START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000829 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): THIRD TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-016. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009 Time: 3:15 - 5:45 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the third Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group meeting of the session, the Parties continued their discussion on the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the treaty Preamble. ¶4. (S) Agreement was reached on combining two paragraphs of the Preamble and how to address the Moscow Treaty. However, the Russian Delegation disagreed with U.S. counterproposals regarding "undiminished security" and, likewise, agreement was not reached on Russian proposals for the paragraphs addressing: 1) the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the successful implementation of the START Treaty, 2) the consequences of nuclear war, and 3) offensive and defensive arms. -------------- PROGRESS -------------- ¶5. (S) Ambassador Ries began by proposing editorial changes which addressed the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms. Ries noted that the changes were minor refinements designed to improve the text in English. Mr. Koshelev agreed, in principle, but wanted to study the changes to ensure that the phrasing worked in Russian as well. Koshelev then revisited already-agreed-to text, noting that there was some redundancy in two paragraphs and suggested combining them. After some discussion, both sides agreed to a single paragraph: "Continuing along the path of forging a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability and cooperation, and desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship." -------------- UKRAINE, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN -------------- ¶6. (S) Koshelev proposed revising the text discussing the contributions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The purpose of the rewrite was to improve the wording by recognizing the contributions of these three nations without "adding significance." The key change in Koshelev's proposal was the deletion of the reference to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). ¶7. (S) Koshelev explained that Ukraine believed the Budapest Memorandum security assurances, provided as part of Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, would expire when START did. Koshelev noted that even though the United States and the Russian Federation did not agree with this interpretation, the Russian Delegation wanted any reference to the NPT removed to preclude Ukraine from making that linkage. Ries concurred that both the United States and the Russian Federation disagreed with the Ukrainian interpretation, but requested further explanation as to why dropping the NPT reference helped. ¶8. (S) Koshelev responded that when Ukraine agreed to give up nuclear weapons, it was provided security assurances which, for Ukraine, was the first step. The second step in Ukraine's view was entering the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Therefore, Ukraine viewed the Budapest Memorandum security assurances as a pre-condition for entering the NPT. These security assurances were much more important to Ukraine than those provided by the NPT. Ms. Kotkova further stated that by including the NPT within this paragraph, Ukraine was provided the link to demand additional guarantees to remain an NPT member. ¶9. (S) Ries replied that the United States had not included the NPT reference in its September 22, 2009 draft of the JDT, but had proposed the language at the September 23, 2009 Treaty Text Working Group meeting. However, its inclusion emphasized the importance of Ukraine's entry into the NPT. Koshelev stated that he was not denying the significance of this event, but stressed that Ukraine had only joined the NPT for the special security assurances which they wrongly believed would expire at the end of START. Many high-ranking Ukrainian Government officials considered entry into the NPT a mistake and Koshelev reminded the U.S. Delegation that the Ukrainians had stated in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) that they might reconsider their non-nuclear weapon status. Koshelev noted that all NPT members received equal treatment, but Ukraine wanted more; in effect, Ukraine advocated the creation of a new category of non-nuclear weapon states. ¶10. (S) In summary, the Russian Delegation believed Ukraine had made a responsible decision to become a member of the NPT and to renounce nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Russian Delegation had one request for this paragraph: to drop the reference to the NPT. Ries said she understood Russia's concern and she would consult with her NPT experts. -------------- THE MOSCOW TREATY -------------- ¶11. (S) Moving on, Koshelev declared that the Russian Delegation had no objection to mentioning the Moscow Treaty, but they preferred to reduce the verbiage to simply noting its successful implementation. Koshelev's rationale was that because the Moscow Treaty had no verification regime it had been subjected to criticism. The Russian Federation had never publicly declared specific reductions of its nuclear arsenal. However, Russia did inform the United States that it was already under the limits prescribed by the treaty. The Russian Delegation agreed that there should be some recognition of the Moscow Treaty because of the accomplishments that resulted from it, but they did not want it over-emphasized because the reductions could not be confirmed. Ries accepted Koshelev's proposal. -------------- UNDIMINISHED SECURITY -------------- ¶12. (S) Ries suggested moving the phrase referring to "undiminished security for the Parties" from the beginning of the eighth paragraph, which discussed the reduction of strategic offensive arms enhancing the security of both parties, to the end of paragraph three about non-proliferation. The revised paragraph would read: "Expressing strong support for global efforts in non-proliferation and guided by the principles of undiminished security for all." Koshelev objected and noted that he had been criticized because the phrase "undiminished security," which was earlier substituted for "equal security," was much weaker. In the Russian view, the phrases "equal security" and "undiminished security for the Parties" referred only to the two Parties of this treaty. By changing it to read "undiminished security for all" and then moving it to another paragraph, it lost that meaning entirely. ¶13. (S) Ries expressed surprise at Koshelev's reaction and noted that "undiminished security for all" was from the language used in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 (September 24, 2009). Ries advocated for following what the United States and Russian Federation had already agreed upon. Koshelev retorted that the Russian side had proposed the principle of "undiminished security for the parties" for one purpose: to find a different formulation for "equal security." Therefore, if this wording for the paragraph on strategic offensive arms was not acceptable, then it was back to "equal security," and as such, starting over. ¶14. (S) Ries noted that the Preamble must set forth principles to which both sides can agree. Recent deliberations on "equal security" had revealed disagreement between the two sides. However, because some agreement did exist, the U.S. Delegation had hoped moving the "undiminished security" phrase to the paragraph discussing non-proliferation would achieve accord. Koshelev replied that "undiminished security for all" was related to nuclear disarmament whereas "equal security for all" was the main goal of nuclear nonproliferation. Koshelev introduced a third concept, "indivisible security." Koshelev informed the U.S. Delegation that "undiminished security for all" was first mentioned in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and later at the 2000 NPT RevCon. However, the Russian position was that this phrase was not as good as "equal security." Koshelev stressed that, for this treaty, "undiminished security" referred just to the United States and Russia; it did not include China, France or anyone else. Therefore, it was not acceptable to merge the two paragraphs as suggested. Ries agreed to leave this issue for now. -------------- DON'T TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR -------------- ¶15. (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concern regarding the paragraph articulating the consequences of nuclear war. Koshelev recognized that it was in the START preamble but pointed out that it was not found in the Moscow Treaty. Koshelev contended that to insert it now into this treaty would be implying that something had changed since 2002. Koshelev emphasized that Russia agreed and supported the concept espoused by this paragraph, but questioned why it needed to be brought up again. Ries agreed that nuclear war was unthinkable, but that this paragraph should be seen as something positive; the idea that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought was a very positive statement. ¶16. (S) Koshelev said his concern was that START was signed near the end of the Cold War in 1991 and, at that time, the statement was useful. But it was not carried over into the Moscow Treaty and mentioning it again was sending the wrong signal. He asked "what would a non-aligned nation think? Did something change that this needed to be emphasized again?" Ries replied that having this statement did not mean the world had gotten more dangerous since 2002 and, therefore, it should not be interpreted that way. Admiral Kuznetsov interjected and said that the relationship that existed between the two Parties when START was implemented was completely different from that which existed now. So to discuss nuclear war was nonsense. Koshelev restated that Russia had nothing against the concept, but questioned the necessity to send this message regarding the horrors of nuclear war. Was it the right thing to do? ¶17. (S) Ries said she understood that the Russians wanted to get away from Cold War thinking and remarked that these discussions are beneficial. However, this issue would not be resolved today. -------------- MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶18. (S) Ries read the U.S. proposal in the twelfth paragraph, "Recognizing the interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms" and added that it elegantly portrayed the offense-defense relationship. Koshelev replied by explaining that it was important for the Russians to have "the deployment of missile defense systems" in lieu of "defensive arms" because this was the first time such a treaty was concluded without the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Koshelev asserted that a decrease in strategic offensive armaments was directly related to the deployment of missile defense systems and that this was effectively the same concept stated by the Presidents in the Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009. However, the phrase "defensive arms" in the Joint Understanding was too imprecise. The substitution of "deployment of missile defense systems" provided for better accuracy. ¶19. (S) Mr. Taylor said the United States proceeded from the premise that the Delegations had been instructed by our Presidents that the subject of the new agreement would be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. That said, the United States was also committed to including a provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. Taylor noted that the United States had historically recognized this relationship but that both sides would probably describe it differently based on each nation's own view of its national security. ¶20. (S) Taylor explained that the United States would not use the phrase "indissoluble interrelationship" when speaking about strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms because the United States did not see the two things as always linked. ¶21. (S) Taylor noted that the United States regarded this negotiation on the reduction of strategic offensive arms as proceeding independently of the discussions on missile defense systems, which were being conducted in another venue in keeping with a Russian suggestion about ways we might work together. ¶22. (S) Taylor said that, in strategic arms reduction talks, the Delegations were discussing U.S. and Russian offensive systems and bilateral strategic stability. However, in separate dialogues concerning strategic defensive systems, we were conferring about third country threats and about how our two countries might work together to counter them. ¶23. (S) Taylor said that the United States and the Russian Federation had developed, and continued to forge, a strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability and cooperation. This could not have been more evident than during this very week as our two Presidents together demonstrated unprecedented leadership in New York and Pittsburgh. Therefore, the United States believed that the paragraph, as drafted, was consistent with the spirit of our current relationship. ¶24. (S) It was for these reasons, and in the spirit of this new strategic relationship, that the U.S. Delegation urged the Russian Delegation to accept the U.S.-proposed formulation. ¶25. (S) Koshelev stated that he agreed with some of the positions addressed by Taylor, but asked why the United States needed strategic ballistic missile interceptors. Taylor replied that this question should be discussed in a different forum. Koshelev complimented Taylor on his diplomacy and followed up with a history of missile defenses, starting with the 1972 ABM Treaty. Koshelev noted that, since then, the positions of the two sides had reversed. The purpose of strategic missile defense was to intercept ballistic missiles and, since only two other nations possessed them (the Russian Federation and China),the Russian position was that the United States needed missile defense to protect itself against Russian strategic offensive arms. Koshelev argued that the build-up and deployment of missile defense systems by one Party affected the strategic deterrence of the other and, therefore, this relationship should be reflected. Koshelev concluded by reiterating that because no ABM Treaty existed, this principle should be enshrined in the treaty. ¶26. (S) Ries agreed that circumstances had changed (between 1972 and now),but also commented that they had progressed in a positive direction. Ries brought the meeting to a close by noting that both sides are undertaking constructive cooperation and evaluating things that threaten and affect the national security of each nation. ¶27. (U) Documents exchanged: - U.S. -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated September 25, 2009 (English and unofficial Russian). - Russia: -- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated September 25, 2009 (paragraph 14) (Unofficial English only). ¶28. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Connell Mr. Evans Dr. Fraley Col Hartford Mr. Sims Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Adm.(Ret) Kuznetsov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶29. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS