JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED

S E C R E T GENEVA 000467 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 TAGS: KACT PARM START JCIC INF US RS UP BO KZ SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) WORKING GROUP MEETING ON UPDATED PHOTOGRAPHS FOR THE SS-27 ROAD-MOBILE ICBM, SS-25 ELIMINATIONS AND SS-27 RVOSI, JUNE 9, 2009 Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-011. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 9, 2009 Time: 3:30 - 5:00 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) A Working Group (WG) meeting was held at the Russian Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss the U.S. request for updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM memorandum of understanding (MOU) photographs, SS-25 Elimination Procedures and SS-27 Reentry Vehicle On-site Inspection (RVOSI) procedures. All Parties were represented except Belarus. ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stated that current MOU photographs of the road-mobile SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister no longer corresponded to the configuration of these missiles as they currently exit the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility (VPMF). The United States requested updated photographs to assist monitors and inspectors in differentiating RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future. ¶5. (S) The Russian Delegation said that it had thoroughly examined the issue prior to arriving in Geneva and noted that SS-27 ICBMs leave the production facility in various configurations. Monitors could use the current MOU photographs in conjunction with measurement procedures to confirm the item of continuous monitoring. As such, Russia did not see the need to provide an updated MOU photograph. ¶6. (S) The U.S. Delegation acknowledged the Russian Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty, noting that 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire self-contained dispensing mechanisms (SCDMs),had been fully eliminated and are considered removed from accountability. The U.S. Delegation requested clarification as to when the Russian Federation intended to eliminate the remaining 109 SCDM casings declared eliminated by Russia prior to 2008. ¶7. (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it intended to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings; however, there is no set timeline as the eliminations could occur prior to or even after Treaty expiration. If any casings are eliminated prior to Treaty expiration the Parties would be notified in accordance with the Treaty. ¶8. (S) The Parties also discussed potential solutions to the shroud used by Russia during SS-27 RVOSIs which impedes U.S. inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 does not have more than one reentry vehicle. The United States posed a series of questions to better understand Russian concerns and drew from previously resolved RVOSI issues as examples of methods that could be used for potential resolution of the current issue. ¶9. (S) The Russian Delegation responded that it is prepared to work toward resolving the issue but if there was an easy solution it would have already been resolved. Ryzhkov stated that the SS-27 ICBM is a different system, and provides a different set of obstacles. The procedures that had been developed for SS-25 RVOSI were not applicable to SS-27 RVOSI. The Russian Delegation said it was not prepared to answer specific questions posed by the United States and requested that the U.S. Delegation provide its questions in writing. ¶10. (S) The Ukrainian Delegation supported a previous Russian argument that telemetric information from flight tests could be used to confirm that the SS-27 ICBM can only be equipped with one warhead and military experts would not want to deploy a system that had not been tested beyond its capabilities. The U.S. Delegation suggested that applying this logic would resolve Minuteman III issues as well, which seemed to result in a consensus to dismiss Ukraine's suggestion. -------------- WHAT'S THE BIG DEAL? SCDMS CAN'T FLY ON THEIR OWN -------------- ¶11. (S) Couch opened the WG Meeting on June 10, 2009, and said the United States would like to acknowledge the Russian Federation's cooperation in bringing its SS-25 ICBM elimination procedures into compliance with the Treaty. Since January 2008, 54 SS-25 ICBMs, including their entire self-contained dispensing mechanisms, had been fully eliminated. The United States concurred with the removal of these missiles from accountability. During JCIC-XXXIII, the United States asked the Russian Federation for clarification on whether the treaty-required elimination procedures would be applied to the 109 SS-25 ICBMs declared eliminated by Russia prior to 2008. ¶12. (S) Couch reminded the Russian Delegation that, in its JCIC-XXXIII Closing Plenary Statement, the Russian Federation said it intended to seek the possibility of eliminating the casings of the instrumentation compartments of the 109 SS-25 ICBMs in question. However, no progress had been made on this issue since that time. Couch said the United States continued to seek clarification as to when the Russian Federation intended to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings, and requested a timeline for those eliminations. ¶13. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia carried out requirements adopted in January 2008 in the spirit of goodwill by presenting these casings to U.S. inspectors during elimination inspections at Votkinsk. In response to the U.S. question, Ryzhkov declared to all Parties that the Russian Federation intends to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings belonging to missiles that Russia had already eliminated. Ryzhkov explained that there were delays in the dismantlement of these casings which are done outside of Votkinsk. The delivery of these items for elimination would occur at a later date and, if it occurred prior to expiration of START, then the Parties would be notified in accordance with the Treaty. ¶14. (S) Couch acknowledged that Russia said it planned to eliminate the remaining SCDM casings, but requested further information regarding the schedule. Ryzhkov responded that the Parties have already been notified and did not believe that the issue was as sensitive as it had been made out to be. Ryzhkov stated that a SCDM casing cannot fly by itself. ¶15. (S) Couch reiterated that the United States would like to know if the eliminations would occur within the framework of START or after the Treaty expires. Ryzhkov answered that a portion of the casings could be eliminated prior to START expiration and others after, but Russia is not looking to store them for future use. -------------- HOW MANY WAYS CAN I SAY "NO DEAL?" -------------- ¶16. (S) Couch said the U.S. Delegation previously informed the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of the SS-27 ICBM launch canister no longer corresponded to the configuration of these missiles as they currently exited VMPF and requested more updated MOU photographs to better assist U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future. However, updated MOU photographs have not yet been received and U.S. portal monitors continue to document differences in SS-27 launch canisters in inspection reports. The United States would like to know whether the Russian Federation would provide updated MOU photographs of the SS-27 ICBM launch canister. ¶17. (S) Ryzhkov responded that the Russian Federation had studied this issue in detail prior to arriving in Geneva and understood U.S. concerns. Ryzhkov stated that the Treaty provides two methods for confirming an item of continuous monitoring: viewing and measuring the dimensions. The results of measurements conducted by U.S. monitors corresponded to the data provided in the MOU for the declared type. Therefore, measurements allowed monitors to confirm that canisters contain an SS-27 ICBM. ¶18. (S) Ryzhkov said the Russian Federation had thoroughly reviewed comments made in U.S. monitoring reports noting the differences regarding the presence and absence of cables and boxes on the exterior portion of the missile canister. Ryzhkov noted that missiles leave the production facility in various configurations and that exterior components were not necessarily consistent features. It was the Russian Federation's opinion that using the current MOU photographs in conjunction with measurements provides sufficient information to confirm that the item of continuous monitoring is of the declared type. The Russian Delegation cited that all U.S. official monitoring reports had confirmed that the item of continuous monitoring was of the type declared and as such Russia does not see the need to provide an updated MOU photograph. ¶19. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the Russian Federation was not prepared to provide a photograph for all the various canister configurations. He showed a photograph of an SS-27 launch canister and highlighted potential differences in various configurations stating that such differences did not change the type of missile. Smirnov noted that these differences were not modifications, but only changes to configurations. Ryzhkov said that final assembly is carried out at bases for strategic offensive arms adding that SS-27 launch canisters have a common configuration once deployed and that U.S. inspectors could confirm this during data update inspections. Ryzhkov drew upon a previous analogy used to explain differences in confirming transporter-erector launchers. Ryzhkov said that, just because one Mercedes does not have an antenna for example, it does not change the type of vehicle; it is still a Mercedes. ¶20. (S) Couch responded to Ryzhkov's reference to viewing and measuring. He said monitors compared the item declared to the appropriate MOU photograph. Couch acknowledged the Russian Delegation's explanation, but reiterated that an updated MOU photograph may help to resolve the problem. Couch stated that it was the totality of differences that caused concern. He then spoke of the differences noted by U.S. portal monitors using the following points. Begin points: -- The United States would like to inform the Russian Federation of the following list of differences in SS-27 launch canisters that have been observed by portal monitors and documented in inspection reports: -- The pair of black cables on the forward end of the non-unique identifier (UID) side were missing. -- Two white cables running from and under the first box from the left on the forward end of the non-UID side and running lengthwise down the canister under the cable raceway were missing. -- The two large raceways visible on the non-UID side of the canister, toward the top of the canister, were separated by a gap roughly 2/3 down the canister toward the launch assist device in the MOU photographs. The gap was noticeably smaller on the inspected launch canister. -- Extending from the second box on the non-UID side were three large conduits not present in the MOU photographs. -- On top of the canister and running the length of the canister to a point above the UID, monitors observed a long narrow rectangular raceway over ten supporting boxes and then another long narrow rectangular raceway over nine additional supporting boxes with four cables attached to the forward end. -- The white cable running from the second box from the right on the forward end of the UID side to the launch assist device end of the UID side was missing. -- On the UID side extending from the first boxes forward of the launch assist device were 14 cables not visible in the MOU photographs. -- Just forward of the first box forward of the launch assist device were eight cables not visible in the MOU photographs. -- A new box was present just aft of the UID and is not visible in the MOU photographs. End points. ¶21. (S) Ryzhkov reiterated that the Russian Federation could not provide photographs for each potential launch canister configuration and a photograph with each component would not help either because the missile would still leave Votkinsk in various launch canister configurations. Ryzhkov stated that Russia understood that the issue may create an awkward situation for monitors but they are experienced enough to differentiate between systems. ¶22. (S) Fortier explained that one of the problems is that the only updated SS-27 road-mobile ICBM MOU photograph provided by the Russian Federation was that of the missile deployed on the launcher as opposed to a photograph of the SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister. This also created problems for U.S. inspectors confirming missile canisters at Plesetsk. (Begin note: The two photographs together provide views of opposing sides of the missile canister. End note.) ¶23. (S) Ryzhkov noted U.S. concerns and said he would take them back to Moscow for consideration. -------------- RUSSIA LETTING THE CLOCK RUN OUT -------------- ¶24. (S) Couch set the stage for the discussion on resolving U.S. concerns with SS-27 RVOSI procedures by proposing an open dialogue with the Russian Delegation to brainstorm potential solutions. He stated that the United States did not presume to tell Russia how to conduct an RVOSI, only to facilitate the process of resolving the issue. ¶25. (S) Couch said the United States believed that the responsibility for proposing solutions that would resolve U.S. concerns rested with the Russian Federation, not only because it was the obligation of the inspected Party not to hamper the inspecting Party in ascertaining that the front section contained no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type, but also because Russia, not the United States, understood the sensitivities involved with the SS-27 system. The United States repeats its readiness to work seriously, and in good faith, with Russia to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both Parties. The United States would be willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitive know-how exists on that system that has led to the use of overly large covers. ¶26. (S) Ryzhkov agreed to allow the U.S. Delegation to commence the meeting by asking questions. Fortier stated that the first issue is to understand the need for the oversized cover. During discussions on the SS-25 RVOSI issue, the Russian Delegation said that the large barrel-shaped cover was needed to protect sensitive know-how. Was this the case with the very large conically shaped cover currently being used during SS-27 RVOSIs? Ryzhkov responded that Russia never said that a large cover was needed to protect sensitive technology. The shape of the shroud depended on the design of the missile and this missile was different than others. Ryzhkov responded that he was not prepared to answer the question, Russia would need to talk with the missile's designer. Ryzhkov offered that the SS-25 RVOSI procedures that had been agreed on would not be applicable to the SS-27 RVOSI. Ryzhkov could only respond that the Russian Delegation was prepared to work the issue and requested that the United States provide its questions in writing to avoid confusion. ¶27. (S) Smith said that Russia had expressed concerns with the space beneath the Minuteman III (MM III) front section. If we were to compare the space beneath the MM III front section with the space under the SS-27 cover, we would find the space under the SS-27 cover to be much larger. With that in mind would it be possible to use a more conformal cover? During the SS-25 RVOSI demonstration, the Russian Federation used a conformal cover over the single reentry vehicle and then demonstrated the construction of the large barrel-shaped cover and showed how it was placed over the reentry vehicle. Was it possible to conduct a demonstration of the SS-27 front section using a similar conformal cover over the single reentry vehicle in order to show U.S. observers the relationship between the large cover and the single reentry vehicle, as well as the rationale for the use of the large cover? ¶28. (S) Ryzhkov responded that the deployed SS-27 ICBM road-mobile and silo configurations were designed before the missile entered into service, so it would be difficult to change the technical specifications. If it were easy to solve this problem, Russia would have resolved it already. As evidenced by the morning meeting on the MM III RVOSI issue, the U.S. Delegation had been studying the issue for quite a while and had potentially found a solution. (Begin note: Ryzhkov was attempting to bring the discussion to a close. End note.) ¶29. (S) Dunn said it was Russia that proposed to hold a WG session to discuss the issue further. The Russian Delegation indicated during the morning Heads of Delegation meeting that it had considered the issue further and had some suggestions or new information to provide. Dunn asked whether this was correct and, if so, was the Russian Delegation prepared to provide that information during this meeting? ¶30. (S) Ryzhkov replied that all people think alike, ask themselves the same questions and follow the same line of reasoning. This issue could be approached from various angles. Ryzhkov said one approach may involve changes to provisions governing the configurations of shrouds. He added that RVOSIs are sensitive and that we had to come to serious agreement. Russia began studying resolution to the SS-27 RVOSI issue long after the United States began its study of the MM III issue. Only in the final stage of the Treaty's life had we reached a possible settlement. Ryzhkov repeated that the Russian Federation understood U.S. concerns and would wait for its written questions on the matter. ¶31. (S) Fortier asked how an experienced Russian inspection team chief. such as Colonel Petrov, would deal with this situation during a reentry vehicle inspection when he peered down into a silo or looked at a road-mobile launcher and saw only a large teepee covering the entire opening of the launch canister where the front section was supposed to be, knowing that his job was to confirm that the front section contained no more reentry vehicles than the one warhead attributed to it. Ryzhkov referred to the Russian proposal to use the Karousel Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE). That proposal showed Russia was ready to resolve the issue in question unilaterally. Maybe, in the future, the Parties could explore such methods to improve inspection procedures. Ryzhkov opined that, on one hand, more sensitive means and measures could help in confirming the number of warheads and on the other hand avoid disclosing sensitivities. To answer the question, Petrov would need to use his arsenal of knowledge to fulfill his duties. ¶32. (S) Shevtsov supported a previous Russian argument that telemetric information from flight tests could be used to confirm that the number of reentry vehicles deployed on the SS-27 ICBM did not exceed the number of warheads attributed to it. The issue with the SS-27 is different than the issue with the Trident II, in that Trident II telemetry information identified more warhead releases than the number of warheads currently attributed to that system. The SS-27 ICBM flight test and telemetry information did not indicate releases of more than one warhead. Shevtsov asked whether a system would be operationally deployed without the appropriate flight tests. He opined that this question is the root of the issue. Military experts would not deploy a system that had not been tested beyond its capabilities. Shevtsov said the United States should pose this question to U.S. military experts. ¶33. (S) Fortier replied that, according to this logic, there would be no need to conduct the MM III demonstration. Shevtsov responded that the MM III is much like the Trident. Fortier responded that the SS-27 ICBM is similar to the RS-24 prototype ICBM, to which Shevtsov agreed. Smirnov also agreed. ¶34. (S) Stein said that both Parties understood the need to protect sensitive technologies and to conduct flight tests prior to deployment. He acknowledged that the conduct of RVOSIs for particular systems differs in practice. Stein noted that the Russian Federation had resolved issues associated with SS-25 and SS-18 ICBM RVOSIs and asked the Russian Delegation to consider adopting some of the concepts used to resolve those issues, such as a more conformal cover, in thinking about the SS-27 RVOSI issue. ¶35. (S) Ryzhkov replied that it took three JCIC sessions to think through the nuances and invent devices to resolve the SS-25 issue. However, the SS-27 ICBM issue is more complex. The procedures used for the SS-25 ICBM RVOSI issue could not be used to resolve the SS-27 ICBM RVOSI issue. ¶36. (S) The Russians agreed that it is their responsibility to propose a solution to the problem. Smith returned to his earlier question and asked if Ryzhkov's response implied that a more conformal cover could not be used. Ryzhkov responded that he could not answer that question, but would get back to the U.S. on it. ¶37. (S) Couch concluded the discussion stating that over the years the JCIC had a successful track record of resolving RVOSI issues, such as the SS-25, SS-18 and Trident II, and the United States was working hard to reach resolution of the MM III issue. The United States only asked that the Russian Delegation take the next step in resolving the SS-27 issue. ¶38. (U) Documents exchanged. None ¶39. (U) Participants: U.S. Mr. Couch Mr. Beddoes Lt Col Comeau Mr. DeNinno Mr. Dunn Maj Edinger Mr. Fortier Mr. Hanchett Mr. Johnston LT. Lobner Mr. Smith Mr. Stein Mr. Vogel Ms. Gross (Int) KAZAKHSTAN Mr. Nurgozhayev RUSSIA Col Ryzhkov Mr. Bolotov Ms. Ivanova Ms. Kotkova Mr. Petrov Mr. Shevtchenko Mr. Smirnov Col Zaytsev Ms. Komshilova (Int) UKRAINE Dr. Shevtsov MGen Fedotov Mr. Shevchenko ¶40. (U) Taylor sends. STORELLA