START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000511 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-II): (U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 22, 2009 SESSION REF: A. STATE 60487 ¶B. MOSCOW 1347 ¶C. STATE 50910 ¶D. STATE 61832 Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-II-001. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 22, 2009 Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations initiated the third round of formal negotiations on the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty on June 22 in Geneva. The focus of the meeting was Russia's presentation of its proposed changes to the U.S. draft Joint Understanding for signature by the Presidents at the July 6-8 Summit in Moscow (REF A). Russia's main proposals were to: - Change "strategic nuclear forces" to "strategic offensive arms" throughout the text; - Limit strategic offensive arms to an aggregate of 500 strategic delivery vehicles and 1675 warheads; - Delete the U.S.-proposed counting rules, but specify that counting procedures would be included in the new Treaty; - Include a provision that each side would determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms; - Include a provision on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms; - Ban the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles; - Limit the deployment of strategic delivery vehicles to each country's national territory; and - Delete the U.S.-proposed statement regarding a commitment to initiate subsequent negotiations on a treaty to further reduce total nuclear weapon stockpiles. -------------- U.S. OPENING REMARKS -------------- ¶4. (S) Gottemoeller welcomed the Russian Delegation and acknowledged that June 22 was the Day of Sorrow and Remembrance, which marked the day Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union. She joined with the Russian Federation in remembering the Soviet citizens who lost their lives during the Second World War, and recognized the contributions made by the Soviet Union in defending against the Nazi invasion. She then made the following remarks: - Significant events had occurred since the START Follow-on meetings held on June 15 and 16 in Moscow. This included the declaration made by President Medvedev in Amsterdam on June 20, which was straightforward and provided a good basis for continued negotiations in Geneva. - In addition, as notified during the meetings in Moscow, Gottemoeller on June 18 provided an information briefing to Members of the U.S. Senate. She was joined by Dr. Jim Miller from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Dr. George Look from the White House, Rear Admiral Phil Davidson from the Joint Staff, Mr. Kurt Siemon from the Department of Energy, Ambassador Ken Brill, and Mr. Terryl Kron, who had participated in the START Follow-on negotiations previously. - It was clear that there was high-level Congressional interest in the START Follow-on negotiations, including from Republican Members of the Senate. Some Senators expressed concern that the negotiations were proceeding too quickly; others believed that they were proceeding too slowly. - During the briefing, Gottemoeller noted the bilateral and bipartisan roots of the current negotiations. These included the Joint Statement made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Sochi in April 2008, and the subsequent meeting of Presidents Bush and Medvedev in the summer of 2008. These bipartisan roots were important as they would facilitate ratification of the new treaty. - Regarding President Medvedev's statement in Amsterdam, there was hardly anything with which the United States could disagree. Therefore, the U.S. Delegation had high hope for progress during this phase of the negotiations. - Neither the Department of State nor the White House provided any public statement in response to President Medvedev's declaration. Instead, the United States was intent on listening to the additional information provided by the Russian Delegation and proceeding with confidential discussions. ¶5. (S) Gottemoeller noted that Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov would meet later during the week. (Begin note: This comment was made before it was known that the SecState would not be traveling. End note.) She hoped to be able to report substantive progress to them ahead of time. She then reviewed the agenda for the current round of negotiations, the objective of which was to agree to a Joint Understanding, ad-referendum-to-governments, for signature by the Presidents at the July 6-8 Summit. To reach that objective, she proposed the Russian Side provide its reaction to the U.S. draft Joint Understanding the morning of June 22 and then the U.S. Side would review the Russian proposal and return the morning of June 23 with a response. Finally, she stated that the U.S. Delegation would provide the U.S. response to the papers the Russian Federation provided during the May 19-20 negotiations in Moscow (REF B) as well as answers to questions the Russians had raised regarding the U.S. non-paper on "Elements of a START Follow-on Agreement" (REF C). -------------- RUSSIAN OPENING REMARKS, WITH FOCUS ON PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV'S JUNE 20 DECLARATION -------------- ¶6. (S) Antonov expressed appreciation for remembering the Soviet citizens who died during the Great Patriotic War, and added that history showed that the United States and Russia could win when they worked together. He added that if the two countries could agree on further reductions of strategic offensive arms, or efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, it would reflect a positive contribution for the future. The United States and Russia must do their best to obtain results that are acceptable to each other. ¶7. (S) Moving to the task at hand, Antonov agreed with the outline and objectives for the June 22-24 negotiations, and confirmed the importance of the Sochi declaration made by Presidents Bush and Putin, as well as the recent declaration made by President Medvedev, in providing a context for the current negotiations. He was pleased with the assessment Gottemoeller provided regarding President Medvedev's declaration and noted, in particular, that she had said there was "hardly anything" with which the United States could not agree. The President's declaration helped define the specific problems that required resolution with the United States, and was consistent with previous statements made concerning the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The President made the declaration proceeding from the Russian Federation's position as a nuclear weapons state and permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, mindful of Russia's commitments under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Antonov noted the positive assessment made by the President with regard to the START Follow-on negotiators, highlighting that the negotiations so far were substantive and constructive, and were off to a good start. Finally, the President reaffirmed the objective of completing a new treaty by the end of the year. Antonov made the following points. Begin points: - Negotiations showed that the United States and Russia had much in common. The constructive environment that existed would also help and must be preserved. - President Medvedev made clear that the new treaty must contain real and effectively verifiable reductions. The President also confirmed the approach agreed with President Obama to reduce warheads below Moscow Treaty levels. The Russian Federation was further prepared to reduce strategic delivery vehicles by a significant factor consistent with the provisions of the START Treaty. - President Medvedev's declaration showed Russia's seriousness with regard to future reductions, but also defined what the basis for further reductions must be. - Russia recalled the U.S. paper on "Elements of a START Follow-on Agreement" (REF C),as well as the information provided during the meetings in Moscow on June 15-16 (REF D), in which the United States referred to the START Follow-on agreement as a "bridge" or "transition" agreement to be followed by more radical reductions in the future. Russia did not consider the START Follow-on agreement to be a "bridge" but rather a long-term substantive agreement with milestones for reductions in strategic offensive arms. - The START Follow-on Treaty should reflect a significant step toward the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and the results of the negotiations should represent U.S. and Russian leadership in this regard. The START Follow-on Treaty should strengthen security and confirm to the world the U.S. and Russian commitment to their NPT Article VI obligations. The START Follow-on Treaty should serve as something the United States and Russia could point to when asked at the 2010 NPT Review Conference what they had done. - Another key point contained in President Medvedev's declaration was that Russia could not agree with U.S. ballistic missile defense plans, and that a START Follow-on agreement was only possible if the United States addressed Russia's concerns. The President highlighted that the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms needed to be reflected in the START Follow-on Treaty. The United States and Russia would not resolve Russian concerns on ballistic missile defense within the context of the START Follow-on negotiations; this would be done through other mechanisms. Again, however, the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms needed to be recognized within the context of the START Follow-on Treaty, and ballistic missile defense would impact the ability to make reductions in strategic offensive arms. - The U.S. paper provided in Moscow on June 15 (REF D) recognized the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and stipulated U.S. readiness to reflect this in the new treaty. This was a step in the right direction, but it was not enough to remove Russian concerns. - Russia had expressed its concerns about conventional strategic offensive arms, which posed a problem with regard to strategic stability. The Russian Federation sought a ban on non-nuclear strategic offensive arms. Transparency measures would not remove all of Russia's concerns. - Finally, the President was clear about limiting the deployment of strategic offensive arms to each country's national territory. The U.S. non-paper coincided with this view. End points. ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the additional insights with regard to President Medvedev's declaration, noting that they would help in the negotiations. She appreciated that President Medvedev had assessed the negotiations positively so far, and noted also his instructions to finish the work by the end of the year. Gottemoeller agreed that it could be done, although she noted it would be difficult. ¶9. (S) Gottemoeller drew attention to the portion of President Medvedev's declaration that stated reductions in strategic delivery vehicles should be several times below START levels. In this regard, it was important to be specific about counting rules for these reductions. ¶10. (S) Regarding Antonov's comment on the concept of a "bridge" agreement, Gottemoeller clarified that the START Follow-on Treaty would be an important, self-standing agreement that would govern the relationship between U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces for a significant period of time. It would represent a serious step toward the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. As discussed before, the United States believed that there should be a commitment to seek further reductions, though it might be discussions instead of formal negotiations on additional reductions. -------------- RUSSIAN-PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S. JOINT UNDERSTANDING -------------- ¶11. (S) Antonov began his review of the U.S. draft Joint Understanding (REF A) by stating that the draft Joint Understanding helped clarify the U.S. position. Russia did not understand, however, why the U.S. draft did not reflect the key concerns expressed by the Russian Federation. The fact that Russian concerns were not being addressed could mean the United States did not understand Russian concerns, in which case Russian negotiators needed to do a better job explaining Russian concerns. Alternatively, it could be that the United States did not want to listen. If this were the case the United States and Russia would not be able to reach an agreement. The Joint Understanding needed to reflect the position of the two Presidents, and should include language concerning: (1) the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms; (2) non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs; and (3) limitations restricting the deployment of strategic offensive arms to national territory. Regarding numbers, the Russian Federation proposed limiting strategic offensive arms to an aggregate of 500 strategic delivery vehicles and 1675 warheads associated with them. ¶12. (S) Before turning to specific changes, Antonov explained that the Russian Federation's approach to the Joint Understanding was to simplify the text because it would not be possible to resolve all of the U.S. and Russian differences on specific issues in time for the July Summit. He stated that, with regard to a commitment on additional future reductions, Russia did not support this idea. It would be premature without knowing the agreed limitations on strategic offensive arms that would be included in the START Follow-on; for example, additional "radical" reductions may not be appropriate immediately if the START Follow-on limited strategic delivery vehicles to 500 or less. Further, such a commitment could not be made without taking into account the nuclear forces of other countries. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Department reviewed the text and concluded that if the Joint Understanding stated that the United States and Russia would "initiate new negotiations," it incorrectly implied that we had not yet had any such negotiations, which could be viewed as inconsistent with our NPT Article VI commitment. Instead of including a commitment on additional reductions in the Joint Understanding, this idea could be pursued later, perhaps between the delegations' legal advisors, while the immediate focus remained on the START Follow-on Treaty. Antonov presented the following Russian-proposed changes to the U.S. draft Joint Understanding, noting that the Russian approach was to include, where appropriate, language that was consistent with the April 1 Joint Statement: - Opening paragraph: Change to "The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have decided on further reductions in and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on prompt conclusion of a new comprehensive and legally-binding agreement to replace the START Treaty, to include the following elements:" - Paragraph 1: Change to "Each Party will reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter their aggregate numbers of these arms do not exceed the agreed levels of 500 strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) and 1675 warheads associated with them." Delete subparagraphs A and B. - Paragraph 2: Delete in its entirety. The United States and Russia were not likely to agree on counting rules before the summit. Further, such detail was a technical matter and should not complicate important political statements. A reference to counting rules could be added to U.S.-proposed Paragraph 3. - Paragraph 3: Renumber as Paragraph 2 and change to "Provisions on counting rules, definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, adapted, simplified and made less costly in comparison with the START Treaty." - New Paragraph 3: "Each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms." - New Paragraph 4: "Provision on interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms." Antonov emphasized that this was drawn from President Medvedev's June 20 declaration, but that Russia did not anticipate that the Joint Understanding would solve the problem of ballistic missile defense. - New Paragraph 5: "Provision banning ICBMs and SLBMs in non-nuclear configurations." - New Paragraph 6: "Provision imposing restrictions on deployment of strategic offensive arms exclusively on each party's territory." - Paragraphs 4 and 5: Renumber as Paragraphs 7 and 8. - Paragraph 6: Renumber as Paragraph 9 and change "strategic nuclear forces" to "strategic offensive arms." - Retain unnumbered paragraph that stated "The two Presidents direct that the treaty be promptly negotiated so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries." - Delete unnumbered paragraph that referenced commitment to initiate negotiations on a subsequent treaty. - Retain remaining paragraph indicating date and location of joint signature. ¶13. (S) After requesting that certain proposed changes be repeated for clarification, Gottemoeller concluded the meeting by requesting the Russian-proposed changes in writing. Antonov replied they would be provided in the afternoon. -------------- RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JOINT UNDERSTANDING -------------- ¶14. (S) Below is the official translation of the Russian-proposed Joint Understanding. As Antonov suggested, when he agreed to provide the Russian-proposed text in writing, Russia's written document included some minor changes as compared with the version presented orally. None of these changes affected substantive points, however. Begin text: Official Translation CONFIDENTIAL To be Turned over to the U.S. Side Paper of the Russian Side June 22, 2009 JOINT UNDERSTANDING The President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America have decided on further reductions in and limitations of their nations' strategic offensive arms and on concluding at an early date a new legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty. The new treaty will contain the following elements: ¶1. A provision to the effect that each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms so that seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter the aggregate numbers of strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) do not exceed agreed levels of 500 and 1675 warheads associated with them. ¶2. Provisions on the counting procedure, definitions, data exchange, notifications, elimination, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures, adapted, simplified, and made less costly, as appropriate, in comparison to the START Treaty. ¶3. A provision to the effect that each Party will determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. ¶4. A provision regarding the interdependence ((Translator's Note: here the Russian text uses the word "vzaimozavisimost'" ("interdependence"),rather than "vzaimosvyaz'" ("relationship"),which was used in the June 20 Amsterdam declaration by President Medvedev and in other Russian documents)) of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. ¶5. A provision banning intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. ¶6. A provision on basing strategic offensive arms exclusively on the national territory of the Parties. ¶7. Establishment of an implementation body to resolve questions related to treaty implementation. ¶8. The provisions of the treaty will not apply to existing patterns of cooperation in the area of strategic offensive arms between a Party and a third state. ¶9. The duration of the treaty shall be established as a period of ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. The two Presidents direct their negotiators to work out the treaty at an early date so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries. Done at (City),this (date) day of (month),2009, in two originals, in the Russian and English languages. FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (President D.A. Medvedev) (President B. Obama) End text. ¶15. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Russian-proposed Joint Understanding, dated June 22, ¶2009. ¶16. (U) Participants: U.S. A/S Gottemoeller Amb Ries Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick Mr. Couch Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Mr. Trout Dr. Warner Mr. French (Int) Ms. Gross (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Koshelev Mr. Belyakov Mr. Ilin Mr. Luchaninov Mr. Malyugin Mr. Neshin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Smirnov Gen Venevtsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) ¶17. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA