(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): ONE-ON-ONE HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING,
OCTOBER 21, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA XXX (SFO-GVA-VI-007)

B. GENEVA 0920 (SFO-GVA-VI-009)

C. STATE 107748 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-010.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 21, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

A/S Gottemoeller Amb Antonov
Ms. Purcell

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On October 21, 2009, United States Head of Delegation
(HOD) Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller met with Russian HOD
Ambassador Antonov at the Russian Mission. Antonov began to
elaborate some new Russian positions regarding missile
defense (MD),strategic offensive arms (SOAs) equipped with
non-nuclear warheads, and numerical limits on ICBM and SLBM
launchers. He appeared open to addressing MD in a separate
document from the treaty as long as it was legally-binding.
He also appeared open to permitting non-nuclear warheads on
strategic offensive delivery vehicles as long as both were
accountable under the treaty. Antonov offered no flexibility
on Russia's proposed limit of 600 deployed and non-deployed
launchers. He continued to reject the concept of counting
and inspecting heavy bomber nuclear armaments in storage.
Tentative agreement was reached on the text of a joint
statement recognizing the contributions of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, to be issued upon expiration of the
START Treaty.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Russia's Need for Missile Defense
Guarantees; Russian Concerns About Non-Nuclear SOA; Launcher
Numbers and Deployment Status; Aversion to WSA Inspections;
START Expiration Joint Statement and Ukraine; Heads-Up on
Bridging Agreement.

--------------
RUSSIA'S NEED FOR MISSILE
DEFENSE GUARANTEES
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov began with a discussion of
Russia's MD concerns. Referring to a U.S. suggestion made
during lunch the previous day that a side agreement on MD
might be developed (REF A),Antonov reiterated that Russia
was not attempting to constrain either the numbers or
locations of U.S. MD systems. Russia recognized that the
treaty the Parties were working on to replace the START
Treaty would cover only SOAs. However, given the fact that
there was no longer an ABM Treaty, Russia required a written,
legally-binding guarantee at the Presidential level of


certain commitments. These were:

- not to convert ICBM or SLBM launchers for use with MD
interceptor missiles;

- not to convert MD interceptor launchers for use with ICBMs
or SLBMs;

- not to give MD interceptor missiles the capabilities or
characteristics of ICBMs or SLBMs;

- there would be verifiable differences.

He added that the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)
could be tasked to agree on verifiable differences that
ICBMs, SLBMs, and their launchers would have from MD
interceptor missiles and launchers. These did not need to be
functional differences. Transparency measures could be
developed.


6. (S) Antonov said he was not yet ready to talk about the
exact format of the agreement, but he referred to a piece of
paper, which he said he had discussed with his lawyers. The
agreement would have to be legally-binding, and would assure
Russia that U.S. MD would not be used against Russia's
strategic deterrent, at least for the lifetime of the new
treaty. He commented that the "fourth phase" of U.S. MD
development would only occur after the new treaty had gone
out of force (ca. 2020) and, therefore, the issue could be
dealt with in the future. By that time, he joked, he would
be retired, and it would be someone else's headache.
Although the United States had decided not to deploy the MD
"third site," Antonov continued to see alarming articles in
the press about various U.S. plans for MD elements in Poland,
the Czech Republic and Ukraine. Without a legally-binding
guarantee, Russian suspicions about the purpose of European
MD systems would remain.


7. (S) Gottemoeller expressed the hope that, over time, not
only would the United States reassure Russia about U.S. MD
systems, but would begin joint MD programs with Russia. The
United States would be prepared to develop a separate joint
statement, but could not agree to include MD provisions in
the START Follow-on Treaty itself. Antonov expressed
confidence that agreement could be reached on the format.
The treaty itself would provide that there were no
limitations on systems other than SOA, and would reflect the
current level of MD. There could be a separate joint
statement, which would not use treaty wording. He also
stated that, although he was not yet ready to talk about it,
nor was he ready to hand over the paper he had discussed with
his lawyers, he was confident a compromise solution could be
found to the proposal that Russia had made relating MDs to
withdrawal from the treaty.

--------------
RUSSIAN CONCERNS
ABOUT NON-NUCLEAR SOA
--------------


8. (S) Antonov mused that the term "ban" with respect to
non-nuclear SOA would sound negative to the U.S. Senate. He
had noticed U.S. efforts in the negotiations not to constrain


possible future research and development. But failure to
constrain non-nuclear SOA would cause commentators in Moscow
to conclude that the new treaty facilitated actual U.S.
employment of ICBMs and SLBMs. If U.S. strategic missiles
were employed as non-nuclear weapons, Russian generals who
lived through the Cold War would suspect that they would be
launched with nuclear warheads the next time. This would
become an increasing concern, even a serious irritant in
U.S.-Russian relations. Nevertheless, there was not really
time now to negotiate the ban on deployment of such weapons
that Russia had been proposing.


9. (S) Antonov suggested that, instead of a ban, all U.S.
non-nuclear warheads and their associated delivery vehicles
would be accountable and would be considered nuclear for
treaty purposes. Subsequent negotiations could determine how
to resolve the specific issue of employment of non-nuclear
ICBMs and SLBMs. Gottemoeller acknowledged that such an
approach would buy some time, noting that Russia was also
developing non-nuclear SOAs. Antonov quipped that Russia
always copied what the United States did.

--------------
LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND
DEPLOYMENT STATUS
--------------


10. (S) Gottemoeller asked for Antonov's thinking about
numerical limits on launchers. Antonov said he had heard
from his delegation what the United States discussed at the
morning's Ad-Hoc Group Meeting (REF B). They perceived that
the U.S. side could not live with fewer than 850 launchers.
Russia's proposed number was 600 launchers, which was
consistent with the structure of Russia's nuclear deterrent.
It would be difficult for the Russian Delegation to accept a
limit as high as 700 launchers; that would be criticized in
Moscow. Gottemoeller noted the main problem was that the
U.S. and Russian force structures differed. Antonov
concluded that the Presidents would need to discuss numerical
limits on November 15. (Begin comment: Antonov was
referring to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Summit scheduled for November 15-16 in Singapore. End
comment.)


11. (S) Antonov complained that the U.S. concept for when
systems would be considered deployed and non-deployed was
unrealistic and inconsistent. After Russia finally agreed to
count the number of warheads actually deployed, the United
States wanted to consider launchers deployed even when they
were not carrying missiles, and to count warheads that were
not loaded on heavy bombers. Gottemoeller acknowledged the
contradiction with the "considered to contain" concept in the
U.S. proposal, but reminded Antonov about the difficulty of
constantly notifying changes every time a missile was placed
in or removed from a deployed launcher.

--------------
AVERSION TO WSA INSPECTIONS
--------------


12. (S) Gottemoeller inquired whether Russia was willing to
count and permit inspections of air-launched cruise missiles
(ALCMs) in storage. Antonov had nothing good to say about


this U.S. proposal. The storage facilities on both sides
contained many other items besides the items subject to
inspection. The other items were sensitive and would have to
be concealed, which would only result in each side suspecting
the other of cheating. It would also be too easy to remove
ALCMs or bombs to another facility before inspectors arrived,
and return them after inspectors departed. The sides would
gain nothing from these types of inspections. The START
experience with these types of inspections had been "very
bad."


13. (S) In response to Gottemoeller's prediction that the
next treaty would cover all warheads in storage, Antonov
acknowledged that warhead transparency and tactical nuclear
weapons might be topics for future negotiations, but it was
not possible to address that at this stage. There was still
too much suspicion between the sides, and there was not
enough time to negotiate access to warheads in the START
Follow-on Treaty. Gottemoeller reiterated the importance of
building a foundation for future negotiations. It was
necessary to begin a process of inspecting ALCMs in storage
so as to build such a foundation. Antonov countered that
negotiations conducted with frankness and understanding of
the other side's concerns would build a sufficient foundation
for the future. Implementing the new treaty would also build
trust.


14. (S) Gottemoeller continued to press. RosAtom had been
accepting U.S. observation at its fissile material storage
facilities for many years, so why was it impossible for the
Ministry of Defense? The United States was not asking for
access into actual warhead facilities, only to the ALCM
storage facilities associated with air bases. Antonov
confessed he did not know the technical reason. But the
Russian Delegation could not identify any benefit to their
side.

--------------
START EXPIRATION JOINT
STATEMENT AND UKRAINE
--------------


15. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov went through Russia's edits
to the U.S.-proposed text of a joint statement by Russia and
the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, in
connection with the expiration of START (REF C, Paragraphs
12-18). They reached agreement on the wording of the text.
Gottemoeller undertook to provide a clean copy (text follows
below) that the sides could confirm was agreed
"ad-referendum." Antonov promised to provide the text in
Russian translation and to send the document to Moscow for
approval.

Begin text (Version of the Joint Statement agreed
ad-referendum, provided the following day):

U.S.-Proposed
Joint Draft Text
October 22, 2009

JOINT STATEMENT
by the United States of America and the Russian Federation
in Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty


on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Russian Federation
recognize the significant contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to
successful implementation of the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(START Treaty).

The value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced when
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine removed all nuclear weapons from their territories
and acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states. The actions of
these states have enhanced the NPT regime, had a beneficial
impact on international security and strategic stability, and
created favorable conditions for further steps to reduce
nuclear arsenals.

The United States of America and the Russian Federation
welcome the commitment of the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to their status as
non-nuclear weapon states. The fulfillment by these states
of their obligations under the Protocol to the START Treaty
of May 23, 1992 (Lisbon Protocol) and their accession to the
NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, strengthened their
security, which was reflected, inter alia, in the Budapest
Memoranda of December 5, 1994. In this connection, the
United States of America and the Russian Federation confirm
that the assurances recorded in the Budapest Memoranda will
remain in force after December 4, 2009.

End text.


16. (S) Antonov informed Gottemoeller that Ukrainian JCIC
Representative Nykonenko had called him and was coming to
Geneva on October 30. He planned to meet with Nykonenko and
asked whether Gottemoeller also would do so. At the same
time, Antonov considered that the Ukrainians were trying to
play Russia and the United States off against each other.
Antonov had not provided the draft joint statement to any
other Party, although all had asked to see it. He and
Gottemoeller agreed it was not yet time to provide the text,
and that they should not accept comments on it from Belarus,
Kazakhstan or Ukraine. They would decide later when the
joint statement should be initialed and by what level
officials.


17. (S) Antonov added that Ukraine was always talking about
security assurances. Russia believed this issue should be
addressed in the NPT context, since it would affect P-5
relations with the other non-nuclear weapons states if they
gave special security guarantees to certain states. The
United States and Russia should work together on this, and
with Ukraine. However, Antonov said he had not found
willingness on the U.S. side to engage.

--------------
HEADS-UP ON BRIDGING AGREEMENT
--------------


18. (S) Antonov revealed he had received a message from


Ambassador Kislyak in Washington after Kislyak's meeting the
previous week with Under Secretary of State Tauscher.
Kislyak had conveyed to Antonov that the United States was
developing an option for the U.S. and Russian Presidents to
agree on a legally-binding framework agreement by December 5,
and that the U.S. proposed discussing such an agreement
during the Summit. Antonov complained that completing such
an interim document and obtaining its ratification by the
Duma would require Russia to halt the negotiations on START
Follow-on.


19. (S) Gottemoeller said she would check with U/S Tauscher,
but she believed there was a misunderstanding. The United
States was not planning for a framework agreement. The
United States was looking at a possible bridging arrangement
to provide for the continuation of notifications,
transparency, and data exchanges during the period between
the expiration of START and entry into force of the new
treaty. She promised to discuss the U.S. ideas at a later
date, but emphasized the need to continue focusing on the new
treaty. Her instructions were to finish the treaty by
December 5.


20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text: "Joint Statement by
the United States of America and the Russian Federation in
Connection with the Expiration of the Treaty on the Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," (Agreed ad
referendum and provided the following day, October 22, 2009.)


21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS