the types of inspections. -------------- PARAGRAPH TWO - RIGHTS -------------- ¶9. (S) Warner noted that the two sides agreed to a substantial portion of the text in paragraph two. After noting the continued bracketing of the term "nuclear warhead," he said that the United States believed it was necessary to specify the number of days after the treaty enters into force (EIF) before the inspection rights applicable for each section. Warner said that the Russian proposal for a simpler formulation in the treaty text would not account for differences in the types of inspections. For instance, while both sides have already exhibited long-range nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles under START, they have not done so for gravity bombs. If the sides agree to inspect heavy bomber nuclear armaments under the START Follow-on Treaty, then the United States would need to exhibit gravity bombs associated with the B-2A bomber so that Russian inspectors would know what to look for to confirm the number of nuclear bombs for that heavy bomber. Warner stated that a single statement for when inspection activities would begin would not work. Ilin asked whether Warner intended for each section of the IP to have its own reference to the number of days after EIF for inspection activity to occur. Warner responded in the affirmative, adding that the Parties will have to agree on the appropriate number of days. For example, the U.S. Delegation believed that the number of days should be 45 days for certain inspections, while the Russian-proposed text on this matter in Article XI is left blank. ¶10. (S) Ilin asked whether the United States proposed to use 45 days as the period prior to the commencement of inspections for all inspections or for just this one type. Warner responded that 45 days would be appropriate for all inspections as long as the heavy bomber armament exhibitions occurred during that 45-day period. Ilin said that it was apparent that U.S. clarifications were more developed than Russian instructions, and he suggested, as a preliminary thought, that the number of days be retained in the treaty text but that he understood the U.S. position. Ilin added that the Russian Delegation would take for homework the first portion of paragraph two, but for now, it would remain in brackets, including the number of inspections at each facility. Warner agreed that the number of inspections would remain bracketed. Ilin asked Warner to clarify that this paragraph was only addressing deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and that another would be for their warheads. Warner said this type of inspection applied to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as well as their warheads, but if we agreed to combine this type of inspection with the data update inspection, then it would still be a Type 1 inspection. There would still be Type 2 inspections, but not at deployed bases. Type 2 inspections would take place at storage facilities, etc. (Begin comment: Under the combined approach, "Type 1" inspections would include nuclear warhead inspections plus data update-like provisions for deployed items of inspection. Type 1 inspections would only be conducted at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and airbases. Type 2 inspections would only be conducted at facilities containing non-deployed items. End comment.) Ilin replied that, for now, this paragraph would have to stay bracketed. -------------- PARAGRAPH THREE - NUMBER OF MISSILES -------------- ¶11. (S) Warner highlighted the difference in the U.S. and Russian views on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and the missiles they contain that would be inspected during each inspection in Section VI. For the United States, the number is two; for the Russian Federation the number is one. This is a significant difference in the two sides' positions that must be resolved in the coming days. Warner noted that both sides agreed to the provision for inspections of empty ICBM or SLBM launchers. Ilin said that the provision for empty silo launchers should be specified in a reference to which Warner responded that it would be better to make this provision more explicit. Ilin said that he preferred a reference. Warner agreed to consider ways to simplify the text and asked Ilin to confirm Russia's position on the number of ICBM or SLBM launcher-missile combinations to be inspected during a single nuclear warhead inspection. Ilin said that the Russian position was clear. Russia desired to reduce the inspection mechanism without making verification less efficient; Russia considered one such RV inspection as sufficient during an inspection of deployed SOA at an ICBM or SLBM base. Warner explained that U.S. analysts strongly argued that conducting two warhead inspections each time provided a better statistical chance of monitoring each side's compliance with the aggregate limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Two as opposed to one RVOSI during a given inspection provided a better picture of the overall situation. ¶12. (S) Ilin, after consultation with Col Novikov, asked how conducting two RV inspections would impact the duration of the inspection. Warner responded that there was no doubt that inspecting two missiles would take more time than one. Ilin noted that there is a limited time for such inspections. Warner pointed out that, for these types of inspections, the time limit is listed as "as needed." For instance, there are uncertainties associated with moving submarines and getting to silos and there are additional safety considerations relating to opening a missile that contains one or more nuclear weapons. Warner said that he hoped the Russian side would accept the validity of the U.S. statistical analysis and agree to two warhead inspections. Ilin said that he was aware of statistical methods, but the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group was working on the number of facilities subject to inspection, nevertheless, he would challenge his colleagues to do their own math. Warner said that the U.S. side would try to clarify the later part of the sentence and that the number of missiles to be inspected during a single nuclear warhead inspection would remain bracketed. -------------- PARAGRAPH FOUR - PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS -------------- ¶13. (S) Warner said that the time of site designation stated in the existing START Format 116 notification provided a fixed start time for several obligations including the beginning of pre-inspection movement restrictions (PIMRs). He also said that the United States believed that the specific PIMRs listed in sub-paragraphs (a) through (h) could be moved to Annex 6 of the IP, but that the text of these provisions would have to be agreed before treaty signing. Ilin agreed with the proposal to move these PIMRs to the "third tier" and said that the references in paragraph four regarding what was "specified in the Notification Protocol" were not needed and that only the reference to the coastline and waters diagram needed to be retained. Warner asked Ilin whether he proposed to delete the reference to the Notification Protocol. Ilin responded that it was unnecessary to include this reference in the IP because the content of the notification was already contained in the notifications section and that the start time for inspections was clearly specified in the text. Mr. Rust interjected that there could be confusion regarding the time an inspection site is designated. He said that it was common practice for an inspection team to designate the site 15 minutes to a half hour before the time indicated in the Format 116 notification. The U.S.-added phrase makes it clear when the clock would start. Ilin said the phrase would have to remain bracketed. Warner said that veteran inspectors tell us that since the time that the inspection site was actually declared was often different from the time specified in the notification, it was important to make the official start time clear, but for now, the brackets would remain. ¶14. (S) Ilin said that he proposed to move sub-paragraphs (a),(b),(c),and (g) to tier three; to merge (d) and (e), so that it referred to all types of ICBMs; and that in (f), the Russian side prefers the term "basing area" vice "re stricted area" when discussing mobile ICBMs. Warner said that term would have to be bracketed, since the two sides have major differences regarding the elements of a mobile ICBM base. Ilin replied that PIMRs should apply only to mobile launchers that were located at the basing area as of the time of implementation of the pre-inspection procedures. "Everything that is there, should stay there," he said. Warner noted that this was constructive and that the U.S. side would take this under consideration, but asked that Ilin provide a revised text in writing. On a broader issue, Warner reminded Ilin that the United States proposed that the sides agree to specific text on selected tier three annexes and that, once agreed, we would not return to those annexes before treaty signing. This was the reason that the United States wants to finalize the text for the sub-paragraphs associated with Annex 6 at this time. ¶15. (S) Ilin said that sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) could be merged by specifying that PIMRs applied to all missile launchers and that separate paragraphs for mobile launchers were not needed. Warner agreed and asked for Russia's position on sub-paragraph (h). Ilin said that the term "re stricted area" would have to be bracketed, although it seemed to Ilin that the position of the two sides was the same on the substance. Warner then asked Ilin to explain Russia's position on the term "basing area," adding that the United States will have to look carefully at how this is handled in the Definitions Subgroup. If it was essentially the same as the old "re stricted area" with the same type of site diagram, then the sides could agree to the new "basing area" term. He added that a similar situation will apply to maintenance areas and specially allocated sites used during reentry vehicle inspections. Warner acknowledged that there was a known difference in views regarding deployment areas and that this issue will be settled in the Treaty Text Working Group. As for the procedure for agreeing to tier three text, Warner said that the sides should examine appropriate tier three material at the end of each section. We should carefully review the material we were sending down to tier three, in the manner we have just done and that the U.S. Delegation would develop a joint draft text for Annexes 6, 8, 9 and 10. Ilin asked why paragraph four included a reference to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the MOU, noting that if that paragraph was going to be sent to the third tier, that was acceptable to him. Warner said that the added phrase clarified the type of diagram being referred to, but that the United States would review whether it was required. -------------- PARAGRAPH FIVE - DURATION OF PIMRS -------------- ¶16. (S) Warner suggested moving the qualifications on PIMRs in sub-paragraph 5(a) to the third tier and subparagraph 5(b) to paragraph 4. Ilin said that he was not against any of the provisions in subparagraphs 5(a) or 5(b) except for the term "re stricted area." However, he thought both subparagraphs could be moved to Annex 6, which would constitute a logical conclusion with respect to all pre-inspection activities. Warner noted that both sides essentially agreed on the substance, but we had to find the right place to put the two sub-paragraphs. The two chairmen agreed on merging sub-paragraph 5(b) into the end of paragraph four. -------------- PARAGRAPH SIX - ARRIVAL AT INSPECTION SITE -------------- ¶17. (S) Warner returned to the evolving U.S. concept on combining nuclear weapons and data update inspections. He emphasized that arrival at an inspection site is a crucial stage, because that was when the inspection team was informed by the in-country escort of deployed SOA for the designated base. Warner asked for Ilin's view regarding the information that should be provided to inspectors. Ilin replied that, in the interests of simplification, the in-country escort should provide, for ICBM bases, a designation of the location of each launcher and the type of each launcher, and the number of warheads contained on each launcher. Ilin could not agree to the term "re stricted area" on the simplified site diagram or to the use of a unique identifier on mobile ICBMs, which he noted "at this point had not been agreed by the Russian side." Warner said the U.S.-proposed text will include appropriate brackets and he understood that the Russian -proposed text did not make a distinction between silo-based and mobile ICBM bases. Warner added that the U.S. Delegation was looking to combine sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii). ¶18. (S) Warner explained that the in-country escort should provide information on the number of deployed ICBMs and deployed launchers of ICBMs for each type of ICBM based there; the number of ICBM launchers in which deployed ICBMs are contained; and a copy of the simplified site diagram for each re stricted area within a mobile ICBM base, annotated to show the location of each of the deployed launchers. In addition, the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader information, in writing, on the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed ICBM launchers, nuclear-armed reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs, and the specific number of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM located on the inspected base. Warner noted that the U.S.-proposed text was very similar to the Russian-proposed text except for the term "nuclear-armed" and that if more than one type of ICBM was specified for that base, such information shall be provided for each type of ICBM. The unique identifier for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall also be specified on the site diagram. Warner added that, with a couple of exceptions, most of the differences in the U.S. and Russian texts are stylistic and that the sides should exchange revised texts. Warner confirmed that the United States would combine sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and that sub-paragraph (b) applied to submarine bases. ¶19. (S) Regarding submarine bases, Warner said that we should combine the information from what used to be two different inspections, both focused on deployed SOA and warheads, and provide the aggregate number of launchers, SLBMs, and the aggregate number of deployed nuclear warheads associated with the base. This would give the big picture of the overall numbers of SLBM launchers and nuclear warheads associated with the base. For submarine bases, the U.S. proposal would call for specifying the number of RVs/warheads on individual SLBM launch tubes only for those submarines in port, and those subject to inspection during the specific inspection. Ilin asked whether an inspection team at a submarine base would be provided the number of warheads for each individual launch tube, and the total number on each submarine. Warner replied that the number of warheads on each tube would be provided for those submarines in port and that the total number of deployed RVs/warheads associated with the base would be provided as an aggregate, including both the number of warheads on SSBNs at sea and the number on the SSBNs at the base. The difference would be that for the submarines in port, the inspection team would also get the number of warheads on each missile in each launch tube. Ilin said that this would be similar to the information provided on mobile launchers of ICBMs at a mobile ICBM base. Warner said that was another issue, but that he took note of his point. ¶20. (S) Returning to ICBMs, Ilin asked whether the procedures for silo launchers and mobile launchers could be combined into a single section. Warner replied that, in most cases, he favored combining sections on silo and mobile ICBMs, but there are cases where mobile ICBMs present their own challenges and require separate treatment. Warner said that both sides should provide revisions of this section. -------------- PARAGRAPH SEVEN - COMPLETION OF PRE-INSPECTION -------------- ¶21. (S) Ilin said that the Russian side agreed with the U.S. text for paragraph seven, except for the number of launchers to be inspected during each inspection. Warner noted that there was a small grammatical change needed to the U.S.-proposed text and suggested continuing their review with paragraph eight at the next meeting of the IPWG. Warner asked Ilin to think through the utility of combining warhead and data update inspections for deployed SOA and the impact such a combination could have on the number of inspections needed each year. Ilin responded that he would spend his time in Moscow developing a response to the package proposal delivered recently in Moscow by National Security Advisor Jones. ¶22. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶23. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Dr. Fraley Maj Johnson Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Dr. Tarrasch Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Ms. Melikbekian Col Novikov Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Zharkih Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶24. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS