START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000821 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) SECOND TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0805 (SFO-GVA-V-005) ¶B. GENEVA 0736 (SFO-GVA-IV-009) ¶C. GENEVA 0781 (SFO-GVA-V-002) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-011. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 23, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Treaty and Definitions Working Group held its second meeting of the session, during which the Parties continued discussions based on the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the Treaty Preamble, dated September 22, 2009. ¶4. (S) The session reviewed most of the language of the preamble to include a short discussion on the title of the treaty itself. The Russian side discussed at length the concepts (and the translation challenges involved) of equal security, and the principle of enhanced security emphasizing the importance it attaches to these principles. In a reversal of position, the Russian Delegation offered to drop its proposed language in the preamble citing the importance of verification in the treaty. Finally, the Russian Delegation wanted to see greater recognition for the contributions of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the preamble. -------------- LET'S BEGIN WITH THE TITLE -------------- ¶5. (S) Ambassador Ries opened the meeting by welcoming the delegates and providing them an extract of wording that had been developed and agreed on during the first meeting (REF A). She noted that certain passages might fit better if the order were changed, but she recommended waiting until the preamble was complete before making any paragraph moves. Mr. Koshelev thanked her for the recommendation, then began by recalling language from the previous session's work (REF B) that had originally said "U.S. and Russia were no longer enemies." He related how his staff had searched for the origin of such language and found it in the Joint Press Statement from the Bush-Putin Conference in Sochi in 2008. Having found the source, he declared he was satisfied with the language as it is now rewritten and did not need to include the phrase. ¶6. (S) Koshelev inquired as to whether the United States was satisfied with the title of the treaty. He sais he thought it was important to be precise about titles of important documents, citing as an example the plan to re-label the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to become the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC),and he wanted to know if the new title of the draft documents was acceptable to both sides. Ries agreed to discuss this with the Delegation. (Begin note: The title in the U.S.-proposed treaty text is the same as the Russian-proposed text. End note.) -------------- REVISITING EQUAL SECURITY -------------- ¶7. (S) Ries offered her reflection on Ms. Kotkova's previous presentation on equal security (REF C),noting that both the United States and Russia have equal sovereignty and were equal members of the global community. Each nation faced its own unique security challenges that must be weighed in a global context. She went on to underscore that the analysis done in determining unique security requirements could not be expressed as "equal" per se, but would be better described as resulting in security arrangements that were mutually beneficial. She sought to avoid the use of a term whose meaning had not changed from the Cold War period. She proposed amending text to reflect "enhancing mutual security." ¶8. (S) Koshelev, acknowledging that the term "equal security" had generated controversy, noted he had two concerns. He was not sure of the exact origin of the concept of "mutual security" and, while there was no doubt mutual security would be enhanced, equal security also needed to be addressed as, for the Russian Federation, it was the basis for any negotiation. He proposed a new formulation of the term, that originally appeared in one of the final documents of the "000 NPT Conference, in which the concept of "Undiminished Security for all" was espoused. The term was translated "ne-nanacenue uscherba bezopasnosti" (literally, non-infliction of damage to security). As it sounded stilted in Russian, Russian interpreters changed it to "Ravnaya bezopasnost" (equal security). Koshelev said his memory was jogged when the U.S. interpreter translated undiminished security in a way different from the term he was used to (the U.S. interpreter used "neoclablennaya bezopasnoct"). He offered to accept undiminished security in place of equal security if the United States was amenable. Ries advised she would take his proposal for consideration, but warned that imprecision regarding translations could inadvertently lead back to the original term and the baggage that came with it. -------------- SO, HOW DO YOU ENHANCE SECURITY? -------------- ¶9. (S) Koshelev addressed another U.S. proposal in the preamble which would "enhance the mutual security of the parties." He did not understand how security could be enhanced. Ries pointed out that this language was drawn from the April 2009 Joint Statement, to which Koshelev responded how the Russian side never really liked the wording of the Joint Statement and had been rushed into accepting it at the last minute. If anything, he wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes in the Joint Statement and possibly even correct them when writing the treaty. General Venevtsev chimed in with the question (Begin comment: Probably for his side more than the U.S. side, as it was not translated. End comment.) "how do you enhance security? You either have it or you don't." Discussion on this point concluded with several variants being suggested, which both sides agreed to re-visit. ¶10. (S) The challenges of finding wording that worked in both languages became more apparent as the working group discussed the Russian-proposed paragraph on the stabilizing effect verifiable reductions have had. In response to a Ries proposal to insert the word "positive" in place of "stabilizing," Koshelev could not understand how the words positive and stability could be used interchangeably. In the end, he accepted the U.S. proposal, advising that the Russian translation would probably use different words, but promising that the choice of words in Russian would faithfully convey the sense of the phrase in English. The paragraph would read, "Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation which had resulted from radical, verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century." -------------- FIRST YOU WANTED IT, NOW WE DO -------------- ¶11. (S) Discussion moved to the paragraph originally proposed by Russia on creating a mechanism for verifying compliance. Koshelev said this was an important concept brought forward from the START Treaty. Ries offered to accept the language in the Russian proposal. Koshelev quickly interjected that the Russian Delegation no longer wished to retain this paragraph but rather wanted to remove it. He explained that the United States gave the Russian Federation, in the waning days of 2008, a draft treaty called the "Treaty on Security and Confidence-Building Measures," which lacked verification measures. (Begin comment. This is probably the October 23, 2008 Draft U.S.-Proposed Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Regarding Strategic Offensive Nuclear Reductions. End comment.) The Russian Delegation sought to add a verification paragraph in the preamble to set the tone for the treaty and ensure that it contained verification provisions. Now that such provisions were embedded in both side's versions of the treaty and the annex(es),there was no reason to have such a provision in the preamble. ¶12. (S) Ries asserted that it was still important to point out (to future readers of the treaty) how verification would be an important element of the treaty, to which Koshelev quipped "all the public really cared about was the numbers and not the details." Koshelev argued that the paragraph would give emphasis to only one aspect of the treaty. To his mind, reductions and limitations were the goal, but he reiterated that Russia supports verification in the new treaty. Koshelev continued to argue how an element of the treaty need not be repeated in the preamble; based on the time spent and vigor of the discussion, it was obvious that the Russians felt strongly about removing the paragraph from the preamble. Ries noted that the preamble served to set the political context and, as such, it was important to highlight the importance of verification, especially since it was one of the key instructions in the April 2009 Joint Statement. Both sides agreed to leave the language bracketed but as a U.S. proposal. Koshelev asserted that, as the Russian Delegation no longer supported the language and the U.S. Delegation now supported the language, the bracket should now reflect the proper ownership. -------------- RUSSIAN TERM DU JOUR - MULTILATERALIZATION -------------- ¶13. (S) Discussion moved to a paragraph addressing the step-by-step process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms with a view to expanding the process in the future. Koshelev appreciated the structure of the language, but wanted to ensure that the paragraph retained a more substantive comment involving multilateralization. He reported how last year's disarmament conference concluded with a statement that "other (nuclear) nations should seamlessly join in the process of nuclear disarmament." He asked what was meant by the use of the word "expanding" (the process). While he thought it probably alluded to more bilateral activities, he wanted the next stage of the process to involve other nations as well. He returned to Article VI of the NPT and pointed out the obligation of all nuclear nations to involve other nuclear nations in the nuclear disarmament process. ¶14. (S) Ries pointed out that there were a number of paths the process could go in the future, and multilateralization was one of them. In her opinion, the key thing was not only to continue but to do more. She offered to modify the wording of the language to recognize that the process for the future could also include multilateralization. -------------- ABOUT OUR FORMER START TREATY PARTNERS -------------- ¶15. (S) As the last portion of the preamble to be discussed for this meeting, Ries turned attention to the various proposed passages that noted the contributions of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. She offered language which captured the essence of the various proposals in a succinct passage. Koshelev opined that the three countries deserved "larger recognition" for contributing to disarmament, as well as contributing to global security as non-nuclear states. While agreeing with the basic U.S. proposal, he wanted "more beautiful words" to emphasize the contributions of the other START Parties. He tasked Kotkova to write a proposal and promised to provide it at the next session. ¶16. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶17. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Connell Mr. Evans Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Ms. Kotkova Adm (ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS