START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000738 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV): (U) RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIR ON CESSATION OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING AT VOTKINSK Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-012. ¶2. (U) At paragraph 3 below is the text of the official translation of the Russian Aide-Memoir on cessation of continuous monitoring at Votkinsk that was provided to the U.S. Delegation on August 31, 2009. ¶3. (S) Begin text: Official Translation CONFIDENTIAL To be Turned over to the U.S. Side Paper of the Russian Side August 31, 2009 On the Issue of Completion of U.S. Inspection Activities at the Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk (Aide-Memoire) The U.S. side's latest official papers on the issue of completion of U.S. inspection activities at the production facility at Votkinsk and the U.S. Department of State's reaction to the relevant demarche from the Ambassador of the Russian Federation in Washington show that our U.S. partners refuse to understand the logic of the Russian side's actions, which is in strict accord with the provisions of the START Treaty. We are perplexed and seriously concerned by the substance of the non-paper of August 14, 2009, entitled "U.S. Views Regarding the Expiration of the START Treaty and Perimeter Portal Continuous Monitoring at the Production Facility (sic) at Votkinsk." Above all, we cannot regard it as an official response to our Note No. 5405 of June 16, 2009, either in form or in content. The Russian side has not questioned and is not questioning the U.S. side's right "to carry out its full START Treaty rights with respect to PPCM at Votkinsk until the expiration of the START Treaty on December 5, 2009." At the same time, the U.S. side has also never denied that after 2400 hours on December 4 of this year there will be no legal grounds for the presence of the U.S. verification mission on the territory of the Russian Federation. Therefore, in accordance with the existing practice of completing continuous (monitoring) inspection activities under the INF Treaty, preparation of the relevant package of documents governing the procedure for completion of U.S. verification activities in Russia was initiated as far back as a year ago. In this connection, in a spirit of good will the Russian side expressed its willingness to provide the United States of America with the necessary assistance in ensuring the calm, orderly, and respectful withdrawal of its personnel and property from Votkinsk. However, it would seem that the U.S. side is not interested in this. The Russian Federation's position on the U.S. verification mission at Votkinsk is utterly transparent and consistent. The issue of the U.S. continuous inspection presence at the Votkinsk plant is not and will not be a subject of negotiations in the context of working out the new treaty on strategic offensive arms. This principled decision by the Russian side is not subject to discussion and, thus, there are no grounds for raising the question of "preservation in a caretaker status" of the U.S. continuous monitoring facility at Votkinsk "until such time as inspection activity (sic) is reestablished." We believe that at present the discussion can involve only the time frame for signing the drafts, which were agreed upon earlier, of the Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation and settlement of accounts. In this connection, we reaffirm our proposal, which was transmitted to the U.S. State Department through Russian Ambassador S.I. Kislyak, to complete this process during the upcoming round of the negotiations on strategic offensive arms in Geneva on August 31-September 3, 2009. We would again urge the U.S. side to comply with its obligations under the START Treaty and begin as soon as possible taking practical steps to complete its continuous presence at Votkinsk so as to ensure that both equipment belonging to the U.S. and U.S. personnel are removed from the territory of the Russian Federation by December 5. We look forward to an early response from the U.S. End text. ¶4. (U) Gottemoeller sends. GRIFFITHS