START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000958 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN'S COFFEE, OCTOBER 26, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-027. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 26, 2009 Time: 11:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA Mr. Elliott Col Ryzhkov Lt Col Goodman Mr. Smirnov Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The U.S. chairman of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) hosted a coffee for his Russian counterpart on October 26, 2009, at the U.S. Mission, to discuss the Russian-proposed CorE protocol delivered to the U.S. side on the afternoon of October 23, 2009. The U.S. chairman requested clarification on specific issues of the Russian-proposed text. Relations between the two chairmen remained very cordial, and they discussed a number of issues frankly. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY Clarification of the Russian-proposed CorE Protocol; Elimination of SLBM Launchers; Concept of Conversion, Again; Loading Tubes; and, Closing -------------- CLARIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN- PROPOSED CORE PROTOCOL -------------- ¶5. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting by informing Colonel Ryzhkov that U.S. translators had finished their work and the U.S. side was studying the Russian Federation's proposal for the CorE protocol that was delivered on Friday, October 23, ¶2009. He opened the floor to Ryzhkov for his comments. Ryzhkov stated that the document presented was a working document and not an official Russian proposal. He continued saying that the Russian side was still working on moving more common text into their general procedures section. Ryzhkov said their intent was to provide a new version that would change the format and structure of the document but would not contain substantive changes. Elliott stated that he understood the draft nature of the Russian proposal and agreed, in principle, to a general procedures section. Elliott suggested the U.S. side would investigate moving repetitive text to the general procedures section. Elliott then asked for clarification on several areas of the Russian-proposed text. -------------- ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Elliott began with Russian Section III, paragraph 1, "Elimination of SLBM Launchers." He stated that the U.S. side believed the removal of the launch tube hatches with no other procedures was not adequate for verification of elimination of the SLBM launcher. Given that both sides would cut up the submarine for scrap, the U.S. view was that the additional procedures the U.S. proposed were not excessive. The primary issue for the U.S. side was at what point the launcher or launchers would be removed from accountability. Elliott stated that the United States could probably accept the procedures if all launch tube hatches and the missile section were removed. (Begin comment: The missile section is the entire area of the submarine where all launch tubes are contained (24 launchers) and encompasses the entire area between the bridge and the tail of the submarine. End comment.) ¶7. (S) Elliott stated that Ryzhkov should notice that the time limits set to complete elimination had been removed in the U.S. proposal. This provided the relief requested by the Russians in a previous meeting. Elliott stated that, under the proposed central limits, the Russians would have plenty of head room to allow the elimination of the launchers to occur at their own pace. Elliott closed by stating that the United States would propose new text in this section that would contain more procedures than proposed by the Russian Federation but less than presented previously by the U.S. side. ¶8. (S) Ryzhkov began with a brief comment on the general section. He provided the following example of streamlined language for the general section. "Conversion or elimination will take place at a place (location) determined by the Party conducting the conversion or elimination." He stated that this sentence was repeated in all sections and should be moved to the general area. Elliott responded that the U.S. side preferred the term "declared elimination facilities" to provide for enhanced verification of the activities. Ryzhkov responded that is not required because the notification specifies the location and procedures of CorE. Elliott responded that generally he agreed, however, he stated the facility must be declared in advance to make preparations for verification and, given that the Russian Federation did not change conversion or elimination facilities very often, this should not be an issue. Ryzhkov reiterated that, in the Russian-proposed text, notification of intent to eliminate was given 30 days in advance and included both the location of the elimination and the procedures to be used. He stated that this notification would provide ample time to prepare for the inspection. Elliott said that the United States would study the Russian proposal. ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia would likely eliminate a larger number of SLBM launchers than the U.S. side, and specifying rigorous procedures would be costly. He said that such procedures would likely not gain support from the Ministry of Defense and the Duma. He said the U.S.-proposed procedures were very costly to the Russian Federation despite U.S. support through the Nunn-Lugar Program and, therefore, Russia selected a key procedure for SLBM elimination that would provide unambiguous verification of the elimination. Ryzhkov stated that it is impossible for a submarine without hatches to go to sea. Russia considered including the U.S. proposal of eliminating the gas generator as well as the launch tube hatches, but rejected that concept since the removal of the gas generator cannot be verified by national technical means (NTM) and also added unnecessary cost to the process. Both sides would have the right to verify eliminations by inspection. He warned that the inspection quota would be low though, so each side would have to analyze which inspections were most important. Ryzhkov said that Russia could study the addition of other procedures but that verification by NTM would be very difficult. Elliott agreed that the intent of the procedures was not to cost either side a significant amount of money, but that the procedures must be verifiable. He also said he did not dispute that the hatches were essential to an operational submarine, but Russia needs to consider additional procedures for elimination of the SLBM launchers that were irreversible. ¶10. (S) Elliott asked, "When you eliminate an SLBM launcher, are you basically turning the submarine into scrap?" Ryzhkov responded "Yes." Elliott stated, "Given that truth, when does the SLBM launcher come out of accountability? Time to complete?" Ryzhkov responded that the time to complete could be very long, however, the verification of the hatch removal and the tubes being empty would be quickly verifiable by NTM and the other procedures that would be performed on the SLBM launcher would be a lower priority than the production of new launchers. Elliott clarified his question, "When does the SLBM launcher come out of accountability?" Ryzhkov responded, "Upon completion of the hatch removal or completion of other procedures, whatever they are. However, adding other procedures are of great cost and adding them are unnecessary." -------------- CONCEPT OF CONVERSION, AGAIN -------------- ¶11. (S) Elliott questioned the concept of conversion from one type of strategic offensive arm (SOA) to another type of SOA (i.e., nuclear to nuclear). He stated the U.S. side did not see a need for specific procedures in the CorE protocol, given that the treaty article provided for such a "conversion." Elliott stated that, during the previous meeting, Ryzhkov said he was going to discuss this concept with the Russian interagency. Ryzhkov responded that he had discussed it at a lower level, but he still needed to discuss it at higher levels within his interagency. Elliott stated the U.S. side did not see a need for such a section on conversion, but could probably accept including it if it were seen as essential to Russia. Ryzhkov responded that some on his delegation believed Russia would need to include provisions and rules in the protocol to do such a conversion. He said that, given the warhead counting rules under START Follow-on, there would be no need to provide procedures on how such a conversion would be accomplished, but including provisions in the protocol would help clarify changes in type and the timing involved in the change in type. He also stated that this section would help Russia from a legal perspective. Elliott asked for clarification regarding when the change in type would occur. Ryzhkov responded, "Following the notification and exhibition, if required by the new type rules." Ryzhkov then clarified that Russia needed such a legal provision in the protocol to clear any ambiguities regarding Russia's ability to conduct such a conversion. He stated, "if not prohibited, it is allowed" was not strong enough, they wanted a specific legal provision allowing this type of conversion. -------------- LOADING TUBES -------------- ¶12. (S) For his last point, Elliott noted that Russian-proposed text included SLBM loading tubes in the section in the CorE Protocol on launch canisters. He explained the difference and function between a U.S. loading tube and a Russian launch canister. Following his explanation, he asked Ryzhkov what he saw a loading tube to be, and Ryzhkov responded "support equipment." -------------- CLOSING -------------- ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov politely stated he had another meeting and must cut their meeting short. Elliott outlined the U.S "way ahead"; the U.S. side would develop a joint draft text and provide it to the Russian side so they could see how the two documents were merged. He stated that the U.S. side would work on the general section and discuss it during the CorE WG meeting on Tuesday (October 27) afternoon. Elliott also stated that the U.S. side would work on shortening Treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov laughed, saying that the Russian Treaty Article VII was very short, only two paragraphs. Elliott stated the U.S. version of Treaty Article VII was also short, only three paragraphs. ¶14. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶15. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS