START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000520 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN FEDERATION-HOSTED LUNCH, JUNE 22, 2009 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-002. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 22, 2009 Time: 1:30 - 3:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) The Russian Delegation hosted a lunch on June 22, 2009, at the Russian Mission. U.S. Delegation members engaged members of the Russian Delegation in discussions on a variety of topics pertaining to the START Follow-on negotiations that included: Russian President Medvedev's Amsterdam Statement of June 20, 2009, issues associated with the Joint Understanding, confusion of the Russian Delegation regarding how the Russian-proposed numerical limits were derived, and differentiating between nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. The general impression of the U.S. Delegation was that the Russian Delegates were less formal than on other occasions and were not reluctant to engage on substantive issues, indeed they sought it out. -------------- PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S AMSTERDAM SPEECH -------------- ¶4. (S) Gottemoeller and Antonov discussed the statement made by Russian President Medvedev in Amsterdam on the previous Saturday, June 20, 2009. Antonov said that he had written the statement as an attempt to begin solidifying the Russian position and to make several points very clear: (1) the Russian President has a positive assessment of the negotiators' work (which was especially important for Antonov); (2) the Presidents gave us instructions to finish by the end of the year, and we should do so (the most important point in the statement to Antonov); and (3) we should achieve effectively verifiable, realistic reductions, and the reductions in strategic delivery vehicles should be a "significant factor" below those in the START Treaty. He said he realized that there were differences between the U.S. and Russian positions on reductions and how to get out of this situation would be a major question for the negotiators. Antonov emphasized that he was serious about the negotiations and wanted them to succeed. -------------- ISSUES WITH THE JOINT UNDERSTANDING -------------- ¶5. (S) Antonov told Gottemoeller that the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was starting to slow-roll the negotiations. Gottemoeller said that reinforced hints she had gotten during the June 15-16 meetings in Moscow. ¶6. (S) Malyugin told Siemon and Buttrick that, since the previous evening (June 21),the Russian Delegation had been working on six different drafts of the Joint Understanding. In fact, Antonov had been changing the language of the Joint Understanding at the table while he was presenting it to the U.S. Delegation. He said that only Antonov's approval of the Joint Understanding was required. Malyugin relayed that part of the problem associated with the Russian-proposed draft was based on the MOD's concern with counting rules. He said that the U.S. Delegation had asked a very good question regarding the issue of counting rules based on "attribution." Russia was not proposing the START-like counting rules of "attributing" a certain number of warheads to each system, but was proposing the Moscow Treaty rules of associating strategic nuclear warheads. He said the Russian Delegation had not realized that the term "attribution" meant START counting rules to the U.S. Side. Malyugin also said that there was flexibility with regard to how the United States and Russia should describe the inter-relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems in the START Follow-on Treaty. ¶7. (S) Malyugin told Buttrick that the Russian-proposed version of limitations on locating strategic offensive arms outside national territory was a "basing" issue, not a "locational" issue. Buttrick asked if Russia was proposing the START language regarding basing strategic offensive arms outside national territory, Malyugin said that was what was intended by Russia's language in the paragraph contained in the Joint Understanding. Buttrick confirmed with Malyugin that Russia's proposal would allow for temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory with notifications as permitted under START. ¶8. (S) Belyakov asked Elliot for clarification regarding the meaning of specified locations for warheads "associated with" bomber bases. Elliott explained the U.S. concept that if one Side acknowledges that it has strategic heavy bombers, then it was logical that they must also acknowledge the need to store nuclear warheads for those bombers and that they must also specify the associated storage area in which the nuclear warheads were stored, to provide for verification. The only other alternative was to declare and verify that the strategic heavy bombers were no longer equipped for nuclear delivery. ¶9. (S) Referring to the Russian desire to remove the commitment to promptly initiate negotiations toward concluding a subsequent treaty with further reductions, Koshelev told Ries that, with such low numbers of delivery vehicles that will exist after the START Follow-on Treaty, Russia was wondering when the United States thought other countries should be brought into any negotiations For example, the Chinese probably have 300 delivery platforms, which was close to the 500 number the Russians were proposing. ¶10. (S) Luchaninov told Brown that the Russian Delegation had been quite surprised, although favorably so, at the positive reaction that Gottemoeller had conveyed during the meeting earlier in the day concerning the contents of the Russian draft Joint Understanding. -------------- WHAT'S BEHIND THE RUSSIAN NUMBERS? -------------- ¶11. (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that he did not know the origin of the 500 delivery vehicle number or the 1675 warhead number that Russia had proposed for the new treaty. He said that the Russian Delegation had only been informed that those would be the numbers proposed. ¶12. (S) Venevtsev informed Trout and Couch that he did not know the method of counting used to develop the Russian proposal to limit delivery vehicles to 500 and warheads to 1675, but rhetorically asked, "Isn't 1675 less than the Moscow Treaty?" He then grinned and asked, "Isn't the 500 delivery vehicle number a nice round number?" ¶13. (S) Siemon and Buttrick explained to Venevtsev that the reason the U.S.-proposed number of 1100 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) was higher than the Russian number of 500 SNDVs was due to how the United States structured and deployed its current strategic forces. Siemon asked Venevtsev how he envisioned that the United States and Russia could narrow the gap between the U.S. and Russian SNDV numbers. Venevtsev stated that "arms control was not cheap. The U.S. will need to reduce the number of submarines and silos." ¶14. (S) Ryzhkov told Trout and Couch that SS-18 silos that did not have missiles deployed in them would not count toward the 500 delivery vehicle number since Russia proposed to only count delivery vehicles and not the launchers. When asked whether Russia could accept gravel put into silos and cuts of only heavy bomber fuselages as a means for removing those items from accountability, Ryzhkov replied that easier, less costly methods of elimination were needed and that such approaches could be considered. He opined that START had over fulfilled in the measures required to eliminate items. ¶15. (S) Ries asked Koshelev what he thought would be the most difficult part of the negotiation, to which he replied "counting rules." The Russians were very concerned about U.S. up-load capacity and would need to have confidence that the numbers reflected what the United States actually had. This would be difficult to get done quickly, and might mean that the new treaty would not be finished by the time START expires, which would necessitate a political statement. He added that he hoped working groups would be established as they would be needed to resolve tough problems. ¶16. (S) Trout asked Venevtsev whether there was enough time to complete the difficult tasks necessary to implement a new treaty by December 5, to which Venevtsev asked what difference it made since negotiations on the new treaty would continue regardless. When Trout noted that all verification measures would terminate without the START Treaty in force, Venevtsev said that would not be a problem. He did not believe either Party would move very fast to change the military situation. He noted that Warner kept telling him that many U.S. strategic force decisions would have to wait until after the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are announced. When Trout said in that case the START Treaty would be in the same condition as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Venevtsev strongly insisted that they were completely different. START had served its purpose, but CFE still had a purpose. -------------- DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS -------------- ¶17. (S) Venevtsev told Couch that there was "no such thing as a conventionally armed ballistic missile." ¶18. (S) Malyugin asked Buttrick and Siemon how the Sides could distinguish between a nuclear or conventional warhead being tested on a new ICBM. Siemon clarified that this issue was a problem that was still in the concept development phase and that the United States was still thinking through solutions to it. Siemon also acknowledged that the Sides could not even distinguish these differences with telemetry. When Malyugin asked how Russia could tell if a missile was nuclear or non-nuclear once it is launched, Buttrick suggested that perhaps some form of transparency could be developed within the context of the operations in the Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). Malyugin thought the idea of using the JDEC for confidence building might prove useful. He also said that a U.S. approach to counting conventional ICBMs and SLBMs within the SNDV limit would be a move in the right direction; however, not counting warheads under the warhead count was a problem for Russia. -------------- VISA PROBLEMS PREVENT NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON -------------- ¶19. (S) Buttrick and Siemon raised with Venevtsev the issue of continuing the dialogue between the U.S. and Russian Delegations to conclude agreement on the Joint Understanding for the Moscow Summit beyond June 24. Siemon asked about holding the meetings in Washington. Venevtsev quickly dismissed Washington as a venue because of problems associated with obtaining visas. He said that it normally takes members of the Russian Government over a month to get visas. He relayed that, during one of his trips to Washington, it took five weeks, and then it was returned to him with a multi-entry visa that was only good for a 3-day period. -------------- OTHER TIDBITS OF INTEREST -------------- ¶20. (S) Koshelev briefly commented to Ries on Iran. Russia, he said, had been careful in its relationship with Iran because it was concerned about the potential for Iran supporting Islamic extremist movements in Russia. That said, Russia was certainly concerned about Iranian nuclear ambitions and thought concerted action was the best way to address the problem. Russia did not favor additional economic sanctions because of a fear that Iran would retaliate by ceasing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Koshelev opined that we could not afford to have this happen since it was only via IAEA inspections that we knew details of Iranian nuclear programs. He added that Russia's commercial interests in Iran had diminished significantly but this was not true of certain European countries. ¶21. (S) Fortier spoke with Koshelev and Ryzhkov about liquid-propellant SLBM eliminations at Krasnoyarsk. Fortier recounted that the problem of eliminated SS-N-18 and SS-N-23 SLBM airframes not being displayed in the open, as required by START, was discussed and successfully resolved during past JCIC sessions. However, there were now indications that the problem may have started again. Ryzhkov thanked Fortier for bringing it to his attention and pledged to have his staff look into it. He believed there were new workers at the Krasnoyarsk plant who may not be aware of the Treaty-required procedures, but he would ensure that they were quickly made aware of them. Ryzhkov claimed that managers at the plant had been fired as a result of the previous incident. ¶22. (S) Venevtsev told Buttrick that Sergey Kashirin, recently from the Arms Control Office in the MFA and a regular attendee at the JCIC and the early START Follow-on sessions, was recently informed that he was being reassigned to the Russian Embassy in Armenia. He said that Kashirin was looking forward to the new assignment, and that he should be moving from Moscow some time this fall. ¶23. (S) Koshelev mentioned to Ries that the Russian Delegation was very grateful for U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller's recognition earlier that day of the Russian Day of Memory and Sorrow. The commemoration of the day when the Great Patriotic War began for the Soviet Union with the Nazi invasion and remembering the large number of human losses sustained during that war was important to Russia. ¶24. (U) Participants. U.S. Ms. Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Kron Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Ms. Gross (Int) Mr. French (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Belyakov Mr. Ilin Ms. Ivanova Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin Col Novikov Mr. Rudenko Col Ryzhkov Mr. Semin Mr. Smirnov Mr. Vasiliev Mr. Venevtsev Ms. Brokhovich (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) Mr. Gayduk (Int) ¶25. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA