START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000774 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-007. ¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 is the official translation of the Russian-proposed treaty text. ¶3. (S) Begin text. Official Translation To be Turned Over to the U.S. Side Document of the Russian Side of September 16, 2009 TREATY BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS The Russian Federation and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Committed to the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat, and to consistent implementation of the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Endeavoring to help reduce the role and significance of nuclear arms in ensuring international security, and expressing support for efforts being undertaken on a global scale in the field of non-proliferation; Continuing along the path of strengthening strategic stability and of establishing new relations in the strategic area, based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation; Considering it necessary to bring their nuclear posture into alignment with the new relations in the post-Cold War era-relations which are built on the basis that the Russian Federation and the United States of America are no longer enemies, that there is no prospect of a war starting between them, and that they are cooperating in areas where it is mutually beneficial; Taking into account the stabilizing effect on the world situation which has resulted from the radical, verifiable reduction of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century; Taking note of the existence of an indissoluble interrelationship between the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the deployment of missile defense systems; In agreement that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration have an impact on strategic stability; Considering that the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, has been implemented in full; Taking note that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have completely fulfilled the obligations they assumed in accordance with the Protocol of May 23, 1992, to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the cause of general and complete nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states; Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to multilateralization of this process in the future; Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, based on the procedures that were elaborated in the START Treaty, and supplemented by transparency and confidence-building measures; Guided by the principle of equal security and believing that global challenges and threats require continued use of qualitatively new approaches to interaction on the whole range of strategic relations, Have agreed as follows: Article I ¶1. Each Party shall implement measures aimed at strengthening trust, openness, and predictability of the development of strategic relations, and shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annex. ¶2. The obligations under this Treaty shall be assumedNOTE1 by the Parties in conditions where they have strategic missile defense systems, hereinafter referred to as MD systems, at the level existing at the time of Treaty signature. ¶3. The terms and definitions adopted for purposes of this Treaty are given in Section I of the Annex to this Treaty. Article II ¶1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, HBs, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and HB nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed: (a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed HBs; (b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed HBs; (c) 600, (("for" missing in Russian - Trans.)) ICBM and SLBM launchers. ¶2. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the aggregate limits provided for in this Article. Article III ¶1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (a) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit; (b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit; (c) Each deployed HB shall be counted as one unit. ¶2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article II of this Treaty: (a) Each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs or SLBMs shall be counted as one warhead; (b) Each long-range nuclear ALCM and each other HB nuclear armament, other than a long-range nuclear ALCM, on deployed HBs shall be counted as one warhead. ¶3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (c) of Article II of this Treaty, each deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be counted as one unit. ¶4. Strategic offensive arms shall be counted toward the aggregate limits provided for in this Treaty as follows: (a) ICBMs - from the time an ICBM is placed in (on) an ICBM launcher, to the time the ICBM is removed from (taken off) the ICBM launcher; (b) SLBMs - from the time an SLBM is placed in an SLBM launcher, to the time the SLBM is removed from the SLBM launcher; (c) HBs - from the time a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments first arrives at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, to the time when the HB conversion or elimination procedures have been completed; (d) warheads: (i) on ICBMs - from the time each reentry vehicle is placed on a deployed ICBM, to the time each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed ICBM or the deployed ICBM with the front section containing reentry vehicles is removed from (taken off) the launcher; (ii) on SLBMs - from the time each reentry vehicle is placed on a deployed SLBM, to the time each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed SLBM or the deployed SLBM with the front section containing reentry vehicles is removed from the launcher; (iii) on HBs - from the time each long-range nuclear ALCM or each other nuclear armament, other than a long-range nuclear ALCM, is placed on a deployed HB, to the time the enumerated nuclear armaments are taken off the deployed HB; (e) ICBM and SLBM launchers: (i) silo launcher of ICBMs - from the time the doorNOTE2 is first installed and closed, to the time the door of the silo launcher of ICBMs is dismantled; (ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs - from the time a mobile launcher of ICBMs arrives at an ICBM base, to the time when the conversion or elimination procedures for a mobile launcher of ICBMs have been completed, or the time of its return to a production facility; (iii) SLBM launcher - when (sic) a submarine coming from a production facility arrives at a base for submarines with SLBM launchers, to the time when the conversion or elimination procedures for an SLBM launcher have been completed. Article IV ¶1. As of the date of signature of this Treaty: (a) Existing types of ICBMs are: (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of ICBMs designated by the Russian Federation as RS-12M, RS-18, and RS-20, which are known to the United States of America as SS-25, SS-19, and SS-18, respectively; (ii) for the United States of America, the types of ICBMs designated by the United States of America and known to the Russian Federation as (BLANK). ; (b) Existing types of SLBMs are: (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of SLBMs designated by the Russian Federation as RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56, which are known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, SS-N-20, SS-N-23, and RSM-56, respectively; (ii) for the United States of America, the types of SLBMs designated by the United States of America and known to the Russian Federation as (BLANK). ; (c) Existing types of heavy bombers are: (i) for the Russian Federation, the types of bombers designated by the Russian Federation as Tu-95MS and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear H and Blackjack, respectively; (ii) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America and known to the Russian Federation as (BLANK). ¶2. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows: (a) ICBMs - when an ICBM or the first stage of an ICBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported in stages, first leaves the production facility; (b) SLBMs - when an SLBM or the first stage of an SLBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported in stages, first leaves the production facility; (c) HBs: when an HB airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where the entire airframe is assembled from HB components; (d) ICBM and SLBM launchers: (i) silo launcher of ICBMs: when the door is first installed and closed; (ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs: when a mobile launcher of ICBMs first leaves the production facility; (iii) SLBM launcher: when a submarine, on which the aforesaid launcher is installed, is first launched. ¶3. In those cases not provided for by the provisions of this Treaty, strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty in accordance with procedures to be agreed by the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. ¶4. Ballistic missiles that have been developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be ballistic missiles to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply. Such missiles shall not be given the capabilities of ICBMs or SLBMs; these missiles and their launchers shall have verifiable differences from the existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers. The procedures for confirming the presence of the above-mentioned differences shall be subject to agreement by the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Article V ¶1. Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases, air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test ranges. ¶2. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges. The construction or conversion of such launchers at test ranges may be carried out only for purposes of testing and training. The number of such launchers shall not be increased above the requirements for testing and training purposes. ¶3. Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at ICBM bases and test ranges. Mobile training launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or elimination facilities. The construction or conversion of such launchers may be carried out only for training purposes. The number of such launchers shall not be increased above the requirements for training purposes. ¶4. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. ¶5. In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber outside national territory in accordance with subparagraph 3 (b) of Article VIII, notification shall be provided. ¶6. HBs equipped or converted for non-nuclear armaments shall be based separately from HBs equipped for nuclear armaments. Article VI ¶1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. ¶2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration. ¶3. Each Party undertakes not to convert HBs equipped for non-nuclear armaments into HBs equipped for nuclear armaments. Nuclear armaments shall not be stored at air bases of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments. The crews of such bombers shall not undergo training to carry out missions involving nuclear weapons. ¶4. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. ¶5. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. ¶6. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments outside the continental portion of national territory. Article VII ¶1. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and of the facilities where they are located shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section III of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶2. Strategic offensive arms and the facilities where they are located shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until such time as they are: (a) eliminated; (b) removed from accountability as a result of flight or static tests, accidental loss, disablement beyond repair, or transfer to static display. ¶3. In fulfilling obligations under this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the upper atmosphere. ¶4. Conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, on site or at other stipulated sites. In this connection, the procedures employed shall ensure that they are rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose. ¶5. Notifications of conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms shall be provided in accordance with Subsection IV of Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶6. Verification of the Parties' implementation of procedures for conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and the facilities where they are located shall be carried out: (a) by using national technical means of verification; (b) by providing notifications; (c) by means of visits, which can be conducted by the inspecting Party, to the sites specified in paragraph 4 of this Article, upon completion of the conversion or elimination procedures. Article VIII ¶1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data. ¶2. In order to ensure fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3 (a) of this Article, and shall provide the other notifications provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article in accordance with the procedure provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article and in Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶3. Each Party shall provide notification to the other Party regarding: (a) data according to categories of data contained in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty and other agreed categories of data with respect to items subject to the limitations of this Treaty, except for data pertaining to warheads, which shall be exchanged twice a year; (b) movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty between declared facilities. Any movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty between facilities shall be completed not later than 30 days after it began; (c) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs; (d) conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations of this Treaty, as well as elimination of facilities; (e) strategic offensive arms of new types; (f) the conduct of inspections, visits, and exhibitions. ¶4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, besides the notifications specified in paragraph 3 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to provide assurance of the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken under this Treaty. ¶5. In order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in accordance with the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. ¶6. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour time period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. ¶7. Neither Party shall release to the public data specified in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty or the photographs appended to it, unless otherwise agreed. Article IX In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, each Party shall, on a voluntary basis, in those cases where it believes ambiguous situations might arise, take measures, including providing information in advance, inter alia through diplomatic channels, on activities being conducted with respect to strategic offensive arms, which are associated with their deployment or increasing their readiness, so as to preclude the possibility of a misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. Article X For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law; (b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; (c) not to use deliberate concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. Article XI ¶1. For the purpose of ensuring verification or confirming data on compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections, visits, and exhibitions. Inspections, visits, and exhibitions shall be conducted (BLANK) days (to be agreed upon) after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter. ¶2. The procedures for conducting inspections, visits, and exhibitions shall be governed by Section V of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶3. Each inspection team conducting an inspection or taking part in a visit or exhibition shall include the number of inspectors specified in Section V of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶4. In order to perform their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Section V of the Annex to this Treaty. ¶5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one inspection or one visit or take part in one exhibition in the territory of the inspected Party at any one time. ¶6. Inspectors shall not disclose information obtained during inspections, exhibitions, or visits, except with the express consent of the inspected Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation even after termination of their activities as inspectors. ¶7. The purpose of inspections is to verify data on the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed HBs and the number of warheads on them, as well as data on the number of deployed launchers of ICBMs and deployed launchers of SLBMs. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no more than five such inspections each year, with no more than one such inspection each year at the same facility. Inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases. ¶8. The purpose of visits is to confirm data on the number of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and non-deployed HBs, on the number of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, data on new facilities provided during an exchange of information, and technical characteristics of strategic offensive arms provided during an exchange of information or demonstrated at exhibitions of new items of SOAs or in the course of confirming that items of SOAs have been converted for new kinds of SOAs. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no more than five such visits each year, with no more than one such visit each year to the same facility. Additional visits beyond the established number may be conducted at the invitation of the inspected Party. Visits shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases, at storage facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, test ranges, and training facilities. ¶9. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions in order to confirm the technical characteristics and differences of new items of strategic offensive arms, and to confirm that procedures for converting items of SOAs for new kinds of SOAs have been completed. Article XII To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Section VI of the Annex to this Treaty. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall hold sessions of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; (b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and (c) resolve questions related to the application of the provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm. Article XIII To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XII of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third state. Article XIV ¶1. This Treaty, including its Annex, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. ¶2. This Treaty shall be concluded for 10 years, unless prior to the expiration of that period it is superseded by a subsequent treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. ¶3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty. ¶4. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty that do not affect substantive rights and obligations of the Parties under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 3 of this Article. ¶5. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to terminate this Treaty if, in its view, further compliance with the Treaty will jeopardize the Party's supreme interests, including in the event of a quantitative and qualitative buildup in the capabilities of strategic missile defense systems. ¶6. A Party that has decided to terminate this Treaty shall inform the other Party of its decision through diplomatic channels at least three months prior to termination of this Treaty, specifying the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. ¶7. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date. Article XV This Treaty will be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Done at (BLANK) on (BLANK) in two copies in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic. For the Russian Federation For the United States of America President of the President of the Russian Federation United States of America -------------- BEGIN TRANSLATER'S NOTES : 1: The Russian verb translated here as "shall be assumed" in accordance with standard treaty usage, may also be translated as "are assumed." 2: The Russian term rendered here as "door" differs from the term for "silo door" used in the START Treaty. Our preliminary research indicates that the term used in this text does in fact refer to the silo door although further clarification is required. END NOTES -------------- End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS