(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 000918 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 20, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0914 (SFO-GVA-VI-016) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-004. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009 Time: 10:00 - 11:30 A.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the U.S. and Russian Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group for this session was held at the Russian Mission on October 20, 2009. Both Working Group Chairs presented points of agreement from their one-on-one coffee the previous day (REFTEL). Both Chairmen also elaborated on their positions in those areas where they still disagreed. ¶4. (S) For the first time, the Russian side discussed elimination procedures related to mobile ICBM launch canisters. The Russian side also complained that the U.S. concept of time limits for the completion of CorE procedures made the process "unnecessarily difficult.". ¶5. (S) Mr. Elliott stated that the U.S. side intended to deliver a revised U.S.-proposed text to the Russian side by Thursday (October 22),in order to facilitate in-depth working group discussion on Friday (October 23).. ¶6. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Refinement of the U.S. Position; Process of Conversion -- and a Resolution; Revised U.S.-proposed Protocol; Russian Reaction and Proposal for ICBM Elimination; and Mandatory and Optional Procedures for Elimination. -------------- REFINEMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION -------------- ¶7. (S) Elliott began the meeting by summarizing the ways in which the U.S. position had been refined during the intersession. First, the United States had reintroduced the term "conversion" into its proposed Protocol. Second, the United States had relocated its proposed procedures for elimination of SLBMs and ICBMs from Treaty Article VII to the CorE Protocol, which was consistent with the Russian �A;approach. Third, the United States had adjusted the wording of its "wildcard" option (permitting the use of unspecified, but confirmable, procedures, developed by the converting or eliminating party) in each relevant section of its Protocol to conform more closely to Russian-proposed text. Finally, the United States had streamlined the sections of its proposed Protocol dealing with other procedures for removal from accountability and facility elimination. -------------- PROCESS OF CONVERSION -- AND A REVOLUTION -------------- ¶8. (S) Elliott stated that, under START, the term "conversion" had been used to describe the process by which one type of strategic offensive arm (SOA) was modified to become another type of SOA. He asserted that this process should still be permitted under the START Follow-on Treaty, but a specific procedure governing these types of modifications was not required in the CorE Protocol. He explained that the proposed Treaty Articles permit each Party to modernize its force and shape its force structure as it saw fit. Therefore, a Party electing to modify an existing type of SOA need only notify the other Party of the intended changes, update the Memorandum of Understanding, and conduct a technical exhibition, if required. These procedures were already detailed elsewhere in the proposed treaty documents, and did not need to be repeated in the CorE Protocol. ¶9. (S) Elliott described the need for a separate process in the new treaty by which an SOA could be converted to another arm "not equipped for nuclear armaments." As an example, he cited the on-going conversion of the U.S. B-1B heavy bomber from a nuclear-capable platform to a conventional platform. ¶10. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov indicated that he fully understood the U.S. position, and stated that the sides were in close agreement regarding their rights to determine the structure of their own strategic forces. In light of past U.S. objections to Russian conversion of the SS-27 road-mobile system to the RS-24 road-mobile system under START, he found Elliott's acceptance of a simple notification upon completion of modifications to an SOA "revolutionary." (Begin comment: Ryzhkov's comments relate to the START Treaty requirement that for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be considered launchers of a different type, the conversion must be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). End comment.) He pledged to communicate this shift in U.S. thinking at the Russian interagency level. ¶11. (S) Regarding the conversion of an item from a nuclear role to a non-nuclear role, Ryzhkov explained that the Russian side considered strategic platforms like heavy bombers and SSBNs to be strategic platforms from their production to their eventual elimination. This view was independent of any physical modifications made to those platforms while in service. Accordingly, he stressed that the Russian side needed to be confident that converted items would not subsequently be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty. After all, he commented, it would not take much effort to re-convert a heavy bomber back to nuclear use. The Russian-proposed treaty provides opportunities for verification in this matter, and he hoped the United States would modify its position to address this concern. -------------- REVISED U.S.-PROPOSED PROTOCOL -------------- ¶12. (S) Elliott next outlined the basic structure of the anticipated U.S. text: Section I addresses procedures for the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs, Section II covers procedures for eliminating silo launchers of ICBMs, Section III addresses elimination of mobile launchers and mobile training launchers, Section IV discusses CorE for SLBM launchers, Section V provides for CorE for heavy bombers, Section VI describes other procedures for removal of items from accountability, and Section VII has procedures for elimination of facilities and fixed structures for mobile launchers. ¶13. (S) Elliott presented notional language for selected CorE procedures. By doing so, he intended to preview the general formula for U.S.-proposed provisions in the CorE Protocol. His comments were as follows. -- The elimination process for ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs shall be determined by the Party conducting the elimination such that ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. -- The elimination process for SLBMs shall be determined by the Party conducting the elimination such that the SLBMs are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. -- Other procedures, determined by the Party conducting the conversion, that render the heavy bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments in a manner that the other Party can confirm; which shall be recorded within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov indicated his agreement as Elliott read each of the formulations. -------------- RUSSIAN REACTION AND PROPOSAL FOR ICBM ELIMINATION -------------- ¶15. (S) Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his presentation. He acknowledged that, since the Russian side had similar provisions governing removal from accountability in Treaty Article VII, he would speak to the Russian Head of Delegation regarding his intent to move those provisions into the CorE Protocol. In addition, the Russian side agreed that elimination should render an item inoperable and unusable for its original purpose. ¶16. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side could not accept everything the United States had proposed to date regarding the elimination of mobile missiles. He explained the Russian position further on this matter by describing the process for missile elimination. First, the elimination of any solid-propellant ICBM would be the same. He recalled that the key procedure from a Russian perspective was the removal of solid-rocket fuel. Following burning of this fuel, no additional steps for elimination should be required. He was confident the United States would agree with this, since U.S. inspectors had observed the elimination of approximately 200 SS-25 missiles in this manner. ¶17. (S) For removal of the missile's fuel by some other means, including washing the fuel out of the rocket motor casing, Ryzhkov stated that the structure of the missile must be destroyed. Here, the Russian-proposed text recalled START Treaty language for crushing or flattening the body of the missile, and he stressed that both sides must agree on these procedures. ¶18. (S) To satisfy the U.S. verification concerns, Russia was willing to make the eliminated missile visible to observation by national technical means (NTM) for a 30-day period. A post-elimination inspection could also be conducted if the opposite Party desired. For launch canisters, Ryzhkov opined that a separation of the canister sections, visible by NTM, would be sufficient to permit verification of ICBM elimination. -------------- MANDATORY AND OPTIONAL PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION -------------- ¶19. (S) Elliott thanked Ryzhkov for his presentation and expressed his wish to review one other item discussed by the Chairs during their meeting the previous day. He contrasted the Russian approach to elimination, which included one mandatory procedure that was usually general in nature, with the U.S. approach, consisting of a series of optional procedures. He said that the United States was discussing adding a mandatory procedure to its list of optional procedures, such as the removal of the silo door for silo launchers, but concluded that the most important principle was that such procedures render the item inoperable for its original use. ¶20. (S) Ryzhkov explained that the Russian endorsement of ICBM silo door removal as a mandatory step had two justifications: 1) the action was clearly visible by NTM, and 2) it obviously rendered the silo inoperable. He asked if the United States had considered whether removal of the silo door could be a mandatory element in its "wildcard" option for silo elimination, and Elliott responded that the United States was still evaluating that notion. Both sides agreed that if the silo door was not removed, confirmation of silo elimination would be extremely difficult. Additionally, each side recognized that a silo with its door removed presented a safety risk, so that each side would ultimately fill an empty silo in some manner. ¶21. (S) Ryzhkov mentioned that the Russian side found the U.S. concept of time limits for elimination made the process unnecessarily difficult. Elliott asked if the Russian approach here was similar to the START Treaty's provisions regarding grading an eliminated silo location, where the initial elimination effort occurs quickly but further actions pertaining to elimination continue for an extended period afterward. Ryzhkov confirmed that this was the case, and that the only time period in the Russian proposal was a 30-day visibility period for verification by NTM after completion of elimination. ¶22. (S) Ryzhkov concluded the meeting by clarifying that the Russian insistence on mandatory procedures was linked to the presence of the "wildcard" option in the CorE text. In exchange for permitting flexibility for future procedural development, the Russian side required agreement on a key mandatory measure in advance. This was necessary to provide confidence in completion of the procedures. Elliott acknowledged the Russian position. ¶23. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶24. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Elliott Mr. Siemon LCDR Brons Mr. Dwyer Lt Col Goodman Mr. Hanchett LTC Leyde LT Lobner Mr. McConnell Ms. Purcell LT Sicks Mr. Strauss Mr. Trout Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Ivanov Ms. Fuzhenkova Mr. Izrazov Mr. Kamenskiy Mr. Koshelev Ms. Kotkova Mr. Leontiev Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Col Zaitsev Ms. Zharkih Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS