START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000963 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 27, 2009 REF: A. STATE 98566 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-004) ¶B. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-030. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009 Time: 10:00 - 11:20 A.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) U.S. Negotiator Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Russian Nnegotiator Ambassador Antonov continued START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty negotiations during a plenary meeting on October 27 largely taken up by a U.S. presentation on its position and proposals regarding mobile missiles and their launchers (REFS A and B). The U.S. presentation was composed of three parts, concentrating in turn on: explaining the rationale behind the U.S. position; delivering a formal package proposal regarding replacing the perimeter portal continuous monitoring (PPCM) activity at the Votkinsk mobile ICBM final assembly plant; and detailing relevant key U.S. limits and constraints associated with the operational "lifetime" of mobile ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian side offered no substantive response, but pledged to consider the proposal and presentations and to respond at a later date. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments; U.S. Presentation on its Position and Proposals Regarding Mobile ICBMs and their Launchers; and, Deafening Silence. -------------- OPENING COMMENTS -------------- ¶5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the U.S.-requested plenary meeting and explained that the U.S. side would deliver its presentation on mobile ICBMs and their launchers in three parts. Mr. Siemon would speak first and lay out the rationale behind U.S. SFO proposals for mobile ICBMs. Second, Mr. Trout would deliver a formal offer to the Russian side regarding a new form of continuous monitoring at Votkinsk. The U.S. side would also hand over a formal paper containing the details of the proposal. Third, Dr. Warner would discuss limits and constraints on mobile ICBM systems during their operational "lifetime." -------------- U.S. PRESENTATION ON ITS POSITION AND PROPOSALS REGARDING MOBILE ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Siemon delivered the following points: - A principal objective of this treaty, which has been emphasized by both sides, is to ensure stability and predictability in the strategic relations between the two Parties. - The Russian-proposed treaty text of September 16 called for "strengthening strategic stability" and for "establishing new relations in the strategic domain, based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation." - During our sessions here in Geneva, the Russian side eloquently described the virtues of stabilizing postures in a Treaty Text Working Group meeting. - The U.S. focus, and resulting proposals for continuing with many of START's provisions for mobile ICBMs, stems directly from this same desire for stability and predictability. The U.S. side is concerned, as both Parties were during START negotiations, that the production, deployment, and elimination of mobile ICBMs cannot be adequately monitored and the number of mobile ICBMs verified in the absence of provisions for this purpose. The United States is concerned about the impact this may have on stability and predictability over time as we continue to reduce strategic offensive arms. - We continue to be concerned regarding the unique potential mobile ICBMs pose for covert augmentation of strategic forces using non-deployed assets. Because of the difficulties of monitoring and verifying numbers of mobile ICBMs in the absence of sufficient provisions, one of the Parties could, in a relatively short period of time, deploy a significantly increased number of mobile missiles that could result in a sudden change in the strategic relationship. - Mobile ICBMs, especially modernized and MIRVed mobile ICBMs, are of particular concern because of their exceptional effectiveness and survivability. - These factors, absent verification and transparency measures necessary to improve predictability, would undermine fundamental principles of our strategic arms control relationship, including confidence in the equivalence of our forces under treaty limitations. In such an event, uncertainty and perceptions of advantage would be of significant concern, in turn raising the potential for instability in strategic relations. The avoidance of such scenarios has been a central purpose of our arms control relationship. - Of course we acknowledge that the Russian side may have no desire to exercise such a capability, but, as the Russian side has eloquently expressed in the context of strategic weapons in a non-nuclear configuration, the two Parties must pay attention to capabilities rather than intentions. - The Russian side's non-paper of July 22, 2009, entitled "On Strategic Missile Systems in a Non-Nuclear Configuration" states "We have noted repeatedly that when dealing with military issues, one takes into account, first and foremost, the Parties' actual potentials rather than their intentions, which can change over time, inter alia, based on existing military capabilities." - The provisions codified in START for mobile launchers and their associated missiles were created for this reason, both to reflect U.S. concerns about Soviet developments as well as Russian concerns regarding the U.S. MX mobile missile program. These provisions have served to manage our concerns. This is why we have imported them into our proposed follow-on treaty. - The Russian side has also asked why, if mobile missiles cause such anxiety, other mobile platforms, such as SSBNs, should not be similarly subject to certain specific provisions. - Ballistic missile submarines, while sharing many of the operational characteristics of mobile ICBMs, including mobility and survivability, are different in that they do not readily lead to the creation of a covert force. These submarines cannot realistically be developed and deployed without the other Party knowing well in advance, and thus do not pose the threat of sudden deployment of a significant number of additional modern and effective launchers. - I would like to emphasize that the U.S. concern involves determining the number of mobile ICBM numbers, not determining the field locations of their launchers. Our concern is principally driven by the desire to avoid the possibility of destabilizing shifts in the strategic balance, not the desire to undermine the survivability of Russian systems. End points. ¶7. (S) Trout delivered the following points relating to the U.S. offer on a new form of continuous monitoring of the production of Russian mobile ICBMs and their launchers: - U.S. concerns and objectives with regard to verification and transparency for mobile ICBMs notwithstanding, the Russian side has made it very clear that it is not prepared to extend the START provision of perimeter portal continuous monitoring under a new treaty, particularly since there is no analogous facility in the United States for Russia to monitor in the same fashion. - We, therefore, have been giving thought as to what alternative measures could give the United States an adequate level of confidence regarding the number of mobile ICBMs Russia possesses. - We are prepared to explore, instead of PPCM, a set of less intrusive measures that would assist our ability to effectively monitor mobile ICBMs. - Specifically, we propose, in lieu of PPCM, the following package of measures: - Continuation of the Russian practice of permanently applying a unique identifier to each mobile ICBM and continuing the START reporting practices for unique identifiers; - Pre-notification to the United States at least 60 hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile ICBM subject to the limitations of the treaty, to include information about the type and variant of the missile, the scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its unique identifier number; and - Installation and operation of a closed circuit TV camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the final missile assembly facility. - If the Russian side were to agree to this proposal, the United States would be prepared, as a gesture of reciprocity, to provide pre-notification of the exits of missiles or first stages from a similar United States facility and to install a closed circuit TV camera there. - Moreover, in addition to the requirement to exchange unique identifiers for mobile ICBMs, the United States could agree, as a matter of reciprocity, to a requirement to exchange unique identifiers for heavy bombers (which would be the existing aircraft tail numbers). Specifically, aircraft tail numbers could be provided as part of the MOU data for each heavy bomber base, and could be included in the movement notifications of deployed heavy bombers. - In making this proposal, the United States has come a long way in the direction of Russia's position. We trust, therefore, that you will give serious consideration to our proposal and our underlying objective, which is to ensure the United States will be able to verify with confidence the number of Russian mobile ICBMs, in order to maintain and sustain confidence and predictability necessary for long-term strategic stability. End points. ¶8. (S) Warner delivered the following points relating to the U.S. position on limits, constraints and monitoring approaches during the operational lifetime of deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers: - The United States is reviewing the collection of limits and other constraints on mobile ICBMs and their launchers, which are combined with the use of both cooperative measures and various inspection activities during the period of the operational lifetime of such missiles, that is, during the period between the production and eventual elimination of such mobile ICBMs. - We have heard and understand Russia's concern that its mobile ICBMs and their launchers not be objects of excessive constraint. - The United States is, however, determined to maintain a package of treaty limits and constraints that are sufficient to enable it to have high confidence regarding the total numbers of Russian mobile ICBMs and their launchers in both deployed and non-deployed status. - Many of the provisions we propose for mobile ICBMs and their launchers are the same as those that apply to silo-based ICBMs. These include, for example, the fact that mobile ICBMs and the warheads on them count against the strategic delivery vehicle and nuclear warhead limits like all other strategic offensive arms, and the nuclear warhead inspections for mobile ICBMs are the same as those applied to other ICBMs and to SLBMs. - Some of the key provisions we propose be applied to deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers during their operational "lifetime" include: - Requiring that deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers be based only within designated Restricted Areas (RAs) and that each mobile ICBM base be located in a separate Deployment Area. This is needed in order to improve the effectiveness of national technical means and inspections. - Providing for cooperative measures that require a Party periodically to display mobile ICBM launchers in the open in order to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means in monitoring the size of the mobile ICBM force. - Imposing limits of 80 each for non-deployed mobile ICBMs and non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers. - Restricting where non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers may be located as measures aimed at limiting the possibility of creating a covert mobile ICBM force. - Developing notifications that provide an insight into the transits of mobile ICBMs. - Establishing the right of inspectors to confirm unique identifiers on mobile ICBMs during data update inspections, and during eliminations. - Establishing specific procedures for the conduct of inspections of deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers at mobile ICBM bases. - With regard to the elimination of mobile ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers, Mr. Elliott is working closely with Colonel Ryzhkov, as I am working with Colonel Ilin, to reach agreement on a set of procedures and inspection activities associated with such eliminations. End points. -------------- DEAFENING SILENCE -------------- ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the presenters and stated that she looked forward to the Russian side's comments and questions and passed the floor to Antonov. ¶10. (S) Antonov said the Russian side would study the formal proposal closely and would prepare a response to the presentation. He then solicited questions or comments from his colleagues. Despite a considerable amount of off-line conversation among Russian Delegation members during the U.S. presentation, no Russian participant volunteered to offer any questions or comments. The chairs thereupon concluded the meeting. ¶11. (S) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S. Non-paper on Transparency Measures for Mobile ICBMs, dated October 27, 2009. ¶12. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Dr. Fraley Mr. Johnston Mr. McConnell Mr. Siemon Dr. Tarrasch Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Zdravecky Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artem'yev Mr. Avdeev Ms. Fuzhenkova Col Ilin Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Ms. Melikbekian Mr. Neshin Col Novikov Mr. Novohatskiy MGen Orlov Col Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venetsev Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Zharkih Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶13. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS