START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000943 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-002, U.S. PROPOSAL FOR COUNTING HEAVY BOMBER (HB) NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-044.-- Request for Guidance-002. -------------- SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶2. (S) The Russian side continues to resist the U.S. concept for counting Heavy Bomber (HB) Nuclear Armaments. Russia's concern is based on 1) the mode of storing Long-Range Nuclear-Armed Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (LRNA),2) permitting U.S. inspectors into its sensitive weapons storage areas and 3) the issue of U.S. upload potential. Background and analysis are in paragraphs 3-5. Recommendations are in paragraphs 6-8. Guidance requested is in paragraph 9. -------------- BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS -------------- ¶3. (S) For several reasons, the Russian side continues to struggle with the U.S. approach for counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments, which includes a provision calling for counting LRNA and nuclear gravity bombs that are not loaded on deployed heavy bombers in the nuclear armament weapons storage areas that are associated with the deployed HB bases. First, the Russian LRNA storage procedure is to de-mate the nuclear warhead from each LRNA and to store the warheads in special nuclear weapons storage sites located 5-15 km outside the HB bases. Cruise missile airframes are stored in separate weapons storage areas located on the heavy bomber bases. The U.S. argues that since the LRNA warhead can only reach its target if carried in an LRNA, the accountable item for heavy bomber nuclear armaments should be the LRNA in which a warhead can be loaded. Second, the Russian side has not embraced the idea of having inspectors look inside their weapons storage bunkers in light of their desire to not reveal their classified information. Third, the Russian side has expressed the view that there is nothing in the U.S. approach for them. Russian delegates argue the U.S. could simply transport additional LRNA to its bomber bases and then upload them whether they are stored nearby or hundreds of miles away from the HB base. Concerns regarding U.S. upload capability are a central theme of the Russians, but addressing them has not been a U.S. key negotiating objective in this treaty. ¶4. (S) The delegation sees a possible scenario in which LRNA airframes would be counted as a means to confirm declared numbers of Russian nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. This concept has been presented to the Russian delegation, but has not received a positive reception. ¶5. (S) In order to increase chances of reaching agreement on counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments in nuclear armaments weapons storage facilities and to begin to address the issue of weapons upload capability, the delegation seeks to introduce a proposal to create the category of non-deployed LRNA and to store these non-deployed LRNA in a central storage facility that are located far from the bases for deployed heavy bombers. Delegation believes this approach may help convince the Russian side to agree to count and inspect deployed LRNA in weapons storage areas at HB bases and to similarly treat non-deployed LRNA located at the central storage facility. This approach would also aid both parties in monitoring LRNA upload capability. -------------- RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶6. (S) Delegation recommends Washington consider a proposal consisting of the generic elements described in paragraphs 7-8 below. ¶7. (S) Excess LRNA airframes would be removed from heavy bombers bases and stored as non-deployed LRNA at declared storage facilities which would be subject to inspection. LRNA airframes located at declared storage facilities would be reported in the Memorandum of Understanding as non-deployed LRNA. Using procedures developed within the Inspection Protocol for inspections of non-deployed SOA, the Parties would confirm the declared number of non-deployed LRNA stored in these storage facilities. ¶8. (S) Heavy bomber nuclear armaments loaded on deployed heavy bombers and in nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with air bases where deployed heavy bombers are based would be counted as the deployed nuclear warheads for deployed heavy bombers. Their numbers would be confirmed using inspection procedures as established in the Inspection Protocol. Under these procedures the U.S. would verify the number of Russian heavy bomber nuclear armaments in the nuclear armaments weapons storage area by counting the LRNA airframes stored there. Each LRNA would be assumed to contain one nuclear warhead. The Russians would be expected to move non-deployed LRNA to storage facilities located far from their HB bases, to report their number in the MOU and its periodic update and possibly to permit reciprocal inspection of these storage areas to confirm the number of declared non-deployed LRNA. -------------- GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶9. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the recommendations contained in paragraphs 6-8. ¶10. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS