START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000784 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN PRESENTATION OF PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009 REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-003. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 21, 2009 Time: 3:15 - 5:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) During the second plenary meeting conducted on September 21, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Delegations continued discussions of the Russian draft treaty (REFTEL). The Russian Delegation explained why it was not in favor of including telemetry provisions in its version of the treaty and expressed concerns over mobile ICBM restrictions proposed by the United States. The Russian legal advisor also presented views on the principle of "equal security." ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation outlined its approach to counting rules, conversion or elimination (C or E) practices, notification procedures, inspections, visits, and exhibitions. They also explained that they do not want to retain telemetry provisions because certain START limitations that telemetry was meant to verify will not be retained in the new treaty. Telemetry data was helpful to the United States in building a global missile defense system, they claimed. They also perceived an imbalance between the treatment of road-mobile missile systems in the U.S. draft as compared to other systems of concern from the Russian perspective, particularly ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers. -------------- RUSSIAN VERSION OF COUNTING RULES -------------- ¶5. (S) Col Novikov reviewed the limits contained within the Russian draft START Follow-on Treaty. Specifically, there were three central limits: a) deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; b) warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; c) ICBM and SLBM launchers. For deployed systems, each deployed system counted as one unit toward the aggregate limit. For warheads, each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs was counted as one warhead and each long-range nuclear ALCM or other nuclear armament deployed on a heavy bomber was also counted as one warhead. For launchers, each deployed and non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMS counted as one unit toward the aggregate limit. He explained that, for the first central limit, ICBMs and SLBMs would count from the time they were placed on or in a launcher and would no longer count once they were removed from a launcher. For heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments they would be counted when the bomber first arrived at an air base and would no longer be counted upon completion of conversion or elimination procedures. Also, non-deployed heavy bombers in storage or at C or E facilities would not be counted. ¶6. (S) Warheads would cout on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs when each reentry ehicle (RV) was placed on the ICBM or SLBM and wuld no longer count when RVs were removed from the launcher. Warheads would count on deployed heav bombers when a long-range nuclear ALCM or other uclear armament was loaded onto the heavy bomberand would not count when those nuclear armaments were removed from the bomber. He noted that the Russian Federation had not included a category for non-nuclear warheads as it proposed to ban them. ¶7. (S) Silo launchers for ICBMs would count against the limit when the silo door was first installed and closed and would no longer count once the silo door was dismantled. Mobile launchers of ICBMs would count when they first arrived at an ICBM base and would no longer count after C or E procedures were complete. An SLBM launcher would count when a submarine is first launched, and would no longer count after conversion or elimination procedures were complete. ¶8. (S) Mr. Elliott asked Novikov if he would clarify whether or not warheads would count toward treaty limits if nuclear weapons were not loaded onto a heavy bomber. Novikov stated if they were not loaded, they would not count but that the heavy bomber would count against the delivery vehicle limits. Dr. Warner pointed out that heavy bombers' nuclear weapons were a large component of the warheads for both sides and it would not be well received by the U.S. Senate that they were not being accounted for. -------------- RUSSIAN VIEWS ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION -------------- ¶9. (S) Mr. Smirnov explained that the Russian Federation took into account ways to simplify C or E procedures as well as to make them less expensive. He noted that each Party would define its own procedures with the goal that the procedures would be irreversible and that verification would be accomplished via national technical means (NTM) in concert with the appropriate notification. The procedures would also render the strategic offensive arms (SOA) inoperable and no longer usable for its intended purpose. He assured the U.S. Delegation that the Russian Federation would agree to display eliminated items in the open to ensure visibility by NTM. He explained that further confirmation would be obtained through a visit to look at the eliminated SOA. ¶10. (S) A/S Gottemoeller asked if these visits would be exhibitions after C or E was accomplished and whether it was correct that under the Russian proposal there would be no demonstration in advance of the C or E. Smirnov clarified that exhibitions would demonstrate the distinguishing features of new SOA, whereas a visit would be conducted to confirm the completion of C or E. Elliott noted that, under START, conversion was only addressed in relation to heavy bombers and asked if the Russian concept would allow the conversion of SLBM launchers. Smirnov stated that the Russian concept would not allow for the conversion of SLBM launchers. (Begin comment: Smirnov's initial answer led to considerable discussion among the Russian Delegation. This issue remains to be clarified. End comment.) Gottemoeller queried Smirnov regarding his earlier statement that each Party would determine its own procedures and that those procedures would be irreversible. She asked if the other side would be able to check to see whether the process was indeed irreversible, to which the Russian Delegation responded that this issue would be discussed at the working group level. Elliott noted that the United States had looked at the history of C or E in START and had envisioned more stringent requirements than the Russian side. -------------- NOTIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO MOSCOW -------------- ¶11. (S) Col Petrov opined that notifications were one of the most important elements of the new treaty and remarked upon the success of the process under START, but noted that a considerable number of notifications were never used under START. The Russian Federation proceeded from that premise and recommended using notifications for the following categories: a) categories of data as agreed during negotiations; b) movement of SOA between facilities to include the movement of heavy bombers; c) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs; d) C or E of SOA to include the elimination of facilities; e) new types of SOA; and, f) the conduct of visits, inspections, and exhibitions. Mr. Trout asked if movement notifications applied to non-deployed missiles, to which Petrov responded that the movement of any SOA would be notified just as it is currently in START. -------------- IS IT A VISIT OR AN INSPECTION? -------------- ¶12. (S) Petrov emphasized that on-site inspections were as important as notifications but were inconvenient and expensive to conduct so the Russian Federation had adjusted the procedures. He explained that the Russian proposal envisaged three categories -- inspections, visits, and exhibitions. An inspection would be conducted to verify the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMS and heavy bombers, as well as to confirm the number of warheads loaded onto them. Also, an inspection would be conducted to confirm the number of deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers. No more than five inspections would be conducted each year and only one at any one facility. He underscored that the Russian Federation did not envision any activities related to continuous monitoring. Visits, on the other hand, would be conducted to confirm the number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, as well as the numbers of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. Data on new facilities as well as technical characteristics of SOAs and confirming the conversion process would be included in visits. No more than five such visits would be conducted each year with no more than one at any one facility. Exhibitions would be conducted to confirm the technical characteristics and differences of new SOA as well as to confirm that the procedures for conversion had been accomplished. He concluded by stating that the legal status of inspectors, as well as their rules for transportation and the rules governing points of entry (POEs),would be retained as they are in START. Warner asked if the objectives of inspections and visits were similar and were conducted by inspectors, why the Russian Federation chose to differentiate between the two. Petrov stated that it was in order to draw the distinction between the activities carried out at various facilities. For reentry vehicles at their deployment sites, inspections are appropriate, but for storage facilities or test ranges, visits are appropriate. -------------- NO TELEMETRY -------------- ¶13. (S) Novikov provided a statement on telemetry. He noted that it was useful in START for determining throw-weight and maximum numbers of warheads, as well as characteristics and reliability of ICBMs and SLBMs. This was important as START used attribution rules versus the actual number of deployed RVs, hence the need for telemetry to provide confirmation. However, the Russian Federation did not see telemetry as useful for the new treaty because it would be an "independent element" not related to the limited items. He drew a connection to the United States withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and alleged that the United States had made use of telemetry from Russian systems to continue to develop a global ABM system. He also observed that the U.S. relationship with the United Kingdom in the field of development of Trident systems allowed for the circumvention of START provisions since telemetry on those flight tests was not provided to the Russian Federation. Therefore, it was not consistent with Russia's interests to keep a telemetry provision. Novikov also noted that telemetry, as practiced under START, was deficient in the exchange of information. Finally, he noted that some U.S. telemetry data was not playable on the U.S.-provided telemetry playback systems. He opined that it would not be possible to adequately address these issues and develop a suitable fix in the time remaining to negotiate a new treaty. He noted that, since these issues were not resolved under START, it would be inappropriate to incorporate telemetry into a new treaty and at the same time incorporate the old problems that went with it. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Novikov for his remarks. On the subject of U.S.-UK collaboration, she reminded the Russian Delegation that this activity fell under a pattern of existing cooperation that is and has been permissible under START. She also observed that the UK systems had differences from U.S. systems that would not facilitate a U.S. modernization plan. She noted that the United States had no desire to transfer old issues from START to the new treaty. Noting the recent Minuteman III demonstration, she commended the U.S. and Russian JCIC members for moving toward resolving a difficult issue that had long hampered implementation of the START Treaty. ¶15. (S) Siemon agreed that it was fair to say that there were questions from both sides concerning telemetry practices. He explained that the interest in telemetry went back to SALT I and stemmed from a provision regarding non-interference with NTM since NTM then was the primary means of verification. In Salt II, the noninterference with the NTM concept was expanded to specifically include noninterference with telemetry. Under START, the noninterference with telemetry provisions were retained and significantly expanded to include the exchange of electronic media and interpretative data to enhance treaty verification. The United States still saw value in retaining the exchange of telemetry in the current treaty to enhance confidence and predictability about the development and deployment of SOA. Perhaps the sides should look at the value telemetry as a provision related to non-interference with NTM. ¶16. (S) Antonov thanked all for their remarks. He noted how the discussions had progressed to the point where the sides could be sincere in voicing their deepest concerns. At the same time, he advised all that the sides needed to remember the principles of trust and confidence-building measures. Going back to Novikov's list of issues, he focused on ABM. While he felt the recent U.S. decision to 'change the architecture of global ABM' was a positive step, it did not change the underlying Russian concerns. Referring to the link between telemetry and the use of its data to develop an ABM system, he was resolute in stating "we will never help or enable efforts to develop a new global ABM system," and this was only one of the Russian concerns over telemetry. Switching to English, he stated that the Russian side could not agree to telemetry provisions until its concerns were "assuaged and allayed." Again, noting the new stage in discussions where both sides were more open about their concerns, he asked the U.S. side to think about the questions. He was willing to wait however long it took, but if the U.S. side did not address the issues already noted, it would be a sign that the Russian side was right all along in its concerns. Gottemoeller thanked Antonov, and observed that the proposed telemetry provisions were not unilateral in nature but reciprocal rights for both sides. -------------- ALL THINGS MOBILE SHOULD BE RE STRICTED -------------- ¶17. (S) General Poznihir discussed concerns with restrictions placed upon mobile missiles in the U.S.-proposed draft treaty provisions. He opined that some of the provisions of the U.S. text were useful and could be incorporated into an agreement. He noted that the right for each side to determine for itself the size and composition of its strategic offensive arms should not be infringed by text provisions. He complained that Article V of the U.S.-proposed text was centered on limiting mobile ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs have many similar characteristics as submarines and heavy bombers in that they have the ability to hide yet there are no limitations on these types of SOA. In his view, SLBMs posed more of a threat from a military point of view yet only mobile ICBMs were re stricted to geographic areas. Provisions for not basing SOA outside national territory already accomplished this geographic restriction and NTM provided adequate verification. SLBMs can move outside of national waters and are difficult to detect. The same situation was true with bombers since they can fly great distances, carry large quantities of nuclear weapons and cannot be verified via NTM. He could not understand the U.S. desire to limit mobile ICBMs. ¶18. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the United States had done its best to retain measures meant to assist with verification and not meant to constrain operations. Historically, there had been concerns regarding mobile ICBMs. Bombers and submarines are large platforms and the sides understand how many they have, whereas mobile ICBMs have a special ability to hide and not be detected. Thus, the United States considers it to be important to verify non-deployed mobile ICBMs in particular. The United States is trying to find a balance between predictability and flexibility. -------------- WAXING PROPHETIC ON EQUAL SECURITY -------------- ¶19. (S) Kotkova presented a legal viewpoint of the principle of equal security. The text of the official translation follows. Begin text: Official Translation Negotiations between Russia and the U.S. to Work out a New Agreement to Replace the START Treaty - Round VI (Geneva, September 21, 2009) On the Principle of Equal Security (Talking Points for the Presentation of the Russian Draft of the New Treaty on SOAs) In our view, the new treaty on SOAs must serve to enhance the security of each of the Treaty Parties and to strengthen strategic stability in general. There exist generally recognized principles of international law, which are firmly established, in particular, in the UN Charter. These include, for example, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, fulfillment in good faith of international obligations, and the sovereign equality of states. These principles reflect a fundamental property of international law as the rights of equal subjects (of international law - Trans.)(par in parem non habet imperium). The special principles of the law of international security are based on these generally recognized principles. Among them, the Russian doctrine of international law distinguishes the principle of undiminished security of other states, which derives from the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs. It assumes that a state conducts a foreign policy that takes into account, to the maximum extent, both its own security and the security of the entire global community. The principle of equal security develops and gives concrete expression to this approach. It is understood to mean that while ensuring its own security, a state should ensure the proportionality of its actions to the capabilities of other states to ensure their security. Thus, this involves a sort of security parity, where neither Party obtains advantages over the other Party in terms of ensuring security. In this connection, what is meant is actual, rather than arithmetical equality in the military-strategic area. End text. ¶20. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Delegation paper On the Principle of Equal Security, September 21, 2009. ¶21. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Elliott Mr. Evans Dr. Fraley Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Siemon Mr. Sims Mr. Smith Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mrs. Zdravecky Ms. Gesse (Int) Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Mr. Koshelev Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Lysenko Mr. Neshin Col Novikov MGen Orlov Col Petrov Mr. Pischulov Gen Poznihir Mr. Rudenko Mr. Semin Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Vasiliev MGen Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaitsev Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) ¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS