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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP CHAIRMENS'
COFFEE, OCTOBER 22, 2009

REF: STATE 99070-(SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003A) AND STATE
99072-(SFO-V-GUIDANCE-003B)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-014.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 22, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

Mr. Elliott Col Ryzhkov
Lt Col Goodman Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Hopkins (Int Ms. Komshiliova (Int)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. Chairman of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group (WG),Mr. Elliott, hosted his Russian
counterpart, Colonel Ryzhkov, for coffee on October 22, 2009
at the U.S. Mission, to discuss the U.S.-proposed CorE
protocol delivered to the Russian side that morning. Elliott
first reviewed the layout of the document and said that many
sections were close to being agreed. Elliott and Ryzhkov
clarified U.S. and Russian positions in those areas where
there was no agreement. Finally, the Chairmen agreed on the
schedule of work for the October 23 meeting and the following
week.


4. (S) Relations between the two Chairmen were very cordial
and they discussed the issues frankly. Many positions held
by the Russian side were discussed in a more open manner than
they had been with the entire delegation present. Although
this meeting was intended only to discuss the way ahead, it
served to broach many important issues and set the stage for
negotiations within the WG structure.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The U.S.-proposed CorE Protocol;
and, After the Closing.

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THE U.S.-PROPOSED CORE PROTOCOL
--------------


6. (S) Elliott began the meeting by presenting the overall
structure of the U.S. proposal for the CorE Protocol. He
then proceeded, section-by-section, to explain where the U.S.
proposal differed from the U.S. official CorE protocol
delivered to the Russian Federation on September 24, 2009
(REFTEL).


7. (S) Elliott began with Section I "Elimination of ICBMs
and SLBMs." Ryzhkov laughed and showed Elliott his document
(in Russian) with the same heading for Section I. Ryzhkov
stated that in many of the sections both sides have the same
language and it will be very easy to agree. Elliott
continued, stating that Section I now contained three


subsections: 1) Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs, 2)
Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers and
3) Procedures for Elimination of SLBMs. The ICBM and SLBM
elimination sections were pulled from the U.S.-proposed
treaty text (Article VII). Elliott explained the differences
in the U.S.-proposed elimination of ICBMs for mobile
launchers of ICBMs by highlighting the simplified procedures
and the facts that, under the revised U.S. approach, the
self-contained dispensing mechnaism (SCDM) was no longer
eliminated and that inspectors would not observe the entire
elimination process but rather the final elimination of all
missile stages. Ryzhkov listened intently taking copious
notes.


8. (S) Elliott continued with Section II "Launchers for silo
launchers of ICBMs." Ryzhkov politely interrupted Elliott
and, again laughing, showed his document (in Russian) with
highlighted text for Section II. He explained that the
highlighted language is where the Russian side had adopted
the U.S.-proposed language. Ryzhkov stated that the Russian
side felt this section was "almost ready" and the sides had
common ground in this area. Ryzhkov stated he would like to
comment on Section I. The Russian proposal also contained
three subsections: 1) Procedures for Elimination of Liquid
Fueled ICBMs, 2) Procedures for Elimination of Liquid Fueled
SLBMs and 3) Procedures for Elimination of Solid Fueled ICBMs
and SLBMs. He said the elimination process for solid
missiles is: 1) burning of all stages, 2) cut first stage
motor case into two parts, and 3) other procedures
(U.S.-proposed wild card option).


9. (S) Ryzhkov continued the discussion by outlining the
structure for each section. Each section follows the same
construct with four steps:

- Notification of intent to eliminate. This
notification must contain the procedures the eliminating
Party intends to use. The Party receiving such notification
can agree or disagree with the procedures. If the Party
agrees, the elimination proceeds as scheduled. If the Party
does not agree, the elimination is halted and the issue will
be discussed in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).
It is the burden of the eliminating Party to
present/demonstrate the procedures at the BCC to convince the
other Party that the procedures render the strategic
offensive arm (SOA) inoperative and preclude it for use for
its original purpose.

- Following notification, the procedures are completed.

- Notification of completion of elimination is sent.

- Within 30 days, the other Party has a right to inspect
to confirm the procedures were accomplished.


10. (S) Elliott asked what happened if the two sides do not
agree in the BCC. Ryzhkov responded that he was confident
the sides would agree and that it was the burden of the Party
conducting the elimination to convince the other Party that
the procedures meet the two basic requirements (render the
SOA inoperative and preclude it for use for its original
purpose). Ryzhkov further stated that the strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia was such


that the disagreements of the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC) would not occur under the BCC. Elliott
then inquired about the timing of the BCC. He stated that
the BCC would only meet twice per year and if the sides did
not agree there could be significant time before it could be
resolved, thus effectively blocking the elimination process.
Ryzhkov responded that special sessions could be called but,
again, he was confident the sides would agree. Ryzhkov
stated the Russian side intended to provide monthly
notifications of the elimination schedule.


11. (S) Elliott continued the discussion by proceeding to
Section III, "Elimination of Launchers for Mobile Launchers
of ICBMs." He highlighted the differences in the
U.S.-proposed elimination procedure by highlighting the
simplified procedures and stated that inspectors would not
observe the entire elimination process but rather the final
elimination steps. Ryzhkov again listened intently and took
copious notes. Moving on to Section IV, "Conversion and
Elimination of SLBM Launchers," Elliott stated that the CorE
of SBLM launchers had been separated into two sections.
Simplified procedures are introduced as well as removing the
time limit for elimination of 270 days. Elliott continued by
stating that the substance in this section is very similar to
the Russian side. Ryzhkov agreed and stated that, for
elimination of SLBM launchers, the Russian side saw a key
procedure of removing the launch tube hatches as mandatory.
There would then be other procedures applied to the launcher
to render them inoperable as decided by the possessing Party.
Elliott noted that the U.S. side would probably not use the
SLBM elimination procedures during this treaty. Ryzhkov
answered that the Russian side would use the elimination
procedures. For conversion, Ryzhkov indicated his view that
the key procedure for an SLBM launcher would be to modify the
height of diameter of the launch tube and other procedures
applied to the launcher to render them incapable for their
original purpose, as determined by the possessing Party.
Elliott noted that the U.S. side may elect to use the
conversion procedures and were, therefore, looking at them
very closely. Ryzhkov nodded, but did not say whether the
Russian side would or would not utilize the conversion
procedures. Elliott stated that the U.S. side understood
that a Party may convert an individual SLBM launch tube or a
whole submarine. Ryzhkov said that was okay and the Russian
side agreed. Elliott again noted, under the U.S. concept,
that it would be permissible under the treaty to convert from
one type of SOA to another type of SOA (i.e., remaining
nuclear) but that procedures for such a conversion were not
required in the CorE Protocol.


12. (S) Elliott began his explanation of Section IV,
"Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers," and again
Ryzhkov politely interrupted Elliott to say the Russian side
had not accepted the U.S. proposal in this section. To which
Elliott nodded. Ryzhkov further stated that the Russian side
had accepted the U.S. proposal in Section V, "Other
Procedures for Removal from Accountability," and said the
Russian side's position was very close on Section VI,
"Elimination of Facilities." Ryzhkov read the Russian
section on elimination of facilities. "A facility shall be
considered eliminated when all SOA declared for the facility
including Training Models of Missiles (TMOMs),fixed
structures, support vehicles, driver training vehicles have


been removed or eliminated," with notification in accordance
with (IAW) the appropriate section and an inspection visit if
the Party so desired.

--------------
AFTER THE CLOSING
--------------


13. (S) While Mr. Smirnov excused himself to smoke, Ryzhkov
asked Elliott to explain the heavy bomber counting rules the
U.S. side had presented in the plenary meeting. Elliott
explained it was his understanding that Russian ALCMs are
stored without their warheads while the U.S. ALCMs are stored
as units with their warheads. Elliott noted that the warhead
could not get to a target without the associated cruise
missile and that the United States would therefore agree to
count the Russian cruise missiles only; which was essentially
considering the ALCMs to contain a warhead. Ryzhkov agreed
that Elliott had correctly described the Russian storage
procedure, but reiterated that the Russian side did not have
bombers uploaded with weapons and, therefore, there were no
deployed warheads. Elliott agreed, but went on to say that
neither did the United States have weapons loaded on bombers
or sitting alert and that this was the point. It would not
be logical to say that the sides had no warheads for their
nuclear bombers. Ryzhkov indicated the Russian side believed
there was a flaw in the U.S. logic in that while only
warheads mated on ICBMS and SLBMs counted, we sought to count
ALCMs not loaded on heavy bombers. Elliott said he
understood this view, but that the U.S. side, due to the
nature of bombers and their inherent ability to be loaded in
a relatively short period of time, felt it very important to
have some level of accounting for these weapons. He also
stated that both sides would look silly in their respective
capitals if they ignored the bomber counting issue. Ryzhkov
said he better understood and would study the possibility of
a distance or time restriction for the storage of ALCMs from
a heavy bomber base.


14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS