START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000976 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0953 (SFO-GVA-VI-030) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-037. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009 Time: 10:00 - 11:00 A.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) In the absence of the U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD), Deputy HOD Ries and Russian Deputy HOD Koshelev co-chaired a plenary meeting at the U.S. Mission on October 29. The main purpose of the meeting was for the U.S. Delegation to present to the Russian Delegation points on the package deal that had been proposed on October 28 by U.S. National Security Advisor Jones and his party in Moscow. The key aspects of that proposal were the numerical treaty limits; treatment of non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs; treatment of abandoned Peacekeeper and Minuteman III silo launchers, B-52Gs, B-1Bs converted to non-nuclear use and SSBNs converted to SSGNs; the offense/defense relationship, and aspects of the verification regime, including special treatment of mobile missiles, a ban on encryption, and the number of annual inspections. ¶4. (S) Following the presentation, the Russian side asked for clarification on the concept of a package deal in addition to several questions regarding the verification portion of the package. The Russian side agreed to review the package deal, once a written copy was received, and to provide a Russian response as was customary in the negotiation process. ¶5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments; U.S. Presentation on its Proposed Package Solution for Core Issues in the New START Treaty; Russian Questions for Clarification; and, Closing Comments. -------------- OPENING COMMENTS -------------- ¶6. (S) Ambassador Ries explained that Jones was in Moscow with senior members of his staff, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller, and Department of Defense representative Jim Miller. The program included a working dinner, as well as meetings with key counterparts the next day. ¶7. (S) Mr. Koshelev stated that the U.S. and Russian positions were moving closer, and that the meetings in Moscow provided good reason for each of the delegations to believe that the work of the negotiations would be completed in a timely fashion. He said the Russian side had not received any information regarding the outcome of the meetings in Moscow and he hoped that the U.S. Delegation could provide that to them. Ries stated the U.S. side shared the Russians' optimism and desire to work hard. -------------- U.S. PRESENTATION ON ITS PROPOSED PACKAGE SOLUTION FOR CORE ISSUES IN THE NEW STAR TREATY -------------- ¶8. (S) Dr. Warner delivered the same points that had been provided in Moscow the previous evening by Jones, as follows: - Regarding the numerical treaty limits: -- Limit on warheads: 1600 -- Limit on strategic delivery vehicles: 800 -- No additional treaty limit on the total number of deployed and non-deployed launchers. -- U.S. delivery vehicles currently counted in START, but no longer part of the U.S. strategic forces will be excluded from the limits on strategic delivery vehicles as follows: --- Abandoned Peacekeeper and MMIII silos and non-operational B-52Gs will be eliminated during the seven-year reduction period using the treaty's simplified procedures. --- All remaining operational B1-Bs will be rendered incapable of deploying nuclear armaments using conversion methods already used for some B1-Bs and will be exhibited to demonstrate the conversion. B1-B operating bases will be subject to yearly inspection to confirm they have not been reconverted. Non-operational B1-Bs will be eliminated during the seven-year reduction period using the treaty's simplified procedures. --- The four SSGNs converted from SSBNs will each be exhibited one time to demonstrate that the launch tubes have been converted to render them incapable of launching an SLBM and that the changes cannot be reversed without major work done in a shipyard. - Regarding non-nuclear Armed ICBMs and SLBMs: -- Non-nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs will count toward the treaty warhead limit both for existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs and for any new type of ICBM or SLBM deployed during the life of the new START Treaty. Existing or new types of ICBM or SLBM armed with non-nuclear warheads will count toward the overall limit on strategic delivery vehicles. -- Verification provisions of the treaty will apply equally to nuclear and non-nuclear deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads. End points. ¶9. (S) Ries continued with the U.S. package proposal by delivering the following points: - Regarding the offense/defense relationship: -- The treaty preamble will contain a statement that there is a relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms and that this relationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. -- The United States is willing to agree to a joint statement that contains a commitment not to convert ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa during the life of the treaty. -- The United States is willing to take note of a unilateral Russian statement noting that Russia undertakes the obligations in the new treaty based on the existing levels of missile defenses and reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty based on a qualitative and quantitative buildup on the capabilities of strategic missile defenses. - Regarding the verification regime: -- In addition to the types of verification measures already agreed, the treaty will include: --- The treaty preamble will contain a statement that there is a relationship between offensive and defensive strategic arms and that this relationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. --- The United States is willing to agree to a joint statement that contains a commitment not to convert ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa during the life of the treaty. --- The United States is willing to take note of a unilateral Russian statement noting that Russia undertakes the obligations in the new treaty based on the existing levels of missile defenses and reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty based on a qualitative and quantitative buildup on the capabilities of strategic missile defenses. End points. -------------- RUSSIAN QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION -------------- ¶10. (S) Ries concluded, stating that the delivered points were a package and should be considered in their entirety. She asked whether the Russian Delegation had any questions. Koshelev asked whether the package was an introduction to dialogue or if it was "take it or leave it." Warner responded that it was a bit of "both." He elaborated by stating that dialogue on the issues is welcome, but the interrelated components of the proposal were offered as a package. Dialogue on those components would certainly be expected. ¶11. (S) Gen Orlov interjected that Russia had not yet "touched" the package in writing. He asked whether the package should be considered general direction or as a specific proposal and whether the details on such things as verification procedures would be similar to previously-proposed procedures. Warner replied that ceilings, elimination of "phantoms," treatment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, and the offense/defense relationship were all very detailed. He noted that the statements in the verification section were broader and that detailed guidance had not yet been received regarding these elements. That guidance would come from Gottemoeller and Washington. He concluded that the package built on previous U.S. proposals, as well as discussions with the Russian side. Ries added that verification was an important subject to the United States and that we understood the Russian message calling for simpler and less costly procedures. In that regard, she encouraged the Russian side to seriously consider Mr. Trout's offer regarding perimeter portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) provided earlier in the week (REFTEL). ¶12. (S) Col Ryzhkov questioned the U.S. statement regarding mobile missile verification procedures. He was troubled that, just as the United States and Russia were coming closer to agreement on verification, the United States now proposed additional elements. Warner replied that the "package" did not in fact refer to additional requirements -- those referred to in the package had already been proposed by the U.S. side. He agreed the verification components of the package did require additional discussion and negotiation, but the other parts of the package provided very clear solutions. ¶13. (S) Koshelev asked Warner's opinion regarding how this package would affect the broader negotiations. Warner stated the answer depended on the acceptability of the package to the Russian side. He said that the issues covered were recognized as critical issues, since the first SFO meeting took place in the spring and. in many cases, proposals were already presented by both sides. He reiterated that the U.S. sought to build a package that contained compromises on numerical limits, non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the offense/defense relationship. In the case of the offense-defense relationship, all Russian proposals, although not in their exact form, were touched upon in the package. Regarding verification, this package offered general direction, but the specifics under that general direction would be developed further by the delegations. He concluded that acceptance of the package would successfully address several critical issues, but many more would still have to be discussed and agreed in order for the delegations to meet the deadline set by the Presidents. -------------- CLOSING COMMENTS -------------- ¶14. (S) Koshelev concluded, saying the Russian Delegation would review the package as soon as they received it in written form and that their analysis would be shared with the United States. He reminded the U.S. side that the nature of conducting negotiations was such that both sides submit proposals for consideration. Therefore, the U.S. view on how to achieve successful talks had been received. The Russian side would shortly provide its formula for how to overcome major differences and achieve success. ¶15. (S) Warner stated that the U.S. Delegation had no instructions regarding the release of the package document, but we would seek clearance to provide an English version as soon as possible. Koshelev asked if the document was provided to the Russian side in Moscow, and Warner replied he believed it was. Ries closed stating we would also check for an official Russian translation. (Begin comment: Papers containing the points made above were provided to the Russian Delegation in Geneva on Thursday, October 29, 2009, in both English and Russian. End comment.) ¶16. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶17. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Lt Col Comeau Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Mr. Dwyer Mr. Elliott Mr. Fraley Mr. Johnston LT Sicks Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Zdravecky Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artem'yev Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Mr. Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Col Novikov MGen Orlov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Zharkih Mr. Gayduk (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS