START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000743 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): (U) U.S. NON-PAPER ON READER'S GUIDE TO CHANGES IN THE U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS, EXHIBITIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009 REF: GENEVA XXXX (SFO-GVA-IV-005) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-014. ¶2. (S) The U.S. Delegation provided the Russian Side a document containing the guide to the U.S.-proposed draft of the START Follow-on (SFO) Protocol on Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities during the morning plenary session on September 2, 2009 (REFTEL). The text of that guide follows in paragraph 3 below. ¶3. (S) Begin text: SFO-IV U.S. Non-Paper September 2, 2009 Reader's Guide to Changes in the U.S.-Proposed Draft of the START Follow-on Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities Introduction: - In drafting the Protocol on Inspections, Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities for the START Follow-on Treaty, the United States has been guided by the general rule that the Parties should strive to maintain as much of the information contained in the Inspection Protocol (IP) of the original START Treaty as seems appropriate. This reflects the fact that the U.S. and Russian Parties have been able to work very effectively in conducting inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring activities within the framework of the IP over the life of the START Treaty. - The United States has, however, made a series of changes to the draft version of the IP to the START Follow-on Treaty that reflect: 1) lessons learned during START implementation; 2) the U.S. judgment regarding certain types of inspections that it believes should be deleted under START Follow-on; and 3) the formulation of new procedures for START Follow-on necessitated by additions in the content of the START Follow-on Treaty. - The United States recommends the following types of inspections be deleted from the START Follow-on Treaty for the reasons cited with each: -- Baseline Data Inspection - This type, in the U.S. view, will not be required in light of the carry-over of much of the relevant data from START. New types of data can be confirmed at the initial data update inspections, which propose will continue to be conducted under the START Follow-on Treaty. -- New Facility Inspection - These inspections were very infrequently implemented under START and their purpose can be accomplished using the initial data update inspections at a newly notified facility. -- Suspect-Site Inspection - These inspections as well were infrequently used under START and, in our view, can be deleted. -- Post-Exercise Dispersal Inspection - This type of inspection was never implemented during START and believe that it can be deleted. -- Close-Out Inspection - The United States believes that these types of inspections can be deleted. If either Party has concerns about the possible conduct of activities for purposes believed inconsistent with the new Treaty at a facility which has been formally closed-out, that Party can exercise its right to check on these activities by conducting a Formerly Declared Facility Inspection, which has been retained. -- The Reentry Vehicle Inspection has been retained for ICBMs and SLBMs, but renamed the "Nuclear Warhead Inspection" to reflect its wider scope. Under the START Follow-on Treaty it will also be necessary to include confirming the number of nuclear armaments associated with deployed heavy bombers in addition to confirming the number of RVs on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition, in the U.S.-proposed draft Treaty and the IP, the United States proposes to combine the Nuclear Warhead Inspection and the Data Update Inspection for air bases of deployed heavy bombers into a single inspection which is entitled a "Nuclear Warhead Inspection." - In light of these recommended deletions, the United States proposes to retain, and in one case rename and combine, the following types of inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring activities: -- Data Update Inspection -- Reentry Vehicle Inspection (renamed the Nuclear Warhead Inspection) -- Conversion or Elimination Inspection -- Formerly Declared Facility Inspection -- Technical Characteristics Exhibition -- Distinguisability Exhibition -- Continuous Monitoring Activities Section I. General Obligations - There are no changes. Section II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members - An early exchange of lists of inspectors is not needed. Paragraph 1. The most recent list of inspectors and monitors exchanged under START should roll over between the two treaties, so an early exchange of these lists is not necessary. The language calling for an early exchange of lists, therefore, was deleted. Section III. Notifications - Makes minor changes to notifications to reflect current START practices. Paragraph 3. In START Follow-on, the notification of an intention to conduct a short-notice inspection shall be provided no less than 24 hours prior to the inspection, vice 16 hours under START. This puts the informal practice that has evolved in START into formal SFO language. Paragraph 4. Due to the reduction of the types of inspections conducted, for short-notice inspections, designation of inspection site and type of inspection will be provided from 4 to 24 hours after arrival at the POE, rather than several variants of times. Paragraphs 5, 6, 7. Tracks changes with reduced types of inspections. Section IV. Arrangements for Transportation -- Adds a section for the Ground Transportation Agreement to support continuous monitoring activities that was agreed within the JCIC via an exchange of letters on this subject. Title of Section. This was changed as a tracking change as it covers more than air transportation in SFO. Paragraph 1. Tracks changes; SFO is bilateral. Paragraph 5. Deletes reference to operational dispersal as this is no longer a type of inspection. Paragraph 8. Deletes references to Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as a tracking change that reflects a bilateral treaty. Paragraph 13. Tracking change from JCIC to BCC. Section B. The paragraphs about the Ground Transportation Agreement are connected with Perimeter Portal and Continuous Monitoring (PPCM),an insertion from the JCIC Exchange of Letters on this subject. Section V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry -- The "70 percent Rule" applies only to air bases for heavy bombers. -- Items of inspection have been updated to include nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, not just long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA). Paragraphs 3, 4, 12, 15, 16. Tracking changes to reflect a bilateral treaty and that the types of inspections have changed. Paragraph 17. This paragraph, known as the "70 percent rule," has been edited so that it applies only to air bases for deployed heavy bombers and is based on the number of airplanes present at the time of designation, not at any time during the first 20 hours. Section VI. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities -- The most significant change is that for nuclear warhead inspections at heavy bomber air bases where the focus is on the inspection of the associated nuclear armaments weapons storage area, and the item of inspection is the specified nuclear armaments. -- START Follow-on adds provisions for establishing a reference cylinder for inspection of heavy bomber nuclear armaments weapons storage areas based on the diameters and lengths of the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers. -- There is a 24-hour limit on the nuclear warhead inspection at air bases for deployed heavy bombers. Paragraph 3. Updates regarding the site boundaries depicted on site diagrams will be exchanged, which in SFO will be accomplished in accordance with MOU Annex J, and not by means of a separate agreement. Paragraph 14, 17. There are tracking changes that reflect changes in the types of inspections and the shift from JCIC to BCC. Paragraph 18. Allows for digital photography; Polaroid cameras will soon be unavailable. Paragraph 20. This paragraph updates the list of what are understood to be items of inspection. The most significant change is that for the inspection of the nuclear armaments weapons storage area at or directly associated with heavy bomber bases, the items of inspection are the specified nuclear armaments and no longer just the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM. Paragraph 23. SFO adds provisions for establishing a reference cylinder for the inspection of heavy bomber nuclear armaments weapons storage areas that is based on diameter and length of the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers. Paragraph 28. This is a tracking change to reflect changes in types of inspections to be conducted. Paragraph 31. The most significant addition to this paragraph, which concerns the duration of inspections, is to place a 24-hour limit on the nuclear warhead inspection at air bases for deployed heavy bombers. The paragraph is also updated to reflect changes in types of inspections. Paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37. These are tracking changes to reflect the changes in the types of inspections to be conducted. Section VII. Data Update Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty -- Air bases for deployed heavy bombers no longer are subject to data update inspections; the provisions checking on updated data are included in the nuclear warhead inspections conducted at air bases for heavy bombers. -- At silo ICBM bases, all silos that are empty but whose associated deployed ICBM is in the maintenance facility shall be subject to an empty launcher inspection. -- The provisions of the Tenth Agreed Statement have been incorporated into the Treaty, allowing conditional inspection of conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers. Paragraph 1. The maximum number of data update inspections to be conducted annually is reduced from 15 to 12. Since air bases for heavy bombers will not be inspectable pursuant to this Section, it would be appropriate to lower the allocation of data update inspections. Paragraphs 1, 2. This is a tracking change to reflect the changes in types of inspections. Previous Paragraph 2. This paragraph has been moved to the discussion of nuclear warhead inspection for air bases for heavy bombers due to the consolidation of the data update and the nuclear weapons inspections. Paragraph 3. Pre-inspection restrictions are updated to apply to the updated list of types of inspections. Paragraph 4. Provisions for baseline inspections have been removed. Paragraph 5. Provisions pursuant to limitations of non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers at maintenance facilities have been removed as they are no longer called for in Treaty Article IV. The provisions on briefing requirements regarding air bases for heavy bombers have been removed as a tracking change. The concept that submarines themselves are not subject to inspection, taken from Joint Statement 16, has been added to subparagraph 5 (c). Paragraph 8. While provisions pursuant to limitations of non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers at maintenance facilities have been removed since they are no longer relevant in Treaty Article IV, an inspector now may simply inspect each empty launcher that is "considered to contain" and whose deployed missile is located in the maintenance facility. Paragraph 9. For road-mobile launchers that have not returned to their re stricted area within 24 hours, it is now the inspection team's right to inspect them, rather than an option for the in-country escort to decide. Also, references to baseline and new facility inspections have been removed as a tracking change. Previous Paragraph 13 from START. Data updates for air bases for heavy bombers has been deleted; the relevant provisions are now included within the nuclear warhead inspection at air bases for heavy bombers. Paragraph 11. The concept that submarines themselves are not subject to inspection, taken from Joint Statement 16, has been added. Paragraph 12. While air bases for heavy bombers are no longer subject to separate data update inspections, training facilities for heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy bombers and, in some instances, conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers are still subject to data update inspections. Provisions are included for inspections of these facilities in this new paragraph. Provisions from the Tenth Agreed Statement on the conditionally inspecting conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers are also included. Former Section VIII from START - Suspect Site Inspections -- This section has been deleted since this type of inspection is not included in START Follow-on. Section VIII. Nuclear Warhead Inspections of Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs Conducted Pursuant to Subparagraph 3(a) of Article XI of the Treaty -- The full disclosure of the number of nuclear- armed reentry vehicles loaded on each launcher at the ICBM or SLBM base will be provided during the pre-inspection briefing. -- Two ICBMs or SLBMs may be selected during each nuclear warhead inspection, provided that the two missiles/launchers are located in the same silo launch group, same re stricted area, or same ballistic missile submarine. Paragraph 1. This type of inspection is now called a "nuclear warhead inspection" (NWI) rather than an RVOSI. There is no inspection-free grace period as the SFO Treaty enters into force; bases will be subject to an NWI immediately upon entry into force of the new Treaty. Paragraph 2. The purpose of the NWI is to confirm the number of nuclear warheads declared for the selected missile, rather than to confirm that the missile holds no more than an attributed number. Paragraph 3. One of the most significant changes is that two ICBMs or SLBMs in their launchers instead of one, as currently provided under START, may be selected for inspection during an NWI. Paragraph 8. Inspection teams will now receive full load-out information for each individual launcher on the ICBM or SLBM base during the pre-inspection briefing. Paragraph 9. There is no separate provision regarding an "empty launcher" inspection. With full load-out information provided, the inspecting Party may choose an empty launcher as one of its two launchers to inspect, if it so desires. Paragraphs 10, 11, 12. In order to minimize disruption of base operations, if the inspecting Party chooses to designate two missiles in launchers for inspection, these two missiles/launchers must be located within the same silo launch group, the same re stricted area for mobile ICBMs, or the same submarine. Paragraph 17. If a launcher designated for inspection is declared not to contain a missile, but upon arrival of inspectors is found to actually contain a missile, the inspection team shall have the right to perform an NWI inspection. Unlike START, this event will trigger the inclusion of an ambiguity in the official inspection report. Section IX. Nuclear Warhead Inspections of Deployed Heavy Bombers and Nuclear Armaments Weapons Storage Areas Associated with Air Bases for Deployed Heavy Bombers Conducted Pursuant to Subparagraph 3(b) of Article XI of the Treaty -- Section IX is a newly created section laying out the activities involved in the conduct of a Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) of deployed heavy bombers and nuclear armament weapons storage areas associated with air bases for deployed heavy bombers. -- The section incorporates language from Section VII of the START Inspection Protocol relating to the inspection of heavy bombers during a data update inspection. Paragraph 1. This paragraph uses standard START language to establish a limit of four NWI inspections at air bases for deployed heavy bombers during a given year. Paragraph 2. This paragraph uses unchanged language from Section VII of the START Inspection Protocol to provide for temporary exemptions from inspection for air bases during specific circumstances. Paragraph 3. This paragraph uses standard START language from paragraph 5 of Section VII to the START Inspection Protocol to state the updated purpose of NWI inspections at air bases for deployed heavy bombers. Paragraph 4. This paragraph uses standard START language to limit the number of NWI inspections that can be conducted at any one time to one. Paragraph 5. This is a modified START paragraph describing pre-inspection restrictions for air bases and nuclear armaments weapons storage areas (NAWSA). The pre-inspection restriction concept remains unchanged from START. This paragraph applies such restrictions to the bombers as in START data update inspection and introduces similar restrictions regarding nuclear armaments for heavy bombers in the NAWSAs. Paragraph 6. This is a modified START paragraph describing information that must be provided during the pre-inspection brief. This information includes: - Numbers and locations of deployed heavy bombers (similar to data provided for START data update inspections at heavy bomber air bases). - Numbers and locations of the nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers. - Numbers and locations of the nuclear armaments in the NAWSA. Paragraph 7. This is a new paragraph using standard START language to allow the use of subgroups by the inspection team. Paragraph 8. This is a newly drafted paragraph employing START language that establishes inspector rights during NWI inspections at air bases. These include rights to: - Confirm the number of deployed heavy bombers, - Confirm the number of nuclear armaments loaded on such bombers, and - Confirm the number of nuclear armaments located in the NAWSA. As in START, this paragraph refers to Annex 4 of the Inspection Protocol for specific inspection procedures to be used during the NWI. Former Section X from START Post Dispersal Inspections -- No longer a type of inspection that will be conducted under START Follow-on. Section X Conversion or Elimination Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty -- Tracking changes have been made to align with changes in the updated Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The Conversion or Elimination Protocol will discussed at a later date. Section XI. Formerly Declared Facility Inspection Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty -- The list of formerly declared facilities resets upon entry into force of the START Follow-on Treaty. Paragraph 1. There will be no grace period associated with the possible conduct of formerly-declared facilities inspections following entry into force of the SFO Treaty. A Party may conduct this type of inspection immediately upon entry into force of the START Follow-on Treaty. The list of formerly-declared facilities will reset upon entry into force of START Follow-on. Former Section XII from START Close-Out Inspections -- No longer a type of inspection that will be conducted under START Follow-on. Section XII. Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty -- ICBMs and SLBMs previously exhibited under START will not need to be exhibited again under the START Follow-on Treaty. -- No provisions directed specifically for heavy ICBMs in the START Follow-on Treaty. Paragraph 1 (pg 48) ICBMs and SLBMs previously exhibited under START will not have to be exhibited again under the new treaty. Nuclear armaments for heavy bombers will be exhibited. Paragraph 3 (START) This paragraph has been deleted because there will be no "early exhibitions" under START Follow-on. Paragraph 11 (START) This paragraph has been deleted because no limits on heavy ICBMs have been carried over to START Follow-on. Section XIII. Distinguishability Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty -- Heavy bombers and ALCMs previously exhibited under START will not have to be exhibited again. -- Nuclear armaments for heavy bombers will be exhibited. Paragraph 1. Heavy bombers and ALCMs previously exhibited under START will not have to be exhibited again. Nuclear armaments for deployed heavy bombers will be exhibited. Tracking changes have been made to reflect that former heavy bombers will not be in SFO. Paragraph 2 (START) Paragraph deleted because there will be no baseline exhibitions; this is not a type of inspection in START Follow-on. Paragraph 5 (START) Paragraph deleted because there will be no early exhibitions as there were under START since they will not be needed. Paragraph 7. Tracking changes have been made to reflect that limits on former heavy bombers will not be included in SFO. Section XIV. Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty -- Engineering site surveys will not need to be conducted if previously conducted under START. There are minor tracking changes throughout the Section. Paragraph 9. Engineering site surveys will not need to be conducted if previously done under START. Section XV. Cancellation of Inspections -- Minor tracking changes to reflect the types of inspections included in START Follow-on. Section XVI. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring Reports -- Minor tracking changes to reflect the types of inspections included in START Follow-on. End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS