START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Monday, 02 November 2009, 12:16
S E C R E T GENEVA 000936
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
EO 12958 DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS KACT, MARR, PARM, PREL, RS, US, START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 22, 2009
REF: GENEVA 0626 (SFO-GVA-III-001)
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-012.

2. (U) Meeting Date: October 22, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------

3. (S) At the plenary meeting on October 22, chaired by U.S. Negotiator Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and Russian Negotiator Ambassador Antonov, the sides focused on ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration. Following a U.S. presentation on the subject, the Russian side asked several questions and commented on the problems associated with such systems, which were generally consistent with concerns expressed throughout the SFO Treaty negotiations. While some parts of the discussion explored new aspects of the problem, the discussion did not reach the point of resolving specific treaty issues, leaving this to the working groups.

4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments: Ratification Warm-up and Other Areas of U.S.-Russian Cooperation; U.S. Presentation on Strategic Missile Systems in a Non-Nuclear Configuration; Familiar Russian Points; and, Newer Elements of Interest and Concern.
--------------
OPENING COMMENTS: RATIFICATION WARM-UP AND OTHER AREAS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION
--------------

5. (S) Antonov began the meeting and noted the contrast between the calm, professional approach to the SFO negotiations in Geneva and the increasing excitement in Washington. This included Senator Kyl’s recent statement on the negotiations and a possible link with ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),as well as meetings that Ambassador Kislyak had recently in Washington with U.S. representatives. This “excitement” had generated a lot of interest in Moscow. Antonov explained that, as a result, Mr. Koshelev was not able to attend the plenary, as he had been called to provide a status report to Moscow.

6. (S) Antonov noted that the delegations were engaged more each day in Geneva on key issues, and that by the end of this round the delegations would need to draw conclusions about progress and outstanding requirements for the negotiations. He noted that Presidents Obama and Medvedev would have the opportunity to meet on the margins of the November 11-13 meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council, and suggested they should discuss one or two key issues related to the SFO Treaty. Antonov said he hoped the United States was considering a similar approach.

7. (S) Gottemoeller characterized the activities in Washington as a warm-up for the ratification debate. There
would be continuing interest regarding the SFO Treaty, although this would actually be the first phase of a two-part debate. Debate on CTBT ratification would be next. Senator Kyl, among others, had made a link between ratification of the SFO Treaty and CTBT, and had said that unless there was an adequate budget for the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, he would oppose ratification of the SFO Treaty. These types of statements and concerns were a reality of the political environment, and the negotiators should not be surprised by them.

8. (S) Changing subjects, Gottemoeller noted news reports from the previous day, including the news from Vienna on the proposal for Iran to provide low enriched uranium to Russia for processing and subsequent shipment to France for production of medical isotopes. She also noted the United Nations report on opium production in Afghanistan, and the problems this generated throughout Europe, including Russia. Both stories touched on important and emerging areas for cooperation between the United States and Russia: peaceful nuclear energy and counter-narcotics.

9. (S) Antonov agreed and noted, in particular, that once the United States finalized the 123 Agreement, there would be much more effective cooperation. Further, U.S. agreement for Russia to become a member of the Australia Group would signal that the Cold War was really over.

10. (S) Gottemoeller acknowledged Antonov’s point regarding the Australia Group, and shared her belief that the 123 Agreement would indeed be completed, noting the legislative process in the United States that would need to be involved.
--------------
U.S. PRESENTATION ON STRATEGIC MISSILE SYSTEMS IN A NON-NUCKEAR CIBFUGURATION
--------------

11. (S) Gottemoeller turned to the issue of strategic ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. She noted that she hoped to explore the issue further with Russia to resolve it in a mutually satisfactory manner. The sides needed to consider the issue in the context of the treaty they were negotiating, and find solutions that would be acceptable for the duration of the treaty. The United States had not made a decision on deployment of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs; it would do so after considering all factors. Russia needed to play a role in this process, including discussing the potential impact of these systems on strategic stability. This process had begun and would be continued. The negotiators, however, needed to focus on developing a solution that would work for the duration of the treaty.

12. (S) Mr. Elliott delivered the following points, in response to the July 22, 2009 Russian paper entitled “Proposals of the Russian Side for the Wording of the Provisions on ICBMs and SLBMs in a Non-nuclear Configuration to be Included in the Text of the New Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms” (REFTEL):
Begin points:
- The United States is considering the development and deployment of ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. However, no decision has been made regarding the possible deployment of such systems. Nevertheless, it is not a fair characterization to say such systems will someday represent a significant segment of the U.S. strategic arsenal. The United States is committed to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and is therefore studying the potential for use of non-nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles to perform a narrow range of missions, some of which currently could only be accomplished with nuclear weapons.
- Recent threats against the United States and its Allies cannot be ignored, nor can they be addressed solely with existing precision-guided, conventional strike capabilities. The time and place in which a serious threat to U.S. national security may appear cannot be predicted with precision, nor can one reasonably expect to have general purpose forces everywhere they might be needed in order to prevent an attack. Therefore, military planners must prepare to defend against attacks that may originate from deep within denied areas or for which only a fleeting opportunity is available to prevent the attack. Strategic ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration, fielded in relatively small numbers, offer the potential means of striking the most serious threats posed by hostile state or non-state actors, over great distances, with precision, little warning, or prospect of escape. Proponents believe that possession of such powerful weapons will better deter hostile regional adversaries because their use is more plausible.
- Bearing in mind the U.S. Government has made no decision to develop or deploy ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration, and acknowledging the Russian side’s view that use of such weapons would be highly ineffective and could cause significant casualties among civilian populations, the U.S. Government will make a decision to deploy such weapons after consideration of all factors and the potential of non-nuclear ballistic missiles for improving U.S. national security.
- The Russian side has also raised the issue of the potential “nuclear ambiguity” associated with an attack carried out with non-nuclear armed strategic ballistic missiles, in a fashion similar to a debate held within the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 2007. In that debate, some expressed concern that the use of non-nuclear warheads on long-range ballistic missiles in an attack would be indistinguishable from a strike carried out with a long-range ballistic missile armed with nuclear warheads and that the ensuing ambiguity could lead to a catastrophic response from a third party--ostensibly Russia.
- An exhaustive National Academy of Sciences study of these systems completed in 2008 concluded that while the issue of warhead ambiguity during employment of conventional prompt global strike systems should not be ignored, when viewed in the strategic context in which such a missile launch might occur, and, combined with available transparency and crisis management procedures, the United States could effectively manage the potential warhead ambiguity concerns. Put more directly, Russia would know it was not in the midst of a grave crisis with the United States when such a strike might occur and, with the aid of such potentially useful
notification and transparency mechanisms as the respective Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),would be able to make an informed and prudent decision regarding the nature of the ballistic missile strike being carried out and thus be able to select the appropriate Russian response to a U.S. long-range, conventional strike on a third party.
- The National Academy of Sciences also concluded that, although it would be impossible to distinguish a conventionally-armed ballistic missile from a nuclear-armed ballistic missile when the missile is in flight, U.S. global strikes by conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs would need to be carried out in a manner that avoided over-flight of Russian territory.
- The Academy further concluded that steps could be taken to notify the Russian Government in advance of an impending strike via the U.S./Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or possibly through the newly-created JDEC. In addition, the JDEC’s shared ballistic missile detection and tracking capabilities could be used to assess the nature of the on-going conduct of a U.S. conventionally-armed long-range strike, whose execution had been pre-notified to the Russian Government. The study acknowledged that the use of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles would, in concept, almost certainly require explicit Presidential launch authorization.
- The Russian side’s non-paper raised the prospect of a scenario in which ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration could supplant nuclear-armed strategic ballistic missiles in an attack against Russian strategic nuclear forces and, if combined with substantial ballistic missile defenses, would pose a serious danger to Russia’s security since it would undermine strategic stability between our two nations.
- The U.S. side has sought to make clear via the repeated statements of successive U.S. Presidents that Russia is no longer considered to be an enemy. The Russian side has questioned the significance of these assertions in its non-paper by noting, “...when dealing with military issues, one takes into account, first and foremost, the Parties’ actual potentials rather than their intentions, which can change over time, inter alia, based on existing military capabilities.” Put more directly, the United States will not field these systems against the Russian Federation.
- This negotiation is set in a geopolitical context wherein the national security concerns of each country are not perfectly aligned and therefore each country must shape its national security strategy and military forces to support its specific needs. Because each party faces unique challenges, it follows that each party’s approach to meeting its particular security challenges will, of necessity, be different. The U.S. side believes that if it chose to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, it would proceed under established principles of mutual security, while acknowledging and seeking to accommodate the concerns of the Russian Federation.
End points.
--------------
FAMILIAR RUSSIAN ARGUMENTS
--------------

13. (S) The Russian Delegation had a number of comments and questions in response to the points that Elliott delivered, which made clear Russia’s continued opposition to U.S. development and deployment of these systems. The Russian Delegation raised several of their concerns they had raised previously in their July 22, 2009 paper (REFTEL). These included: the impact that non-nuclear ballistic missiles would have on strategic stability; command and control, especially when SLBMs with conventional nuclear warheads were deployed on the same submarine, and the level of authority that would be required to employ such systems; and the potential that U.S. development and deployment of these systems would lead to an international arms race and proliferation of such missiles.

14. (S) The U.S. Delegation responded by making the following points:
- Russia would be engaged throughout the U.S. decision-making process, and there would be no surprises with regard to U.S. plans. If these systems were deployed and a decision made to employ such a missile, Russia would be notified in advance. The United States had done considerable analysis associated with over-flight issues to ensure that if such missiles were employed they would not overfly Russian territory. From the U.S. perspective, the existence of these missiles would pose a more credible response to certain scenarios than nuclear weapons and, thus, these conventionally-armed strategic missiles would have better potential to deter or prevent certain acts of aggression.
- A decision to employ conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs would be made by the President, and the same types of command and control procedures that existed for nuclear weapons would be applied to conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missiles. Concerning Russian references to the unauthorized movement of U.S. heavy bomber armaments that occurred a few years ago, the United States considered that to be a very serious incident, which resulted in an immediate investigation and series of corrective actions to prevent such an incident from happening again.
- Regarding the possibility that U.S. development and deployment of conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missiles would result in an international arms race of such systems, other nations that believed they required such capabilities were already working to develop them. This fact aside, the concern raised by Russia suggested that more be done to enhance the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which both the United States and Russia belong, as do other countries Russia was concerned may seek to develop conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, including Ukraine.
End points.
--------------
NEWER ELEMENTS OF INTEREST AND CONCERN
--------------

15. (S) The U.S. and Russian Delegations discussed some newer aspects of Russian concerns. These included the significance Russia placed on consultations, concerns regarding employment scenarios, the utility of the JDEC and whether its potential use in these scenarios would go beyond its original charter, the possibility of employment of multiple missiles simultaneously, the decision process and timeline for the development of these systems, long-term implications for nuclear forces, and the influence of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences study on this issue. Key points included the following:
- Consultation with Russia. Antonov was especially concerned that the United States would make a decision regarding the deployment of non-nuclear-armed ICBMs and SLBMs without engaging Russia in the process. He did not want the United States to proceed on this issue as it had concerning missile defenses in Europe, or have this issue become a serious problem for U.S.-Russian relations. Consultation after the fact would be insufficient.
- Scenarios for Employment. The Russian Delegation raised questions about international law and the basis for employing strategic offensive arms against another country. Dr. Warner responded that the potential implications of their use would depend on the specific international security context at the time of their use, and the provocation involved. Ideally these systems would provide a more credible deterrent for certain adversaries, and they would not need to be employed.
- Transparency and Use of the JDEC. Colonel Ilin commented that, while the United States had suggested the JDEC could be used for tracking a U.S. conventionally-armed ballistic missile, this was not realistic. JDEC notifications required a longer timeline than that which would be associated with the employment of a conventional ballistic missile. The purpose of conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missiles as described by the United States was to provide a prompt global strike capability. The timelines for their use would be too compressed to work through the JDEC. Further, the JDEC was established to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and nuclear war as a result of scenarios such as the malfunctioning of early warning systems. Gottemoeller responded that while Ilin was correct, both sides had seen the potential added utility of the JDEC, and further development of the center was a possibility.
- Use of Multiple Missiles. General Poznihir suggested that use of a single conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missile would be ineffective, and the United States would have to launch multiple missiles to ensure it achieved its objective. He stated that Russia had an automated system of command and control to respond to a nuclear strike, and questioned whether it was realistic to expect Russia to stand down this system when multiple U.S. conventional missiles were launched. Elliott responded that the United States did not envision deploying or employing large numbers of conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs. On the contrary, U.S. use would involve one or two such weapons against localized targets. Russian systems might be automated, but we believe that a Russian nuclear response would require Presidential authorization. If the United States employed a
conventionally-armed strategic ballistic missile, Russian systems would detect the launch and pre-notification would enable Russia to react appropriately.
- Decision Process for Development. The Russian Delegation questioned the decision process for developing and deploying conventional ICBMs and SLBMs. It seemed the U.S. Delegation described operational concepts and command and control procedures as if a decision had already been made. The U.S. Delegation responded that a decision still required significant analysis at the conceptual level. If the Administration decided to proceed, the U.S. Congress would need to approve funding, which it had rejected for the conventionally-armed Trident 2 twice during the previous Administration. Therefore, the overall decision process would be a lengthy one. The U.S. Delegation further noted that Russia had not raised any significant objections when the previous Administration sought Congressional approval for the Conventional Trident Modification. Antonov replied that Russia had had more friends in Congress at that time and Russia knew they would block it.
- Long-Term Implications for Nuclear Forces. General Orlov asked about the integration of conventional and nuclear forces, and how this would impact nuclear force structure over time. Gottemoeller responded that the development of conventional forces could have implications for further nuclear weapon reductions, but there had not been sufficient analysis associated with this issue. She suggested that Orlov’s questions could form the basis of broader discussions on strategic stability.
- U.S. National Academy of Sciences Study. The Russian Delegation asked about the studies that had informed U.S. thinking and, in particular, about the National Academy of Sciences study that Elliott referenced in his presentation. Antonov noted the National Academy of Sciences was a sophisticated group, and it made sense for Elliott to draw from that study. He suspected, however, that Pentagon planning was much more aggressive. Gottemoeller replied that the National Academy of Sciences charter required experts from both liberal and conservative backgrounds to develop a balanced product that could inform U.S. Government thinking. She suggested a joint U.S.-Russian National Academies study might be useful to consider the issue of conventional ballistic missiles and broader impacts on strategic stability.

16. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

17. (U) Participants:
U.S.
A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Lt Col Goodman
Mr. McConnell Mr. Siemon Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Dr. Hopkins (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)
RUSSIA
Amb Antonov Col Ilin Mr. Artem’yev Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Ivanov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Neshin Col Novikov MGen Orlov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Col Voloskov Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Zharkih Mr. Gayduk (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int)

18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS