Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA919
2009-10-27 20:26:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0919/01 3002026
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 272026Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9800
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5116
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2293
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1298
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6489
S E C R E T GENEVA 000919 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
OCTOBER 20, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000919 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): (U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 20, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-008. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009 Time: 4:00 - 6:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) for Session VI was held at the Russian Mission on October 20, 2009. The U.S. Delegation presented a course of action for the remainder of the Inspection Protocol (IP) sections. Key points were the movement of language currently in the U.S.-proposed IP into third-tier documents, comparison of the Russian Federation's naming convention for inspection activities (inspections, visits, and exhibitions) as compared to the U.S. Delegation's view, and the possibility that some third-level material could be worked out under the oversight of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) after the signing of the treaty, but prior to ratification and entry into force of the treaty. The U.S. Delegation presented the Russians with an index listing the proposed third-tier annexes to the IP and a chart comparing the U.S.-proposed inspection naming convention with the Russian-proposed naming system. These items would be discussed further at the next working group meeting. The U.S. side began discussion of joint draft text of Section IV of the U.S.-proposed IP: Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry. The process moved fairly quickly during which text was agreed where concepts were similar. By the end of the meeting, the working group had reviewed about one-third of Section IV. ¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Three Concepts to Consider for Next Meeting; Inspection Protocol Section IV; and Wrapping Things Up. -------------- THREE CONCEPTS TO CONSIDER FOR NEXT MEETING -------------- ¶5. (S) Dr. Warner began the meeting by presenting the Russians with three poi
nts and two hand-outs that could be used for future discussions. He stated that the U.S. Delegation had made significant progress moving selected language from the U.S.-proposed IP into third-tier documents, which the United States calls "annexes." He explained the approach the U.S. Delegation took when creating the third-tier documents, emphasizing that it was to ensure that the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty and IP contained all the rights and obligations, while the third-tier documents/annexes focused on specific processes associated with implementing the SFO Treaty. In some cases, critical concepts were actually brought back up from the existing third-tier documents into the second-tier IP. ¶6. (S) To illustrate, Warner handed the Russian Delegation an index of the 14 draft third-tier annexes, listed by name and number, and indicated how each annex corresponded to a related section of the IP. He noted that, under START, there was a three-level approach to the Treaty -- Treaty articles, protocols, and annexes. The U.S. intent was to approach SFO in the same manner. Warner opined that, even though the United States was intent on ratifying all three levels at the same time, it was possible that a number of the third-tier annexes could be remanded to discussions following treaty signature but, prior to ratification and entry into force, in a similar fashion to the Russian proposal. The U.S. position was still firm in the view that the documents at all three levels would be considered together in the U.S. ratification process. ¶7. (S) Colonel Ilin requested clarification on the movement of text from the IP into the third-tier documents. He asked whether the United States had moved the material into existing annexes. Warner replied that some of the text was moved into existing annexes but, in some cases, new annexes had been produced. Additionally, some annexes were re-numbered and re-named to better follow the sequence of the sections in the IP. Ilin asked whether the United States could present the previous meetings agreed-upon text in IP Section Three that was to be moved to a third annex. Warner replied that the annex could be provided during the next meeting as an example of how the text had been moved down to the third tier. ¶8. (S) Ilin asked again whether the United States considered the third-tier documents necessary for ratification. Warner replied that the U.S. position was that it would be required for U.S. ratification, but each side would have to ratify the elements of the SFO Treaty package in accordance with their own constitutional process, as called for within the treaty itself. Ilin replied that the United States and Russia needed to agree on the number of sections and the size of the treaty. Ilin asked what the working group would do if time ran out before all tier two and three sections/annexes were reviewed. Warner replied that the working group would have to adjust the approach as the deadline got closer. Ilin stated that the Russian Delegation would review the material presented, compare it with the Russian draft text and, at the next working group meeting, the United States and Russia could discuss prioritizing the work. ¶9. (S) Warner's next discussion area was the naming convention for the various types of inspections and exhibitions. He presented the Russian Delegation with a hand-out that listed the U.S.-proposed names for inspection activities, the Russian-proposed names, the purpose of each activity, a newly-proposed name for each activity, and whether that activity would be limited by an annual quota for the number of inspections each year. Warner explained that, in approaching the new naming convention, the United States incorporated the Russian concept that "inspections""would be focused on deployed items, "inspection-visits" would focus on non-deployed items, and exhibitions would be for those remaining activities such as conversion or elimination verification, technical exhibitions, and distinguishability exhibitions. Warner stated that the U.S. side could accept the Russian concept for the term "inspection" that focuses on deployed strategic offensive arms (SOAs) and the warheads they carry. He continued that, although Washington had by no means agreed to use the term "inspection-visit," the chart showed that this type of activity was focused on non-deployed SOA and on new facilities. Warner also reiterated that the U.S. proposed to retain the formerly-declared facility inspection from START. Warner asked that the Russians consider the naming conventions so that they could be discussed later. Warner pointed out that, while the United States and the Russian Federation appeared to agree on the concepts of exhibitions, the United States still needed clarification on how the Russians viewed the two conversion or elimination activities; the demonstration of procedures to be used for conversions prior to their implementation and the confirmation of the results of conversion or elimination procedures. Warner asked whether the Russians considered these two activities to be set against an annual quota. Ilin replied that the Russians considered both to be exhibition activities, that they would be conducted as needed, and not be subject to any quota. ¶10. (S) Ilin inquired why the United States had combined the characteristics of the data update inspection (DUI) and the nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) for "Inspection" activities focused on deployed SOAs. He stated that the two types of inspections had different goals; one was to count warheads and the other was to verify data. Warner replied that in order to fit the Russian-proposed concept of inspecting SOA as either deployed or non-deployed, the United States had to restructure the inspection activities, but that they could be returned to the originally-proposed format if that proved more effective. Warner stated that for heavy bombers, due to the manner in which the inspection would take place, it made sense to combine aspects of DUI and NWI and create one inspection instead of two at heavy bomber bases. Where road-mobile ICBM systems were concerned, things were a bit more complicated, since the DUI at mobile ICBM bases involved confirming data on both deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers. ¶11. (S) Looking at the last column in the chart, Ilin stated that it was still necessary to agree on quotas for the inspections and inspection-visits. Warner agreed and stated that working on the naming conventions and the annual quotas of inspection activities would be important to the Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group, particularly when that working group met to discuss Treaty Article XI. -------------- INSPECTION PROTOCOL SECTION IV -------------- ¶12. (S) Warner distributed to the Russian Delegation a Russian language version of the U.S.-proposed joint draft text of Section IV of the IP, "Procedures Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry" and suggested proceeding with a line-by-line review. Ilin stated that the Russian Delegation had created its own version of a joint draft text of Section IV of the IP but, since they had not produced an English version or produced hand-outs, he could agree to work from the U.S.-proposed joint draft text. The Russian Delegation noted in paragraph one that inspectors would be exempt from customs duties on their baggage and equipment and they also wanted to add that inspectors would not be responsible for paying taxes on baggage and equipment. This concept had also been brought up during discussion of Section II of the IP. Warner said that this issue would need to be researched further and discussed later to be considered for inclusion in both sections. ¶13. (S) Warner then began the discussion of paragraphs three and four which concerned Russian inspection teams arriving at Travis Air Force Base (AFB) and stated that, while the information was important, the United States recommended moving it to the third-tier document, that is, to the annex on "Transportation." Ilin questioned whether there was a need for these provisions at all. Mr. Smith interjected that the processes outlined in those paragraphs were unique to the POE at Travis and important in order to allow a Russian Embassy representative access to the POE facility located on Travis AFB. Ilin reiterated that he believed it could be deleted. Warner countered that, since this issue was contained in one of the annexes about which it was less urgent to reach conclusion, perhaps it could be pushed back to further discussion later in the negotiations. ¶14. (S) The language for paragraph six concerning clothing and badges for inspectors was agreed upon, and it was also agreed to push paragraph six to the third-tier document. The information from paragraph seven was deleted as it was already stated in paragraph one of this section. The paragraph that followed dealt with continuous monitoring and it was agreed to simply double bracket any continuous monitoring-related topics until a decision was made concerning the status of that activity in SFO. The Russian Delegation agreed to study paragraph five on equipment and supplies and revisit it at the next working group meeting. With regard to paragraphs ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen, the possible impounding of equipment, the Russian Delegation wanted to delete or push these paragraphs to the BCC; the United States wanted it retained in the tier three annex document. Warner suggested revisiting these paragraphs and addressing them later. -------------- WRAPPING THINGS UP -------------- ¶15. (S) Warner stated that the revised draft texts for the future IP sections were being translated and that they would be sent to the Russians for study in advance of the joint review of these sections at future IPWG meetings. ¶16. (S) Ilin asked for clarification on the numbers the U.S. proposed for the annual quotas of various inspection activities. Warner replied that the current U.S.-proposed numbers for annual inspection activities were 14 for deployed SOA inspections, 12 for non-deployed SOA inspections or inspection-visits, 2 for formerly-declared facility inspections, and exhibitions were to take place "as required" with no annual quota. Warner stated that the annual quota under START was for 28 inspections each year overall and that the United States proposed to maintain that number under SFO. Ilin replied that the Russian position still called for no more than five inspections of deployed SOA per year, five inspections of non-deployed SOA per year, and that exhibitions would be held as needed without an annual quota. ¶17. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- Proposed index list of tier three documents/annexes; -- Proposed naming convention for inspection activities; and -- Proposed merged draft text of the Inspection Protocol, Section IV. ¶18. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Mr. Buttrick Mr. Coussa Mr. DeNinno Maj Johnson LTC LaGraffe Ms. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Tarrasch Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Izrazov Mr. Ivanov Ms. Kotkova Col Novikov Mr. Venevtsev Mr. Poznihir Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Zharkih Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶19. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS

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