START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000741 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN QUESTIONS ON U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT REF: GENEVA 0735 (SFO-GVA-IV-001) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-003. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: September 1, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:20 p.m. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) Ambassador Antonov stated his expectation that the United States would provide answers to the Russian Delegation's questions from the previous day and repeatedly complained that the United States had not included in the U.S.-proposed text of the treaty Russian proposals that had been provided at previous sessions. He questioned whether the United States was retreating from the Joint Understanding that the Presidents had signed in July in Moscow. A/S Gottemoeller stressed that it was Russia's responsibility to provide their own positions. The United States was not responsible for drafting Russian language for the draft treaty. The United States had provided its proposal on August 24, 2009, and had not yet received any response to that proposal. Moreover, the United States was not retreating from what was agreed in the Joint Understanding. ¶4. (S) Gottemoeller offered an update on the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) review process. She said that the review was nearing completion and that, once that process was complete, Russia would be informed of the results of the review. The process should be completed by late September or early October of this year. Antonov said he did not understand the U.S. reluctance to include language in the draft treaty on the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense. He implored the U.S. Delegation members from the Pentagon, Joint Staff and Department of Energy for a rationale on why the United States was reluctant to accept a provision in the new treaty. Gottemoeller explained that the responsibility of this group was to develop a treaty to replace the START Treaty. That treaty would address strategic offensive arms. Strategic defense would be addressed in another forum. -------------- THE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT, BUT SUBSTANCE IS CRUCIAL -------------- ¶5. (S) Gottemoeller clarified her previous comments on the inclusion of Russian text in the U.S-proposed treaty text. She stated that, after careful reading of the U.S-proposed treaty text, there were several areas where Russian language was explicitly included. Those areas, where the United States had known where Russian text was to be placed in the treaty, the United States had included it in its U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT). She offered the preamble as an example where text reflecting the Russian position on the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense and ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration was included, in brackets. Furthermore, there was specific bracketed Russian text in Article XV, Paragraph 5, concerning qualitative improvements in missile defense systems. The U.S. Delegation had prepared two U.S.-proposed JDTs, one on preambular language, and one on final articles and provided them to the Russian Delegation at yesterday's meeting. Gottemoeller further stated that, although the Russians have provided other specific language, the United States did not know where to place it in the U.S-proposed treaty text. Again, she emphasized that the United States is ready to create q JDT when the Russian Side indicates where its proposed language should fit. Better yet, the United States would like to review a Russian-proposed text for the treaty and compare it with the U.S.-proposed text. ¶6. (S) Antonov followed with a dissertation on the many instances of U.S. unwillingness to consider Russian matters of principle. After a lengthy rant, Antonov finally agreed that the task at hand is to create a joint draft text. Gottemoeller underscored that it is not a matter of reflecting both Sides' text in brackets, that is symbolic and a procedural issue, but rather it is a matter of how to take mutual views into account and reflect it in joint draft text. ¶7. (S) Antonov addressed translation issues. He said that the specific Russian preamble proposals and additional paragraphs that were included in the Joint Understanding were not in the U.S-proposed treaty text. Specifically, the words "impact on strategic stability" which were included in the U.S.-proposed preamble in the section on strategic offensive and defensive arms were not present in the Joint Understanding. Antonov queried whether this was a fundamental change in the U.S. position. Gottemoeller confirmed that it was not a change in the U.S. position and had nothing to do with the accuracy of the translation. -------------- AND ON TO MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she had spent time briefing the U.S. Senate recently on why the language on the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense was in the text of the Joint Understanding. She noted that the signing of the Joint Understanding by President Obama and President Medvedev was continuing a long-standing position first recognized by U.S. President Nixon in 1972 and, therefore, the Joint Understanding is not breaking any new ground. Gottemoeller underscored that both Presidents agreed that the new treaty would be about strategic offensive arms; meanwhile, the United States and Russia have begun a separate process to address defensive systems with the Joint Threat Assessment. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller reported that the Ballistic Missile Defense Review is moving along a timeline that President Obama mentioned to President Medvedev during the Moscow Summit. The review will be completed very shortly and President Obama plans to discuss in early Fall both the process and results. ¶10. (S) Antonov again spoke at length on the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense. He concluded his statement by reiterating that the Russians could not agree to a treaty which did not include this point, adding he could not understand the U.S. problem with accepting the Russian proposal. The Russian Side reacted with considerable surprise when Gottemoeller explained that the Russian insistence on freezing missile defense levels was interpreted by the United States as a limit. The Russian Delegation remarked that it was meant only as a statement of fact, not a limit. The Russian Side pointed to their proposal for Treaty Article XV where either Party could invoke the supreme withdrawal clause should there be a qualitative or quantitative increase in missile defense capability from the time of the signing of the treaty. Both Sides agreed that they had interpreted the language differently. ¶11. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S. Non-paper on Concepts Behind U.S.-Proposed Treaty, dated August 31, 2009. ¶12. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick LtCol Comeau Mr. Dunn Ms. Eccles Mr. Elliott Mrs. Friedt Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Dr. Warner Mrs Zdravecky Ms. Gross (Int) Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Gen (Ret) Buzhinskiy Col Ilin Ms. Ivanova Col Izrazov Ms. Kotkova Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov Mr. Leontiev Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin MGen Orlov Col Pischulov Mr. Rudenko Mr. Semin Mr. Shevchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Tarasov Mr. Vasiliev Gen Venevtsev Mr. Vorontsov Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶13. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS