START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000820 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) SECOND MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019) ¶B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) ¶C. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021) ¶D. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022) ¶E. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023) ¶F. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) ¶G. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-010. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 23, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The second meeting of the Inspection Protocol (IP) Working Group (WG) was held at the Russian Mission on September 23, 2009, to discuss similarities and differences in the U.S. and Russian approaches to inspection procedures provided for under the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty. The Russian Delegation conveyed its vision of inspection activities presented in the Russian-proposed draft of Section V to the Treaty Annex regarding "Inspections, Visits, and Exhibitions" (REF A). The U.S. Delegation expressed concern regarding the Russian use of the word "visit," as well as on the absence of detailed procedures in the Russian-provided draft and how leaving such details to be agreed upon later within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was unacceptable, especially considering that previously agreed language on those details was already recorded in the START Treaty and had been updated in the draft IP developed by the U.S. side. Several differences between the U.S. and Russian draft versions of the IP were identified and discussed, with no decisions being made. Both sides agreed to study the respective drafts to determine what could be added to the Russian version, reduced from the U.S. version, or whether some details could be relocated elsewhere, such as being moved into a "third-tier" document below the level of the U.S.-proposed protocol or the Russian-proposed annex similar to the annexes to the IP developed for START. -------------- COMPARING U.S. AND RUSSIAN APPROACHES -------------- ¶4. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting by presenting similarities and differences that had been identified between the U.S. (REF B) and Russian approaches to inspection procedures provided for under the SFO Treaty. He used a chart to illustrate the correlation between the U.S. and Russian approaches associated with specific inspection activities to show how the two approaches mapped against one another. According to the chart, what the United States calls a "nuclear warhead inspection," used to confirm the declared numbers of deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and deployed heavy bombers and their associated nuclear armaments, is called an "inspection" under the Russian approach. What the United States calls a "data update inspection," used to confirm declared data on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and their associated launchers, is also called an "inspection" under the Russian approach. However, while the United States refers to the activities carried out to confirm declared data on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, non-deployed heavy bombers, and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as "data update inspections," the Russian approach refers to these activities as "visits." The U.S. side proposes to use the initial data update inspection at a new facility to confirm data on relevant items at that facility, while the Russian approach calls this activity a "visit." A "Conversion or Elimination Inspection" under the U.S. approach, which is used to confirm completion of conversion or elimination procedures on strategic offensive arms, was called both a "visit" or "exhibition" in different sections of the Russian draft Treaty. A "formerly declared facility inspection" that has been used under START to confirm that eliminated facilities were not being used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty, continues to be called for in the U.S. draft, but appears to have been omitted under the Russian approach. Both approaches referred to the activity to confirm the technical characteristics of new types of strategic offensive arms as "exhibitions" and both sides dropped the requirement for "close-out inspections" on facilities no longer used for purposes related to SFO. -------------- CLARIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN APPROACH -------------- ¶5. (S) Colonel Ilin explained that the Russian approach envisions three types of inspection activities: 1) inspections; 2) visits; and 3) exhibitions. "Inspections" are to be the toughest and most stringent type of inspection activity, since the purpose is to verify data on deployed strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the treaty. Inspections will be used to not only confirm the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, accountable heavy bombers, and deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, but also to confirm the number of deployed warheads installed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Ilin added that, while the U.S. approach combined the launcher and delivery vehicle into a single entity, the Russian approach counted the launchers separately. Inspections would be conducted only at ICBM bases, submarines bases, and air bases for heavy bombers. The total number of inspections that could be conducted each year would be five, which was said to be based on the results of START inspections and from the previous U.S. draft SFO Treaty given to the Russians in October 2008. Warner reminded Ilin that the U.S. proposed to allow each side to conduct up to 14 nuclear warhead inspections annually as well as 12 data update and 2 formerly declared facility inspections, many more than the five inspections and five visits offered by the Russians. ¶6. (S) Ilin explained that "visits" are to be used for the confirmation of the numbers of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, as well as for confirmation of data associated with new facilities, and the technical characteristics of non-deployed items. The Russian side proposes that each side may conduct no more than five visits annually. The inspecting Party would also have the option of using a visit to confirm the completion of conversion or elimination procedures of strategic offensive arms, but such a visit would be considered one of the overall annual quotas of visits. Visits would be less rigorous than inspections, since, according to the Russians, all activities within this category could also be verified by national technical means of verification. While step-by-step procedures could be developed for inspections, only a few procedures would be necessary for visits. Visits to inventory non-deployed strategic offensive arms would be conducted at ICBM bases, submarines bases, air bases for heavy bombers, storage facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, test ranges, and training facilities. ¶7. (S) Similar to practices under START, "exhibitions" are to be used to confirm the technical characteristics and distinguishability of new ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, ICBM and SLBM launchers, and converted strategic offensive arms. They would be conducted at ICBM bases, submarines bases, air bases for heavy bombers, storage facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, test ranges, training facilities, production facilities, and flight test centers for heavy bombers. The difference in the Russian approach from current START provisions is that the inspected Party would set the schedule and details of how such exhibitions would be conducted. When asked whether an exhibition would be conducted before or after the conversion procedures were completed, Ilin replied that the Russian Delegation did not want to establish that procedure now, but the option of conducting a demonstration of procedures after the completion of the conversion would not be excluded. The procedures associated with exhibitions would be much softer than the present START requirements. -------------- "VISITS" -- A NEGATIVE CONNOTATION -------------- ¶8. (S) Warner expressed concerns regarding the Russian use of the word "visit" in their proposal, viewing it as a troubling direction. START provided for various types of inspections and exhibitions, but not visits. Admittedly, the previous U.S. Administration had provided Russia with a proposed version of the SFO Treaty that introduced the concept of visits into the negotiations. Under that concept, there were to be no inspections and visits were intended to be far less regulated, voluntary in nature, preceded by 30-day advance notification (vice 24 hours of advance notice for a START inspection),and the inspected Party had the right to refuse a proposed visit. As such, the use of the word "visit" in SFO implied that these types of activities were much less stringent than START inspections and much less important sources of information on treaty compliance. The current U.S. Administration seeks to have a very rigorous verification regime built on various types of inspections, not visits. The inspection activities used to confirm data exchanged on non-deployed systems should be just as rigorous as those used for deployed systems, so there should be no difference between inspections and visits, as defined by the Russian approach. The U.S. Delegation believed that inclusion of the word "visit" would pose significant problems with the U.S. Administration's ability to achieve ratification of the SFO Treaty in the Senate. 9 . (S) Ilin responded that, in principle, there had to be a difference between inspections and visits. Differences in the procedures for conducting inspections and visits were essential from the treaty perspective since the verification of treaty limits should be more regulated than the confirmation of information provided voluntarily. -------------- THE DETAILS MATTER -------------- ¶10. (S) Warner observed that there was a dramatic difference in size and scope of the inspection activities and associated procedures that have been proposed by the U.S. and Russian sides. It is obvious, from simply looking at the documents, that the U.S. proposal is much more extensive and detailed than the Russian-proposed text. Moreover, the initial U.S. review showed some of the substantive differences to be very significant. The Russian version lacked specific details in several areas while the U.S. version included detailed procedures that had been worked out and agreed to previously under START that the U.S. believed should continue since the availability of those detailed procedures had been extremely useful in the successful execution of the START verification regime. Warner suggested that, if Russia did not want detailed procedures included in the IP, perhaps those procedures could be relocated into a "third level" annex. -------------- ARE DETAILED PROCEDURES REALLY THE PROBLEM? -------------- ¶11. (S) Mr. Rust, speaking from the perspective of both a former inspector and escort of Russian inspectors, commented on the importance of having detailed procedures and observed that mutual respect and predictability was based on the detailed knowledge and ability to implement the agreed procedures that had been developed by both sides. Although extensive, and sometimes complicated, the detailed procedures have been a key element in the successful implementation of START. Colonel Ryzhkov countered by asking how many ambiguities and problems have arisen in the presence of those detailed procedures for conducting inspections. Rust admitted that many "ambiguities" (instances of perceived non-compliance identified by the inspecting side) had been documented during inspections, but the professionalism and expertise of the inspectors and escorts allowed many problems to be resolved during the inspections. Rust concluded by suggesting that the Russian Selegation consider just how many ambiguities there might have arisen in the absence of detailed inspection procedures. ¶12. (S) Col Zaytsev claimed that the Russian Delegation had attempted to take into account both U.S. and Russian concerns while drafting their proposal. Inspections that lead to ambiguities and problems are those that are more rigid and regulated, while "softer" inspections would, in their view, cause fewer problems. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov cited the lack of problems that Russia had encountered during implementation of Vienna Document inspections as an example of why detailed procedures were undesirable. He asserted that Russia has conducted about 70 inspections under that treaty and there were usually few ambiguities. He opined that too many detailed procedures tended to produce ambiguities and confrontation, but he believed a solution could be found if the sides worked together carefully. It would be difficult to agree on detailed inspection procedures, he noted, since each side has a specific operational approach to its own strategic weapon systems and the differences in approach were very significant. ¶14. (S) Warner agreed that standards should be applied that made practical sense and did not reveal classified national security information, but there is no formula regarding the conduct of inspection activities that could guarantee no ambiguities will arise and be detected. -------------- WORKING OUT INSPECTION DETAILS IN THE BCC IS A BAD IDEA -------------- ¶15. (S) Warner reiterated that there were significant differences in the philosophies reflected in the U.S. and Russian IP proposals. He again expressed serious concern regarding Russia's proposal to develop and agree upon the details of specific inspection procedures within the framework of the BCC after the treaty was signed. It will be far preferable for all procedures to be agreed upon within the SFO negotiations, well before the first inspections could be conducted. It would be highly problematic to expect that the two sides, acting through the BCC, could develop these procedural details from scratch after conclusion and signing of the SFO Treaty, and to commit the sides to follow such a course would inevitably result in a lengthy delay in the initiation of inspections under the new treaty. It will be important to document specific procedures since new personnel that come to work this issue over the next decade will need to know how inspections are to be conducted. Recognizing that there was very little negotiation time left before the deadline set by our Presidents for completing the new treaty, it is unclear why the specific procedures could not be included when previously agreed language on those details is presently available. While parts of the previously agreed language may no longer be useful, we should not simply disregard everything. Provisions on which there are no outstanding problems, such as equipment lists and account settlement procedures, are examples of where the previously agreed language needs to be reintroduced. Warner asked Ilin to clarify whether the removal of the detailed procedures meant that Russia was unhappy with the previously agreed language or that it was just too lengthy and burdensome, to which he received no answer. ¶16. (S) Ilin thanked the U.S.Delegation for the effort it put into preparing such a detailed protocol. While all formulations should be carefully examined, it will be important to progress step-by-step to determine what appears excessive and what is lacking. For example, the U.S. proposal contains many restrictions and inspection activities regarding mobile missiles as well as other provisions that are no longer topical and needed in the new treaty. However, the Russian Dslegation understood the U.S. point that more details were necessary. -------------- DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATION -------------- ¶17. (S) On the provision of the legal status of inspectors and aircrew members (Part II of Section V of the Russian-proposed draft),Ilin stated that there was much commonality in the U.S. and Russian proposals, but the wording was different. Russian ideas were present at various places within the U.S. draft. The differences were primarily related to the drafting principle. The Russian draft concentrated all of the ideas on this subject in one or two places, while the U.S. draft had scattered them throughout its draft. It was not necessarily a bad thing, just different. Therefore, a common philosophy is needed as to how to formulate the text. The philosophy should be positive, build on common ideas, and incorporate what is good. ¶18. (S) Warner pointed out that, under the U.S. concept for the treaty, the IP was by far the most extensive section of the new treaty that the sides would need to deal with. As such, it is important to decide whether to maintain a large protocol that includes specific details or to try to work out a leaner protocol with the details relocated into a series of expanded annexes. In START, the annexes were more detailed than the protocols. The U.S.-proposed draft inspection annexes, which are still being translated into Russian, are very extensive and contain detailed procedures. Therefore, choices need to be made. -------------- DETAILS, DETAILS, DETAILS -------------- ¶19. (S) Warner acknowledged that the U.S. Delegation had not yet had time to fully evaluate the Russian-proposed draft of the Section/Protocol on Inspections since it was only recently received. However, one of the things found in the initial U.S. review was that, in order to shorten its proposed draft Section on Inspections, the Russians had removed information on notifications from the Russian-proposed Section on Inspections and relocated it to the Notifications Section/Protocol. But, in some cases, the elements moved did not necessarily relate to notifications. For example, no references to visas remained in the Russian-proposed draft, but provisions on visas were now present in the Section on Notifications. We should be able to track such things, but it will take time to do so. Other differences that were identified in the initial review of Part II of Section V of the Russian draft included: reducing the number of individuals on the list of inspectors to 200 (U.S. proposal -- 400); increasing the period for making amendments to the list of inspectors to no more than once in three months (U.S. proposal-once every three weeks); decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an inspection to nine (U.S. proposal -- ten0); decreasing the number of inspectors conducting a "visit" to seven (U.S. proposal -- ten); decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an exhibition to 10 (U.S. proposal -- 10 to 20); each side has the option to object to individual inspectors without reason; and a reduction in the number of points of entry to two, a point with which the U.S. could agree. Differences identified in the initial review of Part III of Section V included the removal of all details pertaining to inspection aircraft procedures, such as flight plans and call signs. ¶20. (S) Ilin reiterated his belief that the U.S. and Russian proposals had much in common. Regarding the numerical reductions, it only made sense that the number of people involved in the inspection process would be reduced since the number of inspections would be dramatically decreased as well. However, the final numbers of inspectors would be settled once agreement was reached on the number of activities that would be permitted. ¶21. (S) Warner asked whether there had actually been problems with the list of inspectors. Ryzhkov responded that an agreement was being worked by the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers on increasing the timing of the exchange of the list of inspectors, but that agreement was not yet finalized. However, from the practical perspective, Russia only changes its list of inspectors once or twice a year. -------------- HOMEWORK -------------- ¶22. (S) Ilin concluded by saying that it was clear that some information the Russian Delegation initially deemed as being excessive might need to be reexamined. Following this reexamination, both sides could study the drafts to see what could be added to the Russian version and reduced from the U.S. version. Warner suggested also contemplating whether some details could be relocated, such as into a third-tier document below the level of the U.S.-proposed protocol or the Russian-proposed annex. For the next meeting, both sides were to focus on the provisions that were thought to have the most commonality (legal status of inspectors) and would ensure that each Delegation would have its respective lawyers in attendance to provide legal advice. ¶23. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶24. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Ms. Bosco Mr. DeNinno Mr. Fortier Dr. Fraley Maj Johnson Mrs. Pura Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. St. Julien Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Amb Antonov Mr. Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Mr. Leontiev Col Novikov Gen Orlov Col Petrov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS