Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA934
2009-11-02 09:55:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0934/01 3060955 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 020955Z NOV 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9860 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5156 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2333 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1338 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6529
S E C R E T GENEVA 000934
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 21, 2009
REF: GENEVA 0875 (SFO-GVA-V-042)
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 000934
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 21, 2009
REF: GENEVA 0875 (SFO-GVA-V-042)
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-011.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 21, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 3:00 P.M., a
meeting of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) took place at the U.S.
Mission. The TTDWG was chaired by Ambassador Ries on the
U.S. side and Mr. Koshelev on the Russian side. The meeting
began with discussion of the draft treaty's final provisions,
which include withdrawal and extension. The sides reached
agreement on the extension provision but remained in discord
over the withdrawal clause.
4. (S) Ms. Kotkova presented the Russian side's response to
the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) on the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). The sides were able to agree
on most provisions, but the Russian side reserved on the
issue of provisional application. The sides agreed to leave
brackets around the section of the draft protocol dealing
with convening a special session of the BCC.
5. (S) Finally, Adm Kuznetsov delivered a proposal, based on
his personal experience negotiating START, on how to tackle
the issue of terms and definitions by forming a subgroup to
discuss and resolve differences. Ries took his proposal for
further consideration.
6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Discussion of Previously Exchanged
Texts for Final Provisions; BCC Protocol Dj Vous; and How
to Address Terms and Definitions.
--------------
DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUSLY
EXCHANGED TEXTS FOR FINAL
PROVISIONS
--------------
7. (S) Ries began the meeting by introducing revised
language on treaty extension (Article XV of the U.S. draft
text). She explained that the new formulation eliminated the
phrase "at any time" since its absence implied that a Party
could raise the issue of extension at any time. Koshelev
queried Ries on the meaning and application of the phrase "so
decide" listed in the last sentence. Ries commented that the
phrase referred to the Parties having decided to extend the
treaty, not to jointly consider the matter of extension.
8. (S) Koshelev asked whether the U.S. side had a new
proposal on Treaty withdrawal. Ries said that the United
States could not accept a Russian condition of withdrawal
that is linked to a quantitative or qualitative buildup in
the capabilities of strategic missile defense systems. Nor
could the United States accept the Russian proposal to
terminate the treaty three months from receipt of a Party's
statement of an extraordinary event as having jeopardized its
supreme interest. (Begin comment: The U.S. proposal is six
months. End comment.) Koshelev acknowledged that the TTDWG
would not be able to resolve the issue, but asked Ries
whether both sides could agree on the remaining text. Ries
responded that if the Russians removed the phrase on
conditional withdrawal, the United States could accept the
rest of the paragraph as shown in the JDT.
--------------
BCC PROTOCOL DJ VOUS
--------------
9. (S) Kotkova handed over a Russian-proposed JDT on the BCC
and mentioned that, to a great extent, the Russian side had
accepted U.S.-proposed language from the U.S.-proposed JDT of
the BCC Protocol dated September 30, 2009 (REFTEL); however,
there were a few provisions that would remain bracketed.
Methodically, and at some length, Kotkova provided an
analysis on each paragraph of the text. She emphasized that
many differences were structural and once the sides had
agreed on the treaty structure, many brackets could be
removed.
10. (S) The following summarizes the content of Kotkova's
analysis of the BCC by section and paragraph.
- Section I. Composition of the Commission
-- Paragraph 1. Difference was only an issue of structure.
-- Paragraph 2. Russian side accepted U.S.-proposed
language.
-- Paragraph 3. This paragraph was carried forward from
START's JCIC Protocol and dealt with the alternating
chairmanship of meetings during a session, restrictions on
what should be decided, and which Party should preside. An
earlier sentence suggested that the "head representative,"
could be. Koshelev mentioned that these issues had never
caused problems in the past, the heads of delegation could
decide and this paragraph could be deleted in its entirety;
Ries agreed to delete the paragraph.
-- Paragraph 4. The difference was structural (section
versus sub-section).
- Section II. Convening a Session of the Commission
-- Paragraph 1, Subparagraph b. Added references to
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the request to
convene a session.
-- Paragraph 2. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as the United States had proposed.
-- Paragraph 3. Regarding the location of BCC sessions,
Russia proposed "unless otherwise agreed" to replace "or, as
appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties" since it
is shorter and used elsewhere in the BCC Protocol. Ries and
Koshelev agreed to a new formulation proposed by Mr. Comeau
that combines paragraphs 2 and 3 into a new sentence in the
paragraph: "A session of the Commission shall be convened in
Geneva, Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more
than 15 days, unless otherwise agreed." Additionally, both
sides confirmed their understanding that the provision
"unless otherwise agreed" applied equally to the location
where the commission is to be convened and the length of the
session.
-- Paragraph 4. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as proposed by the United States.
- Section III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission.
-- This entire provision was bracketed by the Russian
side. Koshelev reiterated that this provision was supposed
to respond to an urgent situation but in reality it had never
been used. The Russian side believed the mechanism was
inefficient since either Party had a period of 7 days in
which to respond and up to 10 days to meet after a response,
by which time the urgent matter would have passed. It would
be more beneficial to address immediate concerns through the
Commissioners' direct communication. Ries said the United
States viewed the provision as a valuable mechanism and tool
available to both sides which obligated the sides to have a
meeting in the event a serious concern arose. Just because
it had never been used did not mean it was not useful to have
available. Ries said the U.S. side would consider the
Russian points.
- Section IV. Agenda
-- Paragraph 1. The difference was an issue of the
ultimate structure for the documents.
-- Paragraph 2. Regarding "immediately preceding or" with
reference to questions which may arise before a meeting.
Ries commented that, since this was already accommodated in
Section I, paragraph 2, the United States was willing to
delete the text. In the last sentence Russia proposed to
retain the opportunity to agree during a session on the date
of the next session. Ries deferred agreement until the
United States had an opportunity to study the legal aspects
and determine whether the right existed already in Section
II, paragraph 2.
-- Paragraph 3. Russia proposed to delete this provision
since it was spelled out in Section II, paragraph 1 that the
Commission would meet no fewer than two times each year,
unless otherwise agreed. The right to meet existed
irrespective of the number of questions a Party proposes for
the agenda. Ries agreed to delete this paragraph.
- Section V. Work of the Commission
-- Russia proposed to delete text referring to number,
languages, and authenticity of the Commission's recorded
agreements. After much discussion between Kotkova and Mr.
Dean on the merits of retaining and deleting the text, Mr.
Dunn provided the convincing argument. Dunn indicated that,
in his experience in other bilateral venues when documents
were prepared in two languages without completing a formal
conforming process, it was discovered after signature that
there were errors in interpretation of the language. By
including an obligation that in effect required the sides to
complete a formal conforming process, it would avoid
potential misunderstandings after BCC documents were agreed.
The Russian side decided to leave the text in the paragraph
as the United States had proposed.
- Section VI. Costs
-- Russian side had no differences with the U.S.-proposed
text.
- Section VII. Communications
-- The first bracket was purely structural but the second
bracket referring to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
(NRRC) could be reduced in length by deleting some of the
explanatory text. Ries accepted the Russian proposal to
delete "of the Russian Federation, and the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center of the United States of America" and making
the reference to the NRRCs plural.
- Section VIII. Additional Procedures
-- Paragraph 1. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as the United States had proposed.
-- The remaining paragraphs dealt exclusively with the
concept of provisional application and would be solved
simultaneously with the concept of provisional application
for the treaty writ large. Dean clarified the intent behind
paragraph 3; without provisional application of the treaty
article, provisional application of a protocol on its own
would not make sense. He further explained that the protocol
drew its mandate from the treaty article whereas the
procedures governing the operation of the BCC were in the
protocol; this paragraph meant that both the treaty article
and the protocol would operate provisionally in conformity
with each other. Ries asked whether the Russian side had
concerns with the content of the section. Kotkova said it
was not a matter of the concept of provisional application
but rather that Russia believed a decision should be taken
when the concept of provisional application for the treaty as
a whole was decided.
Kotkova said she would prepare a clean text of the document
and hand it over to the U.S. side.
--------------
HOW TO ADDRESS TERMS
AND DEFINITIONS
--------------
11. (S) Regarding two U.S. non-papers on terms and
definitions, Ries said the first list was based on those
terms and definitions that the United States believed would
be easily agreed upon by the United States and Russia since
both sides had identical texts and the second list conveyed
those terms on which the sides' proposals were relatively
close. Kuznetsov claimed it was the first time he had seen
the documents provided by the U.S. side but allowed that he
was prepared to work in any format on any issue. Kuznetsov
further proposed a mechanism and format to address terms and
definitions. He proposed a TTDWG subgroup be formed to
discuss the issue. Ries thanked Kuznetsov for his desire for
efficiency, but mentioned the idea was new for the U.S. side
and the delegation would need to consider it.
12. (S) Ries said it was important to consider how the terms
were used in the treaty because there might be different
interpretations on both sides. Also, she mentioned that the
TTDWG must continue to work through the treaty articles and
it made sense to coordinate work on terms and definitions
with work on the treaty articles but also to allow for both
to proceed simultaneously. She said there was a much shorter
time to work on the terms and definitions than in the
original START negotiations, but she would report Kuznetsov's
suggestion, will discuss the proposal with her colleagues,
and respond expeditiously.
13. (U) Documents exchanged.
- U.S.:
-- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal for Discussion of Agreed
Terms, October 21, 2009;
-- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal of Terms for Discussion,
October 21, 2009; and
-- U.S.-proposed Text, ((Article XV))1 ((XIV))2, Paragraph
2, October 21, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text on Section VI,
Bilateral Consultative Commission, October 21, 2009.
14. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)
RUSSIA
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Adm Kuznetsov
Col Novikov
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 21, 2009
REF: GENEVA 0875 (SFO-GVA-V-042)
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-011.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 21, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 3:00 P.M., a
meeting of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty Text and
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) took place at the U.S.
Mission. The TTDWG was chaired by Ambassador Ries on the
U.S. side and Mr. Koshelev on the Russian side. The meeting
began with discussion of the draft treaty's final provisions,
which include withdrawal and extension. The sides reached
agreement on the extension provision but remained in discord
over the withdrawal clause.
4. (S) Ms. Kotkova presented the Russian side's response to
the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) on the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). The sides were able to agree
on most provisions, but the Russian side reserved on the
issue of provisional application. The sides agreed to leave
brackets around the section of the draft protocol dealing
with convening a special session of the BCC.
5. (S) Finally, Adm Kuznetsov delivered a proposal, based on
his personal experience negotiating START, on how to tackle
the issue of terms and definitions by forming a subgroup to
discuss and resolve differences. Ries took his proposal for
further consideration.
6. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Discussion of Previously Exchanged
Texts for Final Provisions; BCC Protocol Dj Vous; and How
to Address Terms and Definitions.
--------------
DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUSLY
EXCHANGED TEXTS FOR FINAL
PROVISIONS
--------------
7. (S) Ries began the meeting by introducing revised
language on treaty extension (Article XV of the U.S. draft
text). She explained that the new formulation eliminated the
phrase "at any time" since its absence implied that a Party
could raise the issue of extension at any time. Koshelev
queried Ries on the meaning and application of the phrase "so
decide" listed in the last sentence. Ries commented that the
phrase referred to the Parties having decided to extend the
treaty, not to jointly consider the matter of extension.
8. (S) Koshelev asked whether the U.S. side had a new
proposal on Treaty withdrawal. Ries said that the United
States could not accept a Russian condition of withdrawal
that is linked to a quantitative or qualitative buildup in
the capabilities of strategic missile defense systems. Nor
could the United States accept the Russian proposal to
terminate the treaty three months from receipt of a Party's
statement of an extraordinary event as having jeopardized its
supreme interest. (Begin comment: The U.S. proposal is six
months. End comment.) Koshelev acknowledged that the TTDWG
would not be able to resolve the issue, but asked Ries
whether both sides could agree on the remaining text. Ries
responded that if the Russians removed the phrase on
conditional withdrawal, the United States could accept the
rest of the paragraph as shown in the JDT.
--------------
BCC PROTOCOL DJ VOUS
--------------
9. (S) Kotkova handed over a Russian-proposed JDT on the BCC
and mentioned that, to a great extent, the Russian side had
accepted U.S.-proposed language from the U.S.-proposed JDT of
the BCC Protocol dated September 30, 2009 (REFTEL); however,
there were a few provisions that would remain bracketed.
Methodically, and at some length, Kotkova provided an
analysis on each paragraph of the text. She emphasized that
many differences were structural and once the sides had
agreed on the treaty structure, many brackets could be
removed.
10. (S) The following summarizes the content of Kotkova's
analysis of the BCC by section and paragraph.
- Section I. Composition of the Commission
-- Paragraph 1. Difference was only an issue of structure.
-- Paragraph 2. Russian side accepted U.S.-proposed
language.
-- Paragraph 3. This paragraph was carried forward from
START's JCIC Protocol and dealt with the alternating
chairmanship of meetings during a session, restrictions on
what should be decided, and which Party should preside. An
earlier sentence suggested that the "head representative,"
could be. Koshelev mentioned that these issues had never
caused problems in the past, the heads of delegation could
decide and this paragraph could be deleted in its entirety;
Ries agreed to delete the paragraph.
-- Paragraph 4. The difference was structural (section
versus sub-section).
- Section II. Convening a Session of the Commission
-- Paragraph 1, Subparagraph b. Added references to
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the request to
convene a session.
-- Paragraph 2. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as the United States had proposed.
-- Paragraph 3. Regarding the location of BCC sessions,
Russia proposed "unless otherwise agreed" to replace "or, as
appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties" since it
is shorter and used elsewhere in the BCC Protocol. Ries and
Koshelev agreed to a new formulation proposed by Mr. Comeau
that combines paragraphs 2 and 3 into a new sentence in the
paragraph: "A session of the Commission shall be convened in
Geneva, Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more
than 15 days, unless otherwise agreed." Additionally, both
sides confirmed their understanding that the provision
"unless otherwise agreed" applied equally to the location
where the commission is to be convened and the length of the
session.
-- Paragraph 4. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as proposed by the United States.
- Section III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission.
-- This entire provision was bracketed by the Russian
side. Koshelev reiterated that this provision was supposed
to respond to an urgent situation but in reality it had never
been used. The Russian side believed the mechanism was
inefficient since either Party had a period of 7 days in
which to respond and up to 10 days to meet after a response,
by which time the urgent matter would have passed. It would
be more beneficial to address immediate concerns through the
Commissioners' direct communication. Ries said the United
States viewed the provision as a valuable mechanism and tool
available to both sides which obligated the sides to have a
meeting in the event a serious concern arose. Just because
it had never been used did not mean it was not useful to have
available. Ries said the U.S. side would consider the
Russian points.
- Section IV. Agenda
-- Paragraph 1. The difference was an issue of the
ultimate structure for the documents.
-- Paragraph 2. Regarding "immediately preceding or" with
reference to questions which may arise before a meeting.
Ries commented that, since this was already accommodated in
Section I, paragraph 2, the United States was willing to
delete the text. In the last sentence Russia proposed to
retain the opportunity to agree during a session on the date
of the next session. Ries deferred agreement until the
United States had an opportunity to study the legal aspects
and determine whether the right existed already in Section
II, paragraph 2.
-- Paragraph 3. Russia proposed to delete this provision
since it was spelled out in Section II, paragraph 1 that the
Commission would meet no fewer than two times each year,
unless otherwise agreed. The right to meet existed
irrespective of the number of questions a Party proposes for
the agenda. Ries agreed to delete this paragraph.
- Section V. Work of the Commission
-- Russia proposed to delete text referring to number,
languages, and authenticity of the Commission's recorded
agreements. After much discussion between Kotkova and Mr.
Dean on the merits of retaining and deleting the text, Mr.
Dunn provided the convincing argument. Dunn indicated that,
in his experience in other bilateral venues when documents
were prepared in two languages without completing a formal
conforming process, it was discovered after signature that
there were errors in interpretation of the language. By
including an obligation that in effect required the sides to
complete a formal conforming process, it would avoid
potential misunderstandings after BCC documents were agreed.
The Russian side decided to leave the text in the paragraph
as the United States had proposed.
- Section VI. Costs
-- Russian side had no differences with the U.S.-proposed
text.
- Section VII. Communications
-- The first bracket was purely structural but the second
bracket referring to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
(NRRC) could be reduced in length by deleting some of the
explanatory text. Ries accepted the Russian proposal to
delete "of the Russian Federation, and the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Center of the United States of America" and making
the reference to the NRRCs plural.
- Section VIII. Additional Procedures
-- Paragraph 1. This provision was acceptable to the
Russian side as the United States had proposed.
-- The remaining paragraphs dealt exclusively with the
concept of provisional application and would be solved
simultaneously with the concept of provisional application
for the treaty writ large. Dean clarified the intent behind
paragraph 3; without provisional application of the treaty
article, provisional application of a protocol on its own
would not make sense. He further explained that the protocol
drew its mandate from the treaty article whereas the
procedures governing the operation of the BCC were in the
protocol; this paragraph meant that both the treaty article
and the protocol would operate provisionally in conformity
with each other. Ries asked whether the Russian side had
concerns with the content of the section. Kotkova said it
was not a matter of the concept of provisional application
but rather that Russia believed a decision should be taken
when the concept of provisional application for the treaty as
a whole was decided.
Kotkova said she would prepare a clean text of the document
and hand it over to the U.S. side.
--------------
HOW TO ADDRESS TERMS
AND DEFINITIONS
--------------
11. (S) Regarding two U.S. non-papers on terms and
definitions, Ries said the first list was based on those
terms and definitions that the United States believed would
be easily agreed upon by the United States and Russia since
both sides had identical texts and the second list conveyed
those terms on which the sides' proposals were relatively
close. Kuznetsov claimed it was the first time he had seen
the documents provided by the U.S. side but allowed that he
was prepared to work in any format on any issue. Kuznetsov
further proposed a mechanism and format to address terms and
definitions. He proposed a TTDWG subgroup be formed to
discuss the issue. Ries thanked Kuznetsov for his desire for
efficiency, but mentioned the idea was new for the U.S. side
and the delegation would need to consider it.
12. (S) Ries said it was important to consider how the terms
were used in the treaty because there might be different
interpretations on both sides. Also, she mentioned that the
TTDWG must continue to work through the treaty articles and
it made sense to coordinate work on terms and definitions
with work on the treaty articles but also to allow for both
to proceed simultaneously. She said there was a much shorter
time to work on the terms and definitions than in the
original START negotiations, but she would report Kuznetsov's
suggestion, will discuss the proposal with her colleagues,
and respond expeditiously.
13. (U) Documents exchanged.
- U.S.:
-- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal for Discussion of Agreed
Terms, October 21, 2009;
-- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal of Terms for Discussion,
October 21, 2009; and
-- U.S.-proposed Text, ((Article XV))1 ((XIV))2, Paragraph
2, October 21, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text on Section VI,
Bilateral Consultative Commission, October 21, 2009.
14. (U) Participants:
U.S.
Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)
RUSSIA
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kamenskiy
Adm Kuznetsov
Col Novikov
Mr. Venevtsev
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
15. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS