START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000942 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-003, MODIFIED SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE (SLBM) LAUNCHER ELIMINATION PROCEDURES REF: A. STATE 99070-(SFO-V GUIDANCE-003A) AND STATE 99072-(SFO-GUIDANCE-003B) ¶B. STATE 91018 (SFO-GUIDANCE-001) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-045 -- Request for Guidance-003. -------------- SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶2. (S) The delegation proposes a compromise SLBM launcher elimination procedure for incorporation into the START Follow-on Treaty (SFO). The procedure would allow an eliminating party to exclude affected SLBM launchers from the limitations of the treaty as soon as missile tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed, similar to the original START Treaty. The affected SSBN would then have to remain visible to NTM until the missile section is removed from the submarine. Background and analysis are provided in paragraphs 3-7. Recommendation is in paragraph ¶8. Guidance requested is in paragraph 14. -------------- BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS -------------- ¶3. (S) In accordance with the U.S. position detailed in the U.S.-proposed draft STARET Follow-on Conversion or Elimination Protocol (REFS A and B),as modified by REF C, the U.S. Delegation has attempted to negotiate agreement on SLBM launcher elimination procedures for SFO with the Russian side. From the outset, the Russian side has insisted on a simplified, minimalist approach to SLBM launcher elimination consisting of missile tube hatch removal or hatch destruction. The Russian side has argued that the point of such elimination is to ensure the affected launcher is rendered incapable of launching SLBMs and that, although other additional procedures might be employed by the eliminating Party, the simple act of hatch removal or hatch destruction by itself is sufficient to achieve this aim. The U.S. assesses that the Russian proposal is inadequate because it is too easy to reverse as compared to other approaches discussed below. ¶4. (S) The U.S. understands that missile tube hatch removal would prevent the eliminating Party from employing the affected tube as a launcher for an SLBM. However, the U.S. Delegation believes that an item's elimination must result in a very difficult to reverse change to an item that renders it completely inoperable as a launcher of SLBMs . The initial U.S. proposal (REFS A and B) required either 1) complete removal of the missile section from the SSBN or 2) complete dismantlement of the missile section of the SSBN prior to removal from treaty accountability. This language was extracted from the original START Treaty, and conforms closely to existing U.S. procedures for SSBN decommissioning. However, those procedures did not permit removal of the SSBN from START accountability prior to completion of all of the elimination procedures. ¶5. (S) The Russian side has pointed out, correctly, that only Russia intends to eliminate SLBM launchers by decommissioning SSBNs during the planned life of the SFO Treaty. Since they plan to decommission many older SSBNs, they argue that the U.S.-proposed elimination procedures are cost-prohibitive, excessive, and therefore unacceptable. ¶6. (S) It should be noted that Russia has completely accepted the U.S.-proposed concept for SLBM launcher conversion. Russia currently has no intention of converting any SLBM launchers during the life of the SFO Treaty. ¶7. (S) The U.S. Delegation has developed a proposed compromise procedure described below that would provide the Russian side some short-term cost savings while providing adequate elimination measures in the long run and appropriate opportunities for effective verification via NTM, which are required by the U.S. -------------- RECOMMENDATIONS -------------- ¶8. (S) Delegation recommends a revised SLBM launcher elimination proposal provided in paragraphs 9-12. These steps would replace existing SLBM launcher elimination procedures in the U.S.-proposed Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Delegation will draft the relevant provisions for inclusion in the Protocol upon approval of this recommendation. ¶9. (S) The ballistic missile submarine must remain at the location for implementing the elimination process and be visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process as provided for in paragraphs 10 and 11: ¶10. (S) All missile launch tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings must be removed from the ballistic missile submarine. ¶11. (S) The missile section must be removed from the ballistic missile submarine. ¶12. (S) Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, the SLBM launchers would cease to be subject to the aggregate limit on SLBMs and their associated launchers provided for in Article II of the Treaty. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraphs 11, the SLBM launchers eliminated would cease to be subject to ny provisions of the Treaty. -------------- GUIDANCE REQUESTED -------------- ¶13. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the modified U.S. position regarding SLBM launcher elimination procedures as outlined above in paragraphs 9-12 or provide alternative proposal. ¶14. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS