GEORGIA TALKS ROUND 6: MORE CIVIL; MINOR PROGRESS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 GENEVA 000592 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019 TAGS: GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS SUBJECT: GEORGIA TALKS ROUND 6: MORE CIVIL; MINOR PROGRESS; SOUTH OSSETIANS STILL MAJOR OBSTACLE REF: A. A) GENEVA 409 ¶B. B) GENEVA 494 Classified By: Peter Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: The tone in the sixth round of the Geneva Talks on Georgia was a distinct improvement over round five (reftels),with all participants (except the South Ossetians) being civil and many being constructive. The South Ossetians were the clear exception, sticking to unacceptable demands and insulting Georgia (as well as the U.S.). The Russians were selectively constructive, adopting a strategy of appearing conciliatory without really ceding ground. The Abkhaz were genuinely constructive throughout, as were the Georgians, who made consistent efforts to be respectful and accommodating to other speakers. In the end, both Working Groups had something to show for the session. In Working Group 1 (security),the Abkhaz de facto representatives agreed to an initial meeting of the Joint Incident and Response Mechanism for Abkhazia on July 14 in the sensitive Abkhaz town of Gali, (home to a large ethnic Georgian community). Working Group 2 (refugees and IDPs) announced agreement - very reluctant on South Ossetia,s part - to begin a joint assessment of water rehabilitation needs. There was considerable discussion of non-use of force (NUF) agreements, with the South Ossetians tabling a direct NUF agreement with Georgia and Georgia countering with a proposal for a new bilateral NUF with Russia. In the end, the co-chairs issued an upbeat press release about the overall session, noting the constructive tone, areas of agreement and plans to hold round seven on September 17. In adopting its generally more constructive approach, the Russian delegation appeared to want to avoid both the isolation it felt in the Security Council on the UNOMIG resolution and any blame for further undermining international community engagement on Georgia. End Summary and Comment. -------------- Working Group 1 - Security -------------- ¶2. (SBU) All sides, including the South Ossetians, agreed that the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) are useful and important and should continue to function. The Abkhaz de facto rep expressed a readiness for the IPRM in Abkhazia to begin operations in Gali, a sensitive town in southern Abkhazia that is home to Abkhazia,s Georgian minority, and to convene the first meeting on July 14. The Abkhaz rep also confirmed a willingness, despite the loss of UNOMIG, to allow both the EUMM and UN to participate in the IPRM, thereby clearing the way for the IPRM to emerge as a vehicle to secure the UN,s return to Abkhazia, without a UNSC mandate. ¶3. (SBU) In contrast, South Ossetian de facto "Foreign Minister" Chochiyev set conditions for convening the IPRM to deal with South Ossetia: chairmanship should include Georgia and South Ossetia (to secure implicit recognition of South Ossetia,s independence); the fate of three South Ossetians who disappeared in October 2008 must be clarified; and Georgia must provide a written guarantee that it will not use force against South Ossetia. (Comment: this was a new condition. End comment.) On the chairmanship, South Ossetia suggested it rotate between Georgia and South Ossetia. Georgia rejected this, calling for continuation of the current arrangement of EUMM and OSCE jointly facilitating (not chairing) the sessions. South Ossetia rejected this. On the disappearances, Georgia repeated an offer to allow South Ossetians to visit sites in Georgian-controlled territory to investigate, with the proviso that Georgia be allowed to do the same in South Ossetia. South Ossetia rejected this proposal. Georgia expressed a willingness to hold the next JIPRMs for South Ossetia in Ergneti and Dvani (a concession) and even Russia intervened and tried to walk South Ossetia back a bit from its conditions, but to no avail. In a later discussion of the press release with co-chairs, South Ossetia insisted that there was no agreement on when the South Ossetian IPRM might meet again. South Ossetian representatives also refuse to allow the IPRM to convene on South Ossetian territory. ¶4. (SBU) There was much discussion about non-use of force (NUF) agreements. South Ossetia tabled a draft text for bilateral NUF agreements between Georgia on the one side and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, which would secure implicit recognition of the independence of both separatist regions. Russia supported this, having made a similar proposal during round five of the Geneva talks. Georgia GENEVA 00000592 002 OF 003 countered that it had already made a binding commitment to the NUF in the September 12 ceasefire agreement and quoted a Russian statement acknowledging that Georgia had made such a commitment. Georgia pointed out that Russian President Medvedev had included the "presidents" of Abkhazia and south Ossetia as signatories at the September 12 signing ceremony. While Georgia did not recognize them as included in the agreement, it appeared that Russia did and should therefore consider them covered by the NUF element of the September 12 agreement. Finally, Georgia expressed a willingness to make another written commitment to Russia on NUF, if that would reassure all sides, and distributed a draft text. ¶5. (SBU) EUR DAS Bryza expressed support for NUF agreements in general, but agreed that Georgian had already made such a commitment in the September 12 agreement. He stressed that the US would hold Georgia to that commitment. When South Ossetia responded that Georgian assurances were worthless, since there had been an NUF agreement in force before the conflict last year, Bryza noted that it had been South Ossetia and Russia who had refused to increase transparency in the conflict zone in the years leading up to last summer, when the U.S. and our Euro-Atlantic partners repeatedly pressed for more OSCE military observers. He stressed that Georgia had legitimate security concerns, citing the ongoing large-scale Kavkaz-2009 Russian exercise and aggressive Russian military deployments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (including artillery at Akhalgori within firing range of Tbilisi). This would seem to support the need for a reaffirmation of the Russia-Georgia NUF agreement. Russia responded that Kavkaz-2009 was indeed large, as it was necessary to make a show of force as a deterrent to any further Georgian aggression. In the end, there was general agreement that the NUG topic deserved further attention in future rounds. -------------- Working Group 2 - Refugees and IDPs -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The co-chairs of Working Group 2 had planned to focus discussions on the five concept papers on displacement-related themes (e.g. housing, legal status, water) distributed by the co-chairs following round 5, hoping to review only the practical recommendations to avoid polemics. Instead, the South Ossetians presented a three-page paper focusing exclusively on "unacceptable" language (references to the status of territory, the use of Georgian geographic names, etc.) used throughout the concept papers. South Ossetia concluded that the papers were otherwise not worthy of comment. The Russian rep was more circuitous in his undermining of the concept papers. He began by saying that one could not delve into the details of practical problems on the ground without first addressing the primordial issues of security and trust and called for a "comprehensive approach" to humanitarian issues. He went on, however, to present a lengthy Russian alternative paper (text only in Russian) on displacement-related issues that, at least according to his oral presentation, had considerable overlap with the issues in the co-chairs, concept papers. ¶7. (SBU) Given this overlap, the co-chairs attempted to steer the discussion back to the recommendations from the concept papers. The Russians and South Ossetians consistently countered that the concept papers were an unacceptable basis for discussion, with the Russians continuing to push for a discussion of fundamental security issues and the South Ossetians raising the case of the three missing South Ossetians (para 3). (Comment: While unhelpful, the interventions by the Russians and South Ossetians remained civil in tone. End comment.) The Chairs and the U.S. countered that those were matters for Working Group 1 and that the remit of Working Group 2 was to address practical humanitarian issues in an un-politicized way. ¶8. (SBU) With the clock ticking down, the co-chairs moved quickly through the topics discussed in concept papers, without reference to specific recommendations. The OSCE rep briefed on progress made in on water issues, since Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia had named technical experts for discussions since round 5. The OSCE called for agreement to move forward with a needs assessment for the rehabilitation of both drinking and agricultural water infrastructure, which will for the baseline for expert-level discussions. To proceed, all parties must send a letter to the OSCE Chair (Greece) stating their support for the needs assessment. South Ossetia initially balked at sending such a letter, but after much prodding gave in. This, in the end, was the only GENEVA 00000592 003 OF 003 deliverable for Working Group 2. The co-chairs promised to take a look at the new Russian issues paper and see what they could salvage from the concept papers. They will circulate some form of new issues paper in the coming weeks. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) While Geneva VI lacked dramatic breakthroughs, the agreement of de-facto Abkhaz authorities to convene the IPRM on Abkhaz territory (and particularly, in Gali, where ethnic Georgians complain of human rights abuses),marked an important step forward. This step clears the way for an informal agreement reached by UNSYG Special Rep Verbeke, Russian Deputy Minister Karasin, Abkhaz de-facto authorities, and DAS Bryza, to use the IPRM as a platform allowing the UN to return to Abkhazia in a quiet, status-neutral way. The general tone of the discussions was improved compared to the vitriol and theatrics of round five; except for early salvos by Russia and South Ossetia in WG1 questioning the continued utility of the Geneva talks - easily beaten back by the US and others - it appeared that all parties are willing to stick with the forum for now. EU Special Rep Morel and UN Special Rep Verbeke believed the non-confrontational, more constructive approach of both Russian and Abkhaz participants reflected their surprise at being isolated by Msocow,s decision to veto UNOMIG,s technical rollover in the UNSC. The Russian delegation in Geneva appeared to want to avoid a repeat performance and/or being perceived as further undermining international community engagement on Georgia. GRIFFITHS