JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE

S E C R E T GENEVA 000468 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON COURTLAND MISSILE ASSEMBLY FACILITY AND RS-24 NEW TYPE, JUNE 9, 2009 REF: A. SECSTATE 40874 (JCIC-DIP-02-002) PROVISIONS IN ADVANCE OF DATA ON THE LV-2 SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE ¶B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN CONCERNS REGARDING U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009 (E-MAILED FROM MOSCOW-NO REPORTING CABLE) ¶C. GENEVA 466 (JCIC-XXXIV-015) ¶D. STATE 58439 (JCIC-XXXIV-GUIDANCE 002) Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-012. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 10, 2009 Time: 10:30 - 11:30 A.M. Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the U.S. Mission on June 10, 2009, to discuss Russian concerns with the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility and the U.S. concerns associated with the Russian declaration of a prototype of a new type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). All Parties were represented. ¶4. (S) The Russian Delegation reiterated its position on Courtland as a production facility and planned to review the additional information provided this session by the U.S. Delegation (REF A). The U.S. Delegation stated U.S. concerns with Russia's prototype RS-24 ICBM and expressed hope that the Russian Delegation would soon provide additional information on its plans to test and deploy the prototype ICBM. The Russian Delegation assured the Parties that all Treaty obligations would be met when the testing and development of the prototype was complete. -------------- THEY ARE WHAT THEY WERE -------------- ¶5. (S) Koshelev opened the HOD Meeting and offered that the issue of the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility was first discussed at JCIC-XXXI. He thanked the U.S. Delegation for the additional document provided on April 23, 2009 (REF A), and the U.S. Delegation Paper containing a U.S. response to the Russian aide-memoir of March 10, 2009 (Ref B),that had been provided on June 9, 2009 (Ref C). He reviewed the points made in the Russian Federation aide-memoire from March 10, 2009. He noted that there had not been time for the Russian Delegation to analyze the paper provided the previous day by the U.S. Delegation. He noted that the United States had not yet responded to Russian questions; specifically, Russia still questioned the declaration of Courtland as a production facility, the definition of a target vehicle as a submarine launch ballistic missile (SLBM),and what to do if a target vehicle was encountered by Russian inspectors. ¶6. (S) First, Koshelev stated Courtland did not conform to the START Treaty definition of the term "production facility" and the activities as briefed were not consistent with paragraph (a) of the START definition for "production facility." ¶7. (S) Second, Koshelev explained that the Russian Federation did not think it was correct for a target vehicle incorporating a Trident I first stage SLBM to be considered a Trident I SLBM. He paraphrased paragraph 3(a) of Article III of the Treaty on the first stages of a particular type of SLBM. He repeated that a target vehicle was not a Trident I SLBM and there was no category for target vehicles. He continued that, if any missile with the first stage could be referred to as an SLBM of that type, there would be a conflict with confirmation of type in terms of technical characteristics. ¶8. (S) Lastly, Koshelev said there remained a question of what a Russian inspection team would do when encountering a target vehicle. He opined that the United States should have identified and provided inspection procedures to the other Parties. Koshelev asked the United States for further clarification. ¶9. (S) Taylor assured all Treaty Parties that the activities conducted at the Courtland Missile Assembly Facility were in compliance with Treaty requirements. He pointed out the related portions of the Treaty definition for "production facility" which states that "for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored and transported in stages are assembled." He reminded all Parties that the United States maintains, stores, and transports the Trident I SLBM in stages, so that when a Trident I SLBM first stage was encountered, it was considered to be a Trident I SLBM. ¶10. (S) Taylor described the activities at Courtland at which Trident I SLBM first stage motors were accountable as a Trident I SLBM and would undergo activities consistent with work done at production facilities, including stage assembly. He stated that Trident I SLBM first stages assembled at the Courtland Facility would be incorporated into launch vehicle-2 (LV-2) space launch vehicles and that these LV-2 would begin exiting the Courtland Facility in the near future. ¶11. (S) Taylor reiterated that the LV-2 would be accountable under the START Treaty as a Trident I SLBM; it was the Trident I SLBM first stage that was the item of accountability in accordance with START, Article III, paragraph 3(a). He quoted the Treaty and reminded the Parties of the Diplomatic Note (REF C) that provided the LV-2 technical information. Taylor concluded that an LV-2 target vehicle, if encountered by Russian inspectors, would be considered a Trident I SLBM first stage. ¶12. (S) Koshelev asked his Russian Delegation experts if they were satisfied with the U.S. response. Ryzhkov answered that they planned to study the document that was provided and comment in detail during the intersession. Taylor clarified with additional points and explained that it would be a similar situation if U.S. inspectors encountered a START or a START I space launch vehicle. Both space launch vehicles were SS-25s in terms of accountability, notifications, and other obligations of the Treaty. In similar fashion, when Russian inspectors encountered a Trident SLBM in a loading tube and requested that it be removed, they determined type of SLBM by viewing and measuring the first stage only. Ryzhkov asked whether telemetry would be provided for an LV-2 flight test and Taylor assured him that all Treaty obligations would be met and all Treaty notifications would be provided. -------------- WHEN, OH WHEN, WILL THE PROTOTYPE BE -------------- ¶13. (S) Taylor addressed the second agenda item, stating that issues associated with Russia's prototype of a new type of mobile ICBM (RS-24) were discussed extensively since JCIC-XXIX. He added that, although the Russian Federation had provided some information, Washington still had concerns with regard to the Russian Federation's plans for testing and deployment of the new prototype ICBM. Taylor noted that, during the last JCIC session, the United States provided a written copy of those concerns to be taken back to Moscow for consideration. Taylor cited statements in the Russian press by both the chief designer of the RS-24 ICBM and the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces indicating that the RS-24 ICBM would enter service by the end of 2009. He stated that the United States continued to await a response regarding the Russian Federation's plans for the testing and deployment of the RS-24 ICBM. ¶14. (S) Koshelev said he consulted with Russian missile and legal experts and wanted to stress that the RS-24 was still a prototype ICBM. He stated that the missile's final technical characteristics were not finalized. He indicated that, when the development of the prototype of the RS-24 was complete, the Russian Federation would provide all of the information required by the Treaty. Koshelev cautioned that the media should not be relied upon since some statements were made for political reasons and may not be based on fact. He reminded the Parties that he was the Russian Federation's authority and would provide the official report on this issue. He closed saying he would do his best to provide the information to help the United States understand, or as his foreign minister says, allay concerns. ¶15. (S) Shevtsov raised the point that Russia had many variants and asked whether there was a special name or index for the new type of missile under development. Koshelev said, again, that when the Russian Federation had the information they would provide it to all Parties, as required by the Treaty. ¶16. (S) On the margins of the meeting, Hanchett provided a U.S. Delegation paper to Ryzhkov containing the U.S. response (REF D) to the Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008 on Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM flight test on August 13, 2008, and two interpretive data sheets to correct interpretive data sheets that had errors. ¶17. (U) Documents exchanged. - U.S.: -- U.S. Delegation Paper from JCIC-XXXIV of June 9, 2009, U.S. Response to Russian Aide-Memoire of December 23, 2008, on Telemetric Information for the Minuteman III ICBM Flight Test on August 13, 2008. ¶18. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Taylor Mr. Beddoes Ms. Bosco Lt Col Comeau Mr. Couch Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Fortier Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston LT Lobner Mr. Smith Mr. Stein Mr. Vogel Ms. Gross (Int) BELARUS Mr. Ugorich Mr. Ponomarev KAZAKHSTAN Mr. Nurgozhayev RUSSIA Mr. Koshelev Mr. Bolotov Ms. Ivanova Mr. Kashirin Ms. Kotkova Mr. Petrov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Serov Mr. Shevtchenko Mr. Smirnov Mr. Vorontsov Col Zaytsev Mr. Dashko (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) UKRAINE Mr. Nykonenko MGen Fedotov Mr. Shevchenko Dr. Shevtsov ¶19. (U) Taylor sends. STORELLA