START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000955 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) MOU WORKING GROUP CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 23, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0923 (SFO-GVA-VI-017) ¶B. GENEVA 0925 (SFO-GVA-VI-018) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-025. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 23, 2009 Time: 4:30 - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA Mr. Trout Gen Orlov LT Lobner Gen Poznihir TSgt Bennett (Int) Mr. Pischulov Mr..Voloskov -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On October 23, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group chairs met at the U.S. Mission. Participants were Mr. Trout and LT Lobner on the U.S. side, and Gen Orlov, Gen Poznihir, and Mr. Pischulov on the Russian side. At this meeting, Orlov provided Trout a Russian-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for the MOU. The sides also discussed, with no movement on either side, U.S. and Russian approaches to counting warheads associated with heavy bombers. The sides also discussed warhead data and whether notification of, and changes in, such data would be required under the treaty. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: MOU Structure; Warheads and Notifications; Submarine Nomenclature; Drawings and Heavy Bombers; and, Let's Do This Again. -------------- MOU STRUCTURE -------------- ¶5. (S) Orlov began the meeting explaining that the Russian-proposed JDT that he was providing today had four categories of information: proposals by the U.S. side, proposals by the U.S. side which are unacceptable for the Russian side, proposals by the U.S. side which the Russian side concurs and, proposals by the Russian side. He noted that some issues were still being worked internally within the Russian Delegation and, consequently, they were not reflected in this version. Trout asked whether the 
Russian-proposed JDT took into account the U.S. proposal that had been provided to the Russian Delegation the previous day on the U.S. vision of how the U.S. MOU format would convert to the Russian MOU format. Orlov said that it did. (Begin comment: See paragraph 25 for the text of this document. End comment.) -------------- WARHEADS AND NOTIFICATIONS -------------- ¶6. (S) Trout noted that the U.S. proposal of listing warhead data for each launcher was not shown in the text of the Russian-proposed JDT. Orlov replied that Russia had envisioned only providing aggregate warhead numbers for each base, not warhead numbers for individual launchers. Trout asked whether providing this level of openness was unacceptable to Russia. Orlov provided a lengthy dissertation on the relationship between the MOU data, notifications, the ability to move missiles from and between launchers, and individual warhead data. Trout said that, in the U.S. view, there should be no requirement to provide notification of the movement of warheads. ¶7. (S) Poznihir asked Trout to explain the U.S. concept for notifications for warhead data. Trout explained that the U.S. concept was that, every six months, each side would provide a "snapshot" of the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at each facility. This concept did not require individual notifications when warhead data at specific locations changed. Both Orlov and Poznihir questioned the point of listing such data, since it would never be correct at the time of inspection. Trout pointed out that this was a transparency measure and the U.S. side realized that the data may be different from the data reported at the time of an inspection. ¶8. (S) Poznihir questioned the "inconsistent" U.S. logic in that an ICBM or SLBM launcher is "considered to contain" a missile from the time the launcher is created until it is eliminated. However, this U.S. concept did not apply to warheads. Trout suggested that this question be taken up in a different working group. ¶9. (S) Trout further clarified that this sort of information would be more advantageous to the Russians than to the United States since the United States is the only Party that is changing the warhead loadout. Poznihir smiled and said it was for that exact reason that they would consider this idea. ¶10. (S) Orlov asked again about notifications regarding warheads, asking whether there would be notifications, for example, if a missile were to break and the warheads would not be on that missile for some period of time. Trout again replied that the United States did not envision providing notifications for warheads. Poznihir countered by claiming that, logically, if the data changed, a notification should result. Trout responded that the United States wanted to ensure that the treaty language requiring notifications for MOU data would not apply to warhead data. ¶11. (S) Orlov made the point that inspections were structured to determine that there were no more missiles and warheads at the base than declared. However, the warhead data in the MOU would be different than that presented during the inspection. Trout acknowledged that there would be some differences in the data. But the MOU data would be useful in preparing inspection teams for the inspection. It also was logical that inspection teams probably would be more interested in data that changed than data that remained the same. Trout pointed out that there also was the long-term perspective. President Obama wanted the United States and Russia to move to even lower nuclear warhead numbers than those under negotiation now. The provision of warhead numbers for each launcher would promote a higher level of confidence in each Party's understanding of the other Party's strategic forces. He added that this increased confidence would be necessary at lower levels of nuclear weapons. ¶12. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States envisioned this treaty as the first in a series, to which Trout replied yes. Orlov joked that, at this rate, the MOU would get very large with all the U.S. "openness" proposals. ¶13. (S) Poznihir asked about U.S. intentions with respect to de-MIRVing ICBMs. Trout responded that the United States was indeed moving to single warhead ICBMs. During the seven-year reduction period, inspectors would continue to see differences, but after that period they would always see single warhead ICBMs. Orlov again questioned that if the MOU listed all the same number, what was the point of even declaring the data in the MOU. Trout explained that the point of declaring this information was to increase openness and stability between the Parties. -------------- SUBMARINE NOMENCLATURE -------------- ¶14. (S) Pischulov asked whether the United States sought to provide UIDs for submarine hulls. Lobner replied that no, that was not the U.S. proposal. The United States envisioned an alphabetical name would be provided for each SSBN, such as "Alpha." Poznihir asked the U.S. side to clarify that the U.S. proposal would list the warheads on each deployed SLBM, by SSBN, every six months. Lobner confirmed this was the case. ¶15. (S) Pischulov then sought clarification between the listed submarine in the MOU and the name given at the time of inspection. He asked how inspectors could confirm that hull Alpha in the MOU was hull Alpha at the submarine base. Lobner clarified that the U.S. proposal was designed to increase transparency and stability. He noted that Pischulov was correct in understanding that there was no mechanism that could confirm that the submarine listed in the MOU was the same submarine chosen at the submarine base. Trout added that Russia would have to trust us that it was the same boat. He pointed out the warhead loadout would probably stay fairly consistent and Russia could use the warhead count on each deployed SLBM to gain confidence that the MOU submarine with the same alphabetic name as that reported during an inspection was the same submarine. -------------- DRAWINGS AND HEAVY BOMBERS -------------- ¶16. (S) Poznihir switched topics to address the empty PK silos. He asked where the United States intended to declare this data in the MOU. Trout replied that right now, nowhere. Poznihir asked about the B-1B, to which Trout responded that nuclear B-1Bs will be listed in the MOU, but no conventional B-1Bs would appear in the MOU. Both sides agreed this issue still had to be resolved. ¶17. (S) Poznihir turned to the counting of heavy bomber nuclear armaments, asking whether the U.S. position was to count the warheads by counting the number of warheads at the storage location. Trout answered that, yes, the United States had envisioned going to the warhead storage area to count, but we were now considering just counting the ALCMs, and using an attribution type approach so that one ALCM would equal one warhead. Trout also noted the different practices of the two Parties as the United States stored ALCMs with warheads in them while Russia did not have warheads in their ALCMs. ¶18. (S) Poznihir questioned what he called "virtual counting," and began a lengthy explanation using drawings to illustrate the problems the Russian Federation faced with the U.S. concept. ¶19. (S) Trout, throughout the various sketches, reiterated that the time or distance between the base and the storage area did not matter. The Party simply had to ask whether the storage areas supported the heavy bombers at the airbase. If a Party was to conduct a mission, from where would the bombers get the nuclear weapons? ¶20. (S) Both Orlov and Pischulov made their own drawings, illustrating cases where, or near the base, a storage area may only have limited, say 50, ALCMs, but that also relatively nearby, there could be a storage facility that could have considerably more, say 200, ALCMs. They also made the point that even though there might be only 100 ALCMs near the base, there could be 500 ALCMs at a central storage facility. Therefore, within a couple of weeks the heavy bomber base could have 600 ALCMs instead of the 100 declared for the base. They emphasized that Russia could not envision counting all of these weapons under the warhead limit. ¶21. (S) Orlov and Pischulov also made numerous cases regarding the capability of the bomber, similar to the attribution rules in START. Lobner reiterated that, under the U.S. concept, the capability of the bomber or, in other words, how many weapons it could carry was not the important factor and was not required to be declared in the MOU. Rather, the number of weapons at the base, regardless of types of bombers or numbers of bombers located at the airbase, was what should be declared. ¶22. (S) Trout added that, under the Russian concept, nothing counted. He further explained that it was important for the Russian Federation to understand that the concept of not counting any bomber warheads would be a show stopper in the U.S. Senate. Poznihir offered an attribution rule of one warhead per bomber. -------------- LET'S DO THIS AGAIN -------------- ¶23. (S) Orlov concluded the meeting noting that this was a very useful and open discussion, and that he looked forward to smaller group meetings in the future. Trout and Orlov also agreed that working groups should get together twice the following week, starting on Tuesday, if possible. ¶24. (S) Trout thanked Orlov for the Russian proposal and said that the United States was eager to read through it and that, perhaps, it could be discussed at the next meeting. ¶25. (S) Begin text ( U.S. Paper outlining the structure of the MOU): SFO-VI MOU Working Group U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text October 21, 2009 Structure of the Memorandum of Understanding ¶I. AGGREGATE NUMBERS ¶1. FOR EACH PARTY, THE DATA ON AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE AS FOLLOWS: ((2. FOR EACH PARTY, THE DATA ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS AS PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ARE AS FOLLOWS: (I) ICBMS AND ICBM LAUNCHERS (II) SLBMS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS (III) HEAVY BOMBERS))1 ((3. FOR EACH PARTY, ADDITIONAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS RELATED TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY ARE AS FOLLOWS:))1 II. ICBMS, ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON ICBMS III. SLBMS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON SLBMS IV. HEAVY BOMBERS AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON ((HEAVY BOMBERS))1 ((THEM))2 ((IV. STATIC DISPLAYS OF ICBMS, SLBMS, ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS))2 ((V. SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES))1 ((VI. ELIMINATED FACILITIES))1 ANNEXES TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ANNEX A ICBM AND SLBM TECHNICAL DATA ANNEX B HEAVY BOMBER TECHNICAL DATA ANNEX C ((HEAVY BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS))1 ((LONG- RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM))2 TECHNICAL DATA ANNEX D OTHER DATA REQUIRED BY THE TREATY ((ANNEX E OTHER REQUIREMENTS))1 (( ))1 Proposed by the United States. (( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation. End text. ¶26. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text: Structure of the MOU, dated October 21, 2009. - Russia: -- Section II - Database in Relation to Strategic Offensive Arms, (MOU),dated Oct 23, 2009. ¶27. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS