START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000742 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): (U) TAYLOR/KOSHELEV DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE JCIC SESSION BEFORE START TREATY EXPIRATION ON MARGINS OF SFO NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 3, 2009 REF: A. SECSTATE 87998 ¶B. SECSTATE 91521 ¶C. RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TEXT FOR A JCIC AGREEMENT PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK DATED JANUARY 26 2009 AND ASSOCIATED LETTERS ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND COST SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (E-MAILED TO WASHINGTON -- NO REPORT CABLE.) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-007. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 3, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva Participants: U.S. Russia Mr. Taylor Mr. Koshelev Mr. Johnston Mr. Malyugin -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Russian Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) Representative Koshelev requested a meeting with U.S. JCIC Representative Taylor on the margins of the Start Follow-on (SFO) negotiations in Geneva on September 3, 2009. Koshelev wanted to discuss the possibility for further work in the JCIC prior to its expiration in December 2009. Koshelev wanted to know whether it would be possible to finish the work on the pending agreement on close-out procedures for Votkinsk. Taylor used the opportunity to raise two possible issues for resolution/consideration by the Parties -- resolution on the MMIII RVOSI question and possible agreement on a final, close-out Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at Treaty expiration. ¶4. (S) Koshelev began the meeting in a frenzied state. Taylor commented, saying he could appreciate Koshelev's state, given the hectic pace of the week and the fact that Koshelev had to endure a day of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) discussions. Koshelev lamented that it was not so much the CFE discussions as it was the pressures back in Moscow. It was becoming more and more difficult to be away from Moscow, especially at the same time as his boss, Antonov. This was the reason he would not be coming back to Geneva for the opening week of negotiations later in September. He would be the only deputy in Antonov's directorate and, therefore, he would have to stay in Moscow to keep everything in order. He would be arriving on September 27. ¶5. (S) Turning to JCIC issues, Koshelev began by noting the U.S. response (REF A) to Ukraine's non-paper on its position in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty that Ukraine had delivered at the previous JCIC session in July ¶2009. Moscow appreciated very much the U.S. approach and, in fact, Koshelev believed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) would use many of the same points in their discussions with Ukraine. Ukrainian JCIC Representative Nykonenko would be arriving in Geneva on Friday, September 4, 2009, for bilateral discussions on expiration of the START Treaty. Koshelev said that he would like to get clarification on one point in the U.S. paper. Koshelev was having a difficult time explaining the phrase "the 'reset' of relations with Russia would not come at Ukraine's expense." This phrase had raised many questions within the MFA. It seemed as if the United States was offering much more than a reaffirmation of the security assurances contained in the Trilateral Statement and in the Budapest Memorandum. Koshelev fully understood that the United States and Ukraine had a bilateral relationship and that Vice President Biden's remarks in Kyiv were for political purposes. However, the questions Ukraine had raised were within the context of the START Treaty and Ukraine was a member of one side of the treaty with Russia. Therefore, it seemed strange that the United States would be approaching Ukraine differently from Russia in this context. In Russia's view, there should be nothing more than a reconfirmation of the Trilateral Statement and the Budapest Memorandum. Malyugin offered that many in the MFA had imagined a similar statement could be made for another state, such as Poland. Did the U.S. statement mean there was more to be offered? ¶6. (S) Taylor thanked Koshelev for sharing his concerns and said that he would inform Washington of the concerns raised. It was his personal view that because Ukraine had raised the question of assurances, coupled with the fact that the United States had been adamant that the follow-on negotiations with Russia would be bilateral, the United States wanted to assure Ukraine the U.S./Ukraine bilateral relationship would not suffer. -------------- RVOSI ISSUES -------------- ¶7. (S) Taylor turned to potential issues that could be raised at a JCIC for resolution citing the upcoming MMIII RVOSI demonstration. Taylor noted that the United States had received the previous day the Russian notification listing the observers from Russia and Ukraine that would be coming to the demonstration at Malstrom Air Force Base September 9-11 (REF B). Koshelev agreed saying that, just the week prior, Col Ryshkov had spoken with Koshelev saying that he had been working very hard to address U.S. concerns with the SS-27 RVOSI and that he hoped there would be some new approaches to this issue that could be demonstrated at the next SS-27 RVOSI. -------------- VOTKINSK CLOSE-OUT AGREEMENT -------------- ¶8. (S) Koshelev raised the issue of the Votkinsk agreement (REF C) asking if it would be possible to complete work on that agreement as time was quickly passing to get everything done prior to expiration of the Treaty. Taylor said that once he had authority to bring the document to the table again, he believed all that remained was to conform the document and prepare it for signing. In his conversations with the U.S. Delegation lawyer, Mr. Brown, it would take no more than a couple of days to complete the conforming. Koshelev said he appreciated this information and hoped that the Parties could move forward on the document, perhaps as soon as the first week of the next SFO session beginning September 21. Taylor said that it would all depend on whether Washington was ready to work on the document. -------------- FINAL-CLOSEOUT MOU -------------- ¶9. (S) Taylor next addressed the issue of a final-closeout MOU. Taylor explained that the Treaty did not provide for such, noting that the Treaty expired before the next six-month update would be submitted. Moreover, there was no authority to provide such an update after December 5, 2009. Taylor believed that it would be important to have a clear understanding of each Side's data at expiration of the START Treaty. The Parties could agree that MOU data, as of 0001 hours December 4, 2009, could be transmitted not later than 2400 hours on December 4, 2009. This would be important also to our work in the START Follow-on negotiations as the data would form the basis for our work on the SFO MOU. Koshelev said that this was an interesting proposal and that he would discuss this with his colleagues in Moscow. -------------- TIMING FOR JCIC IS THE QUESTION -------------- ¶10. (S) Taylor asked Koshelev what his thoughts were on timing for a JCIC session between now and December. Koshelev said that it would depend on when his delegation would be in Geneva for SFO negotiations. The Russian SFO Delegation would be limited to two weeks in Geneva at a time and then back to Moscow. Taylor offered that Koshelev had to be kidding. It would be impossible to complete work on a START Follow-on treaty with that kind of limited schedule. The Parties had only a little more than three months before START expired. Koshelev said that it was unfortunate but Antonov could not devote all his time to negotiation of this treaty. Koshelev had seen a transcript of the phone conversation between President Obama and President Medvedev where Obama said that the U.S. Negotiator would spend 100 percent of her time on the negotiation of the new treaty and Medvedev had offered the same commitment. Unfortunately, this had not filtered down to Antonov. It was extremely difficult for personnel in Antonov's department to be away. Either Antonov or one of his deputies had to be present in Moscow to keep things on track. This was why Koshelev would not be arriving in Geneva until September 27. ¶11. (S) Koshelev offered September 28-30 as possible dates for the JCIC. Taylor opined that his expectations for work on the SFO treaty would be very intense during this period and it would be difficult to focus attention on a JCIC session. He offered that it might be possible during mid-October during the ministerial. Koshelev said that he was concerned that a mid-October date could present problems with arranging to remove equipment and supplies from Votkinsk in a timely manner. Koshelev was also concerned about giving Ukraine a platform to stir things up with talk about joining the negotiations. Taylor offered that Ukraine's insistence on being a part of the negotiations should not be a surprise. The United States had been very clear that the negotiations for a START Follow-on treaty would be bilateral between the United States and Russia. Koshelev agreed, saying that Moscow was keen to end START on a positive note and did not want Ukraine to create problems. His view was that with the U.S. and Russian Representatives in Geneva, the Belarusian and Kazakhstani representatives to the UN in Geneva could be empowered to represent their governments in the meeting. He felt certain that Nykonenko would want to travel to Geneva. If the United States and Russia could conform the Votkinsk agreement during the first week of the SFO negotiations beginning September 21, the document could be ready for signature quickly. The session would not need to be more than a couple of days. -------------- ANOTHER APPROACH ON THE VOTKINSK AGREEMENT -------------- ¶12. (S) Taylor offered that the Votkinsk agreement did not have to be concluded in the JCIC. He had briefly discussed this with the Legal Advisor. The agreement could be concluded as an Executive Agreement between the United States and Russia. We would probably need to include Belarus in some form as the plan for transporting the equipment and supplies involved ground transportation through Belarus. Koshelev said that this was an interesting idea and that he would review this approach with his lawyers. It would be helpful if this could be done without the possibility of Ukraine's participation to prevent possible problems. This might all be unnecessary as Ukraine had spoken about calling for an extraordinary session of the JCIC and he expected he would know more after the meeting with Nykonenko on September ¶4. ¶13. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS