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09GENEVA453 2009-06-10 16:48:00 SECRET US Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-006.



2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:15 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations continued the second
round of START Follow-on negotiations on the afternoon of
June 2, 2009 at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland. The
Russian Delegation asked questions related to the
verification, duration, and further reductions beyond the
START Follow-on Treaty portions of the U.S. paper entitled
"Elements of the START Follow-On Treaty," which had been
provided during the first round of negotiations in Moscow
(REF A). The delegations also exchanged ideas pertaining to
the potential format and context of the required report to
the Presidents for a July Summit, but no decision was
reached. The Russian Delegation suggested two documents, one
a joint statement for Presidents and a second negotiator's
report for foreign ministers containing a summary of
negotiations. The U.S. Delegation stated that a single
document for Presidents was the appropriate approach and that
the United States was inclined to conclude a more detailed
report along the lines of the 1992 Joint Understanding that
had been exchanged between the United States and the Russian
Federation regarding the framework for the START II
negotiations.



4. (S) The Russian Delegation also stated that any
commitment for further reductions needed to be considered
cautiously. Special conditions were needed for reductions to
occur in the future. The U.S. Delegation stated that the
issue of further reductions was important to both Presidents
and needed to be discussed. The delegations agreed to meet
again on the morning of June 3, 2009, to discuss the schedule
of events prior to the July Summit, U.S. questions pertaining
to the Russian vision paper provided earlier (REF B), and
approaches to accreditation with the Swiss.



--------------------------


MORE RUSSIAN QUESTIONS
ON U.S. "ELEMENTS"


--------------------------





5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the meeting at the U.S. Mission
and invited the Russian Delegation to continue providing
questions related to the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the
START Follow-on Treaty," which the Russian Delegation had
started but did not complete prior to the conclusion of the
morning session (REF B). (Begin comment: The Russian paper
was subsequently provided and will be sent SEPTEL
(SFO-GVA-I-007). End comment.)




--------------------------


QUESTION 1: VERIFICATION


--------------------------





6. (S) Antonov directed attention to paragraph C of Section
V entitled "Verification" of the U.S. "Elements" paper and
questioned the need to have ICBMs and SLBMs subject to the
treaty. He asked whether it was really reasonable to have
the basic START verification provisions (such as RVOSI, data
update inspections, exhibitions, and the exchange to
telemetry) when there was no limit on ICBMs and SLBMs.
Gottemoeller responded that such questions required further
study. However, the U.S. Delegation had similar questions
related to the verification procedures proposed in the
Russian paper entitled "How the Russian Side Envisions the
New START Treaty," so it was a question for both delegations
to continue to consider.



--------------------------


QUESTION 2: DURATION


--------------------------





7. (S) Antonov moved to the Section in the U.S. "Elements"
paper entitled "Entry into Force and Duration." The United
States proposed that the duration of the treaty be 5-10 years
with the period to reach limits being 3-5 years. He asked
whether it would be better to establish a firm timeframe for
reaching limits for eliminations, as was required by START.
Gottemoeller replied that no decision had been made. START
defined specific phases for eliminations, which were
important to the treaty, while the Moscow Treaty did not.
She suggested that this was an example of when a hybrid of
the two treaties could be incorporated into the follow-on
treaty.



--------------------------


QUESTION 3: COMMITMENT TO
NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS


--------------------------





8. (S) Antonov emphasized that the questions asked were only
preliminary questions. The Russian Delegation wanted to
better understand the U.S. approach. While Russia was
opposed to some aspects of the U.S. proposal, it favored
other parts. He then moved to his final question which
related to the last paragraph of the U.S. non-paper on
further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty. He
stated that, while the inclusion of tactical nuclear warheads
and the goal to eliminate all nuclear weapons were fair and
the objectives were well-fixed, special conditions were
needed for them to occur in the future. All of the elements
were already reflected in the preamble with the reference to
Article VI of the NPT, and the goal of the elimination of all
nuclear weapons was clearly stated. President Obama's own
words stated that perhaps the elimination of nuclear weapons
would not occur in his lifetime. Therefore, the Russian
Delegation was not ready to assume obligations for future
negotiations on further radical reductions before the
parameters of the START Follow-on Treaty were even
established. It would be important to first see how the
implementation of the START Follow-on Treaty progressed,
cautioning that non-aligned states would claim that not
enough was being done regardless of what was agreed to.


Antonov did not believe that there was a double standard.
Russia was in favor of a world free of nuclear weapons, but
the work to get there needed to be based on the principle of
"undiminished security for all," a phrase he admittedly stole
from the CFE Treaty.



9. (S) Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that the issue of
further reductions was important to both Presidents,
considering that it had been part of President Obama's Prague
speech and President Medvedev's Helsinki speech. The issue
was inescapable, so the importance of tackling it before the
NPT Review Conference next year must be recognized. She
pointed out thatQhe term that Antonov had used, obligation,
had a legally-binding feel to it, whereas the United States
looked at it as being a commitment, which would be
politically-binding. In either case, Russia and the United
States must continue to consider this issue and should commit
to it.



--------------------------


THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTS


--------------------------





10. (S) Antonov concluded the afternoon session with a
presentation on the view of the Russian Delegation as to what
a report by the negotiators to the Presidents at the July
Summit in Moscow might look like. He said that both
delegations needed to concentrate on a shared view for a
joint document outlining the progress made during the
negotiations for the Presidents to possibly sign in July.
The document could take the form of a Joint Statement, a
Joint Communique, or an Aide Memoire and he was flexible on
what it might be called. Antonov explained that there also
needed to be a second document, which would be the
negotiators' report that would be submitted to the foreign
ministers, who would then pass it on to their respective
Presidents. The report to the ministers would be a brief
summary of the results of the sessions held to date.



11. (S) Regarding the report to the Presidents, Antonov
stated that the repQt would confirm the mandate from the
Presidents and fix the objectives of a START Follow-on
Treaty. The report should be a brief, concise document,
possibly consisting of only three paragraphs. The first
paragraph would summarize the progress made during the first
stage of the negotiations. The second paragraph would
reconfirm the mandate to continue efforts to reach agreement
on a treaty and could include agreed numbers associated with
the aggregate ceilings on strategic nuclear warheads and
strategic delivery vehicles. However, agreed numbers were
not required for this report and their absence would not be
considered to be a failure. The third paragraph would
identify the specific tasks to be achieved by the
negotiators. Well understood phrases should be used, but
modified as necessary. Antonov continuously emphasized that
he was open to U.S. proposals regarding this important report.



12. (S) In response to Antonov's question about what the
United States envisioned for the joint statement,
Gottemoeller offered that the United States was inclined to
conclude a more detailed report along the lines of the 1992
Joint Understanding that had been exchanged between the
United States and the Russian Federation regarding the


framework for the START II negotiations. Such a report
should discuss concrete elements to be included in the
potential treaty under negotiation, including the key
aggregate ceilings as appropriate. Antonov cautioned against
trying to agree on specific numerical limitations in the
short time remaining before the Summit, given the existence
of apparent differences by the two Sides on a number of
issues.



13. (S) Responding to Gottemoeller's question as to how a
report to ministers related to the report to the Presidents,
Antonov said that the negotiators needed to go through their
respective ministers, who have direct access to the
Presidents. As such, he foresaw the document only being a
couple of sentences reporting that the negotiators had
fulfilled their directive and reporting progress towards that
end.



14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.



15. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Ms. Gottemoeller
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kron
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Belyakov
Mr. Ermakov
Mr. Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Lychaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Schevtchenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Trifonov
Mr. Ubeev
Mr. Vasiliev
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


Mr. Lakeev (Int)



16. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
STORELLA