START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 000975

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(S) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-005 - CATEGORIES OF INSPECTION
ACTIVITIES AND ANNUAL QUOTAS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-050 -- Request for Guidance-005.

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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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2. (S) Although the U.S. and Russian delegations initially
tabled very different categories for the major types of
inspection activities under START Follow-on (SFO),after
considerable negotiation, the sides have begun to converge on
a revised set of inspection categories. The delegations,
however, remain far apart on the annual inspection quotas
associated with the two major types of inspections. In light
of this, the delegation believes that it would facilitate
achievement of a verification package containing acceptable
types and numbers of inspections if we were to adopt two new
categories of inspections, one of which will involve a single
type of inspection for operational ICBM, SSBN/SLBM, and heavy
bomber bases, and which will combine the elements in the
U.S.-proposed nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) and data
update inspection (DUI) for those bases. The second type
would deal with non-deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA).
The delegation also seeks flexibility regarding the annual
quotas for these two types of inspections. Background and
Analysis is in paragraphs 3-11. Delegation recommendations
are in paragraph 12-14. Guidance requested is in paragraphs
15-16.

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
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3. (S) The current U.S. position regarding types of
inspections calls for the conduct of NWIs to confirm the
number of warheads on a given number of delivery vehicles at
operational bases and the conduct of DUIs to confirm declared
numbers of deployed and non-deployed SOA and certain support
equipment at operational bases and at other locations. The
United States proposed two types of exhibitions. The
Russians have also proposed two major types of inspections,
one focused on deployed SOA and the warheads on them and the
other dealing with non-deployed SOA and the elimination of
SOA. They also proposed several types of exhibitions. The
U.S. and Russian delegations have presented and discussed
their proposals at length over a series of Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meetings during the recently
completed session in Geneva. While understanding has
increased on both sides, it is clear that a compromise
package will be needed in order to move forward and secure a
verification package incorporating types of inspections and
numbers (quotas) that satisfy us.


4. (S) The current U.S. position on the maximum number of
inspections to be conducted annually is derived from an
Intelligence Community proposal. This proposal adjusted the
numbers of each type of inspection proposed for SFO in order
to cover all the different types of inspections without
increasing the overall maximum quota of annual inspections
(28) called for under START. The current U.S. proposal on

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annual inspection quotas is broken down as follows:

-- For NWIs of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, 10 inspections annually at
ICBM and SLBM bases and four inspections per year at heavy
bomber bases; and

-- For DUIs and formerly declared SOA facility inspections,
12 DUI inspections annually at a wide range of sites and an
additional two inspections at formerly declared facilities.


5. (S) The Russian delegation has proposed significantly
smaller numbers of annual inspections:

-- For deployed SOA and the warheads on them, five
inspections per year; and

-- For non-deployed SOA (including inspections of the
results of elimination and of formerly declared facilities),
five inspections per year.


6. (S) Recent discussions between the U.S and Russian
co-chairs of the IPWG have suggested that the first major
type of inspection, Type 1, should be reconfigured to focus
on a combination of the elements of the proposed NWI and DUI
that would involve inspecting both deployed and non-deployed
SOA at the operational bases for silo-based and mobile ICBMs,
SSBNs/SLBMs and heavy bombers. The initial U.S. inspection
proposal already follows this pattern in calling for such a
combined inspection at heavy bomber bases. The second major
inspection type, Type 2, would focus on non-deployed SOA
located at sites other than operational bases, that is, at
storage facilities, test ranges, repair facilities,
conversion or elimination facilities, etc., and on formerly
declared facilities.


7. (S) Implementation of the two revised inspection
categories would raise a couple of challenges. First, the
new, combined Type 1 inspections at the mobile ICBM and SSBN
bases would involve considerably longer, more complex
inspections than either the NWI or DUI when they are
conducted at these locations separately. Combined
inspections at silo-based ICBM bases and heavy bomber bases
would, in our view, not pose any significant challenges.
(Begin comment: U.S. members of the IPWG went through the
detailed activities, step-by-step, that would be involved in
conducting the new, combined inspections at the mobile ICBM
and SSBN bases and are convinced that it could be done
effectively, but acknowledge the need to efficiently manage
sub-groups within the inspection teams to accomplish
simultaneous tasks when implementing the combined inspection
concept. The use of sub-groups in single-purpose inspections
is, of course, standard practice under START. End comment.)
Delegation believes the United States will want to conduct
the new combined inspections over at least a two-day period.
In addition, delegation recommends the permitted duration of
the data update portion of these combined Type 1 inspections
not exceed 24 hours following the completion of the agreed
procedures to confirm the number of nuclear warheads for the
selected SOA.


8. (S) The second challenge will involve fitting U.S.

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desired inspections of key Russian operational bases within
the annual quota of inspections. Under the new combined
approach, the only inspections conducted at operational ICBM,
SLBM, and heavy bomber bases would be Type 1 inspections.
Under START, and our current SFO proposal, these bases have
been and would continue to be subject to inspection under
both the NWI and DUI annual quotas. Consequently, the total
number of inspections at operational bases could have been up
to 20 or more inspections annually. Under the new construct,
U.S. inspections of such operational bases, albeit longer and
more comprehensive since they combine the elements of the NWI
and the DUI, would have to fall within the maximum quota of
at most 14 Type 1 inspections, should we succeed in
maintaining the maximum for this category at 14. This will
be a challenge, given the fact that the Russians propose a
maximum of only five Type 1 inspections per year.


9. (S) Some on the delegation believe Washington needs to
consider whether the loss of separate NWI and DUI inspections
at individual bases to clarify multiple issues--particularly
those that involve more than one re stricted area--could
outweigh the usefulness of the combined Type 1 inspection for
monitoring mobile ICBM forces. They believe understanding
questionable activity at the facility could best be done by
either an NWI or a DUI to clarify the issue or,
alternatively, by NWI inspection conducted at one re stricted
area and a DUI conducted at another re stricted area. They
also believe the requirement to carry out NWI and DUI at one
re stricted area in the combined inspection scenario could
only be viable if there are 12-14 such Type 1 inspections per
year.


10. (S) On balance, delegation supports adoption of the
revised major categories of inspections: Type 1 focused on
both deployed and non-deployed SOA at operational bases, an
approach made possible by creating the new "combined
inspection," and Type 2 focused on non-deployed SOA at places
other than operational bases. Delegation believes that
despite the challenges noted above, the new categories are
fully workable and will allow the United States to
effectively confirm the data desired under both types of
current inspections. We believe this approach will be
effective if the quota for annual Type 1 inspections is 12-14
inspections per year. The revised categories also offer an
excellent opportunity to reach agreement with the Russians in
a manner that adopts some of their key ideas, but also
convinces them to drop their proposal of characterizing the
Type 2 inspections as "visits," a term we find totally
unacceptable.


11. (S) With regard to the annual inspection quotas, some
delegation members believe if we keep the U.S.-proposed
inspection quotas of up to 10-14 inspections (others believe
12-14) each for the two major types of inspections, there
will be ample opportunity to inspect a large portion of the
38 Russian facilities subject to inspection of these types
once a year. The Russians claim they will be modestly
reducing the number of their facilities subject to inspection
to the mid-30s due to their anticipated force adjustments
under SFO. The Russian-proposed annual quotas of no more
than five for each of the two major inspection types are far
too low to provide an adequate basis to monitor compliance

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with the treaty and to create the kind of deterrent against
cheating that we seek. Given the great differences in these
proposed annual inspection quotas, the likely outcome of
negotiations is a compromise number, but one that provides at
least a double digit number for the maximum number of annual
inspections of each major type.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
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12. (S) Delegation recommends Washington grant the
delegation authorization to develop the two new types of
inspection activities: Type 1 inspections focused on the SOA
at operational ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber bases, including
the nuclear warheads for them, which will involve the conduct
of inspections that combine elements from the currently
proposed NWI and DUI; and Type 2 inspections focused on
non-deployed SOA at facilities other than operational bases
as well as on formerly declared facilities for SOA. However,
some delegation members are concerned about the impact on
monitoring and, ultimately, verification of mobile ICBM
launchers caused by the loss of flexibility associated with
the use of combined inspections rather than separate ones for
nuclear warheads and data updates. They suggest that this
should be considered in deciding whether to accept the
revised inspection categories, including the new combined
inspection at operational bases.


13. (S) In working out the revised inspection categories,
the delegation will retain the limit of no more than two
inspections of a given type to be conducted at any single
facility during a year. It will also ensure that inspection
activities to confirm the elimination of SOA shall be
conducted on an "as needed" basis rather than being counted
within the Type 2 annual quota.


14. (S) With regard to the annual inspection quotas,
delegation recommends it be given the flexibility to
negotiate annual quotas for Type 1 and Type 2 inspections
that may be modestly fewer than the 14 each proposed for
their NWI and DUI counterparts, but under no circumstances
fewer than 10 for either category.

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GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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15. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the
recommendations contained in paragraphs 12-14.


16. (S) Delegation requests guidance be provided on this
issue no later than OOB Geneva time on Monday, November 9,

2009.


17. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS