(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

S E C R E T GENEVA 000914 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP CHAIRMANS' COFFEE, OCTOBER 19, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-016. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: October 19, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 5:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. RUSSIA Mr. Elliott Col Ryzhkov Lt Col Goodman Mr. Smirnov Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The U.S. Chairman of the Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) hosted a coffee, on October 19, 2009, at the U.S. Mission to discuss the way ahead for the CorE WG for this session. The U.S. Chairman presented his recommendation for the schedule of work for the session, and described the U.S. approach to "conversion" and the structure of the treaty with regard to elimination and conversion. The Russian WG Chairman said that there should be a single basic requirement for elimination. For ICBM silos, it should be the removal of the silo launcher door. For solid rocket motors, it should be removal of the fuel. Moreover, Russia opposed the U.S. approach to elimination of mobile missiles. ¶4. (S) Relations between the two chairmen were very cordial and they discussed many issues frankly. Many positions held by the Russian side were discussed in a more open manner than with the entire Delegation present. Although this meeting was intended only to discuss the way ahead, it served to broach many important issues and set the stage for negotiations within the WG structure. ¶5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Planning a Way Ahead; Revisions to U.S. Position; The Easy Stuff; Refining the Concept of Conversion; Russian Proposal for Mobile Missile Elimination; Closing -------------- PLANNING A WAY AHEAD -------------- ¶6. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting by opening the floor to Colonel Ryzhkov. Ryzhkov stated he was looking forward to hearing the U.S. proposal on CorE and that he thought the two sides agreed on many of the procedures in the sections for SLBM launcher elimination, silo elimination, and liquid propellant missile elimination. Elliott agreed with Ryzhkov that, in many of the sections, the two sides can easily agree. Elliott then presented Ryzhkov with his work plan for this session. The U.S. side had been working hard on the protocol and had gone through many revisions. The U.S. side planned to present its new proposal by late Wednesday or Thursday. This would give the Russian side time to study the proposal and ask questions at the Friday (October 23) CorE WG meeting. During the following week, the sides would work to develop joint draft texts for the CorE Protocol. Elliott stated that the U.S. side had developed their top issues and he would like to discuss them in this forum. However, the U.S. side had not finished its analysis of the mobile missile provisions and was not prepared to discuss them. Ryzhkov agreed with the work plan. -------------- REVISIONS TO U.S. POSITION -------------- ¶7. (S) Elliott began by summarizing the U.S. top issues. He discussed the ways in which the U.S. position had been refined during the intersessional period. First, the United States had reintroduced the concept of "conversion" into its proposed Protocol for clarity. Second, the United States had relocated its proposed procedures for elimination of SLBMs and ICBMs from Treaty Article VII to the CorE Protocol, which was consistent with the Russian approach. Third, the United States had inserted Russian and U.S. language permitting a flexible "wildcard" option that would permit the use of procedures, determined by the converting or eliminating Party, in each relevant section of its Protocol. Finally, the United States had streamlined the sections of its proposed Protocol dealing with other procedures for removal from accountability and facility elimination. -------------- THE EASY STUFF -------------- ¶8. (S) Ryzhkov stated that there were many areas the two sides could agree on very easily. He began by discussing silo elimination. The Russian side proposed that by removing the silo door the launcher would be eliminated. The step of removing the door was a key procedure for the elimination of the silo. This procedure would be visible by national technical means (NTM) of verification. The Russian side would then take additional steps (i.e., removing equipment, harvesting precious metals, destroying top side buildings, etc.). The Russian side did not see a need for a time limit on completing the elimination, which was an unnecessary bind on the Parties. Elliott asked whether the Russian side intended to fill the silo for safety reasons. Ryzhkov responded, "yes" and that their procedure was to: 1) remove the silo door; 2) remove launch equipment; 3) destroy the top side buildings; 4) use resultant rubble to fill silo; 5) grade over the filled silo; and 6) re-cultivate the land. Elliott asked when the silo would be removed from accountability. Ryzhkov responded, "When the silo door is removed." ¶9. (S) Ryzhkov continued, stating that, similarly, the key elimination procedure for an ICBM or SLBM is fuel removal. He specifically referenced static firing of the rocket motor to remove the fuel. He concluded by saying, "after fuel is removed, all other procedures are extra." ¶10. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian proposal is simple: after the completion of the key procedure, the item is considered eliminated and is removed from accountability. Elliott asked whether the Russian side objected to the U.S. proposal of multiple procedural options for CorE. Ryzhkov responded that he could not answer, but would ask his delegation. -------------- REFINING THE CONCEPT OF CONVERSION -------------- ¶11. (S) Elliott stated that, under START, the term "conversion" had been used to describe the process by which one type of strategic offensive arm (SOA) was converted to become another type or variant of SOA (i.e., remaining nuclear). He asserted that this process should still be permitted under the START Follow-on Treaty, but that procedures specifying the details of this type of modification were not required in the CorE Protocol. He explained that the proposed treaty articles permit each Party to modernize its force and shape its force structure as it sees fit. Therefore, under the U.S. approach, a Party electing to modify an existing type of SOA to another type of SOA would only need to notify the other Party of its plans, update the Memorandum of Understanding, and conduct a technical exhibition, if required. Language detailing this process was contained in the U.S.-proposed treaty text, and did not need to be repeated in the CorE Protocol. ¶12. (S) Elliott described the need for a process by which an SOA might be modified so as to "not be equipped for nuclear armaments" (i.e., nuclear to non-nuclear). As an example, he cited the on-going conversion of the U.S. B-1B heavy bomber from a nuclear-capable platform to a conventional platform. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov expressed understanding of the U.S. position, and stated that the sides were in close agreement regarding their rights to modernize, develop new systems and determine the structure of their own strategic forces. ¶14. (S) Regarding the conversion of an item from a nuclear role to a non-nuclear role, Ryzhkov explained that the Russian side considered strategic platforms like heavy bombers and SSBNs to be strategic platforms from their production to their eventual elimination. He stressed that the Russian side needed to be confident that converted items would not subsequently be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty because it would not take much time to re-convert a heavy bomber for nuclear use. (Begin comment: This refers to the Russian desire to employ confidence-building visits to B-1B bases to confirm they are not being reconverted. End comment.) ¶15. (S) Elliott responded by stating that verification of the conversion of these platforms is essential and that the Russian proposal of visits (i.e., transparency) had merit. Elliott said he would discuss this proposal with the U.S. Delegation. -------------- RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR MOBILE MISSILE ELIMINATION -------------- ¶16. (S) Despite Elliott's comment at the beginning of the session that "the United States has not finished its analysis of mobile missile elimination," Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side could not accept everything the United States had proposed to date regarding the elimination of mobile missiles. He reiterated that the key procedure was the removal of fuel. Following burning of the solid rocket fuel, no additional steps for elimination should be required. ¶17. (S) Elliott asked which of the U.S.-proposed procedures for elimination of mobile ICBMs was most offensive to the Russian side. Ryzhkov responded immediately that it was the intrusiveness of the U.S. inspection teams. Ryzhkov said he was confident that the United States would agree with the key procedure, since it had observed the elimination of over 200 SS-25 missiles and the U.S. missile experts would find this key procedure sufficient. Elliott responded that the U.S. side is reviewing its position on mobile missile elimination procedures and the two sides should work to find common ground between the two proposals. ¶18. (S) Ryzhkov then gave a presentation on the properties of solid rocket fuel. He stated the fuel was very sensitive to variations in humidity and temperature and that missiles left outside, open to the elements, would not be usable. Missiles left outside would be visible to NTM and would assist in verification of ICBM elimination. -------------- CLOSING -------------- ¶19. (S) Elliott concluded the meeting by thanking Ryzhkov for his presentation and then recapped the way ahead for the week. Elliott recommended that the two sides begin drafting joint texts on the least controversial provisions discussed in the meeting. He stated that the U.S. side would present a revision of the U.S.-proposed text, addressing many topics discussed, by late Wednesday. This would give the Russian side time to review the document. He recommended the sides take the least controversial sections (in Russian and English) one at a time and work through those sections to learn the process for drafting joint draft text. Elliott stated the U.S. side would present an outline of the sections in the WG meeting on Tuesday (October 20) to help better focus the discussion. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶21. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS