START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000807 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-013. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 24, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the September 24 plenary meeting, chaired by U.S Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD Ambassador Antonov, the sides presented updates on the positive progress of the respective working groups. Working group chairs, as well as HODs, were optimistic that progress would be made through the difficult issues remaining and that common ground would be found. ¶4. (S) The U.S. side clarified its approach to the draft treaty in response to Russian assertions that the U.S. draft contained "excessive" and "rigorous" verification measures. Gottemoeller stressed that no measures in the U.S.-proposed draft go beyond those provisions that were contained in START. She stated that based on experience with START, the United States believed that carefully defined procedures offered the best chance of success in implementing the new treaty. Furthermore, a degree of technical detail consistent with previously agreed-upon text was essential to produce a verifiable treaty. ¶5. (S) The U.S. side presented its approach in drafting the proposed Elimination and Telemetry Protocols. The Elimination Protocol presentation was well-received by the Russian side. Following the presentation of the approach to the Telemetry Protocol, the Russian Delegation provided no response. -------------- A PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION FROM ANTONOV -------------- ¶6. (S) Antonov opened the plenary meeting on September 24, 2009, and asked a philosophical question on the overall U.S. approach. It was clear to the Russian Ddelegation that the new U.S. Administration had proposed more rigorous verification measures than the previous Administration. Specifically, treaty material proposed by the Bush Administration had emphasized openness and transparency, while the current U.S.-proposed draft employed vigorous and "excessive" verification measures. He emphasized that the Cold War was over, both the United States and Russia had existing patterns of cooperation from the START Treaty, and the U.S.-Russian relationship was developing. Finally, he observed that these aspects of the U.S.-proposed draft did not seem consistent with the spirit of recent remarks by the U.S. and Russian Presidents. ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the basis of all U.S. work was the original START Treaty, and that no measures in the U.S.-proposed drafts went beyond the precedents found in START. She agreed with sentiments expressed by the Russian side that START implementation had been a beneficial, positive experience for each side, but that the difficulties in implementing START yielded lessons relevant to the current negotiations. Where there had been carefully defined procedures, the United States and Russia have had the most success; impromptu procedures could lead to difficulties. -------------- HAIL PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS -------------- ¶8. (S) Both Antonov and Gottemoeller traded general remarks regarding the improved state of the current U.S.-Russian relationship, and each cited recent comments by the American and Russian Presidents in New York. Antonov mentioned two of the more difficult issues Russia believed were related to the START Treaty, the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms and the need to address the use of strategic offensive arms in a non-nuclear configuration. Gottemoeller acknowledged the challenge of these particular issues, and suggested that the Treaty Text Working Group chairs meet individually to discuss these items further. She commented that there is pressure from Washington to reach an agreement on the new treaty, and both HODs expressed confidence that such an agreement would be reached by the end of the year. -------------- A SOLID START BY THE WORKING GROUPS -------------- ¶9. (S) The working group Chairs from both sides summarized progress made to date. All chairs joined their Russian counterparts in praising the constructive, business-like and positive atmosphere observed in the working group meetings, and hailed the clarity of presentations made by the other side. ¶10. (S) Mr. Koshelev noted that the Treaty Text Working Group had had no differences in eight paragraphs of the Preamble, but had not yet come to the "most tasty" paragraphs, where there would definitely be brackets. He opined that the final provisions of the treaty would be agreed quickly. His co-chair, Ambassador Ries, highlighted the positive atmosphere, and acknowledged the hard and productive work done by each side. Ries agreed that difficult issues lay ahead, but expressed confidence that agreement would be reached. ¶11. (S) Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the Inspection Working Group Chairs, both echoed the positive statements made by their peers while acknowledging the significant gap between the level of detail provided by the United States and the level of detail provided in the Russian-proposed drafts. Ilin noted that the two sides would have to decide on how to reflect the different levels of detail in the treaty. In addition, Ilin called attention to the differences between the sides in the areas of mobile ICBMs and provisions for continuous monitoring. ¶12. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov noted that the Elimination Protocol Working Group had only met once so far, but he looked forward to the upcoming U.S. presentation and would work to bring both positions together. Mr. Elliott of the Elimination Protocol Working Group thanked Ryzhkov for his coherent and professional presentation to the U.S. side and his cordial manner in session. Elliott observed that the U.S.-proposed text was generally closer to the words in the existing START Treaty than the Russian approach. However, he had noted several elements in the Russian text that indicated their position was close to that of the United States, and he was hopeful that each side would reach common ground. ¶13. (S) Mr. Siemon thanked the Russian side for its enlightening presentation regarding the Russian approach to notifications, and highlighted several major areas of agreement between the two sides. He commented that he looked forward to a productive discussion with the Russian side in this area. ¶14. (S) Mr. Trout, Chair of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group, praised the productive nature of early meetings with the opposite side and stated that the exchange of questions to date had been very fruitful. General Orlov opined that the MOU Working Group is the main one, because it is discussing counting rules for the new treaty. He also praised the good atmosphere. ¶15. (S) Antonov summarized the reports by the working group chairs, emphasizing the friendly relations and mutual respect between Delegation members despite the difficulties that confronted them. He expressed reservations regarding the level of technical detail in the U.S.-proposed Inspection Protocol, stating that lawyers for the Russian State Duma would not be able to understand it. This, in turn, would make ratification by the Russian side difficult. He allowed that while issues of Russian lawyers were not a U.S. problem, he hoped the U.S. Delegation could see things from his point of view. He opined that Russia had initially believed everything in the U.S. proposal had been drawn from the original START Treaty, but it turned out that many points were new and had been incorporated from Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) agreements. This made translation and understanding more difficult for the Russian linguists. He closed by thanking the U.S. interpreters for their help and expressed a desire that cooperation between the interpreters increase. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller responded that U.S.-proposed technical language using JCIC agreements were historical precedent and did not represent significant differences, but simply provided more detail. Since lawyers understood precedent, she was confident that the U.S. proposal would not pose a problem. Gottemoeller also reminded all present that ratification in the Senate was never far from her mind. -------------- U.S. APPROACH TO THE ELIMINATION PROTOCOL -------------- ¶17. (S) Mr. Elliott presented the following concepts fundamental to the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol. Begin points: The Russian-proposed Article VII in its Annex Section pertaining to conversion and elimination provides a framework much like that of the U.S. proposal. - Strategic offensive arms shall be subject to the limitations provided for in the treaty until they have been eliminated, removed from accountability, or placed on static display. - The Russian proposal, similar to the U.S. proposal, provides language specifying conversion procedures that ensure that strategic offensive arms are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. - Finally, the Russians propose that verification of elimination or conversion procedures shall be carried out by national technical means, notifications and visits, which is again similar to the U.S. proposal. Elliott explained that the U.S. concept for the Elimination Protocol draws on previous language from the START Treaty as much as possible. START's Conversion or Elimination Protocol has served as a solid foundation to remove items from each Partie's force structure. Using similar language and procedures from the Protocol, adapted and simplified, where possible, reinforces the U.S.-Russian relationship based on shared knowledge, understanding and expectations. Since the last session of negotiations, the United States has amended its views on conversion or elimination. The United States has proposed to retain the concept of elimination in the Treaty as described below. - The U.S. believes that "elimination" is a process by which a Party alters an accountable item such that it is no longer subject to the limitations of the treaty - numerical limits and the broader treaty limits. - Under START, conversion procedures applied primarily to heavy bombers. There was no provision for a conversion procedure to remove a heavy bomber from being subject to START's limitations. - The U.S. proposes the term "elimination" apply to a procedure to physically alter an item and thereafter remove that item from accountability under the treaty. - Also, the United States recognizes that methods short of physical destruction are equally advantageous to each Party: 1) as a means of removing an item from accountability under the treaty; 2) to retain use of the item for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty; and 3) to save costs. - In this connection, the United States proposes a range of procedures to eliminate an item, any of which may be used by a Party for elimination. - Additionally, the United States acknowledges that in the future a Party may develop a unique procedure that was previously not considered during negotiations that may leverage advanced technologies or save time and money. In this instance, the United States proposes an option to use these procedures provided there is a sufficient level of transparency during the process. Elliott discussed several items the U.S. proposes to delete from the existing START Conversion or Elimination Protocol: - Procedures for Elimination of Silo Training Launchers and Silo Test Launchers: These types of launchers are not deployed launchers and are not accountable under the new treaty and therefore do not require elimination procedures. - Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers: These types of launchers are also not deployed launchers and are not accountable under the treaty. Therefore, they do not require elimination procedures. Elliott also addressed the retention of the following elimination procedures in the new Protocol. These align with the proposals Russia offered in Article VII: - Procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Launch Canisters, Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile ICBMs. - Procedures for the elimination of SLBM launchers and heavy bombers in addition to procedures for removal from accountability, due to flight tests or static tests. End points. ¶18. (S) Elliott closed by stating we have a rare opportunity to apply the lessons learned from START to an entirely new treaty, one that offers increased transparency and openness, reinforcing our mutual understanding that the Cold War was truly behind us. These opportunities include the viewing of exhibitions, notifications of actions we intended to take (and have taken),and the use of national technical means of verification. ¶19. (S) Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his presentation, and asked whether the existing START procedures retained under the U.S. proposal were included fully, or if the U.S. proposal included new ideas. Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal included some old procedures, added some new procedures, and had one that permitted flexibility for future development similar to the Russian proposal. ¶20. (S) Colonel Novikov asked Elliott whether the United States intended to change existing conversion procedures. Elliott answered that the United States hoped to retain flexibility by using the term "elimination" but retaining the concept of "conversion." For example, one method of disposing of a mobile launcher would be to cut the launcher into pieces. Another method would be to alter the launcher physically so that it could be used in a manner not inconsistent with the treaty. -------------- U.S. APPROACH TO TELEMETRY -------------- ¶21. (S) Mr. Siemon presented the following concepts supporting the U.S. Telemetry Protocol and Treaty Article: Begin points: The primary difference in the U.S.-proposed Treaty Article on Telemetry and the associated Telemetry Protocol and Annexes concerns limitations on encryption and encapsulation. The U.S. proposes reducing the total number of flight tests for which a Party may encrypt or encapsulate data while increasing a Party's flexibility regarding encryption. Specific changes associated with encryption and encapsulation follow: - Under Treaty Article X, the United States proposed that encryption and encapsulation be permitted for 7 rather than 11 flight tests each year. - In the associated Section III, Paragraph 2(b) of the Telemetry Protocol, the United States proposed that: "Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types that were deployed as of Treaty signature but none of which are deployed at the time of the flight test, as well as during no more than a total of two flight tests each year for ICBMs of existing types that are deployed and two flight tests each year for SLBMs of existing types that are deployed by each Party." In other respects, the U.S.-proposed Telemetry Protocol and associated Annexes remain the same as under START with the following changes: - References from "tapes" to "recording media" have been changed to more closely reflect current practices. - In Section I, Paragraph 1(c)(i),the United States added "as appropriate" after the reference to recording speed in meters and inches per second of tapes. - Only demonstrations of playback equipment that is different than the equipment demonstrated under START are required. - In Section 3, Paragraph 2(a) of the Protocol, the United States amended language to reflect increased flexibility with regard to encryption, including the provision that notification of any encrypted flight test will be provided in advance versus the single notification for the one type as provided under START. The Annexes have the following changes: - Throughout Annex 1, installation activities and equipment exchanges need not be performed if they were already performed for equipment provided under START. - In Annex 1, Section III, equipment lists have been updated to reflect the equipment that is required and is currently in use. - In Annex 2, reference to "attributed warheads" was deleted since the concept no longer applies. - Annex 5 was deleted. - Paragraph references throughout also have been updated. End points. ¶22. (S) There were no questions from the Russian side. Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. approach to telemetry illustrated the general approach that the U.S. side had taken to drawing on language from the START Treaty. New language was developed only if equipment or items were different than they were under START; measures were retained only if they were actually useful under START; and if an item, weapon, or system has been replaced or retired, the associated provisions were deleted, as had been the case with rail-mobile missiles. ¶23. (U) Document exchanged. None. ¶24. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries LCDR Brons Mr. Buttrick Mr. Colby Lt Col Comeau Mr. Dean Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Dr. Fraley Mr. Johnston Ms. Pura Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Col Ilin Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Gen Orlov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS