START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 000975 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (S) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-005 - CATEGORIES OF INSPECTION ACTIVITIES AND ANNUAL QUOTAS Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-050 -- Request for Guidance-005. -------------- SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶2. (S) Although the U.S. and Russian delegations initially tabled very different categories for the major types of inspection activities under START Follow-on (SFO),after considerable negotiation, the sides have begun to converge on a revised set of inspection categories. The delegations, however, remain far apart on the annual inspection quotas associated with the two major types of inspections. In light of this, the delegation believes that it would facilitate achievement of a verification package containing acceptable types and numbers of inspections if we were to adopt two new categories of inspections, one of which will involve a single type of inspection for operational ICBM, SSBN/SLBM, and heavy bomber bases, and which will combine the elements in the U.S.-proposed nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) and data update inspection (DUI) for those bases. The second type would deal with non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA). The delegation also seeks flexibility regarding the annual quotas for these two types of inspections. Background and Analysis is in paragraphs 3-11. Delegation recommendations are in paragraph 12-14. Guidance requested is in paragraphs 15-16. -------------- BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS -------------- ¶3. (S) The current U.S. position regarding types of inspections calls for the conduct of NWIs to confirm the number of warheads on a given number of delivery vehicles at operational bases and the conduct of DUIs to confirm declared numbers of deployed and non-deployed SOA and certain support equipment at operational bases and at other locations. The United States proposed two types of exhibitions. The Russians have also proposed two major types of inspections, one focused on deployed SOA and the warheads on them and the other dealing with non-deployed SOA and the elimination of SOA. They also proposed several types of exhibitions. The U.S. and Russian delegations have presented and discussed their proposals at length over a series of Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meetings during the recently completed session in Geneva. While understanding has increased on both sides, it is clear that a compromise package will be needed in order to move forward and secure a verification package incorporating types of inspections and numbers (quotas) that satisfy us. ¶4. (S) The current U.S. position on the maximum number of inspections to be conducted annually is derived from an Intelligence Community proposal. This proposal adjusted the numbers of each type of inspection proposed for SFO in order to cover all the different types of inspections without increasing the overall maximum quota of annual inspections (28) called for under START. The current U.S. proposal on GENEVA 00000975 002 OF 004 annual inspection quotas is broken down as follows: -- For NWIs of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, 10 inspections annually at ICBM and SLBM bases and four inspections per year at heavy bomber bases; and -- For DUIs and formerly declared SOA facility inspections, 12 DUI inspections annually at a wide range of sites and an additional two inspections at formerly declared facilities. ¶5. (S) The Russian delegation has proposed significantly smaller numbers of annual inspections: -- For deployed SOA and the warheads on them, five inspections per year; and -- For non-deployed SOA (including inspections of the results of elimination and of formerly declared facilities), five inspections per year. ¶6. (S) Recent discussions between the U.S and Russian co-chairs of the IPWG have suggested that the first major type of inspection, Type 1, should be reconfigured to focus on a combination of the elements of the proposed NWI and DUI that would involve inspecting both deployed and non-deployed SOA at the operational bases for silo-based and mobile ICBMs, SSBNs/SLBMs and heavy bombers. The initial U.S. inspection proposal already follows this pattern in calling for such a combined inspection at heavy bomber bases. The second major inspection type, Type 2, would focus on non-deployed SOA located at sites other than operational bases, that is, at storage facilities, test ranges, repair facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, etc., and on formerly declared facilities. ¶7. (S) Implementation of the two revised inspection categories would raise a couple of challenges. First, the new, combined Type 1 inspections at the mobile ICBM and SSBN bases would involve considerably longer, more complex inspections than either the NWI or DUI when they are conducted at these locations separately. Combined inspections at silo-based ICBM bases and heavy bomber bases would, in our view, not pose any significant challenges. (Begin comment: U.S. members of the IPWG went through the detailed activities, step-by-step, that would be involved in conducting the new, combined inspections at the mobile ICBM and SSBN bases and are convinced that it could be done effectively, but acknowledge the need to efficiently manage sub-groups within the inspection teams to accomplish simultaneous tasks when implementing the combined inspection concept. The use of sub-groups in single-purpose inspections is, of course, standard practice under START. End comment.) Delegation believes the United States will want to conduct the new combined inspections over at least a two-day period. In addition, delegation recommends the permitted duration of the data update portion of these combined Type 1 inspections not exceed 24 hours following the completion of the agreed procedures to confirm the number of nuclear warheads for the selected SOA. ¶8. (S) The second challenge will involve fitting U.S. GENEVA 00000975 003 OF 004 desired inspections of key Russian operational bases within the annual quota of inspections. Under the new combined approach, the only inspections conducted at operational ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases would be Type 1 inspections. Under START, and our current SFO proposal, these bases have been and would continue to be subject to inspection under both the NWI and DUI annual quotas. Consequently, the total number of inspections at operational bases could have been up to 20 or more inspections annually. Under the new construct, U.S. inspections of such operational bases, albeit longer and more comprehensive since they combine the elements of the NWI and the DUI, would have to fall within the maximum quota of at most 14 Type 1 inspections, should we succeed in maintaining the maximum for this category at 14. This will be a challenge, given the fact that the Russians propose a maximum of only five Type 1 inspections per year. ¶9. (S) Some on the delegation believe Washington needs to consider whether the loss of separate NWI and DUI inspections at individual bases to clarify multiple issues--particularly those that involve more than one re stricted area--could outweigh the usefulness of the combined Type 1 inspection for monitoring mobile ICBM forces. They believe understanding questionable activity at the facility could best be done by either an NWI or a DUI to clarify the issue or, alternatively, by NWI inspection conducted at one re stricted area and a DUI conducted at another re stricted area. They also believe the requirement to carry out NWI and DUI at one re stricted area in the combined inspection scenario could only be viable if there are 12-14 such Type 1 inspections per year. ¶10. (S) On balance, delegation supports adoption of the revised major categories of inspections: Type 1 focused on both deployed and non-deployed SOA at operational bases, an approach made possible by creating the new "combined inspection," and Type 2 focused on non-deployed SOA at places other than operational bases. Delegation believes that despite the challenges noted above, the new categories are fully workable and will allow the United States to effectively confirm the data desired under both types of current inspections. We believe this approach will be effective if the quota for annual Type 1 inspections is 12-14 inspections per year. The revised categories also offer an excellent opportunity to reach agreement with the Russians in a manner that adopts some of their key ideas, but also convinces them to drop their proposal of characterizing the Type 2 inspections as "visits," a term we find totally unacceptable. ¶11. (S) With regard to the annual inspection quotas, some delegation members believe if we keep the U.S.-proposed inspection quotas of up to 10-14 inspections (others believe 12-14) each for the two major types of inspections, there will be ample opportunity to inspect a large portion of the 38 Russian facilities subject to inspection of these types once a year. The Russians claim they will be modestly reducing the number of their facilities subject to inspection to the mid-30s due to their anticipated force adjustments under SFO. The Russian-proposed annual quotas of no more than five for each of the two major inspection types are far too low to provide an adequate basis to monitor compliance GENEVA 00000975 004 OF 004 with the treaty and to create the kind of deterrent against cheating that we seek. Given the great differences in these proposed annual inspection quotas, the likely outcome of negotiations is a compromise number, but one that provides at least a double digit number for the maximum number of annual inspections of each major type. -------------- RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶12. (S) Delegation recommends Washington grant the delegation authorization to develop the two new types of inspection activities: Type 1 inspections focused on the SOA at operational ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases, including the nuclear warheads for them, which will involve the conduct of inspections that combine elements from the currently proposed NWI and DUI; and Type 2 inspections focused on non-deployed SOA at facilities other than operational bases as well as on formerly declared facilities for SOA. However, some delegation members are concerned about the impact on monitoring and, ultimately, verification of mobile ICBM launchers caused by the loss of flexibility associated with the use of combined inspections rather than separate ones for nuclear warheads and data updates. They suggest that this should be considered in deciding whether to accept the revised inspection categories, including the new combined inspection at operational bases. ¶13. (S) In working out the revised inspection categories, the delegation will retain the limit of no more than two inspections of a given type to be conducted at any single facility during a year. It will also ensure that inspection activities to confirm the elimination of SOA shall be conducted on an "as needed" basis rather than being counted within the Type 2 annual quota. ¶14. (S) With regard to the annual inspection quotas, delegation recommends it be given the flexibility to negotiate annual quotas for Type 1 and Type 2 inspections that may be modestly fewer than the 14 each proposed for their NWI and DUI counterparts, but under no circumstances fewer than 10 for either category. -------------- GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶15. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the recommendations contained in paragraphs 12-14. ¶16. (S) Delegation requests guidance be provided on this issue no later than OOB Geneva time on Monday, November 9, ¶2009. ¶17. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS