START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000829

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
THIRD TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-016.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009
Time: 3:15 - 5:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the third Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group meeting of the session, the Parties continued their
discussion on the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for
the treaty Preamble.


4. (S) Agreement was reached on combining two paragraphs of
the Preamble and how to address the Moscow Treaty. However,
the Russian Delegation disagreed with U.S. counterproposals
regarding "undiminished security" and, likewise, agreement
was not reached on Russian proposals for the paragraphs
addressing: 1) the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine to the successful implementation of the START Treaty,
2) the consequences of nuclear war, and 3) offensive and
defensive arms.

--------------
PROGRESS
--------------


5. (S) Ambassador Ries began by proposing editorial changes
which addressed the step-by-step process of reducing and
limiting nuclear arms. Ries noted that the changes were
minor refinements designed to improve the text in English.
Mr. Koshelev agreed, in principle, but wanted to study the
changes to ensure that the phrasing worked in Russian as
well. Koshelev then revisited already-agreed-to text, noting
that there was some redundancy in two paragraphs and
suggested combining them. After some discussion, both sides
agreed to a single paragraph: "Continuing along the path of
forging a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust,
openness, predictability and cooperation, and desiring to
bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with
this new relationship."

--------------
UKRAINE, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN
--------------


6. (S) Koshelev proposed revising the text discussing the
contributions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The
purpose of the rewrite was to improve the wording by
recognizing the contributions of these three nations without
"adding significance." The key change in Koshelev's proposal
was the deletion of the reference to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).


7. (S) Koshelev explained that Ukraine believed the Budapest
Memorandum security assurances, provided as part of Ukraine's
accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, would
expire when START did. Koshelev noted that even though the
United States and the Russian Federation did not agree with

this interpretation, the Russian Delegation wanted any
reference to the NPT removed to preclude Ukraine from making
that linkage. Ries concurred that both the United States and
the Russian Federation disagreed with the Ukrainian
interpretation, but requested further explanation as to why
dropping the NPT reference helped.


8. (S) Koshelev responded that when Ukraine agreed to give
up nuclear weapons, it was provided security assurances
which, for Ukraine, was the first step. The second step in
Ukraine's view was entering the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon
state. Therefore, Ukraine viewed the Budapest Memorandum
security assurances as a pre-condition for entering the NPT.
These security assurances were much more important to Ukraine
than those provided by the NPT. Ms. Kotkova further stated
that by including the NPT within this paragraph, Ukraine was
provided the link to demand additional guarantees to remain
an NPT member.


9. (S) Ries replied that the United States had not included
the NPT reference in its September 22, 2009 draft of the JDT,
but had proposed the language at the September 23, 2009
Treaty Text Working Group meeting. However, its inclusion
emphasized the importance of Ukraine's entry into the NPT.
Koshelev stated that he was not denying the significance of
this event, but stressed that Ukraine had only joined the NPT
for the special security assurances which they wrongly
believed would expire at the end of START. Many high-ranking
Ukrainian Government officials considered entry into the NPT
a mistake and Koshelev reminded the U.S. Delegation that the
Ukrainians had stated in the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC) that they might reconsider their
non-nuclear weapon status. Koshelev noted that all NPT
members received equal treatment, but Ukraine wanted more; in
effect, Ukraine advocated the creation of a new category of
non-nuclear weapon states.


10. (S) In summary, the Russian Delegation believed Ukraine
had made a responsible decision to become a member of the NPT
and to renounce nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Russian
Delegation had one request for this paragraph: to drop the
reference to the NPT. Ries said she understood Russia's
concern and she would consult with her NPT experts.

--------------
THE MOSCOW TREATY
--------------


11. (S) Moving on, Koshelev declared that the Russian
Delegation had no objection to mentioning the Moscow Treaty,
but they preferred to reduce the verbiage to simply noting
its successful implementation. Koshelev's rationale was that
because the Moscow Treaty had no verification regime it had
been subjected to criticism. The Russian Federation had
never publicly declared specific reductions of its nuclear
arsenal. However, Russia did inform the United States that
it was already under the limits prescribed by the treaty.
The Russian Delegation agreed that there should be some
recognition of the Moscow Treaty because of the
accomplishments that resulted from it, but they did not want
it over-emphasized because the reductions could not be
confirmed. Ries accepted Koshelev's proposal.

--------------

UNDIMINISHED SECURITY
--------------


12. (S) Ries suggested moving the phrase referring to
"undiminished security for the Parties" from the beginning of
the eighth paragraph, which discussed the reduction of
strategic offensive arms enhancing the security of both
parties, to the end of paragraph three about
non-proliferation. The revised paragraph would read:
"Expressing strong support for global efforts in
non-proliferation and guided by the principles of
undiminished security for all." Koshelev objected and noted
that he had been criticized because the phrase "undiminished
security," which was earlier substituted for "equal
security," was much weaker. In the Russian view, the phrases
"equal security" and "undiminished security for the Parties"
referred only to the two Parties of this treaty. By changing
it to read "undiminished security for all" and then moving it
to another paragraph, it lost that meaning entirely.


13. (S) Ries expressed surprise at Koshelev's reaction and
noted that "undiminished security for all" was from the
language used in United Nations Security Council Resolution
1887 (September 24, 2009). Ries advocated for following what
the United States and Russian Federation had already agreed
upon. Koshelev retorted that the Russian side had proposed
the principle of "undiminished security for the parties" for
one purpose: to find a different formulation for "equal
security." Therefore, if this wording for the paragraph on
strategic offensive arms was not acceptable, then it was back
to "equal security," and as such, starting over.


14. (S) Ries noted that the Preamble must set forth
principles to which both sides can agree. Recent
deliberations on "equal security" had revealed disagreement
between the two sides. However, because some agreement did
exist, the U.S. Delegation had hoped moving the "undiminished
security" phrase to the paragraph discussing
non-proliferation would achieve accord. Koshelev replied
that "undiminished security for all" was related to nuclear
disarmament whereas "equal security for all" was the main
goal of nuclear nonproliferation. Koshelev introduced a
third concept, "indivisible security." Koshelev informed the
U.S. Delegation that "undiminished security for all" was
first mentioned in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, and later at the 2000 NPT RevCon. However, the
Russian position was that this phrase was not as good as
"equal security." Koshelev stressed that, for this treaty,
"undiminished security" referred just to the United States
and Russia; it did not include China, France or anyone else.
Therefore, it was not acceptable to merge the two paragraphs
as suggested. Ries agreed to leave this issue for now.

--------------
DON'T TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR
--------------


15. (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concern regarding
the paragraph articulating the consequences of nuclear war.
Koshelev recognized that it was in the START preamble but
pointed out that it was not found in the Moscow Treaty.
Koshelev contended that to insert it now into this treaty
would be implying that something had changed since 2002.
Koshelev emphasized that Russia agreed and supported the

concept espoused by this paragraph, but questioned why it
needed to be brought up again. Ries agreed that nuclear war
was unthinkable, but that this paragraph should be seen as
something positive; the idea that nuclear war cannot be won
and must never be fought was a very positive statement.


16. (S) Koshelev said his concern was that START was signed
near the end of the Cold War in 1991 and, at that time, the
statement was useful. But it was not carried over into the
Moscow Treaty and mentioning it again was sending the wrong
signal. He asked "what would a non-aligned nation think?
Did something change that this needed to be emphasized
again?" Ries replied that having this statement did not mean
the world had gotten more dangerous since 2002 and,
therefore, it should not be interpreted that way. Admiral
Kuznetsov interjected and said that the relationship that
existed between the two Parties when START was implemented
was completely different from that which existed now. So to
discuss nuclear war was nonsense. Koshelev restated that
Russia had nothing against the concept, but questioned the
necessity to send this message regarding the horrors of
nuclear war. Was it the right thing to do?


17. (S) Ries said she understood that the Russians wanted to
get away from Cold War thinking and remarked that these
discussions are beneficial. However, this issue would not be
resolved today.

--------------
MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


18. (S) Ries read the U.S. proposal in the twelfth
paragraph, "Recognizing the interrelationship between
strategic offensive and defensive arms" and added that it
elegantly portrayed the offense-defense relationship.
Koshelev replied by explaining that it was important for the
Russians to have "the deployment of missile defense systems"
in lieu of "defensive arms" because this was the first time
such a treaty was concluded without the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. Koshelev asserted that a decrease in
strategic offensive armaments was directly related to the
deployment of missile defense systems and that this was
effectively the same concept stated by the Presidents in the
Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009. However, the phrase
"defensive arms" in the Joint Understanding was too
imprecise. The substitution of "deployment of missile
defense systems" provided for better accuracy.


19. (S) Mr. Taylor said the United States proceeded from the
premise that the Delegations had been instructed by our
Presidents that the subject of the new agreement would be the
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. That
said, the United States was also committed to including a
provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms. Taylor noted that the United
States had historically recognized this relationship but that
both sides would probably describe it differently based on
each nation's own view of its national security.


20. (S) Taylor explained that the United States would not
use the phrase "indissoluble interrelationship" when speaking
about strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms
because the United States did not see the two things as

always linked.


21. (S) Taylor noted that the United States regarded this
negotiation on the reduction of strategic offensive arms as
proceeding independently of the discussions on missile
defense systems, which were being conducted in another venue
in keeping with a Russian suggestion about ways we might work
together.


22. (S) Taylor said that, in strategic arms reduction talks,
the Delegations were discussing U.S. and Russian offensive
systems and bilateral strategic stability. However, in
separate dialogues concerning strategic defensive systems, we
were conferring about third country threats and about how our
two countries might work together to counter them.


23. (S) Taylor said that the United States and the Russian
Federation had developed, and continued to forge, a strategic
relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability
and cooperation. This could not have been more evident than
during this very week as our two Presidents together
demonstrated unprecedented leadership in New York and
Pittsburgh. Therefore, the United States believed that the
paragraph, as drafted, was consistent with the spirit of our
current relationship.


24. (S) It was for these reasons, and in the spirit of this
new strategic relationship, that the U.S. Delegation urged
the Russian Delegation to accept the U.S.-proposed
formulation.


25. (S) Koshelev stated that he agreed with some of the
positions addressed by Taylor, but asked why the United
States needed strategic ballistic missile interceptors.
Taylor replied that this question should be discussed in a
different forum. Koshelev complimented Taylor on his
diplomacy and followed up with a history of missile defenses,
starting with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Koshelev noted that,
since then, the positions of the two sides had reversed. The
purpose of strategic missile defense was to intercept
ballistic missiles and, since only two other nations
possessed them (the Russian Federation and China),the
Russian position was that the United States needed missile
defense to protect itself against Russian strategic offensive
arms. Koshelev argued that the build-up and deployment of
missile defense systems by one Party affected the strategic
deterrence of the other and, therefore, this relationship
should be reflected. Koshelev concluded by reiterating that
because no ABM Treaty existed, this principle should be
enshrined in the treaty.


26. (S) Ries agreed that circumstances had changed (between
1972 and now),but also commented that they had progressed in
a positive direction. Ries brought the meeting to a close by
noting that both sides are undertaking constructive
cooperation and evaluating things that threaten and affect
the national security of each nation.


27. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated
September 25, 2009 (English and unofficial Russian).


- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble,
dated September 25, 2009 (paragraph 14) (Unofficial English
only).


28. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Connell
Mr. Evans
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Mr. Sims
Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Adm.(Ret) Kuznetsov
Gen Venevtsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


29. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS