START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000819 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007) ¶B. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023) ¶C. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) ¶D. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) ¶E. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021) ¶F. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019) ¶G. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022) ¶H. STATE 088263 (SFO-DIP-09-002) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-004. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 22, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the September 22 plenary meeting chaired by U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD Ambassador Antonov, the U.S. Delegation posed some big-picture questions about the Russian-proposed treaty text which had been provided to officials at the United States Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A). The U.S. Delegation pointed out the difficulties Russia's proposed text would cause in the areas of counting heavy bomber warheads and effective verification. Antonov emphasized that Russia was seeking a new approach different from START, which he termed a treaty of the Cold War. ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation provided a proposed omnibus annex to the treaty, that the U.S. side noted would flesh out our understanding of Russia's treaty concepts. The Russians clarified several points: they did not envisage subjecting facilities that they are using in Kazakhstan to treaty restrictions; they would not permit a right of sequential inspections or visits; and they did not support visiting eliminated facilities. -------------- RUSSIA PROVIDES ITS PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX -------------- ¶5. (S) Antonov presented Russia's proposed Annex to the Treaty Between the United States and Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a 34-page document in the original Russian that included six sections on definitions (REF B), the data base (REF C),conversion and elimination procedures (REF D),notifications (REF E), inspections/visits/exhibitions (REF F),and the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) (REF G). The Russian Delegation considered that this format (treaty text plus single annex) would be easier for its legislature to ratify. They could consider other options, however, and would listen to U.S. views. Antonov commented, jokingly, that just as the United States had devoted half its text to mobile missiles, Russia had devoted half of its text to ballistic missile defenses. Antonov noted that this was the final document of Russia's treaty proposals. Russia was ready to work cooperatively on the annex so that it would address both sides' concerns. New ideas could also be incorporated in the course of negotiations. ¶6. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the document and noted that the U.S. negotiators needed the draft annex in order to complete their understanding of Russia's proposed treaty text. The focus of this meeting would be initial U.S. questions on the rationales behQ Russia's treaty proposals. ¶7. (S) In response to Antonov's joke, Gottemoeller reassured the Russian side about the potential for U.S. development of a global missile defense (MD) capability. She reiterated relevant points made by the President in his April 1 meeting with Russian President Medvedev in London and his April 5 speech in Prague. The planned European MD deployments would be focused on the Iranian threat. If the Iranian missile and weapons of mass destruction threats went away, so too would the need for future MD deployments in Europe. ¶8. (S) Antonov replied that he was familiar with these Presidential statements. His Delegation had not said they were concerned about global MD systems following the September 16 U.S. announcement of new MD plans. That concern had existed for years. The Delegation was simply inviting Washington MD experts to come to Geneva and have a serious discussion with Russian experts, outside the framework of the START Follow-on Negotiations. Russia had many questions and wanted to understand the new U.S. policy better. -------------- TREATY PHILOSOPHY 101 -------------- ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller's first questions addressed some of the basic concepts of Russia's proposed treaty. She asked whether Russia's omission of many of the prohibitions contained in START Article V, Paragraph 18, was based on an assumption that such prohibitions were covered under other international agreements that remained in force. For example, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty contained a prohibition on emplacing nuclear weapons launchers on the seabed and the ocean floor, similar to a ban contained in Subparagraph 18(b) of Article V of START. On the other hand, if other countries perceived that the U.S. and Russia were dropping long-standing constraints on their strategic arms, it would seem as if our countries were backtracking on arms control. ¶10. (S) Antonov professed to be unfamiliar with the specific provisions of each article in the Russian draft, but assured Gottemoeller that Russia's philosophy was always to further the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was clearly necessary to convince opponents and skeptics of the new treaty that the United States and Russia were not undermining any previous agreements on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Russia had only deleted START provisions that hampered operations. He conceded it was possible that Russia had removed too much. The working groups could discuss such questions. (Begin comment: During a break, Antonov remarked that he had felt cornered by the question, since the military had cut a lot of material out that he had not paid attention to. End comment.) ¶11. (S) Gottemoeller noted that the United States wanted the new treaty to preserve predictability as well as flexibility. The U.S. side also wanted simplification. It was important to ensure that there were no contradictions among those three aspects of the treaty. Antonov agreed. -------------- MORE QUESTIONS ON RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY -------------- ¶12. (S) Fraley asked why Russia had added a provision on measures aimed at strengthening trust, openness, and predictability to the other obligations in Paragraph 1 of Article I. The United States had proposed simply to use the original START formulation for this paragraph (REF H). Antonov answered that Russia's proposed treaty was designed to be new and to differ from START, which had been negotiated under very different circumstances from the present. Russia had recently, and with great difficulty, accepted that the new treaty should be a "hybrid." While START should be the foundation for the new treaty, Russia did not believe it was simply a matter of taking START and crossing some text out. Russia believed the new treaty should show the world the new character of U.S.-Russian relations, and had highlighted this in Article I. As for specific measures, the experts could consider in the working groups what measures would be possible. Zaytsev added that, in this treaty, Russia was not just reducing numbers, but also wanted to include confidence-building measures, such as notifications. ¶13. (S) Warner asked for additional clarification of how heavy bomber armaments would count under Russia's approach. The Parties had committed to reduce strategic offensive arms (SOAs),including those for heavy bombers. According to Russia's proposed Article III, heavy bomber nuclear armaments would only count when they were actually deployed on a heavy bomber. The fact was that neither Party keeps nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers. Therefore, we would both appear to have zero heavy bomber nuclear armaments. The Russian Delegation acknowledged that this was correct. Zaytsev said the problem had existed under START and still existed for the new treaty -- heavy bomber warheads could not be verified. It was too difficult to count warheads in storage. Russia's logic was to account for heavy bomber warheads in the same way as ICBM and SLBM warheads; i.e., only warheads deployed on heavy bombers would count. The U.S.-proposed approach created problems in terms of what portion would count and what would not, and which storage facilities would be subject to the treaty. ¶14. (S) Warner acknowledged that defining heavy bomber warheads was difficult, but heavy bombers were different from ICBMs and SLBMs and did not lend themselves to being counted in the same way. The U.S. side would discuss its proposed approach in more detail in the working groups. Russia's proposal would reduce nuclear arms by definition instead of in reality. Our countries would look foolish if we declared heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments on both sides but said they had no weapons. The United States certainly did not want to load nuclear armaments on its heavy bombers and put them on alert, as was done during the Cold War. ¶15. (S) Antonov said Warner's comments about heavy bombers not being counted with warheads reminded him of Russia's long-standing concerns about ICBM and SLBM front sections that did not carry as many warheads as their maximum capacity. Russia wanted to limit upload capability. The case with heavy bombers would be similar: no warheads were currently loaded, but they existed somewhere and would be ready to load onto heavy bombers. Russia was not trying to find out U.S. secrets, and was not interested in warheads located in storage facilities. Warheads could not fly on their own. The focus was on delivery vehicles, which Russia wanted to reduce permanently. -------------- LAUNCHERS AND LIMITS -------------- ¶16. (S) Trout questioned Russia's Article III, Subparagraph 4.(e)(ii) provision, which states a mobile launcher is removed from accountability by returning to the production facility. Under the START Treaty, such movement did not change the accountability of a mobile launcher. Antonov was unable to address Trout's question. Orlov proposed discussing the question in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group, adding that, if a mobile launcher returned to a production facility, it would not be deployed. Orlov promised he would also have questions for the U.S. side at the working group meeting. ¶17. (S) Fraley asked the Russian side to clarify the difference between the proposed accountability rules in Russia's Article IV, Paragraph 2 and Article III, Paragraph ¶4. What kinds of limits were being referred to in each case? After much discussion among the Russian Delegation, Antonov said Article IV, Paragraph 2 defined when items became subject to the treaty in general. It was not about numbers. ¶18. (S) Purcell asked about Russia's Article V, Paragraph 2 proposed restrictions on test launchers. Since, in Article II. Russia proposed a single limit on both deployed and non-deployed launchers, why did Russia see a need to distinguish test launchers from deployed launchers? The U.S.-proposed treaty text included limits on test launchers because the U.S. view was that such launchers would not count under the central limits. Zaytsev attempted an answer, saying that Russia had not proposed specific limits on test launchers since they would fall under the proposed aggregate launcher limit. Their location would determine whether the launchers were test or training launchers. Test launchers would be located at test ranges and would be considered non-deployed. At the end of the meeting, Zaytsev added privately that such non-deployed launchers would not differ from deployed launchers. Purcell noted that was why she had asked the question. -------------- MANY QUESTIONS, FEWER ANSWERS -------------- ¶19. (S) DeNinno noted that Russia's Article VII, Paragraph 3 provided for use of ICBMs and SLBMs as space launch vehicles, but Russia's treaty did not mention space launch facilities. What was Russia's view regarding space launch facilities under the new treaty? What was the status of the Leninsk Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan? Finally, would ICBMs, SLBMs, and their first stages used for space launch be accountable in the new treaty in the same way as under START? ¶20. (S) Smirnov stated that Leninsk was located in Kazakhstan, and the United States and Russia had agreed that this treaty would not include third parties. Russia viewed Paragraph 3 of Article VII as identifying one way in which the Parties could eliminate missiles. Each missile would be subject to the treaty until launched -- the same general counting rule as under START. Petrov added that launchers at Leninsk would remain accountable until eliminated. ¶21. (S) Warner commented that the U.S. side was trying to correlate Russia's concept of inspections and visits with the START inspection regime. Inspections and visits seemed to be similar to START reentry vehicle inspections and data update inspections. The biggest difference was the change in the annual quota. Russia wanted no more than five inspections and five visits, while the United States was proposing 12 data update inspections and 10 warhead inspections. Since there were many more Russian ICBM bases than U.S. ICBM bases, the United States considered Russia's annual quota too low. Gottemoeller asked whether a single inspection team could conduct a visit to a base and then a sequential inspection at the same base. Petrov responded that Russia's concept did not provide for a single team to conduct more than one inspection, visit, or exhibiion. The Russians were willing, however, to disuss this issue further in the working group andto consider numbers and types of facilities. ¶22. (S) Warner asked whether Russia's concept include anything like the U.S.-proposed formerly declard facility (FDF) inspections. Petrov answered, gain, saying that Russia was not providing for tat kind of inspection. Eliminated facilities coul be monitored with national technical means (NTM. Warner remared that NTM was indeed the primay means of monitoring former facilities, but if uestions arose on that basis, the United States wold want the opportunity to follow up with an inspction. The United States was dropping facility close-out inspections, bu wanted to retain FDF inspections. Petrov counteed that, in the entire START experience, there hd never been any ambiguities regarding activitie at former facilities. Russia proposed that, if uestions arose, it would be possible to discuss hem in the BCC. ¶23. (S) Gottemoeller summed up hat both sides had agreed to simplify treaty procedures and reduce costs, and also to make verification more effective. The Delegations would continue to develop concepts of predictability under more efficient conditions. All of the measures must be sound. Antonov said the exchange of questions was very useful, making the Russian side think more about its rationales. He hoped that the working group meetings that were about to commence would be friendly and constructive, with no fighting. Acceptable compromises must be found. ¶24. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Russian-proposed Annex to the Treaty, dated September 22, 2009. ¶25. (U) Participants. U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dwyer Mr. Elliott Dr. Fraley Col Hartford Maj Johnson Mr. Johnston Ms. Purcell Mr. Siemon Mr. Smith Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Artemyev Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Lysenko Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Gen Orlov Col Petrov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaytsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶26. (U) Gottemoeller sends, GRIFFITHS