START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000968

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-007 - CONCENTRATION OF MOBILE
ICBMS DURING INSPECTIONS OF SOA AT OPERATIONAL BASES
INCLUDING THE DEPLOYED NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-047 -- Request for Guidance-007.

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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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2. (S) The Russian delegation is strongly resisting the
inclusion in the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty of any
"special" provisions focused on constraining mobile ICBMs.
The delegation believes that it would facilitate our securing
agreement to those provisions we really need if we show some
flexibility regarding certain provisions pertaining to mobile
ICBM systems. Specifically, the delegation seeks flexibility
regarding the requirement to "concentrate" mobile systems
deployed in the field back to the re stricted areas where
they are based within 24 hours of designation by an
inspection team that their base will be inspected to confirm
the accuracy of data on the number and types of items of
inspection located there. Background and analysis is in
paragraphs 3-12. Recommendations are in paragraph 13.
Guidance requested is in paragraph 14.

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
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3. (S) Mobile ICBMs achieve survivability by successfully
avoiding detection when deployed in the field. In addition,
mobile ICBM systems have a unique capability to disperse
quickly from their re stricted areas (RA). During the latter
part of the inspection regime for INF, Russia routinely
dispersed substantial numbers of its mobile systems from
their RAs upon learning that a U.S. on-site inspection was
imminent, thus demonstrating an ability to disperse from
their RAs before pre-inspection movement restrictions went
into effect. A desire to discourage such a dispersal,
combined with a desire to facilitate efforts with national
technical means (NTM) to detect a covertly deployed mobile
ICBM force, led to the inclusion within the START Treaty of a
provision that requires all mobile ICBMs deployed in the
field to "concentrate" back in their RAs once a mobile ICBM
base had been officially designated for the conduct of a data
update inspection.


4. (S) For START data update inspections, all mobile ICBM
launchers, with the exception of those located at the
maintenance facility or engaged in relocation, are required
to "concentrate," that is, to return to their assigned re
stricted areas (RAs) within 24 hours after an inspection has
been officially declared for their base, putting these
launchers back in their RAs prior to the beginning of an
inspection. For those deployed launchers unable to return
to their RAs due to force majeure, Russia was required to
provide either the coordinates of the launchers still in the
field or to transport inspectors to them. This
"concentration" of deployed mobile launchers has not been
required by the START Treaty during reentry vehicle on-site
inspections (RVOSI). During the course of START
implementation, the United States has not detected any rapid



dispersal of mobile ICBMs from their bases in response to
notification that a mobile ICBM base was about to be
inspected.


5. (S) To preclude the possibility of rapid dispersal being
used to impede U.S. inspectors from getting an accurate
count, the current U.S. negotiating position retains the
concentration provision from START. It states that all
mobile ICBM systems deployed in the field must return to
their RAs within 24 hours of site designation for a data
update inspection. If mobile launchers have not returned,
the inspection team has the choice of being transported to
the location of the mobile ICBM systems that have not
returned, or receive a list with the geo-coordinates for
those systems.


6. (S) Members of the Russian delegation have been steadfast
in their rejection of any "special" procedures that would
apply to Russian mobile systems, particularly the U.S.
proposal that would require Russia to concentrate their
mobile launchers back within their assigned RAs within 24
hours of site declaration. The Russians have noted
repeatedly that neither SSBNs nor heavy bombers that are
deployed from their bases when inspections occur are required
to return to their bases. Moreover, they openly question
whether this provision is mainly designed to assist the U.S.
Intelligence Community in evaluating the effectiveness of its
NTM in locating Russian mobile ICBMs deployed in the field.


7. (S) The delegation seeks flexibility to modify or
possibly to drop the requirement for concentration of
deployed mobile launchers for inspections of the SOA at
operational bases including the deployed nuclear warheads on
them. Some delegation members believe that concentration of
mobile launchers within 24 hours after site designation
provides only a marginal increase in confidence that the
Russian Federation has not deployed a covert mobile force.
They further believe elimination of this requirement would
not cause a significant degradation of confidence in
verifying the numbers of mobile ICBMs.


8. (S) Those that support substantially modifying or
dropping the concentration requirement believe that while
concentration of mobile ICBM launchers back to their RAs does
provide some increase in confidence in verifying the numbers
of deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers, a determined
Russian effort could obviate that gain. If a covert force
had already been produced and deployed, merely concentrating
a division's worth of launchers would be unlikely to help
uncover the covert force. Unique identifiers (UIDs) could
easily be replicated, again circumventing any benefit gained
by concentration.


9. (S) Finally, those who hold this view also believe that
if the U.S. delegation was authorized to modify or remove the
requirements of this provision, along with removing the
requirement to transport inspectors to mobile systems that
have not returned to their RAs, this would address the
Russian concerns that mobile systems are being subjected to
excessive restrictions and requirements that could reduce the
survivability of their mobile ICBM force in the field.
Additionally, proponents of this view point out that the



Russian Federation has not shown a tendency to disperse their
mobile systems to avoid inspection, so the risk of rapid
dispersal in response to an imminent possible U.S. on-site
inspection if the concentration provisions are removed would
be low. Those who hold this view believe that were the
delegation allowed to drop the concentration provision, this
would remove a major obstacle to reaching agreement on the
combined inspection of SOA at the mobile ICBM bases, an
important U.S. objective.


10. (S) Others on the delegation, while supporting
modification of the concentration procedure, oppose dropping
the requirement altogether. They argue that, since deployed
mobile ICBM systems are located inside closed, single-bay
fixed structures at their bases, the United States cannot be
sure, using NTM, how many mobile ICBM launchers are on the
base on any given day, nor can it be sure how many launchers
might deploy to the field shortly before the commencement of
an inspection. If, at a minimum, deployed mobile ICBM
systems are not required to return to their RAs, it could
result in fewer such systems being available for inspection.
In that case, there would be a significant reduction in the
ability of the United States to confirm the accuracy of
declared data or to verify the UIDs on a substantial sample
of mobile ICBMs. Confirming UIDs is a primary means of
providing confidence that the deployed mobile ICBM force is
not being covertly or overtly augmented. Although it is
impossible to know if Russia has any intention, or the fiscal
resources needed to develop and deploy a significant covert
mobile ICBM force during the life span of the SFO, Russia
does have the production capability to produce additional
mobile ICBMs and their launchers.


11. (S) Those concerned about a decision to simply drop the
concentration requirement suggest that the delegation be
permitted to propose a modified approach for concentrating
selected mobile launchers so the regiment identified for
inspection by the U.S. inspection team prior to the team's
arrival in-country would be available for inspection. One
possible alternative would be to require the return of all
mobile ICBM launchers that departed the re stricted area
selected for inspection between the time the U.S. notified
Russia of its intent to conduct an inspection (NRRC
notification of an impending inspection is sent 16 hours
prior to team's arrival at point of entry (POE)) through the
implementation of pre-inspection restrictions at the
designated re stricted area.


12. (S) The new concentration approach would modify the
requirement for all mobile ICBM launchers deployed in the
field to return to base by limiting this required return to
only those mobile ICBM launchers that had departed from their
RAs up to 16 hours prior to the time when the specific mobile
ICBM base was officially designated for inspection. The
16-hour interval reflects the fact that the inspected side
first receives notification through the NRRC of an impending
inspection from the inspecting Party 16 hours prior to the
inspection team's arrival at the POE. All mobile ICBM
launchers from the designated base that had deployed to the
field more than 16 hours before the designation of the
inspected base would not be required to return to base, thus
allowing them to continue their field deployment.




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RECOMMENDATIONS
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13. (S) The delegation requests authorization to further
develop and propose to the Russian side a revised version of
the concentration requirement, along the lines described in
paragraph 12 above. This revised approach, with its
differential return-to-base requirements should discourage or
simply roll back Russian rapid dispersal of mobile ICBM
launchers flushed upon receipt of information that an
inspection will be initiated within a matter of hours that
could be focused on one of their mobile ICBM bases. At the
same time, the revised concentration provision would not
necessitate return to base of mobile ICBMs already in the
field prior to the initial notification of an impending
inspection, thus allowing them to continue their operational
activities without being compelled to reveal their location
and thus jeopardize what the Russians perceive to be their
immediate and longer term survivability when deployed.
Should the Russians prove unwilling to accept the modified
concentration provision, some in the delegation would
recommend dropping the concentration requirement altogether.
Others reject this abandonment of some form of concentration
requirement.

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GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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14. (S) Delegation requests that Washington consider the
recommendations contained in paragraph 13 in order to provide
its response no later than OOB in Geneva on Monday, November

9.


15. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS