(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): FIRST MEETING OF THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY
TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 19, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0856 (SFO-GVA-V-044)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-003.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 19, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:50 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the Treaty Text and Definitions
Working Group (TTDWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on October
19, 2009. The Russian chair provided a Russian-proposed
joint draft text (JDT) with a new formulation for the
withdrawal and extension clauses of U.S.-proposed Treaty
Article XIV. The U.S. chair provided new U.S.-proposed joint
formulations for paragraph 1, Section I, and paragraphs 1 and
4, of Section II, of the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC) Protocol.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation clarified that its position on
extension of the treaty would not require meetings to discuss
one side's intent, and would set no deadline before which the
Parties must meet to discuss extension. The Russian
Delegation reiterated its need for a special provision in the
withdrawal clause specifically providing for withdrawal in
the event of "qualitative or quantitative buildup" in missile
defense systems, and cited Russia's continued concern about
the potential threat to Russia's deterrent capability posed
by U.S. missile defenses. Russian chair Mr. Koshelev
explained that the issue behind making the proposal for
direct communication between the BCC commissioners during the
intersessional period limited to BCC-related matters was not
a legal one, but to clarify for the Russian Ambassador in
Washington the legitimate responsibilities of the
commissioners.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY. Revised Draft Preamble; Treaty
Extension; Strategic Missile Defense Buildup as Grounds For
Withdrawal; and On the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

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REVISED DRAFT PREAMBLE
--------------


6. (S) Following a discussion on a version of the draft
preamble, which had been provided to Amb Antonov by A/S
Gottemoeller, Koshelev agreed to provide the United States
with a written list of questions on the revised draft
preamble. Amb Ries said the U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD)
would respond. (Begin comment: The list of questions was
not received by the end of the week. End comment.)

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TREATY EXTENSION
--------------


7. (S) Koshelev noted the productive discussions during the


last session on procedures to extend the treaty and asked Ms.
Kotkova to clarify the Russian position. Walking through a
new Russian proposal for paragraph 2 of Treaty Article XIV
(Article XV in the Russian treaty draft),Kotkova explained
the Russian side's opinion that if either of the Parties
wanted to extend the Treaty, it could be done without holding
a meeting to discuss extension. Additionally, Russia
believed there should be no set deadline before which the
Parties must consult to discuss extension; extension could be
accomplished as little as one day before the Treaty expired.
Kotkova and Koshelev confirmed Mr. Dean's observation that
the core difference in their new proposal was that the U.S.
proposal established an obligation to meet, whereas a meeting
would be voluntary in the new Russian proposal. Taylor noted
that the Russian proposal was worth study by the United
States.

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STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE
BUILDUP AS GROUNDS FOR WITHDRAWAL
--------------


8. (S) Kotkova provided a new Russian proposal for the
withdrawal clause in U.S. draft treaty Article XV, paragraphs
5 and 6, and reiterated the Russian position that the grounds
for withdrawal based on extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the treaty included "a qualitative and
quantitative buildup in the capabilities of strategic missile
defense systems."


9. (S) Ries rejected the Russian argument for a special
provision on defensive systems as a basis for withdrawal.
She reminded the Russian Delegation that both sides had
agreed the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty was about strategic
offensive arms and, therefore, it was inappropriate to
include a special provision on defensive systems in the
paragraph for withdrawal for extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty. She noted the
U.S.-proposed general withdrawal clause was common to all
arms control treaties and the approach for the SFO Treaty
should be the same. Taylor added that the essence of the
disagreement was in defining qualitative or quantitative
potential for elements of a missile defense and pointed out
that, with the exception of the bracketed Russian text on
defensive systems, the United States could work with the text
in the rest of the paragraph.


10. (S) Koshelev disagreed that strategic defensive systems
were unrelated to the SFO Treaty context. He argued that the
existence of strategic defensive systems without limits was a
unique and exclusive problem for this treaty, and that was
why Russia had included the topic in the treaty's preamble.
Our Presidents had included the interrelationship of
strategic offensive and defensive systems in their Joint
Understanding. Koshelev further explained that Russia
understood the sole objective of strategic missile defenses
was to intercept strategic offensive missiles and the more
interceptors one side had, the weaker the other side's
potential would be. Koshelev said the Russian side would
insist on including the text on strategic defenses for the
near term -- unless the sides could find a solution elsewhere
-- and that the bracketed text be retained for discussion by
the HODs.




11. (S) Ries asked whether the new Russian proposal (that
the treaty would terminate three or six months after the date
of the withdrawal notice, "unless the notice specifies a
later date") implied there could be a longer period between
notification of intent to withdraw and actual treaty
termination. Kotkova indicated this was correct. During the
discussion on strategic defenses, Koshelev explained that the
Russian logic behind a three-month notice was the same as for
the three-month withdrawal provision in the Moscow Treaty;
the absence of the ABM Treaty and the potential need to
respond to the rapid development of strategic missile
defenses drove the decision to reduce the withdrawal period
from six to three months.


12. (S) Ries emphasized that the subject of defensive arms
was being discussed in other venues, which was appropriate.
Recent talks in Moscow between Undersecretary of State
Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov were
specifically related to cooperation between Russia and the
United States on emerging threats and defensive systems, with
the implication being that such cooperation should be viewed
as a positive step for development of a defensive capability
against common threats and as an indication of the evolution
of the relationship between the countries. Ries noted that
the United Statesbelieved withdrawal should be in response
to truly an extraordinary event or set of circumstances, ad
six months was a reasonable period.


13. (S Koshelev admitted that the Russian side also viewd
the talks in Moscow on missile defense cooperation as
"promising," but cautioned that he had personally been
working to develop such mutual cooperation for over 10 years
and ADM Kuznetsov for over 20 years. Koshelev agreed to
withhold assessment, and expressed his hope that current
efforts would be more successful.


14. (S) Drawing a comparison with the Tauscher-yabkov
discussions, which focused on joint assesments of threats
from third countries, Venevtsev interjected that the Russians
wanted this languag in the SFO Treaty for a different
reason. The ussian concern, he stated, was the threat to
Rusia's deterrent potential from U.S. missile defense.
Ries pointed out that the United States had gone to great
lengths to explain that its defensive ystems should not e
perceived to pose a threat o Russia.


15. (S) Lt Col Comeau asked whether he Russians viewed the
words "withdraw" and "terinate" used in the first and last
sentences of the new Russian proposal as synonymous. (Begin
comment: Kotkova had mentioned earlier that the previous
Russian drafts used language in the withdrawal clause that
was not correct for a bilateral treaty. End comment.)
Kotkova explained that, in the Russian concept, "withdraw"
was a term related to multilateral treaties that remained in
force despite withdrawal of one Party, whereas bilateral
treaties "terminate" when one of the two Parties withdrew.
Moreover, "withdrawal" would be the action taken by a state
and "termination" of the treaty would be the result of that
act.

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ON THE BILATERAL


CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
--------------


16. (S) Ries asked if there were any questions on the
U.S.-proposed JDT on the BCC Protocol, dated September 30,
2009, which was provided during the last session (REFTEL).
Kotkova listed several differences between the drafts of the
BCC Protocol and the existing Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC) Protocol, which were confirmed by Amb Ries
to be factually accurate. Ries explained that the changes
were made to give the new treaty more flexibility and to make
it more succinct. Koshelev said he agreed with the concept
of a hybrid treaty, but claimed the draft BCC provisions had
actually increased in volume, while the HODs expected the
working groups to streamline provisions.


17. (S) Ries then introduced the U.S.-proposed new joint
formulations for paragraphs I and II, BCC Protocol, dated
October 19, 2009, and highlighted the streamlined formulation
in paragraph II, subparagraph 1 on convening a session of the
commission. Taylor explained the U.S. approach was to
tighten up text using language proposed by both sides, and
had moved the Russian bracketed first sentence (on the number
of sessions to be held each year) down to the end where it
made a more logical transition. Koshelev and Kotkova noted
that the new joint formulation appeared to be word-for-word
from the U.S. proposal except the final sentence, to which
Ries responded that when examined closely, the penultimate
sentence summarized language from both sides regarding
submission of questions to the BCC. Koshelev had no further
comments and indicated he would have his experts look it over.


18. (S) Ries moved on to the proposed new joint formulation
for paragraph 4, on communication between the commissioners
of the Parties during the intersessional period. She noted
that the shorter text still provided the authorizations the
Russian side desired. Koshelev replied that the new language
still did not remove Russian concerns, and explained the
issue was with the Russian Ambassador to the United States in
Washington, Ambassador Kislyak, who wanted all contacts with
the U.S. Government to go through his office. Koshelev
explained that the U.S. proposal appeared to give the BCC
authority over all matters between the two sides, rather than
just those issues related to the BCC.


19. (S) Taylor asked whether the Russian concern over
communication between the commissioners was about a possible
resolution of a problem not within the purview of the BCC or
the SFO or an attempt to solve something outside the treaty,
or just a blanket statement that all communications must go
through the Russian Embassy in Washington. Noting his
respect for Kislyak, Koshelev explained that the issue was
not a legal problem; the new joint formulation suited him
personally, and then opined that sometime during the duration
of the SFO, future heads of the BCC might resolve this
problem with a new Russian ambassador. (Begin comment: He
seemed to indicate that the phrase needed to be limited in
the text to reassure Kislyak that the commissioners would
only discuss SFO/BCC matters. End comment.)


20. (S) Ries explained the new proposed formulation on when
to first communicate the names of the BCC commissioners,
which clearly illustrated an effort to streamline text.


Koshelev admitted he liked this version, but deferred on
making a decision. According to the current Russian
position, the treaty provisions could not be provisionally
applied, therefore, the Russian bracketed text for
communication of the names no later than 30 days after entry
into force remained the Russian position. Koshelev agreed
that keeping open the possibility of provisional application
of the BCC was a sound idea and that Russia would study the
proposal.


21. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed new joint formulations for paragraphs I
and II, BCC Protocol, October 19, 2009 (in English and
unofficial Russian); and

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text and Unofficial Russian
Translation of the Protocol on the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC),September 30, 2009 (in English).

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Joint Text of U.S. Treaty Article
XIV, Withdrawal, October 19, 2009 (in Russian and unofficial
English); and

-- Russian-proposed Joint Text of U.S. Treaty Article
XIV, Extension, October 19, 2009 (in Russian and unofficial
English).


22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Ms. Cherry
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Kvavilashvili
Mr. McConnell
Mr. Taylor
Ms. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Kamensky
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetzov
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


23. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS