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09GENEVA910 2009-10-23 19:10:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA
(SFO-GVA-VI): PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 19, 2009

REF: A. STATE 105942 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-005)

B. MOSCOW 2600 (SFO-MOS-002)

C. GENEVA 744 (SFO-GVA-IV-013)

D. MOSCOW 2607 (SFO-MOS-003)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-002.



2. (U) Meeting Date: October 19, 2009
Time: 11:00 A.M. - 12:50 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) At the October 19 Plenary Meeting chaired by U.S.
Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD
Ambassador Antonov, the U.S. Delegation provided a short
recap of the previous week's meetings in Moscow, noting that
the coming two weeks will be a decisive round of
negotiations. The Russian Delegation affirmed President
Medvedev's commitment that the Russian Federation will do its
best to sign the treaty by December and its readiness to
"reduce more than thrice the number of carriers of strategic
offensive weapons." Antonov noted that the two sides still
have different approaches to several key issues and confirmed
Russia's position that the prospects of a new treaty depend
on the settlement of three specific issues: (1) the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms;
(2) the issue of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration; and (3) counting rules in the new treaty.



4. (S) Antonov stated his Delegation's readiness to sign the
Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of
Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at
Votkinsk and associated letters, within the framework of the
START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Antonov also said that the Russian Ddelegation was open to
creating additional ad-hoc working groups of five to seven
members to tackle specific issues.



5. (S) The Russian Delegation presented a briefing entitled
"Comments on the Strengthened Verification Mechanism for the
New START Follow-on Treaty" that compared the number of
inspections from the START Treaty with the U.S. and Russian
proposals in START Follow-on. Russian discussion following
the briefing noted that existing verification procedures for
strategic offensive arms (SOAs) were very expensive and
complicated and tended to disrupt routine military
operations. The Russians also noted that the new treaty
should provide an opportunity to achieve verification using
some of the same procedures implemented under START, but
would not provide for verification of 100 percent of all
SOAs. A basic principle of the Russian approach in the new
treaty was that the Parties will have a small quota of annual
inspections that will have to be used more wisely and will
cause less disruption at operational bases. According to the
Russian view, the Parties should receive more information
through the notification regime. In response, the U.S.
Delegation questioned if it was the Russian intention to use
confidence-building measures to augment the lower number of

Russian-proposed inspections to which the Russian Delegation
suggested the use of additional, voluntary visits to Russian
facilities.



6. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Recap of the Moscow Meetings and
the Road Ahead; Votkinsk, Former Start Parties, and UN First
Committee; Work Plan for the Next 2 Weeks; Ryzhkov's
Verification Briefing; Warner's Questions; and More U.S.
Questions on Ryzhkov's Briefing.



--------------------------


RECAP OF THE MOSCOW
MEETINGS AND THE ROAD AHEAD


--------------------------





7. (S) Gottemoeller began the meeting with a short recap of
the previous week's meetings in Moscow, noting that while the
meetings there were useful, the next two weeks in Geneva
would be even more intensive. In her view, the coming two
weeks will be a decisive round of negotiations, after which
the heads of the delegations must make a recommendation to
their respective leaders on how to complete work on the
treaty.



8. (S) Antonov replied that it was good to be able to focus
on the main issue in the international agenda, the START
Follow-on Treaty negotiations. He commented that President
Medvedev had just made a statement, prior to his visit to
Belgrade on October 20, that the Russian Federation will do
its best to complete work on the treaty by December.
According to Antonov, Medvedev "reiterated that we are ready
to reduce more than thrice the number of carriers of
strategic offensive weapons." Antonov noted that Medvedev
personally follows very closely what the Russian negotiators
are doing, noting that this is both very pleasant but also
imposes a high level of responsibility. Medvedev gave very
clear and simple instructions--to do all that the Delegation
can do to conclude a new treaty with the United States by
December. Antonov added that Medvedev had personally taken
certain steps of an organizational and financial nature to
ensure success.



9. (S) Presidential support notwithstanding, Antonov pointed
out that the two sides still have different mental and
psychological approaches to several key issues in the treaty.
He said that, in Russia, "when it's cold, we prefer to be
near a heater and do nothing. We have no desire to work when
it's cold.' (Begin comment: He was replying to one of
Gottemoeller's remarks, in which she had mentioned that with
the weather getting colder, it was a spur to working harder.
End comment.) Antonov agreed with Gottemoeller's assessment
that this round of negotiations will be decisive and that
there are essential questions that must be answered in the
next two weeks. He confirmed Russia's position that the
prospects of a new treaty depend on the settlement of three
specific issues: (1) the relationship between strategic
offensive and defensive arms; (2) the issue of ICBMs and
SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration; and (3) counting rules
in the new treaty. Antonov pointed out that once these
issues are resolved there are still several others to settle.



--------------------------


VOTKINSK, FORMER START
PARTIES, AND UN FIRST COMMITTEE



--------------------------





10. (S) Antonov noted that the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Agreement on
Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous
Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk,
and associated letters, would be signed the next day by the
U.S. JCIC Representative, Jerry Taylor, and the Russian
Representative, Sergey Koshelev (REFS A and B). Antonov said
that the Russian Delegation was ready to finalize the
Russian-proposed text for a Joint Statement by the Russian
Federation and the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty
(REF C). Finally, Antonov expressed regret that he was
unable to convince the United States to agree to jointly
submit a resolution to the United Nations First Committee on
the achievements of the START Treaty. In his view, the
United States had made a tactical mistake and someone in
Washington had underestimated the value of such a document in
the General Assembly.



--------------------------


WORK PLAN FOR THE
NEXT TWO WEEKS


--------------------------





11. (S) Returning to the current session, Antonov said that
it was important for everyone to be flexible regarding the
meeting schedule. He said he was open to creating additional
ad-hoc working groups of five to seven members to tackle
specific issues. He added that these groups could be chaired
by existing working group chairs or by the Heads of
Delegation but, to be successful, these groups would need the
support of the other working groups. Gottemoeller said that
she had a very positive reaction to Antonov's comments
regarding the organizational approach. Antonov said the
Russian Delegation was prepared to follow up on the issues
raised in Moscow and that he was impressed by the
presentations made there by General Orlov and Dr. Warner (REF
D). For today, the Russian Delegation was prepared to
clarify its position, using charts and tables, on the
verification mechanism in the new treaty. These charts were
developed after a thorough analysis of the U.S. and Russian
verification approaches. Antonov said that there are some
other principled differences in the U.S. and Russian
approaches in the treaty, for instance, the sides
significantly differ on telemetry and on mobile ICBMs. The
Russian Delegation is also very interested in a U.S.
presentation on new types of non-nuclear strategic offensive
arms and how they will be addressed in the new treaty.
Antonov added that he had expected such a presentation in
Moscow, but the U.S. needed more time; he was glad that the
U.S. Delegation agreed to provide the briefing this week.



--------------------------


RYZHKOV'S VERIFICATION BRIEFING


--------------------------





12. (S) Antonov introduced Colonel Ryzhkov, who gave a
briefing entitled "Comments on the strengthened verification
mechanism for the new START Follow-on treaty." (Begin
comment: The briefing consisted of three slides. Slide one:
"Verification Mechanisms Under the START Treaty." Slide
two: "Verification Mechanism for the New START Follow-on

Treaty (U.S. proposals)." and Slide three: "Verification
Mechanism for the new START Follow-on Treaty (Russian
Federation proposals)." Copies of the slides will be scanned
and e-mailed to State. End comment.) Ryzhkov began by
noting that existing verification procedures for strategic
offensive arms were very expensive and complicated. He said
that, under the START Treaty, the Parties verified the number
of deployed weapons and ensured that reductions were properly
completed. The treaty also provided for information
exchanges, inspections, demonstrations, and the use of
national technical means of verification--each regulated by
procedures. He reminded his audience that START was
negotiated in a period of confrontation between the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR)
and that, at the time, such an approach was justified. Now,
however, the situation was different; we have normal
relations and are partners. The Russian Federation was now
proceeding from the Joint Understanding signed by Presidents
Obama and Medvedev in Moscow on July 6, 2009, which stated
that the new treaty would contain "provisions on definitions,
data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and
verification procedures, as well as confidence building and
transparency measures, as adapted, simplified, and made less
costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty."



13. (S) According to Ryzhkov, the new treaty should provide
an opportunity to verify, using some of the same procedures
that were used to verify START, but not provide for
verification of 100 percent of all SOAs. A basic principle
of the Russian approach in the new treaty is that the Parties
will have a small quota of inspections that will need to be
used more wisely and will cause less disruption at
operational bases. The Parties will receive most of their
information through the notification regime and, therefore,
the Russian side had agreed to retain existing START
notifications almost in their entirety. Ryzhkov said he
believed that the types of inspections the U.S. proposed were
very similar to the Russian proposals. Under the U.S.
inspection proposal, warhead, data update, and elimination
inspections would be retained. The Russian proposal used
different names for those inspections, but the substance was
the same. To demonstrate the impact of the existing START
inspection regime and the U.S.- and Russian-proposed START
Follow-on inspection regimes, Ryzhkov calculated an
inspection "load factor" for each of his slides. (Begin
comment: The load factor was calculated by dividing the
maximum number of inspections called for in a given number of
inspectable facilities. End comment.)



14. (S) Using this methodology, Ryzhkov calculated that the
load factor on the Russian Federation under the existing
START Treaty (Slide One) is 0.44. In other words, almost
half of Russian facilities are subject to inspection each
year. On slide two, he said that the U.S. proposed a
two-fold increase in annual inspections of up to 85 each
year. This would be a load factor of 0.82. On slide three,
he used the Russian approach proposed for START Follow-on and
reduced the load factor to 0.29. Ryzhkov then asked, for
what purpose does the United States want to strengthen the
verification regime. He added that, although he had
calculated the load factors for the Russian Federation, if he
had done the same calculations for the United States, they
would show the same trend.



15. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Ryzhkov for his presentation
and commented that he had said that notifications would be
the basic means for exchanging data on forces according to
the Russian proposal. Gottemoeller added that Ryzhkov had
mentioned that the Russian approach was almost unchanged from
START, but she understood that Russia had eliminated some
notifications in its START Follow-on proposal. She asked
Ryzhkov to explain what principle guided the Russian decision
to eliminate notifications. Ryzhkov responded that the
Russian proposal was guided by two principles. First, Russia
used the same approach for all types of strategic offensive
arms and that, if the United States studied the Russian text
on notifications, it would notice that Russia proposed to
combine several existing START notifications. The second
principle involved adapting new elements of the START
Follow-on treaty to allow for the exchange of information on
items such as warheads. The Russian-proposed Notification
Protocol was based on the experience of implementing the
START Treaty. There were approximately 150 notifications in
the START Treaty, but only about 30 were actually used. The
Russian proposal simply reflected this practice.
Gottemoeller then turned to Warner for additional questions
on Ryzhkov's presentation.



--------------------------


WARNER'S QUESTIONS


--------------------------





16. (S) Warner noted that Ryzhkov's presentation contained
some interesting charts and observations. He was curious,
though, as to how Ryzhkov calculated the number of facilities
subject to inspection. Warner said that if he asked his
staff to develop a similar chart, he would get a
substantially different number of facilities. He added that
the two sides should compare numbers to get them closer
together. Looking to the future, Warner said that he
believed there would be about 50 Russian and 20 U.S.
facilities subject to inspection under the new START
Follow-on treaty. Warner noted that on slide one, both sides
agreed that the maximum number of inspections to be conducted
in a given year under the START Treaty was 28. On slide two,
the United States proposed to continue that same quota.
However, on slide three, the Russian side proposed a
substantial reduction in the number of inspections to 10.
Warner explained that the United States seeks to maintain the
very important and useful inspection regime that has worked
under START, while the Russian Federation proposes to cut it
back drastically.



17. (S) Referring to slide two, Warner questioned why
Ryzhkov assigned the 17 inspections to the rotation of
monitors in Votkinsk. He noted that monitoring was a
continuous inspection activity; monitors may come and go, but
the activity never stops. Warner then referred to slide
two--Elimination Inspections--and noted that the chart
indicated up to 40 inspections. He noted that the U.S.
proposal on elimination inspections focused on mobile ICBMs
and their launchers, not on silo-based ICBMs and on SLBMs.
He added that this number was much larger than expected and
that Ryzhkov must be anticipating an elimination inspection
of every launcher. Warner said it would be useful to
understand how Ryzhkov calculated the inspection load, but
that the sides need to get the numbers of facilities to be
inspected and the anticipated numbers of inspections much

closer.



18. (S) Ryzhkov responded that the numbers of Russian (then
Soviet) facilities used on slide one was based on data as of
the signing of the START Treaty; he acknowledged that the
numbers would be different now. On slide three, Ryzhkov said
that there would be 34 inspectable Russian facilities under
START Follow-on. He also noted that the header on column two
of slide three should read "Number of RF facilities,
including by types of SOAs," vice "Number of U.S.
facilities...." adding that the number of U.S. facilities
should be provided by the United States. Warner replied
that, in his estimation, there would be 18-20 U.S.
inspectable facilities at the outset of START Follow-on
implementation. With regard to Warners comment on the
inspection load factor, Ryzhkov said that the same trends
would apply to the U.S. approach and that the number would be
higher for U.S. facilities. In response to Warner's question
on the number of continuous monitoring rotations, Ryzhkov
said that the number 17 included the number of standard
rotations and the number of so-called "mini-rotations" each
year. On the number of elimination inspections, Ryzhkov said
he derived the number 40 from his understanding that the U.S.
proposed to conduct elimination inspections for mobile ICBMs,
silo-based ICBMs, and for SLBMs. Mr. Elliott responded that
it was not the U.S. intention to conduct elimination
inspections for silo-based ICBM launchers or for SLBM
launchers and that the Russian Delegation had possibly
misinterpreted the intent of the draft U.S. Conversion or
Elimination Protocol.



--------------------------


MORE U.S. QUESTIONS
ON RYZHKOV'S BRIEFING


--------------------------





19. (S) Mr. Trout noted that, on slide one, the number of
inspectable Russian facilities as of the beginning of START
was 63. He asked Ryzhkov whether he knew what the load
factor would be, given the current number of START
facilities. Ryzhkov replied that, under the U.S. proposal
for START Follow-on, he believed the load number would be
0.7, but that he would verify the actual number and respond
later. Mr. Siemon added that Ryzhkov's clarification of
Russian views on combining inspections and reducing
notifications was useful in bringing the U.S. and Russian
positions closer, especially as the Inspection Protocol and
Notification Working Groups conclude their work. Siemon
noted that, in the Russian-proposed treaty text, Article XI
covers inspections and Article IX covers viability and
effectiveness and confidence-building measures for the
treaty. Siemon asked whether it was the Russian intention to
use confidence-building measures to augment the lower number
of Russian-proposed annual inspections and visits. If that
is the Russian intention, it would be helpful to understand
the kinds of confidence-building measures that Russia would
include in Article IX.



20. (S) Ryzhkov responded that Colonel Ilin was responsible
for that issue but, in Ilin's absence, he would respond.
Ryzhkov said that, in addition to the quota of ten annual
inspections and visits, Russia would also suggest to propose
additional visits to Russian facilities on a voluntary basis.
He added that, if the United States had questions regarding

Russian activities, the Russian Federation could invite U.S.
inspectors to visit the facility, as a confidence-building
measure. Such visits could be coordinated either through
diplomatic channels or through the START Follow-on
notification system. Siemon said it would still be helpful
to understand the kinds of situations that would need this
type of clarification. Ryzhkov replied that, in 2008, the
Russians had sent three Topol-M mobile launchers to Red
Square in Moscow to participate in a parade. Such a
situation could create an ambiguity during an inspection if
U.S. inspectors expected to find the missiles at their base
and they were not there. In such a situation, Russia could
notify the United States that the Topol-M launchers would be
in Moscow and invite the military attache to attend the
parade.



21. (S) Gottemoeller said that Ryzhkov had mentioned that
transparency measures in Article IX would be voluntary and
governed by the principle of goodwill. She asked Ryzhkov
whether there are additional principles that might govern
transparency measures, for example, a principle of best
efforts to remove concerns. How is the Russian Federation
thinking of voluntary measures to remove concerns? Ryzhkov
replied that the main principle is an exchange of information
based on the mandatory provisions regarding the existence and
status of SOAs. He added that it is impossible to stipulate
in a treaty all possible situations. Ryzhkov then gave
another example of voluntary transparency measures. He said
that the Russian Federation had recently informed the United
States through diplomatic channels that it intended to change
its inspection procedures on the Topol-M variant 2 even
though there was no obligation to do so. He added that,
taking into account U.S. concerns regarding those inspection
procedures, the Russian Federation thought it appropriate to
inform the United States of the change. As for the text of
Article IX, Ryzhkov said that a working group could address
it. Antonov interjected that the Heads of Delegation would
decide which working group would work on the text.



22. (S) Gottemoeller replied that she wanted to pass her
compliments on the efforts of the JCIC to clear questions
from its agenda. She pointed out that the recent
participation of Russian inspectors in the Minuteman III
front section demonstration had made great progress in
clarifying a long-standing question. She also noted that the
recent inspection at Teykovo, referenced above by Ryzhkov,
had clarified U.S. questions on Russian systems. In her
view, the JCIC was making great progress of clearing
important questions from the agenda and, while the sides may
not clear all the issues, their efforts are noteworthy.
Gottemoeller said that she hopes to carry the spirit of these
efforts into the work on the new treaty.



23. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Chart entitled Comments on the Strengthened
Verification Mechanism for the new START Follow-on Treaty,"
October 19, 2009. Official translation of the chart will be
e-mailed to VCI/SI.



24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Lt Col Blevins
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Johnston
LT Sicks
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Smith
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artemyev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Voloskov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Zharkih
Ms. Komshilova (Int)



25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS