START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000957 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004 - REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ICBMS AND SLBMS INSPECTED TO DETERMINE THEIR REENRTY VEHICLE LOADING DURING NUCLEAR WARHEAD INSPECTIONS OR INSPECTIONS OF SOA AT OPERATIONAL BASES, INCLUDING THE DEPLOYED NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEM REF: A. STATE 091093 ¶B. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-049 -- Request for Guidance-004. -------------- SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶2. (S) The Russian side has strongly resisted the U.S. proposal to designate two ICBMs or two SLBMs for RV inspection during each nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) under START Follow-on (SFO). The delegation believes that offering to designate only one launcher that contains a deployed missile during such inspections would facilitate completion of SFO negotiations by December 5. Background and analysis are in paragraphs 2-8. Recommendation is in paragraph 10. Guidance requested is in paragraph 11. -------------- BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS -------------- ¶3. (U) During inspections under START, inspectors identified one ICBM or SLBM in a designated launcher for reentry vehicle (RV) inspection. Additionally, inspectors could designate for inspection one launcher that did not contain or was not considered to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM from among those declared not to contain a missile when the inspection team arrived at the base. ¶4. (S) The current U.S.-proposed SFO Inspection Protocol calls for the designation of two ICBM or SLBM launchers during nuclear warhead inspections for the purpose of confirming the number of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles on the ICBMs or SLBMs in or on those launchers (REF A). The U.S. proposal provides for inspecting any launcher not containing an ICBM or SLBM to be counted as one of the two allowed designated launchers subject to inspections. ¶5. (S) The designation of two launchers containing a missile with a missile vice one launcher was based on Intelligence Community (IC) analysis which concluded that the designation of two as opposed to one launcher/missile combination during each NWI would produce a greater degree of confidence regarding the other side's actual numbers of deployed warheads across its ICBM and SLBM forces. The random designation of two launchers/missiles during each inspection (20 launchers/missiles annually, with 2 launchers/missiles inspected at each of 10 anticipated inspections in a given year) would provide better than a 90-percent chance of detecting at least one missile with an RV load-out different from what was declared if 10 percent of the deployed ICBM/SLBM force were actually equipped with a different payload. The designation of only one launcher/missile during each inspection (10 launchers/missiles annually) would require more than 20 percent of the entire ICBM/SLBM force to be deployed with a larger-than-authorized number of warheads to have a 90-percent chance or better of detecting at least one missile with a different load-out than declared. ¶6. (S) The Russian-proposed SFO Inspection Annex 5 (REF B) follows a methodology similar to START by allowing the designation of one launcher containing a missile loaded with RVs/warheads and one launcher considered empty or loaded with zero warheads. ¶7. (S) In a separate RFG, the delegation proposes to combine what used to be the Data Update Inspection with Nuclear Warhead Inspections into a new combined inspection (Begin note: The combined inspection is referred to as a Type 1 inspection. End Note.) that will be conducted at ICBM, SLBM and heavy bomber bases. This approach would add complexity as well as time to complete the new Type 1 combined inspection at an ICBM or SLBM base. The inspection of the warheads deployed on the missiles in or on two rather than one launcher during such a combined inspection would greatly increase the level of effort required and time needed to conduct a combined inspection to the point where it would be unacceptable for an operational base to deal with. Moreover, independent of the idea of creating a combined inspection, the Russian delegation has made it very clear that it will strongly resist any requirement to open up two ICBMs or SLBMs for RV inspection during an NWI. ¶8. (S) Negotiations with the Russian delegation have reached an impasse over this issue, and the Russian delegation has made it clear that it is strongly opposed to conducting an RV inspection on more than one ICBM or SLBM during an NWI or the new combined inspection. ¶9. (S) The delegation believes that there is an opportunity to break this impasse and move forward, if it is given the flexibility to offer that only one ICBM or SLBM launcher with a deployed ICBM or SLBM be designated for RV inspection during an NWI or the new combined inspection. Such an offer would be premised on retaining the Russian proposal to allow as well the designation of one empty launcher for inspection, if any such launchers exist at the base. In addition, this concession should be linked to Russian agreement on an adequate number of such inspections each year. Further, the offer to inspect the number of RVs deployed on only one ICBM or SLBM during a combined inspection will facilitate gaining Russian acceptance of the idea of conducting combined inspections at operational ICBM and SLBM bases. -------------- RECOMMENDATION -------------- ¶10. (S) The delegation recommends Washington grant authorization to offer designation of one rather than two launchers that contain deployed ICBMs or SLBMs with warheads for an NWI provided inspectors are also granted the right to designate and inspect one ICBM or SLBM launcher that is empty, without a front section, or which contains zero warheads on it and that the Russians accept the U.S. position that at least 10 such inspections are allowed each year. -------------- GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶11. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the recommendations contained in paragraph 9. Delegation requests guidance be provided on this issue no later than OOB, Geneva time, on Monday, November 9, 2009. ¶12. (U) Ries sends. GRIFFITHS