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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING,
SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

REF: A. STATE 097473 (SFO-V-GUIDANCE-002)

B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-029.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the September 29, 2009, meeting of the Working
Group on the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),chaired by
Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, the delegations went through a
comparison of each side's proposed categories of data to be
included in the database for the new treaty. The Russians
confirmed that they would include many of the same categories
of data as the United States on facilities and the items
located there. Russia's aggregate data reflected its
proposed treaty limits and counting rules, with the addition
of aggregates of non-deployed items. Orlov unsuccessfully
pressed for U.S. agreement to categorize data the way Russia
had proposed.


4. (S) The Russian delegation agreed to include repair and
production facilities for both mobile ICBM launchers and
their associated ICBMs, and ICBM and SLBM loading facilities.
They would not agree to include throw-weight, and would not
list separate aggregate numbers for mobile launchers or their
associated ICBMs. They reacted negatively to the U.S. view
that the Peacekeeper ICBM would not be declared in the new
treaty because it was no longer deployed. For their part,
the Russians made a new proposal to combine space launch
facilities and test ranges.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF MOU DATA CATEGORIES
--------------


5. (S) Orlov opened the working group meeting and confirmed
he had received the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the U.S.
and Russian proposals (Refs A and B) for the MOU data base
that was provided earlier in the day, and he agreed to
discuss it. He then provided an unofficial Russian paper
titled, "Main Composition of Data Base the Parties Intend to
Exchange under the New Treaty."

Begin official translation of that paper:

Handed over by the Russian
Side on September 29, 2009

Official Translation

Main Composition of the Data Base the Parties Intend to
Exchange under the New Agreement


1. List of SOAs proposed for inclusion in the data


base:

Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers;
Warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Non-deployed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers.


2. Aggregate data proposed for inclusion in the data
base:

Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
HBs;
Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers and
SLBM
launchers;
Aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs,
SLBMs, and HBs;
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
HBs.


3. List of facilities for which it is proposed that a
data base be provided:

ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with
SLBMs,
and air bases for HBs;
Storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
Test ranges for ICBMs and SLBMs;
(Space launch facilities);
Training facilities (ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs);
HB flight test centers;
Repair facilities for SLBMs and HBs;
Conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs,
SLBMs, and HBs;
Conversion or elimination facilities for mobile
launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers;
Production facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs;
Production facilities for ballistic missile
submarines;
Static display.


4. List of ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped
with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs for which the data base is
provided:

Russian Federation

ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:
e.g., Dombarovskiy

ICBM bases for mobile ICBMs:
e.g., Vypolzovo

Submarine bases:
e.g., Yagel'naya

HB bases:
e.g., Ukrainka

U.S.


ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:
e.g., Minot

Submarine bases:
e.g., Silverdale

HB bases:
e.g., Dyess


5. Data with respect to ICBM bases, bases of
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases for HBs, for
which the sides intend to carry out exchanges:

Name and coordinates of the base;

Type of ICBM (SLBM, HB);

For each type:
Aggregate number of deployed ICBMs (SLBMs, HBs);
Aggregate number of deployed ICBM launchers (SLBM
launchers);
Aggregate number of warheads on delivery vehicles
located at a base;
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs (SLBMs and
HBs);
Aggregate number of non-deployed ICBM launchers
(SLBM
launchers);
Launcher groups;
Silos used as launch control centers;
Other launch control centers.

End text.


6. (S) Trout indicated that the U.S. paper contained a
side-by-side list of the categories of data that each Party
proposed to include in analogous sections of the data base.
Orlov jokingly regretted that the paper did not include a
third column with compromise proposals. Trout responded that
once the sides identified and understood the similarities and
differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches, the U.S.
delegation hoped to draft a proposed joint draft text (JDT)
during the break in sessions. His goal for this meeting was
to confirm what each side believed should be in the MOU.
(Begin comment: The following paragraphs represent the U.S.
side-by-side comparison of the U.S. positions and the Russian
positions that were provided to the Russian delegation. End
comment.)


7. (S) The United States would include in Section I of the
MOU (Aggregate Numbers) the following two aggregate numbers:

- Deployed ICBMs/SLBMs and their associated launchers,
deployed heavy bombers; and

- Nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs/SLBMs, Nuclear
armaments on or associated with deployed heavy bombers.


8. (S) Russia's Section I of their draft annex (Ref B)
included the following five aggregate numbers:

- Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers;


- Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs;

- Warheads on Deployed ICBMS, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers;

- Non-Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, Heavy Bombers; and

- Non-Deployed Launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs


9. (S) Orlov said the U.S. Non-Paper on the MOU (Ref A) that
had been provided on September 21, 2009, had stated that
throw-weight data should be in Section I. However, the
United States had since decided that throw-weight should be
declared in Annex F on ICBM and SLBM technical data. Orlov
commented dryly that Russia would omit throw-weight data
entirely, so moving it to Annex F was a step in the right
direction.


10. (S) Trout asked why Russia included an aggregate number
for non-deployed items in Section I when Russia was not
proposing any numerical limits on such items. Colonel
Ryzhkov answered that, in the Russian approach, non-deployed
items would be subject to some limitations under the treaty,
some information would be provided about them, and certain
verification provisions would apply. Indeed, Ryzhkov added,
one aim of the verification regime was to monitor
non-deployed delivery vehicles, even though it would be only
be to a limited extent. Russia considered it logical to list
aggregate data for all items in Section I. In turn, Ryzhkov
asked what the U.S. goals were for the verification regime
regarding non-deployed delivery vehicles, and where the
United States would list such aggregate data. Trout
responded that the United States would include the data
somewhere in the MOU, but viewed Section I as relating only
to the central limits as defined in the treaty. Trout also
described the U.S.-proposed verification regime for and
limits on non-deployed mobile ICBMs and mobile launchers.


11. (S) Ryzhkov indicated dissatisfaction with limits on
mobile ICBMs, and asked what the U.S. reasoning was for
imposing them. Trout explained that the United States had
always been concerned that mobile ICBMs were the only force
that could be rapidly expanded without being readily
observable. The START restrictions on mobile ICBMs were
equal because the United States was planning at the time of
the START negotiations to deploy Peacekeeper ICBMs in a
mobile configuration. While many things were different now,
the monitoring problem had not changed. The United States
was looking mostly for transparency, along with some
restrictions. Orlov commented that Russia could ask for the
same with regard to other "mobile" systems, such as
submarines, if the United States kept talking about mobile
ICBMs.


12. (S) Trout went on to note that the United States would
include a Section II in the MOU: Additional Aggregate
Numbers. He said that Russia's proposal did not contain it.
The numbers in it were associated with the limits the United
States was proposing in our Article IV of the treaty.
Section II would include:

- Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

- Non-Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs at Test Ranges



- Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

-- Mobile Test Launchers at Test Ranges

- Mobile Training Launchers

- Test Heavy Bombers

--------------
ICBM-RELATED DATA
--------------


13. (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an
MOU Annex A: ICBMs and ICBM Launchers, which Russia had as
part I of Section II of Section II of its Annex. The U.S.
would again include two aggregate limits, as well as the
following data:

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates

--- ICBMs for Mobile Launchers
--- ICBMs at Test Ranges
--- Mobile Launchers for ICBMs

-- Other Launcher Aggregates

--- Test Launchers
--- Mobile Test Launchers
--- Training Launchers
--- Mobile Training Launchers

- Facilities listed:

-- Bases and Maintenance Facilities

-- Loading Facilities

-- Production Facilities
--- ICBMs
--- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

-- Storage Facilities
--- ICBMs
--- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

-- Repair Facilities
--- ICBMs
--- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

-- Test Ranges

-- Training Facilities

-- Elimination Facilities

- ICBM base data:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

-- Two Aggregate Numbers



-- Coordinates of each silo

- Other facility data, to include the maintenance
facility
at ICBM bases:

-- Non-Deployed ICBMs, Training Models of Missiles
(TMOMs)


14. (S) Trout said the Russian Federation's Section II:
ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM Launchers,
and SLBM Launchers; (I) ICBMs, Warheads on ICBMs, ICBM
Launchers, would include the following data:

- Five aggregate limits would be declared at the
beginning and for each base

- Additional Declared Values:

-- None

- Facilities listed:

-- Bases

-- Production Facilities

-- Storage Facilities
--- ICBMs
--- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs
-- Test Ranges


-- Training Facilities

-- Conversion or Elimination Facilities
--- ICBMs
--- Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

- ICBM base data:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

-- Unknown


15. (S) After considerable probing by Trout, Orlov
acknowledged it would make sense to list production
facilities for mobile launchers in the Russian data. In
addition, the sides decided it would be best to retain the
category of loading facilities for both ICBMs and SLBMs.
Although neither Party had any ICBM loading facilities, the
category could be desired in the future. Russia also agreed
to add repair facilities for ICBMs and mobile launchers if
the United States would include that category too. The
Russians promised to include aggregate numbers of items at
each base, and the coordinates of each silo launcher, just as
in START.

--------------
SLBM-RELATED DATA
--------------




16. (S) Trout added that the United States would retain an
MOU Annex B (SLBMs and SLBM Launchers) with the following
data:

- Two Aggregate Limits

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates
--- SLBMs at Test Ranges

-- Other Launcher Aggregates
--- Test Launchers
--- Training Launchers

- Facilities listed:

-- Bases

-- Loading Facilities

-- Production Facilities
--- SLBMs
--- Ballistic Missile Submarines

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Test Ranges

-- Training Facilities

-- Elimination Facilities

- Submarine base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

-- Two Aggregate Numbers

-- Non-Deployed SLBMs

- Other facility data:

-- Non-Deployed SLBMs, TMOMs


17. (S) Trout continued that the Russian Federation's
Section II: ICBMs, SLBMs, Warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM
Launchers, and SLBM Launchers; (II) SLBMs, Warheads on SLBMs,
SLBM Launchers, included the following data:

- Five aggregate limits would be declared at the
beginning and for each base

- Additional Declared Values:

-- None

- Facilities listed:

-- Bases



-- Production Facilities
--- SLBMs
--- Ballistic Missile Submarines

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Test Ranges

-- Training Facilities

-- Conversion or Elimination Facilities
--- SLBMs
--- Ballistic Missile Submarines

- SLBM base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

-- Unknown


18. (S) Since Russia would provide the total number of
non-deployed SLBM launchers at submarine bases, Trout asked
whether Russia would provide the number of empty SLBM
launchers in each 6-month update. Orlov affirmed this would
be the case, with Ryzhkov adding it would be the case if the
United States provided it. Trout did not respond, but
promised to declare elimination facilities for both SLBMs and
SLBM launchers.

--------------
HEAVY BOMBER DATA
--------------


19. (S) Trout continued that the United States would retain
an MOU Annex C (Heavy Bombers) with the following data:

- Two Aggregate Limits

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates
--- None

-- Other Aggregates
--- Test Heavy Bombers
--- Training Heavy Bombers

- The following facilities are listed:

-- Bases for Deployed Heavy Bombers

-- Production Facilities

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Flight Test Centers




-- Training Facilities

-- Elimination Facilities

- Air base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

-- Three Aggregate Numbers
--- Includes Nuclear Armaments Weapons Storage
Areas with coordinates

- Other facility data:

-- Training Heavy Bombers, Test Heavy Bombers


20. (S) The Russian Federation's Section III: Heavy Bombers
and Warheads on Them, would include the following data:

- Two aggregate limits would be declared at the
beginning and for each base

- Sub-aggregate limits

-- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range
Nuclear ALCMs

-- Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear
Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for
Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

-- Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for
Nuclear Armaments other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs

- Additional Declared Values:

-- Non-Deployed Aggregates
--- Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers

-- Other Aggregates
--- Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear
Armaments
--- Test Heavy Bombers
--- Training Heavy Bombers
--- Heavy Bombers Converted to Ground Trainers

- The following facilities are listed:

-- Bases for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range
Nuclear ALCMs

-- Production Facilities

-- Storage Facilities

-- Repair Facilities

-- Flight Test Centers

-- Training Facilities



-- Conversion or Elimination Facilities

- Air base data included:

-- Name and Coordinates of Facility

- Other facility data:

-- Unknown


21. (S) Orlov asked Trout to clarify what was meant by the
term "nuclear armaments weapons storage areas associated with
each air base." Trout explained that, under the U.S.
concept, accountable warheads could be either on heavy
bombers or in storage facilities that were associated with
the air base. Orlov asked whether it could be said that the
storage facilities were situated at the air base. Trout
clarified that the storage facilities could be at the air
base or some distance from the base. Orlov asked how far
away the storage facilities could be. Trout clarified
further that the issue was not distance, but which facility
provided the warheads that would be carried by the heavy
bombers at an air base. In other words, the declared weapons
storage area would be wherever the nuclear armaments that
would be used to load the bomber would be drawn from. He
said he was not talking about central storage.


22. (S) On receiving this clarification, Orlov asked about
the U.S.-proposed verification regime for heavy bomber
warheads. How did the United States propose to count such
warheads? Trout explained that the U.S. vision was to report
the number of warheads in storage at the storage facilities
that directly support the heavy bomber airbase, as well as
any warheads actually loaded on heavy bombers. The
U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol discussed warhead
inspections at air bases to confirm the number of heavy
bombers, the number of warheads on them, and the number in
storage at weapons storage areas directly supporting the air
bases. Orlov stated that the Russians had a different
understanding on this issue and almost certainly would oppose
it. Trout noted that this issue was broader than the purview
of the MOU Working Group.


23. (S) Going through Russia's paper on the data base, Orlov
sought to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement. He
pressed for agreement to include Russia's five groupings of
aggregate data somewhere in the MOU. Trout continued to
resist, inasmuch as the United States characterized and
grouped the data differently from Russia's proposal. The
United States also had a different concept as to when or if a
launcher or heavy bomber would be considered non-deployed.
Trout confirmed that the U.S. proposed to provide complete,
comprehensive data in the MOU and its annexes.

--------------
DISAPPEARANCE OF PEACEKEEPERS
AND SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES
--------------


24. (S) Orlov then asked whether the United States planned
to declare its Peacekeeper ICBM silos as non-deployed
launchers and the missiles as non-deployed ICBMs. Trout


informed him that Peacekeepers would not count in this treaty
because they would not be an existing type as of treaty
signature. Amid exclamations of "Why, why?" from several
Russian participants, Orlov said that was not the correct
answer. The Russian delegation would not be able to explain
it to their leadership. Orlov asked how Russia would be able
to confirm that the Peacekeeper launchers were not
launch-capable. He said further discussion was needed in the
working groups and at higher levels.


25. (S) When asked about declaring static displays in the
MOU, Trout confirmed that the United States would not include
them, because the United States would consider static
displays as eliminated items. Orlov promised that Russia
would study that proposal.


26. (S) Orlov proposed that the sides agree to combine in
the data base the facilities that were declared as space
launch facilities and test ranges under START. Surprised at
this new proposal, Trout asked what inspection rights would
apply. Orlov repeated that Russia wanted to combine such
facilities and call them all test ranges, with no
verification measures. (Begin note: Orlov's statement was
inconsistent with Russia's proposed treaty text, which states
that visits shall be conducted at test ranges, inter alia.
End note.)


27. (S) Documents exchanged:

-- U.S.:

- Side-by-side comparison of U.S. and Russian proposals
for the MOU data base, dated September 29, 2009.

-- Russia:

- Unofficial paper titled, "Main Composition of Data Base
the Parties Intend to Exchange under the New Treaty," dated
September 29, 2009.


28. (S) Participants:

U.S.:

Mr. Trout
Lt Col Blevins
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov


Mr. Pishchulov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


29. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER