START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000805 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009, P.M. SESSION REF: GENEVA 0736 (SFO-GVA-IV-009) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-005. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 22, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) At the first Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties discussed the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the Treaty Preamble. The U.S. Delegation made the point that the draft U.S.-proposed JDT was a mechanical merger reflecting the texts of both Parties with no attempt to change either the U.S. or Russian-proposed text. It was based on the draft provided at the last session (REFTEL) and included only minor technical refinements. ¶4. (S) Agreement was reached ad-ref on the first seven paragraphs of the Preamble with the majority of the changes involving text related to the new relationship between the United States and Russian Federation. -------------- OFF TO A FAST START -------------- ¶5. (S) At the first meeting of the TTDWG, Ambassador Ries provided the Russian Delegation with a revised U.S.-proposed JDT on the preamble. She said the revised draft reflected minor refinements of the text that had been provided at the last session. The Delegations agreed that no changes were required for the proposed text of paragraph 1 defining the Parties to the treaty. Discussion of paragraph 2 centered on fulfilling obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat. Mr. Koshelev suggested that language in the second sentence be changed to "aimed at the goal of nuclear disarmament" to tie this sentence to the fulfillment of the obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Ries explained that signatories to the NPT had legally-binding obligations required by Article VI; however, freeing humanity from the nuclear threat was an overall goal, not a legally-binding obligation. As such, with the addition of Russian-proposed "historic" and changing to a singular threat, the U.S.-proposed formulation better suited a compromise. Koshelev accepted the compromise text. -------------- YES, NUCLEAR DEVASTATION IS FRIGHTENING -------------- ¶6. (S) Moving on to discussion of the U.S.-proposed text taken from the START preamble, in JDT paragraph 3, Koshelev recommended deleting the paragraph on the consequences of nuclear war since use of the phrase "nuclear war" did not accurately reflect the new relationship between Russia and the United States. Emphasizing nuclear devastation would tend to frighten those countries outside the treaty. Koshelev agreed to keep the paragraph bracketed and to re-address the need for the paragraph at a later date. -------------- ENDEAVORING TO PERSEVERE -------------- ¶7. (S) With respect to the fourth paragraph, Ries offered that the term "endeavoring" in English implied "help" which was a word inserted by the Russian side and, in fact, was a stronger word. Therefore, she proposed deleting "help." Koshelev stated that the paragraph presented conflicting ideas. On the one hand, it stated that nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Soviet Union/Russia were a stabilizing factor for many decades and helped to avoid nuclear war. The other part of the sentence suggested that reducing nuclear weapons would produce strategic stability. We have to be careful, he said, what signal we send other nations--we don't want to inadvertently suggest that more countries having nuclear weapons would by stabilizing. The Russian side observed that some even argue that lower levels of nuclear weapons are more destabilizing. ¶8. (S) The sides agreed to split the text into two paragraphs: "Expressing strong support for global efforts in non-proliferation..." and "Endeavoring to further reduce the role and importance of nuclear weapons..." as a means of avoiding ambiguity and to make clear both the commitment to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and reducing the role and importance of nuclear weapons. -------------- EQUAL SECURITY -------------- ¶9. (S) Ries offered that paragraph 5 provided two very positive ideas: the principle of strengthening security and forging a new strategic relationship. To resolve the difference in the U.S.- and Russian-proposed texts, Ries recommended the following formulation: "Guided by the principle of strengthening strategic security and continuing along the path of establishing a new relationship based on openness, predictability and cooperation." Koshelev stated that the original formulation reflected a negative Cold War relationship and the text required language that strengthened the security of both Parties. As such, Koshelev suggested the following formulation: "Endeavoring to strengthen in equal measure the security of both Parties, and continuing along the path of forging a new relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability and cooperation that promotes the maintenance of strategic stability." ¶10. (S) Ries suggested an alternate formulation that split the paragraph into two paragraphs as the Russian side had proposed for a previous paragraph. The new formulation would reflect the April 1, 2009 Joint Statement Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms on the idea of mutually enhancing the security of both Parties. The formulation for the first paragraph was as follows: "Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will mutually enhance the security of the Parties and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces." The second paragraph was formulated as follows: "Continuing along the path of strengthening security for both Parties based on mutual trust, openness, predictability and cooperation." ¶11. (S) Koshelev stated that this text had been discussed earlier in a plenary. The text on "mutually enhancing the security of both Parties" had been decided upon at the last second in April 2009 and the principle of equal security had not been reflected precisely as Russia had intended in the Joint Statement. The Russian concept of equal security had not been correctly captured in the April 1, 2009 London Statement. Koshelev offered language drawn from the NPT RevCon statement of 2000 as a better expression of the Russian view. Both sides agreed to leave the paragraph unfinished until a later date. -------------- WRAP UP ON A GOOD NOTE -------------- ¶12. (S) Brown presented an explanation for new proposed text for paragraph 6 that reflected the fact that Russia and the United States were not enemies. The Russian formulation of the text gave the connotation that the United States and Russia were once enemies and the proposed formulation provided a more positive formulation. Koshelev accepted the original U.S. language which had not included this phrase, thereby eliminating the need to make this change. ¶13. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated September 22, 2009. ¶14. (U) Participants: U.S. Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Connell Mr. Evans Dr. Fraley Mr. Hanchett Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Taylor Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Col Kamenskiy Ms. Kotkova Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Lysenko Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶15. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS