(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 000921 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 20,2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-019. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009 Time: 11:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S.: RUSSIA Mr. Trout Gen Poznihir LT Lobner Col Ryzhkov Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) On October 20, 2009, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group Chairs met at the Russian Mission following the conclusion of the first Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group meeting of the session. Participants were Mr. Trout and LT Lobner on the U.S. side, and Gen Poznihir and Col Ryzhkov on the Russian side. At this meeting, Trout provided Poznihir the U.S.-proposed text for the MOU in English and Russian. The Chairs also discussed the planned schedule for the MOU Working Group and Russian plans on launch canister elimination. ¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Load-Factor on Russian Facilities; Let's Talk Mobiles and Launch Canisters; and, MOU Work Schedule. -------------- LOAD-FACTOR ON RUSSIAN FACILITIES -------------- ¶5. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov began the meeting by providing Mr. Trout a document (text of official translation follows below) listing the 45 Russian facilities that existed at START Treaty entry into force, and not the 63 facilities that existed in Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine at that time. Trout asked whether this lower number of facilities would increase the load factor from that shown on the previous document. Ryzhkov agreed it would. Trout asked how the load factor between that identified for START Follow-on would be different from the load factor that exists today with the current number of Russian facilities. Ryzhkov said it would be the same. He said there would be some differences because they intend to eliminate a few more facilities before the START Follow-on treaty enters into force. Begin text (Russian List): Official Translation SFO - VI October 20, 2009 Russian Federation SOA Facilities - 63 Facilities with ICBMs - 45 ICBM Bases - 25 Dombarovskiy Kozel'sk Tatishchevo Uzhur Vypolzovo Yoshkar-Ola Nizhniy Tagil Teykovo Barnaul Irkutsk Novosibirsk Kostroma, Bershet', Krasnoyarsk Vypolzovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Kartaly, Bershet', Drovyanaya, Krasnoyarsk, Aleysk Drovyanaya, Kansk Svobodnyy, Teykovo Storage Sites - 5 Piban'shur Piban'shur Surovatikha Khrizolitovyy Plesetsk Znamenka Training Sites - 5 Balabanovo, Serpukhov, Rostov Perm', Goryachiy Klyuch End text. -------------- LET'S TALK MOBILES AND LAUNCH CANISTERS -------------- ¶6. (S) Trout asked Ryzhkov to clarify a statement he had made during the CorE Working Group meeting regarding the elimination of launch canisters. Specifically, Trout asked what the Russian position was on how a launch canister would be eliminated. ¶7. (S) Ryzhkov went into a lengthy discussion noting that Russia had plans for other uses of launch canisters other than simply destroying them. He said he understood the necessity of having some means of national technical means (NTM) to verify the elimination of the canisters and that, perhaps, the canisters could simply be separated into two pieces to demonstrate that they did not contain missiles. He said, with a smile on his face, that they could even stand the launch canisters halves up vertically for some period of time for NTM to see. He added that these "eliminated" canisters might be used to store water or, as Ukraine had proposed, grain, or even some type of carcinogenic substance. He emphasized the point that a launch canister by itself was not a strategic offensive arm (SOA); it needed the associated missile, technical equipment, and trained personnel to operate it. ¶8. (S) Poznihir asked what would be wrong if Russia loaded new missiles into the launch canisters. Trout said there would be nothing wrong with that approach if Russia declared them as new missiles. Ryzhkov acknowledged that Russia would indeed declare them as such. ¶9. (S) Trout asked if such canisters were located in areas outside the elimination facility, would the Russian Federation use the canisters as smaller, broken up parts or would they put them back together to use them. Ryzhkov said he did not know because he did not know how they would be used. ¶10. (S) Trout asked how NTM could differentiate between a full canister vice an empty canister observed in the open. Ryzhkov, along with Poznihir, made the point that even if the canister was the original length it could not store a missile because of the technical humidity and temperature controls that were needed to maintain a missile. ¶11. (S) Trout countered that it was Russian procedure to transport missiles in such containers for periods of time. Poznihir replied that the time window that the launch canister could support the missile environment was very small. ¶12. (S) Ryzhkov launched into a long discourse explaining why there should be substantially fewer inspections, considering the cost and disruption to operations they caused, and considering the improved U.S.-Russian relationship. He stated that NTM, along with a few inspections, should provide confidence for each side. Trout said Ryzhkov was giving NTM much more capability than it was capable of providing. Poznihir said that his office frequently worked with the space agency and he was not giving away any military secrets to say that the U.S. space observation systems were much more capable than the Russian system. -------------- MOU WORK SCHEDULE -------------- ¶13. (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed MOU and an unofficial Russian translation of the document. Trout indicated that, although this version only reflected the U.S. position, the United States was already working on a U.S.-proposed joint draft text that incorporated Russian positions. Additionally, he added, Annex J was not included in what was provided today because the United States was still finalizing that section. Trout mentioned that the United States was considering moving Annex J into the third tier inspector handbook, but a final decision had not been made. Finally, Trout asked whether the Russians were near the point where they could deliver their version of the MOU. ¶14. (S) Poznihir thanked Trout for the documents, adding that General Orlov would have been here but he had a sore throat. He stated that the Russian translators were finishing up the Russian version of the MOU, and he expected the Russian Delegation would be ready to deliver the document by the end of the week. He clarified that this document was more of a joint draft text, in that the Russian position, U.S. position, and agreed language were listed. He added that with the new U.S. document, they would gain a better understanding of the U.S. position. ¶15. (S) Trout replied that he looked forward to seeing the Russian proposal. Trout and Poznihir agreed that the working group should meet next week at least twice, once both sides had reviewed the other sides' documents. Trout added that he hoped to have an Annex J ready to deliver early next week. ¶16. Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed MOU, dated October 6, 2009. - Russia: -- Listing of Russian Facilities at Entry into Force of the START Treaty, dated October 20, 2009. ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS