Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA921
2009-10-28 14:46:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0921/01 3011446 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 281446Z OCT 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9812 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5128 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2305 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1310 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6501
S E C R E T GENEVA 000921
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 20,2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 000921
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 20,2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-019.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009
Time: 11:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:
U.S.: RUSSIA
Mr. Trout Gen Poznihir
LT Lobner Col Ryzhkov
Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) On October 20, 2009, the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group Chairs met at the Russian Mission
following the conclusion of the first Conversion or
Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting of the session.
Participants were Mr. Trout and LT Lobner on the U.S. side,
and Gen Poznihir and Col Ryzhkov on the Russian side. At
this meeting, Trout provided Poznihir the U.S.-proposed text
for the MOU in English and Russian. The Chairs also
discussed the planned schedule for the MOU Working Group and
Russian plans on launch canister elimination.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Load-Factor on Russian Facilities;
Let's Talk Mobiles and Launch Canisters; and, MOU Work
Schedule.
--------------
LOAD-FACTOR ON
RUSSIAN FACILITIES
--------------
5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov began the meeting by providing Mr.
Trout a document (text of official translation follows below)
listing the 45 Russian facilities that existed at START
Treaty entry into force, and not the 63 facilities that
existed in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine at that
time. Trout asked whether this lower number of facilities
would increase the load factor from that shown on the
previous document. Ryzhkov agreed it would. Trout asked how
the load factor between that identified for START Follow-on
would be different from the load factor that exists today
with the current number of Russian facilities. Ryzhkov said
it would be the same. He said there would be some
differences because they intend to eliminate a few more
facilities before the START Follow-on treaty enters into
force.
Begin text (Russian List):
Official Translation
SFO - VI
October 20, 2009
Russian Federation
SOA Facilities - 63
Facilities with ICBMs - 45
ICBM Bases - 25
Dombarovskiy
Kozel'sk
Tatishchevo
Uzhur
Vypolzovo
Yoshkar-Ola
Nizhniy Tagil
Teykovo
Barnaul
Irkutsk
Novosibirsk
Kostroma, Bershet', Krasnoyarsk
Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Kartaly, Bershet', Drovyanaya,
Krasnoyarsk, Aleysk
Drovyanaya, Kansk
Svobodnyy, Teykovo
Storage Sites - 5
Piban'shur
Piban'shur
Surovatikha
Khrizolitovyy
Plesetsk
Znamenka
Training Sites - 5
Balabanovo, Serpukhov, Rostov
Perm', Goryachiy Klyuch
End text.
--------------
LET'S TALK MOBILES
AND LAUNCH CANISTERS
--------------
6. (S) Trout asked Ryzhkov to clarify a statement he had
made during the CorE Working Group meeting regarding the
elimination of launch canisters. Specifically, Trout asked
what the Russian position was on how a launch canister would
be eliminated.
7. (S) Ryzhkov went into a lengthy discussion noting that
Russia had plans for other uses of launch canisters other
than simply destroying them. He said he understood the
necessity of having some means of national technical means
(NTM) to verify the elimination of the canisters and that,
perhaps, the canisters could simply be separated into two
pieces to demonstrate that they did not contain missiles. He
said, with a smile on his face, that they could even stand
the launch canisters halves up vertically for some period of
time for NTM to see. He added that these "eliminated"
canisters might be used to store water or, as Ukraine had
proposed, grain, or even some type of carcinogenic substance.
He emphasized the point that a launch canister by itself was
not a strategic offensive arm (SOA); it needed the associated
missile, technical equipment, and trained personnel to
operate it.
8. (S) Poznihir asked what would be wrong if Russia loaded
new missiles into the launch canisters. Trout said there
would be nothing wrong with that approach if Russia declared
them as new missiles. Ryzhkov acknowledged that Russia would
indeed declare them as such.
9. (S) Trout asked if such canisters were located in areas
outside the elimination facility, would the Russian
Federation use the canisters as smaller, broken up parts or
would they put them back together to use them. Ryzhkov said
he did not know because he did not know how they would be
used.
10. (S) Trout asked how NTM could differentiate between a
full canister vice an empty canister observed in the open.
Ryzhkov, along with Poznihir, made the point that even if the
canister was the original length it could not store a missile
because of the technical humidity and temperature controls
that were needed to maintain a missile.
11. (S) Trout countered that it was Russian procedure to
transport missiles in such containers for periods of time.
Poznihir replied that the time window that the launch
canister could support the missile environment was very small.
12. (S) Ryzhkov launched into a long discourse explaining
why there should be substantially fewer inspections,
considering the cost and disruption to operations they
caused, and considering the improved U.S.-Russian
relationship. He stated that NTM, along with a few
inspections, should provide confidence for each side. Trout
said Ryzhkov was giving NTM much more capability than it was
capable of providing. Poznihir said that his office
frequently worked with the space agency and he was not giving
away any military secrets to say that the U.S. space
observation systems were much more capable than the Russian
system.
--------------
MOU WORK SCHEDULE
--------------
13. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed MOU and an
unofficial Russian translation of the document. Trout
indicated that, although this version only reflected the U.S.
position, the United States was already working on a
U.S.-proposed joint draft text that incorporated Russian
positions. Additionally, he added, Annex J was not included
in what was provided today because the United States was
still finalizing that section. Trout mentioned that the
United States was considering moving Annex J into the third
tier inspector handbook, but a final decision had not been
made. Finally, Trout asked whether the Russians were near
the point where they could deliver their version of the MOU.
14. (S) Poznihir thanked Trout for the documents, adding
that General Orlov would have been here but he had a sore
throat. He stated that the Russian translators were
finishing up the Russian version of the MOU, and he expected
the Russian Delegation would be ready to deliver the document
by the end of the week. He clarified that this document was
more of a joint draft text, in that the Russian position,
U.S. position, and agreed language were listed. He added
that with the new U.S. document, they would gain a better
understanding of the U.S. position.
15. (S) Trout replied that he looked forward to seeing the
Russian proposal. Trout and Poznihir agreed that the working
group should meet next week at least twice, once both sides
had reviewed the other sides' documents. Trout added that he
hoped to have an Annex J ready to deliver early next week.
16. Documents exchanged.
- U.S.:
-- U.S.-proposed MOU, dated October 6, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Listing of Russian Facilities at Entry into Force of
the START Treaty, dated October 20, 2009.
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 20,2009
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-019.
2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009
Time: 11:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva
Participants:
U.S.: RUSSIA
Mr. Trout Gen Poznihir
LT Lobner Col Ryzhkov
Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int)
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
3. (S) On October 20, 2009, the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group Chairs met at the Russian Mission
following the conclusion of the first Conversion or
Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting of the session.
Participants were Mr. Trout and LT Lobner on the U.S. side,
and Gen Poznihir and Col Ryzhkov on the Russian side. At
this meeting, Trout provided Poznihir the U.S.-proposed text
for the MOU in English and Russian. The Chairs also
discussed the planned schedule for the MOU Working Group and
Russian plans on launch canister elimination.
4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Load-Factor on Russian Facilities;
Let's Talk Mobiles and Launch Canisters; and, MOU Work
Schedule.
--------------
LOAD-FACTOR ON
RUSSIAN FACILITIES
--------------
5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov began the meeting by providing Mr.
Trout a document (text of official translation follows below)
listing the 45 Russian facilities that existed at START
Treaty entry into force, and not the 63 facilities that
existed in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine at that
time. Trout asked whether this lower number of facilities
would increase the load factor from that shown on the
previous document. Ryzhkov agreed it would. Trout asked how
the load factor between that identified for START Follow-on
would be different from the load factor that exists today
with the current number of Russian facilities. Ryzhkov said
it would be the same. He said there would be some
differences because they intend to eliminate a few more
facilities before the START Follow-on treaty enters into
force.
Begin text (Russian List):
Official Translation
SFO - VI
October 20, 2009
Russian Federation
SOA Facilities - 63
Facilities with ICBMs - 45
ICBM Bases - 25
Dombarovskiy
Kozel'sk
Tatishchevo
Uzhur
Vypolzovo
Yoshkar-Ola
Nizhniy Tagil
Teykovo
Barnaul
Irkutsk
Novosibirsk
Kostroma, Bershet', Krasnoyarsk
Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Kartaly, Bershet', Drovyanaya,
Krasnoyarsk, Aleysk
Drovyanaya, Kansk
Svobodnyy, Teykovo
Storage Sites - 5
Piban'shur
Piban'shur
Surovatikha
Khrizolitovyy
Plesetsk
Znamenka
Training Sites - 5
Balabanovo, Serpukhov, Rostov
Perm', Goryachiy Klyuch
End text.
--------------
LET'S TALK MOBILES
AND LAUNCH CANISTERS
--------------
6. (S) Trout asked Ryzhkov to clarify a statement he had
made during the CorE Working Group meeting regarding the
elimination of launch canisters. Specifically, Trout asked
what the Russian position was on how a launch canister would
be eliminated.
7. (S) Ryzhkov went into a lengthy discussion noting that
Russia had plans for other uses of launch canisters other
than simply destroying them. He said he understood the
necessity of having some means of national technical means
(NTM) to verify the elimination of the canisters and that,
perhaps, the canisters could simply be separated into two
pieces to demonstrate that they did not contain missiles. He
said, with a smile on his face, that they could even stand
the launch canisters halves up vertically for some period of
time for NTM to see. He added that these "eliminated"
canisters might be used to store water or, as Ukraine had
proposed, grain, or even some type of carcinogenic substance.
He emphasized the point that a launch canister by itself was
not a strategic offensive arm (SOA); it needed the associated
missile, technical equipment, and trained personnel to
operate it.
8. (S) Poznihir asked what would be wrong if Russia loaded
new missiles into the launch canisters. Trout said there
would be nothing wrong with that approach if Russia declared
them as new missiles. Ryzhkov acknowledged that Russia would
indeed declare them as such.
9. (S) Trout asked if such canisters were located in areas
outside the elimination facility, would the Russian
Federation use the canisters as smaller, broken up parts or
would they put them back together to use them. Ryzhkov said
he did not know because he did not know how they would be
used.
10. (S) Trout asked how NTM could differentiate between a
full canister vice an empty canister observed in the open.
Ryzhkov, along with Poznihir, made the point that even if the
canister was the original length it could not store a missile
because of the technical humidity and temperature controls
that were needed to maintain a missile.
11. (S) Trout countered that it was Russian procedure to
transport missiles in such containers for periods of time.
Poznihir replied that the time window that the launch
canister could support the missile environment was very small.
12. (S) Ryzhkov launched into a long discourse explaining
why there should be substantially fewer inspections,
considering the cost and disruption to operations they
caused, and considering the improved U.S.-Russian
relationship. He stated that NTM, along with a few
inspections, should provide confidence for each side. Trout
said Ryzhkov was giving NTM much more capability than it was
capable of providing. Poznihir said that his office
frequently worked with the space agency and he was not giving
away any military secrets to say that the U.S. space
observation systems were much more capable than the Russian
system.
--------------
MOU WORK SCHEDULE
--------------
13. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed MOU and an
unofficial Russian translation of the document. Trout
indicated that, although this version only reflected the U.S.
position, the United States was already working on a
U.S.-proposed joint draft text that incorporated Russian
positions. Additionally, he added, Annex J was not included
in what was provided today because the United States was
still finalizing that section. Trout mentioned that the
United States was considering moving Annex J into the third
tier inspector handbook, but a final decision had not been
made. Finally, Trout asked whether the Russians were near
the point where they could deliver their version of the MOU.
14. (S) Poznihir thanked Trout for the documents, adding
that General Orlov would have been here but he had a sore
throat. He stated that the Russian translators were
finishing up the Russian version of the MOU, and he expected
the Russian Delegation would be ready to deliver the document
by the end of the week. He clarified that this document was
more of a joint draft text, in that the Russian position,
U.S. position, and agreed language were listed. He added
that with the new U.S. document, they would gain a better
understanding of the U.S. position.
15. (S) Trout replied that he looked forward to seeing the
Russian proposal. Trout and Poznihir agreed that the working
group should meet next week at least twice, once both sides
had reviewed the other sides' documents. Trout added that he
hoped to have an Annex J ready to deliver early next week.
16. Documents exchanged.
- U.S.:
-- U.S.-proposed MOU, dated October 6, 2009.
- Russia:
-- Listing of Russian Facilities at Entry into Force of
the START Treaty, dated October 20, 2009.
17. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS