START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000858 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) SIXTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, P.M. SESSION REF: GENEVA 0857 (SFO-GVA-V-042) U.S.-PROPOSED JDT OF THE BCC PROTOCOL Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-035. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 30, 2009 Time: 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the sixth Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties revisited some items from the fifth meeting. The U.S. delegation provided the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the Protocol on the Bilateral Consultative CommisQn (BQ) (Reftel). ¶4. (S) The delegations differed on whether the withdrawal notification period should be 3 or 6 months, what term,Q"withdraw from" or "terminate") was appropriate for pulling out of the treaty, and the need for a meeting to discuss extending the treaty. The U.S. delegation also explained its positions on the BCC Protocol JDT, including the need to allow for provisional application. -------------- AGREEMENT ON TREATY ARTICLE XVII -------------- ¶5. (S) Before the working group turned to the U.S.-proposed JDT of the BCC Protocol, Ms. Kotkova clarified one item in Article XV of the treaty regarding its registration. Specifically, she explained the use of the words "shall" and "will," which should be "shall" in the English text and "will" in the Russian text. "Will" was the Russian word that corresponded to the English "shall" in Russian treaty practice. Ambassador Ries had no objection. -------------- -- THREE- OR SIX-MONTH NOTIFICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL -------------- -- ¶6. (S) Koshelev focused on another paragraph in Article XV which stated that the Parties would provide 6 months notification prior to withdrawing from the treaty. Koshelev stated that the Russian version had a 3-month notice citing the Moscow Treaty as precedence. Ries replied that in recognition of the significance of this arms control treaty and since START, which had worked so well, had the same timeframe, 6 months was an appropriate interval. Additionally, Ries pointed out that 6 months gave both parties a moderate period to adjust to such a major event. Koshelev responded by noting the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty had a 6-month withdrawal clause and when the United States exercised its withdrawal right, it had made a "national" decision. As the U.S. demonstrated, once such a decision was made it was too serious to be reconsidered. Koshelev's second point was that the rationale for the 6-month clause in START, and in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, was to provide an adequate interval for the Parties to remove their continuous monitoring equipment and supporting teams. However, in this treaty, the technical aspects did not require such a lengthy period. Koshelev concluded by stating the Russian delegation was not "insisting" on a 3-month period but that it was requesting the U.S delegation to give the reasons for its position. ¶7. (S) Ries complimented the Russian delegation for its thorough analysis but noted that verification measures were still in negotiations and the U.S. position was still that continuous monitoring should carry over into the new treaty. Again, Ries emphasized the value of utilizing the 15 years experience gained from START and that the decision to withdraw was a very weighty one which merited a longer withdrawal period. Dr. Fraley reminded Koshelev that the INF Treaty had already incorporated the 6-month withdrawal clause before it was decided to include continuous monitoring into its verification regime. Koshelev agreed with Fraley and contended that the Russian delegation was still trying to better understand the rationale for the 6-month clause; even some of his own delegation members had made the same arguments as the U.S. delegation. Koshelev jokingly offered a compromise solution of meeting each other halfway; such as a 4 and one half-month period. -------------- "WITHDRAW" VERSUS "TERMINATE" -------------- ¶8. (S) Continuing with Article XV, Koshelev stated that at the previous meeting he had requested that the U.S. delegation think about substituting "terminate" for "withdraw from" in the phrase "each party shall have the right to withdraw from this treaty..." Mr. Dean responded that "withdrawal from" was a more precise legal term. Mr. Taylor pointed out that the same term was used in the previous bilateral treaties negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Ms. Kotkova agreed that "withdrawal from" had been used in the INF, START and the Moscow Treaties but implied that after the first time this term was used, it was carried over into subsequent treaties without adequate analysis. Ms. Kotkova offered to submit a new proposal at a later time for the U.S. delegation to consider. Ries concurred. -------------- IS A TREATY EXTENSION MEETING NECESSARY? -------------- ¶9. (S) Koshelev questioned the need for the Article XV statement, "No later than 1 year before the expiration of the 10-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended." He stated that the treaty could only be extended if both Parties agreed. If one party wanted to extend the treaty, it could make the proposal and then there would be such a meeting. Otherwise, the meeting was superfluous. Ries countered that this meeting was intended to have both sides jointly consider the issue and noted that it was hardly an onerous obligation. Koshelev stated that such a decision of this nature would only be made at the highest level of the national governments and that if it was decided not to extend, having a meeting between the Parties would not change anything. Koshelev referenced the recent START situation where both the United States and the Russian Federation separately made the "national" decision not to extend START; therefore, the obligatory meeting had served no purpose. Ries stated she understood that this meeting could not undo a national-level decision but that it provided the forum for both sides to jointly consider the effects of such a decision. Mr. Dunn also noted that this meeting added to the predictability and stability of this arms control regime. Koshelev recapped that representatives at such a meeting had no authority to decide, they could only inform. Kotkova proposed the following "as an idea" for consideration: "Each of the Parties shall have the right to address the other party with the proposal to extend this Treaty, in such a case, the Parties shall jointly consider the possibility of extending this Treaty." Ries said that the U.S. delegation would consider it and also Koshelev's explanation. -------------- BCC SESSIONS -------------- ¶10. (S) Ries turned to the BCC Protocol. Koshelev stated the Russian delegation had just received the Russian translation of the JDT at the beginning of this meeting and so had not had the opportunity to study it. As a follow-up to the previous day's discussion, Koshelev referred back to the treaty Article XIII (BCC) and questioned what "activities" come under the BCC. Should the BCC have other meetings besides the "sessions" called for in the protocol? Noting that at yesterday's meeting, Taylor had mentioned exhibitions. Koshelev stated that exhibitions were not sessions. Referencing START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),Koshelev declared that this body had no other activities except sessions. The JCIC could make decisions at such sessions but the event itself, e.g., an exhibition, came under the purview of another organization such as a military unit. Taylor countered that sessions were held in Geneva under the JCIC but that the framework of the JCIC also included notifications, agendas, and communications. Also, decisions on demonstrations such as Russia's 2005 proposal on supplemental radiation detection equipment (RDE),the U.S. proposal on Trident reentry vehicle on-site inspection (RVOSI),and the Minuteman III front section demonstration were all made within the framework of the JCIC. Admiral Kuznetsov responded that the JCIC practice was to only conduct sessions. Kuznetsov proposed that if both delegations intended for the BCC to go outside of the JCIC construct, then this should be discussed now. Ries and Koshelev agreed. ¶11. (S) Kuznetsov stated that he had carefully reviewed the BCC Protocol that had been provided by the U.S. side and observed that it only referenced "sessions." (Begin comment: Document had been handed over only ten minutes earlier. End Comment.) There was no mention of any other activities such as "meetings." Koshelev stated that Kuznetsov's observations had gained the attention of the Russian Prime Minister's Legal Department. They discerned that the terms "meetings" and "sessions" were typically used in discussions but that the BCC Protocol contained only the term "sessions." Koshelev put forward that if the two terms were to be used, they must be defined within the framework of the BCC. (Begin comment: The term "meeting" was in the U.S.- and Russian-proposed BCC protocols, Paragraph 3 and 6 respectively. End comment.) -------------- THE BCC PROTOCOL -------------- ¶12. (S) Ries stated that as with other treaties, there were always some unresolved items and details at the time of signature. Experience showed having an agreed channel made for easier resolution of such issues. After START was signed, the JCIC began meeting shortly afterwards and it accomplished a good deal of useful work. For these reasons, the U.S. delegation advocated for a provisional application for launching the BCC. With that, Ries proposed going through the document, highlighting the differences between the U.S. and Russian versions and providing rationale for the U.S. text. Koshelev asked if there was anything different from START. Dean replied that it was substantially the same. Kuznetsov noted that in developing the Russian version, the writers removed clauses that were seldom or never used such as the special session. The objective was to make it shorter and clearer. ¶13. (S) Ries asked for the Russian view on provisional application. Kotkova replied that this would be solved when the other working groups finished their work. For example, the Inspection Protocol Working Group was considering putting the development of some inspection procedures under the BCC. If this happened, there would be a need for a provisional application but if everything was resolved by the working groups, there would be no need for one. ¶14. (S) Starting in Section I, Composition of the Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries stated that the United States favored having the names of the BCC commissioners exchanged 30 days after "signature" vice after "entry into force" because of the possibility of provisional application. Also in Paragraph 1, Ries concurred with the Russian version of the Parties communicating "through diplomatic channels" because the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center was viewed as a diplomatic channel. In Paragraph 3, Ries explained that the term "head representative" provided for more flexibility than "commissioner," since in the U.S. proposal a session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, each Party could be represented by their alternates, members, advisors or experts. ¶15. (S) In Section II, Convening a Session of the Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries asked why the Russian version proposed two obligatory BCC sessions per year. Koshelev replied that in the last 2 years, as the head of the Russian delegation to the JCIC, he had experienced difficulties in calling together a JCIC meeting. However, Koshelev agreed to reconsider the Russian position. In the same paragraph, regarding the agenda, Ries noted the Russian version stated that in regard to the reply to a request for a BCC session, the other Party "may express its consent to the proposals received." Did that mean that a Party had a right to object? Koshelev replied that every one of a Party's concerns should be discussed; the BCC should address all questions. In Paragraph 3, Ries explained the U.S version "...the Commission shall remain in session..." was more precise than the Russian version "shall last no longer than..." Continuing with Paragraph 4, referring to the phrase "The Commissioner...may communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party..." Ries explained that the U.S. version "may" was preferable to the Russian version "shall." Koshelev replied that the Russian Ambassador to the United States wanted all communications to go through the Russian Embassy in Washington. For that reason, Koshelev preferred the U.S. version that allowed the BCC Commissioners to communicate with each other at their discretion. Lastly in this paragraph, the Russian version had the phrase "concerning questions that are related to the competency of the Commission." Ries queried on the use of the term "competency." The delegations ascertained that it was a translation issue; Koshelev said a better word in English may be "authority." ¶16. (S) The Russian version had deleted Section III, Convening a Special Session of the Commission. Ries stated that that U.S. version kept it because it allowed for a quicker convening of a BCC session to address an urgent issue. Koshelev noted that a special session had never been called for in the 15 years of START. Kotkova offered that for such scenarios, the BCC commissioners were already empowered to communicate directly. ¶17. (S) Lastly, in Section V, Work of the Commission, the Russian version proposed to dispense with the provision for the authenticity of the BCC documents. Kotkova argued that since this was already common legal practice and appeared in each of the Commission's documents, it did not need restating in the protocol. Dean countered that the authenticity statement needed to be retained to ensure the practice continued. Ries suggested resolving this at the next meeting. ¶18. (S) Documents exchanged: -- U.S.-proposed JDT of the Bilateral Consultative Commission, dated September 30, 2009 (English and unofficial Russian) ¶19. (S) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Connell Mr. Dean Mr. Dunn Dr. Fraley Col Hartford Mr. Sims Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Adm. Kuznetsov Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. RICHTER