START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000804 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 REF: A. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019) ¶B. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-006. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 22, 2009 Time: 3:00 - 5:10 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working Group focused on reviewing the recently-received Russian draft on Section V to the Treaty Annex regarding Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions (REF A). The Russian Delegation presented similarities to and differences from the START Treaty and the U.S.-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol (REF B). ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stressed the importance of having a verification regime with enough precision and fidelity to ensure treaty ratification in the United States Senate. The U.S. Delegation also expressed concern over the Russian Federation's approach to counting warheads on heavy bombers, as well as its desire to delay agreement on many specific inspection procedures until after ratification when they are slated to be worked out within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) prior to the initiation of the various inspection activities. -------------- IF YOU WANT IT RATIFIED, IT BETTER BE VERIFIABLE -------------- ¶5. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting by acknowledging that the United States had only received the Russian draft of the Annex that morning. Warner stressed how crucial the role of verification was to the treaty and emphasized the level of scrutiny that the United States Senate would put on the Inspection Protocol coming out of the working group. ¶6. (S) General Orlov asked whether the Senate's interest was motivated by the concept of "trust but verify" or by budgetary concerns. Warner explained that Senator Nunn had recently reminded several senior U.S. Administration officials of how important verifiability was to Members of the Senate in establishing the credibility of any arms control treaty. Warner predicted that the strength of the verification measures for this treaty could be a key factor in winning the two-thirds majority required for United States Senate ratification. -------------- SYNOPSIS OF SECTION V TO TO THE DRAFT RUSSIAN TREATY ANNEX -------------- ¶7. (S) Ilin proposed an exchange of views on the Russian- and U.S.-proposed drafts of the Inspection Protocol. His goal was to gain an understanding of the inspection provisions proposed by each side by summarizing the key similarities and differences between their respective versions. He wanted to first identify the common approaches and then locate the differences, while agreeing to move forward despite them. Next, he proposed both sides work together to develop proposed solutions for those differences. Ilin acknowledged that some differences would stem from major unresolved issues in the treaty and noted that these would ultimately be settled by the Heads of delegation. Warner stated that the United States was interested in such a comparison of both the treaty and protocol texts as they apply to the various inspection activities. Reminding Ilin that the United States had only received the Russian-proposed annex, which contained a number of sections, that morning, Warner expressed an interest in hearing Russia's view of the similarities between the two countries' approaches to inspections and thus verification. ¶8. (S) Ilin provided an overview of Section V of the Russian-proposed draft treaty annex, entitled "Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions," which equates to the U.S. Inspection Protocol. He noted that, in preparing their text, the Russian side attempted to reduce the number of inspection activities and procedures by leveraging the experience gained during implementation of the START Treaty. They also sought to make the inspection mechanism less cumbersome and more cost-effective. He stressed the importance of establishing clearly understandable rules. Ilin briefly summarized the ten parts of Section V, noting that they had generally followed the path laid out in START and, in many cases, had come up with provisions that corresponded to sections in the U.S.-proposed draft Inspection Protocol. The parts of the Russian draft are: ¶I. General Obligations; II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors and Aircrew Members; III. Arrangements for Air Transportation; IV. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry; ¶V. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions; VI. Inspections; VII. Visits to Declared Facilities and Visits to New Facilities; VIII. Technical Characteristics and Distinguishability Exhibitions; IX. Cancellation of Inspections, Visits or Exhibitions; and ¶X. Inspection, Visit or Exhibition Reports ¶9. (S) Ilin briefly described the types of sites and items that would be subject to inspections and visits. Inspections, he noted, are focused on deployed ICBMs, SLBMS and heavy bombers, deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and on the warheads deployed on these missiles and bombers. In contrast, visits are focused on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers as well as non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. Ilin stated that, by limiting inspections and visits to no more than five per year for each type, the sides would save money while ensuring confidence and transparency between Parties. He confirmed that many of the specific procedures to be used to conduct inspections, visits and exhibitions would have to be agreed upon in the BCC prior to the initiation of these activities. ¶10. (S) Predicting that few disagreements would arise between the Parties regarding most of these parts, Ilin noted key additions and deletions from the original START provisions. Highlighting the removal of all ground transportation provisions related to continuous portal monitoring, he reminded the U.S. side that the Russian position on discontinuing portal monitoring at Votkinsk had been made very clear. He indicated that the Russian-proposed draft provided 18 hours for delivering an inspection group to an inspection or visit site. He also pointed out that, while visits could last up to 36 hours, inspections were not limited in duration as long as the time to complete the procedures was reasonable. -------------- THE BOMBER PARADOX -------------- ¶11. (S) Colonel Zaitsev noted that the Duma remained skeptical of how warheads are being counted under the Moscow Treaty and said that many Russian experts believed that the new treaty should retain the START attribution-based counting rules. Nevertheless, he indicated that the Russian side had attempted to construct rules for counting deployed warheads according to the U.S. approach and found that the task was very difficult. ¶12. (S) Warner described the paradox in Russia's approach to counting warheads associated with heavy bombers, which is their proposal that bomber armaments, bombs or long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs, count only when they are actually loaded on a heavy bomber. He acknowledged that devising a method of verifying warhead numbers in general was very difficult and stated that doing so for heavy bombers was one of the most challenging problems confronting the Inspection Protocol Working Group. Indicating that the Russian method of only counting those nuclear weapons actually loaded on bombers on a day-to-day basis did not reflect current practices of the United States or Russia, Warner expressed doubt that such a method would be acceptable to the United States Senate. He indicated that some would question the need for the bombers in the first place if both sides simply declared that there were no nuclear warheads associated with them. He reminded Ilin that the United States had proposed a method for inspecting the weapons storage areas associated with heavy bomber air bases and reaffirmed that the bomber problem was a crucial point of treaty warhead accounting and verification that needed work. -------------- SPEAKING OF PARADOXES -------------- ¶13. (S) Ilin stated that the sides would encounter other paradoxes, such as the U.S. intent to equip existing ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads and to develop new ballistic missiles and heavy bombers solely for non-nuclear use. He opined that the United States' desired to have such delivery vehicles fall outside the scope of the new treaty. ¶14. (S) Warner provided a brief summary of inspections proposed in each side's drafts and noted that it was challenging to come up with a one-to-one comparison. He asked what Russia meant by a non-deployed silo launcher. Ilin stated that test launchers and training launchers for silo-based ICBMs are examples of non-deployed silo launchers. -------------- STAY BETWEEN THE LINES -------------- ¶15. (S) Warner noted the dependence of the Inspection Protocol Working Group upon certain provisions in the treaty, particularly Article XI. Recognizing that the review and redrafting of all treaty articles falls under the Treaty Text Working Group, he nevertheless suggested that the Inspection Protocol Working Group make a comparison of the sides' approaches to Article XI as a starting point for building their understanding of how inspection activities would work. Ilin stated that it would not be productive to discuss Article XI since the responsibility for development of treaty articles belongs to the other working group. -------------- LET THE BCC WORRY ABOUT THE DETAILS -------------- ¶16. (S) Expressing concern over the Russian-proposed draft's repeated call to having specific inspection-related procedures worked out in the BCC, Warner asserted that both sides should take advantage of their Delegations' expertise as well as their familiarity with the implementation of existing START provisions. Believing that both sides should draft the needed procedures wherever possible, he again emphasized the importance of building verification procedures that would support ratification and not just rely upon the BCC to do so after the treaty was signed. Ilin argued that Russian reliance on the BCC was based on the time constraints set by the two Presidents for completing the new treaty and the confidence the Russian side has in the future BCC. He indicated that there was no reason for concern, since the Russian version of the treaty requires that all the needed procedures be agreed upon in the BCC before inspections and visits began. By avoiding addressing the many procedures that will be needed, Ilin continued, the treaty would be reduced in size thus saving considerable negotiating time. -------------- PICK A NUMBER BETWEEN FIVE AND TWELVE -------------- ¶17. (S) Ilin and Warner discussed their respective rationales for each side's proposed annual number of inspections. Ilin stated that Russia's proposal for five inspections per year was derived from the U.S.-proposed draft treaty of October 2008. Warner reminded Ilin that the draft text came from a previous administration and did not represent the current administration's approach to a follow-on treaty. As a former base commander, Orlov opined that inspections were onerous on facilities and stated that limiting their number had been one of Russia's primary goals. Warner echoed Orlov's sentiment concerning the impact of inspections on those facilities, having recently visited several U.S. bases and discussed these matters with local base personnel. Nevertheless, the U.S. side believes a larger number of inspections of the various types are needed each year, although he noted that the U.S.-proposed protocol had reduced the maximum number of data update inspections from 15 to 12 per year. Warner argued that the U.S. side believes that at least 12 inspections are needed annually to provide a sufficient sample of the number of sites subject to inspection. ¶18. (U) Documents exchanged. None. ¶19. (U) Participants: U.S. Dr. Warner Ms. Bosco Mr. DeNinno Mr. Fortier Maj Johnson Ms. Pura Ms. Purcell Mr. Rust Mr. Smith Ms. St. Julien Ms. Gesse (Int) RUSSIA Col Ilin Mr. Leontiev Gen Orlov Col S. Petrov Mr. A. Petrov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS