START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000978 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) CORE WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-039. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 5:20 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The fifth Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov, focused on the discussion of "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability," and "General Provisions" in the draft CorE Protocol. The Russians stated that, since a facility encompassed fixed structures, it was not necessary to specify procedures to eliminate fixed structures on a facility being eliminated. Fixed structures would be eliminated as part of the procedures for elimination of facilities. All of the remaining subsection on "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability" was agreed and brackets removed. ¶4. (S) In discussing each side's draft "General Procedures," the Russian chair emphasized the importance of two paragraphs in the Russian-proposed text. The first one dealt with what the result of conversion must be, and the other dealt with CorE procedures developed by a Party that were other than those listed in the CorE Section. They stated that the two paragraphs could not be considered separately and it was important to the Russian side that both be included in the section on General Provisions. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability; Original Purpose; Section VI Text Agreed; Section I: General Provisions; Location Chosen by the Party; and, A Russian Point of Emphasis. -------------- SECTION VI: OTHER PROCEDURES FOR REMOVAL FROM ACCOUNTABILITY -------------- ¶6. (S) Elliott began the meeting by addressing Subsection VI, "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability." The United States proposed a general paragraph specifying that an item ceased to be subject to the limitations provided for in the treaty after completion of the procedures listed in the subsection. The Russian-proposed text did not have a comparable paragraph. Ryzhkov agreed with the need for this paragraph; however, he suggested that the list of items to which these provisions could apply be amended to include ICBMs for silo launchers, and SLBMs. (Begin comment: These two items were unintentionally omitted in the U.S.-proposed text. End commente.) He also stated that the procedures of this subsection would not apply to fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Fixed structures would not be accidentally lost or disabled beyond repair, since they were constructed in sections that would be replaced if an accident inside the structure damaged part of the structure. The procedures applicable to fixed structures were included in the last subsection, "Procedures for the Elimination of Facilities." This was appropriate, since a fixed structure was located in and linked to a facility and would not be eliminated separately from the facility. ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov continued that the term "mobile training launchers" could also be deleted, since this type of item did not exist. A mobile launcher was either deployed or non-deployed, and mobile launchers used for training were non-deployed launchers that were located at training facilities. The sides also agreed to remove "launch canisters" from the list at Ryzhkov's suggestion, since they are not, in and of themselves, an accountable item. The formulation agreed was, "ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of the procedures provided for below, as applicable." -------------- ORIGINAL PURPOSE -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott read, and Ryzhkov agreed on, the wording for the paragraphs on accidental loss and disablement beyond repair. Regarding the paragraph on static displays, Elliott noted that the United States had concern with the Russian-proposed phrase "for their original purpose" after the phrase "shall be rendered inoperable," because the phrase raised the question of what was the original purpose of a strategic offensive arm (SOA). (Begin comment: The U.S. Delegation had in mind that the original purpose of U.S. heavy bombers was dual-use. End comment.) Ryzhkov said that the Russian formulation was more precise and had the meaning that the item could not be used as a weapon or as a component of a weapon. Mr. Smirnov added that the formulation meant that a launcher could not be used as a launcher--that was its original purpose. ¶9. (S) The formulation agreed for the static display paragraph was "Prior to being placed on static display, strategic offensive arms ((limited by this treaty))2 shall be rendered inoperable. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex." Ryzhkov said Russia's proposed phrase "limited by this treaty" would remain in brackets pending a legal review of whether it was necessary. Elliott and Ryzhkov agreed to use analogous wording in paragraph 5 on ground trainers. The formulation agreed was "Prior to being used as a ground trainer, a heavy bomber shall be rendered inoperable. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex." -------------- SECTION VI TEXT AGREED -------------- ¶10. (S) Elliott noted that, although the new U.S.-proposed paragraph that addressed when an item ceased to be subject to the limitations of the treaty, the last sentence of the paragraph on flight tests and static tests was still required since it addressed the date when the item ceased to be subject to the treaty. Ryzhkov agreed, adding that START Format 3 and Format 78 noted these dates and would both be applicable in this case under the new treaty. Regarding static testing, Elliott clarified that there were two types of static testing; testing which included dissection and testing that included firing, and both needed to be covered. The formulation agreed for the paragraph was "Prior to a flight test, static testing, or static firing of an ICBM or SLBM, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsections XXX and XXX of Section XXX of this Annex. The ICBM or SLBM shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty on the date of the flight test, static testing, or static firing as specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex." With this, the entire subsection was agreed. -------------- SECTION I: GENERAL PROVISIONS -------------- ¶11. (S) Elliott and Ryzhkov discussed whether it was appropriate for the CorE section to have its own chapeau, or whether the chapeau at the beginning of the overall protocol or annex would be sufficient. Elliott proposed moving the phrase "limited by this Treaty" into the chapeau, in some manner so as not to repeat it in Subsection I on "General Provisions." Ryzhkov said the phrase needed to be either included in the chapeau or repeated in each paragraph of Subsection I; it was better to leave the text bracketed and leave the decision to the lawyers in the next session. -------------- LOCATION CHOSEN BY THE PARTY -------------- ¶12. (S) In reference to the Russian-proposed text in the paragraph of the subsection on "General Provisions," Elliott asked whether the location chosen by the Party conducting the CorE would be a "declared" facility and listed in the Memorandum of Understanding. Elliott said he understood that each Party had the right to choose the location, but wanted clarification that any facility chosen would be declared. Ryzhkov said the location would have to be declared, since SOA can only be located at declared facilities as was stated in Article VII of the new treaty, and he stated that he had no objection to using the term "declared facility." He noted that what he was also trying to capture in this paragraph was a situation in which a missile might be eliminated by exploding it in a field: in such a case, though, the location would be declared an elimination facility. Ryzhkov noted that, since the provisions for verification by national technical means within paragraph 2 were also in Treaty Article VII, the text could be deleted. Elliott agreed and noted that the text of the U.S.-proposed paragraph 3 was also repeated in Treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov noted that there could be a situation in which neither national technical means of verification nor an inspection was possible. Ryzhkov then gave an example of the loss of a bomber at sea. In this example, only notification would be practical. -------------- A RUSSIAN POINT OF EMPHASIS -------------- ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov asked the U.S. side to look very closely at the texts in the Russian-proposed paragraphs 3 and 4, on CorE procedures and associated obligations within the BCC framework. These texts were important to the Russian side and had to be considered together. These paragraphs addressed conversion and elimination, precluding an item's use for its original purpose, and the "wild card" procedures. He explained that these paragraphs described how a Party would provide information about new procedures and would conduct a demonstration in the BCC framework if the other Party had concerns. The procedures in the two paragraphs would allow the United States to save large amounts of money by permitting conversion of SOA into items that were not SOA. Elliott said the U.S. side would study the Russian texts of those paragraphs during the break and be prepared for further discussion during the next session. ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov also said that he would work with Smirnov, during the upcoming break to develop some new ideas concerning mobile launcher elimination to address some of the concerns of the United States. He asked the United States to reconsider CorE procedures for solid-propellant missiles. Since Russia was helping the United States save money by converting SOA, the United States should accommodate Russia's need to economize and not spend excessive amounts of money on unnecessary measures. ¶15. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶16. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott LCDR Brons Mr. Brown Mr. Dwyer Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett Ms. Purcell LT Sicks Mr. Strauss Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Mr. Smirnov Ms. Zharkih Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶17. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS