START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000951

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER
23, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0944 (SFO-GVA-VI-014)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-024.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 23, 2009
Time: 4:00 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the October 23, 2009 Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group (WG) meeting, the Russian side presented
and reviewed their revised draft text on CorE. the Russian
Delegation said much of their text was consistent with the
U.S.-proposed text that was delivered to the Russian side the
previous day. Colonel Ryzhkov held the floor for the
majority of the meeting and read through both his talking
points and several sections of the new Russian CorE text
verbatim. While the Russian text contained many
similarities, two conceptual differences emerged, one being a
new "General Rules" section that was intended to serve as a
catch-all for CorE notifications, exhibitions and
inspections, while the other was the concept of permitting
conversions of ICBM and SLBM launchers for use with other
types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Mr. Elliott agreed that the WG had
made considerable progress on both text and general concepts
and reminded both sides that maintaining momentum the
following week would be critical for achieving closure.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A new "General Rules" Chapeau in
the Russian Text, Russian CorE Talking Points and Text, and,
Much Ado About Similar Text.

--------------
A NEW "GENERAL RULES"
CHAPEAU IN THE RUSSIAN TEXT
--------------


5. (S) Ryzhkov began the second meeting of the CorE WG by
thanking Elliott for delivering the latest revision of the
U.S.-proposed CorE text the prior day (REFTEL) and proposed
that the day's WG focused on a section-by-section overview of
the Russian new draft CorE text, followed by a general
discussion of the new ideas and concepts presented in that
text. Elliott replied that, based on the previous day's
one-on-one meeting between he and Ryzhkov, there was much
agreement both technically and textually in the respective
documents.


6. (S) Ryzhkov began his overview by stating that the
Russian side had created a "General Rules" chapeau meant to
capture the large quantity of provisions and notifications
that were repeated throughout the various sections of
previous U.S. texts. Before reading his talking points,
Ryzhkov opined that the "General Rules" chapeau could contain
additional items and invited the U.S. side to provide them.
Ryzhkov then read, verbatim, the Russian "General Rules"
section from the draft document.



Begin text:


1. Part One: Notifications of the conversion or elimination
of strategic offensive arms shall be provided in accordance
with subsection IV of Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty.


2. Part Two: After completion of conversion of an item of
SOA into a different item of SOA or into an item which is not
an item of SOA, the converting Party shall conduct a one-time
exhibition in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article XI of
this Treaty.


3. Part Three: Prior to the initiation of conversion of one
item of SOA into an item which is not an item of SOA, the
converting Party shall conduct a demonstration of the
procedures used within the framework of the BCC.

End text.

--------------
RUSSIAN C OR E TALKING
POINTS AND TEXT
--------------


7. (S) Ryzhkov asked that the U.S. side consider this
approach and pointed out that almost every section of the
U.S.-proposed text had these general provisions throughout.
He stated further that the "General Rules" section could
contain other verbiage that would shorten the document if
common language could be consolidated in this section.
Ryzhkov read through his talking points concerning the main
sections of the Russian CorE text.

Begin text:

Section I in the Russian side's document covers the
procedures for the elimination of ICBMS and SLBMs.

Paragraph one covers the elimination procedures for
liquid fueled ICBMs.

Paragraph two covers the elimination of liquid fueled
SLBMs. (Begin comment: Ryzhkov indicated that these two
sections were almost identical to the U.S. section. End
comment.)

Paragraph three covers the elimination of solid fueled
ICBMs and SLBMs. There is a key procedure followed by two
additional procedures. (Begin comment: This is incorrect.
The Russian text provides the eliminating party three
choices. Two are described in the text and the third is the
"wild card" option. End comment.).

For the elimination of solid fueled ICBMs, the Russian side
would consider the removal of propellant by burning as a key
procedure.

The second procedure is the removal of propellant by another
means, the separation of all missile stages followed by
cutting the first stage into two parts.

The third procedure would be the "wild card" procedure,


meaning that this procedure would be determined by the
eliminating party to render the ICBM or SLBM unusable. The
eliminating party would provide a notification stating what
specific procedures would be used. In the event the other
side disagreed with the stated procedures, the eliminating
party would detail the specific procedures through photos,
displays, slides or other appropriate means at the BCC. That
presentation would be used to persuade the other side that
the procedures were still valid.

The procedures our side lists for the elimination of launch
canisters for ICBMs and loading tubes for SLBMs are very
similar to those of the U.S. side.

There is a notification when the item is eliminated and the
item should remain visible to national technical means (NTM).
I used this section as an example because the provisions and
procedures are common throughout our document.

The final paragraph highlights the fact that an elimination
procedure can be verified by the inspecting team. The
verification is important to prove that the item has been
eliminated

Section II covers the conversion or elimination of ICBM
launchers.

Our side included some new provisions. This section is not
entirely similar to the corresponding U.S. section as it
contains procedures for the conversion of ICBM launchers.

Each party is guided by the future plans of its Strategic
Systems.

Our side is aware that the U.S. does not intend to convert
ICBM launchers. We want to retain this as an option in the
treaty. Section II has two subsections: one covers the
elimination of ICBM launchers the other covers the conversion
of ICBM launchers.

The section covering the elimination of ICBM launchers itself
contains two subsections:

The elimination of silo launchers

The elimination of mobile launchers

With respect to the elimination of silo launchers, both sides
have very similar approaches concerning the mandatory
procedures. However, we have differences in how the
elimination is implemented.

The elimination of mobile launchers section contains a
described procedure, which is the removal or destruction of
the erector/launcher mechanism, as well as the "wild card"
option.

The Russian Federation wants to retain an option for
converting our mobile launchers. For example, we may use the
converted mobile launcher vehicle for agricultural purposes.
As such, we use the "wild card" option for the conversion of
ICBM launchers. In this new treaty, both sides agree to no
limits on the conversion of ICBM launchers from one type of


ICBM to another type of ICBM. The Russian side believes the
converting party should hold an exhibition to remove any
doubt by the inspecting party.

An inspection team can confirm the conversion or elimination
procedures for ICBM launchers.

Section III covers the conversion or elimination of SLBM
launchers.

Our side has minor differences with the U.S. proposal.

We provide for one key procedure for the elimination of SLBM
launchers which is to remove the hatch of the submarine.

Our side also retains the "wild card" option for the
elimination of SLBM launchers.

As for the conversion of SLBM launchers, our text contains
three approaches:

The height or diameter of the launcher shall be decreased so
that the launcher can no longer contain the smallest SLBM
deployed by the possessing party.

Removal of critical components necessary for the launch of
SLBMs.

The third approach is the "wild card" option.

Section four covers the conversion or elimination of Heavy
Bombers.

There are two sections: The elimination of heavy bombers and
the conversion of heavy bombers.

The procedure for the elimination of heavy bombers calls for
the removal of one of the bomber's basic design elements,
which is to say its tail, wings, or fuselage.

The conversion of heavy bombers has two sections:

The conversion of nuclear capable heavy bombers to another
type of nuclear capable heavy bomber; and

The conversion of nuclear capable heavy bombers to
non-nuclear capable heavy bombers.

There is much common text with the U.S. concerning how a
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments will be converted
to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

Section five covers other procedures for removal from
accountability.

Section six covers the elimination of other facilities.

Any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated
for the purposes of the Treaty if all strategic offensive
arms, including training models of missiles, training
launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of
ICBMs, launch-associated support vehicles,
transporter-loaders and driver training vehicles specified


for such a facility have been removed or eliminated.

A notification will be provided upon completion of the
procedures.

Our text provides for follow-on inspections to confirm the
conversion procedures, for example, of SLBM launchers from
nuclear to non-nuclear or the conversion of heavy bombers to
a non-nuclear configuration.

I would like to return to the concepts from Section five,
"Other procedures for removal from accountability." The two
sides have a common approach and language. Allow me to read
from the text.

Part 1 covers Accidental Loss. If, in the judgment of
the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided
for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an
accident, notification thereof shall be provided.

Part 2 covers Disablement Beyond Repair. If, in the
judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under
the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond
repair, notification thereof shall be provided.

Part 3 covers Static Display. Prior to being placed on
static display, ICBMs, SLBMs, launch containers, ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall be
rendered inoperable and unusable so that they cannot be used
for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A notification
shall be provided.

Part four covers heavy bombers for use as ground
trainers. Prior to being used as a ground trainer, a heavy
bomber shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it
cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A
notification shall be provided.

Part five covers flight tests or static testing of ICBMs
and SLBMs. Prior to a flight test or static test of an ICBM
or SLBM, notification thereof shall be provided. An ICBM or
SLBM shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided
for in the Treaty from the date of the flight test or static
test specified in such a notification.

End text.

--------------
MUCH ADO ABOUT SIMILAR TEXT
--------------


8. (S) Elliott said he recognized the agreement between much
of the U.S.- and Russian-proposed texts, while noting that
Russia's section five omitted in many paragraphs the
U.S.-proposed subparagraph (b) wording that the item shall
cease to be subject to the treaty. Ryzhkov declared it was
possible that the Russian proposal contained omissions or
errors and that it should be considered a draft text.
Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that all CorE notifications in
the Russian-proposed text were captured in their new "General
Rules" chapeau. Elliott opined that much progress had been
made during the week and that next week would be critical to
maintaining momentum.




9. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Document of the Russian Side for Section III:
Procedures For Conversion or Elimination, dated October 27,

2009.


10. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
LCDR Brons
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Strauss
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Col Izrazov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Zharkikh
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


11. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS