(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

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SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
CHAIRMANS' COFFEE, OCTOBER 19, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-016.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 19, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

Mr. Elliott Col Ryzhkov
Lt Col Goodman Mr. Smirnov
Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int)

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. Chairman of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group (WG) hosted a coffee, on October 19,
2009, at the U.S. Mission to discuss the way ahead for the
CorE WG for this session. The U.S. Chairman presented his
recommendation for the schedule of work for the session, and
described the U.S. approach to "conversion" and the structure
of the treaty with regard to elimination and conversion. The
Russian WG Chairman said that there should be a single basic
requirement for elimination. For ICBM silos, it should be
the removal of the silo launcher door. For solid rocket
motors, it should be removal of the fuel. Moreover, Russia
opposed the U.S. approach to elimination of mobile missiles.


4. (S) Relations between the two chairmen were very cordial
and they discussed many issues frankly. Many positions held
by the Russian side were discussed in a more open manner than
with the entire Delegation present. Although this meeting
was intended only to discuss the way ahead, it served to
broach many important issues and set the stage for
negotiations within the WG structure.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Planning a Way Ahead; Revisions to
U.S. Position; The Easy Stuff; Refining the Concept of
Conversion; Russian Proposal for Mobile Missile Elimination;
Closing

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PLANNING A WAY AHEAD
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6. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting by opening the floor to
Colonel Ryzhkov. Ryzhkov stated he was looking forward to
hearing the U.S. proposal on CorE and that he thought the two
sides agreed on many of the procedures in the sections for
SLBM launcher elimination, silo elimination, and liquid
propellant missile elimination. Elliott agreed with Ryzhkov
that, in many of the sections, the two sides can easily
agree. Elliott then presented Ryzhkov with his work plan for
this session. The U.S. side had been working hard on the
protocol and had gone through many revisions. The U.S. side
planned to present its new proposal by late Wednesday or
Thursday. This would give the Russian side time to study the
proposal and ask questions at the Friday (October 23) CorE WG


meeting. During the following week, the sides would work to
develop joint draft texts for the CorE Protocol. Elliott
stated that the U.S. side had developed their top issues and
he would like to discuss them in this forum. However, the
U.S. side had not finished its analysis of the mobile missile
provisions and was not prepared to discuss them. Ryzhkov
agreed with the work plan.

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REVISIONS TO U.S. POSITION
--------------


7. (S) Elliott began by summarizing the U.S. top issues. He
discussed the ways in which the U.S. position had been
refined during the intersessional period. First, the United
States had reintroduced the concept of "conversion" into its
proposed Protocol for clarity. Second, the United States had
relocated its proposed procedures for elimination of SLBMs
and ICBMs from Treaty Article VII to the CorE Protocol, which
was consistent with the Russian approach. Third, the United
States had inserted Russian and U.S. language permitting a
flexible "wildcard" option that would permit the use of
procedures, determined by the converting or eliminating
Party, in each relevant section of its Protocol. Finally,
the United States had streamlined the sections of its
proposed Protocol dealing with other procedures for removal
from accountability and facility elimination.

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THE EASY STUFF
--------------


8. (S) Ryzhkov stated that there were many areas the two
sides could agree on very easily. He began by discussing
silo elimination. The Russian side proposed that by removing
the silo door the launcher would be eliminated. The step of
removing the door was a key procedure for the elimination of
the silo. This procedure would be visible by national
technical means (NTM) of verification. The Russian side
would then take additional steps (i.e., removing equipment,
harvesting precious metals, destroying top side buildings,
etc.). The Russian side did not see a need for a time limit
on completing the elimination, which was an unnecessary bind
on the Parties. Elliott asked whether the Russian side
intended to fill the silo for safety reasons. Ryzhkov
responded, "yes" and that their procedure was to: 1) remove
the silo door; 2) remove launch equipment; 3) destroy the top
side buildings; 4) use resultant rubble to fill silo; 5)
grade over the filled silo; and 6) re-cultivate the land.
Elliott asked when the silo would be removed from
accountability. Ryzhkov responded, "When the silo door is
removed."


9. (S) Ryzhkov continued, stating that, similarly, the key
elimination procedure for an ICBM or SLBM is fuel removal.
He specifically referenced static firing of the rocket motor
to remove the fuel. He concluded by saying, "after fuel is
removed, all other procedures are extra."


10. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian proposal is simple:
after the completion of the key procedure, the item is
considered eliminated and is removed from accountability.
Elliott asked whether the Russian side objected to the U.S.


proposal of multiple procedural options for CorE. Ryzhkov
responded that he could not answer, but would ask his
delegation.

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REFINING THE CONCEPT
OF CONVERSION
--------------


11. (S) Elliott stated that, under START, the term
"conversion" had been used to describe the process by which
one type of strategic offensive arm (SOA) was converted to
become another type or variant of SOA (i.e., remaining
nuclear). He asserted that this process should still be
permitted under the START Follow-on Treaty, but that
procedures specifying the details of this type of
modification were not required in the CorE Protocol. He
explained that the proposed treaty articles permit each Party
to modernize its force and shape its force structure as it
sees fit. Therefore, under the U.S. approach, a Party
electing to modify an existing type of SOA to another type of
SOA would only need to notify the other Party of its plans,
update the Memorandum of Understanding, and conduct a
technical exhibition, if required. Language detailing this
process was contained in the U.S.-proposed treaty text, and
did not need to be repeated in the CorE Protocol.


12. (S) Elliott described the need for a process by which an
SOA might be modified so as to "not be equipped for nuclear
armaments" (i.e., nuclear to non-nuclear). As an example, he
cited the on-going conversion of the U.S. B-1B heavy bomber
from a nuclear-capable platform to a conventional platform.


13. (S) Ryzhkov expressed understanding of the U.S.
position, and stated that the sides were in close agreement
regarding their rights to modernize, develop new systems and
determine the structure of their own strategic forces.


14. (S) Regarding the conversion of an item from a nuclear
role to a non-nuclear role, Ryzhkov explained that the
Russian side considered strategic platforms like heavy
bombers and SSBNs to be strategic platforms from their
production to their eventual elimination. He stressed that
the Russian side needed to be confident that converted items
would not subsequently be used for purposes inconsistent with
the treaty because it would not take much time to re-convert
a heavy bomber for nuclear use. (Begin comment: This refers
to the Russian desire to employ confidence-building visits to
B-1B bases to confirm they are not being reconverted. End
comment.)


15. (S) Elliott responded by stating that verification of
the conversion of these platforms is essential and that the
Russian proposal of visits (i.e., transparency) had merit.
Elliott said he would discuss this proposal with the U.S.
Delegation.

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RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR
MOBILE MISSILE ELIMINATION
--------------


16. (S) Despite Elliott's comment at the beginning of the


session that "the United States has not finished its analysis
of mobile missile elimination," Ryzhkov stated that the
Russian side could not accept everything the United States
had proposed to date regarding the elimination of mobile
missiles. He reiterated that the key procedure was the
removal of fuel. Following burning of the solid rocket fuel,
no additional steps for elimination should be required.


17. (S) Elliott asked which of the U.S.-proposed procedures
for elimination of mobile ICBMs was most offensive to the
Russian side. Ryzhkov responded immediately that it was the
intrusiveness of the U.S. inspection teams. Ryzhkov said he
was confident that the United States would agree with the key
procedure, since it had observed the elimination of over 200
SS-25 missiles and the U.S. missile experts would find this
key procedure sufficient. Elliott responded that the U.S.
side is reviewing its position on mobile missile elimination
procedures and the two sides should work to find common
ground between the two proposals.


18. (S) Ryzhkov then gave a presentation on the properties
of solid rocket fuel. He stated the fuel was very sensitive
to variations in humidity and temperature and that missiles
left outside, open to the elements, would not be usable.
Missiles left outside would be visible to NTM and would
assist in verification of ICBM elimination.

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CLOSING
--------------


19. (S) Elliott concluded the meeting by thanking Ryzhkov
for his presentation and then recapped the way ahead for the
week. Elliott recommended that the two sides begin drafting
joint texts on the least controversial provisions discussed
in the meeting. He stated that the U.S. side would present a
revision of the U.S.-proposed text, addressing many topics
discussed, by late Wednesday. This would give the Russian
side time to review the document. He recommended the sides
take the least controversial sections (in Russian and
English) one at a time and work through those sections to
learn the process for drafting joint draft text. Elliott
stated the U.S. side would present an outline of the sections
in the WG meeting on Tuesday (October 20) to help better
focus the discussion.


20. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


21. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS