START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000447 SIPDIS DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 CIA FOR WINPAC JCS FOR J5/DDGSA SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR NSC FOR LOOK DIA FOR LEA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019 TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 3, 2009, MORNING SESSION REF: A. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001) ¶B. STATE 50910 ¶C. MOSCOW 1347 ¶D. GENEVA 414 (SFO-GVA-I-007) Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-008. ¶2. (U) Meeting Date: June 3, 2009 Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. Place: Russian Mission, Geneva -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶3. (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations to the START Follow-on negotiations met in Geneva on June 3, 2009, to discuss planning for the next session and U.S. questions on the Russian "vision" for a START Follow-on Treaty (REF A). The Russian Delegation said that the next round of negotiations should take place in Geneva, June 22-24, and that it could not meet the week of the June 15 because there was insufficient time to prepare. The U.S. Delegation countered that it was concerned that waiting until June 22 was too late considering the looming deadline of the July 6 Summit and the obligation to provide a progress report to Presidents Obama and Medvedev. The U.S. Delegation proposed that a small delegation travel to Moscow to meet on June 18-19 to provide a draft report for the Presidents, written responses to Russian questions, and any refinement of the U.S. "Elements" paper (REF B),and then reconvene in Geneva on June 22 for as long as it takes to finalize the report. The U.S. Delegation agreed to provide a copy of the draft report through diplomatic channels prior to the meeting, emphasizing that the U.S. vision is to have a substantive report to the Presidents modeled on the July 1992 Joint Understanding for the START II Treaty. The Russian Delegation countered that this proposal was unfair since it would have only a weekend to review the U.S. draft, prepare a response, get it cleared in Moscow, and then travel to Geneva. The Russian Delegation complained that the U.S. Delegation did not come to Geneva for this session as well-prepared as the Russian Delegation since all the discussion had been on Russian papers. Still, it would meet with the United States anytime to work on the Presidential report as long as it addressed the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces and the Russian Delegation was given time to work the Russian interagency. The United States offered to meet in Moscow on June 15 to allow time to prepare for meetings in Geneva on June 22. The Russian Delegation tentatively agreed to this schedule and asked that the United States also respond in writing to the eight papers provided in Moscow (REF C). ¶4. (S) The U.S. Delegation asked the Russian Delegation several questions to clarify the U.S. understanding of the Russian "vision" paper provided on June 1 (REF A). The Russian Delegation promised to provide complete answers in writing, but did comment on some of the questions. On the principle of equal security, the Russian Delegation stated that the new treaty should create conditions so that each Party's security is better and stronger. On "strategic delivery vehicles," it said that the Russian view includes ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, but not launchers, but was open to including launchers. On a prohibition to not base outside the "continental" portion of each Party's national territory, the Russian Delegation said that the provision means what it says and, on the similar prohibition of stationing of heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the "continental" portion of each Party's national territory, that provision should apply to any vehicle designed to deliver nuclear weapons. On the question on information provided in flight test notifications, the Russian Delegation said that there are several START notifications that could be changed to make the system more efficient, but that the Russian Federation would honor its obligations under the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement. On the difference between inspections, visits, and exhibitions, it said that inspections would apply to deployed forces, including to verify data on delivery vehicles, launchers, and warheads; visits would be conducted to support transparency for non-deployed forces; and exhibitions would apply to new types of armaments. On the question of the proposed Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) being able to make viability and effectiveness changes to the new treaty, the Russian Delegation said that it believed the BCC should function in a similar fashion as the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). On the question of effectively verifying mobile ICBMs, it said that since the Cold War was over, special verification measures were no longer needed for mobile ICBMs and that national technical means (NTM) of verification was sufficient. And, on telemetry, the Russian Delegation said that since the new treaty would focus on the actual deployment of warheads and not on attributed warheads, telemetry was not needed. ¶5. (S) There was a brief discussion of the status of getting the U.S. and Russian Delegations officially accredited with the Swiss Government and the Russian Delegation provided the text of a press release that the Russian MFA will post on its website on June 4 (REF D). -------------- WHEN AND WHERE TO MEET AGAIN -------------- ¶6. (S) Antonov opened the meeting by recapping the significant events of the last two days, noting that the Russian Delegation provided a paper describing Russia's vision of the new treaty (REF A). He said that Russia planned for the next round of negotiations to take place in Geneva, June 22-24, and that it could not meet the week of June 15 because there was insufficient time to prepare. Gottemoeller countered that she was concerned that waiting until June 22 for the next meeting was too late considering the looming deadline of the July 6 Presidential Summit and the obligation to provide a progress report to Presidents Obama and Medvedev on that date. ¶7. (S) Gottemoeller proposed that a small U.S. delegation travel to Moscow to meet on June 18-19 to provide a draft report for the Presidents for the summit, written responses to Russian questions. for instance, the relationship between ODSNW and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV),and any refinement of the U.S. elements paper. This schedule would allow the Russian Side to digest substantive U.S. answers prior to Geneva. The delegations could then reconvene in Geneva on June 22 for as long as it takes to finalize the report. ¶8. (S) Gottemoeller assured Antonov that she would endeavor to provide a copy of the draft report through diplomatic channels prior to the meeting, emphasizing that the U.S. vision is to have a substantive document for the Presidents to sign modeled on the July 1992 Joint Understanding for the START II Treaty and that work on the document should occupy most of the delegations' time until it was complete. Antonov countered that he was ready to meet with the United States as early as tomorrow in Moscow, but that this proposal was unfair to the Russian Delegation since it would have only a weekend to review the U.S. draft, prepare a response, get it cleared in Moscow, and then travel to Geneva. ¶9. (S) Antonov chided the U.S. Delegation for not coming to Geneva as well-prepared as the Russian Delegation, since all the discussion had been on Russian papers. He said that he would meet with the United States anytime to work on the Presidential report as long as it addressed the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces and that he was given time to work the Russian interagency. Antonov asked that the United States not revert to previous models by presenting a paper on a Saturday and demanding an answer on Monday. He reiterated that the Russian Side was ready to meet again as early as tomorrow, but without receiving papers from the United States in advance, there would be nothing to discuss. ¶10. (S) Antonov added that, if the U.S. Delegation came to Moscow on June 18 to brief the Russian Delegation, he would, in turn, need a week to brief his superiors which would mean that the soonest he could meet again in Geneva would be June 29, stating again that he would need more than a weekend to review U.S. papers and then fly to Geneva for a Monday meeting. Further, in his opinion, the two Sides may need more than three days in Geneva to complete the work but, since the United States has not provided a draft Presidential report, he was unable to assess how much time was needed since he did not know the substance of any U.S. paper, nor did he know how his Russian colleagues would react. Again, he said, the United States was welcome to come to Moscow on June 18 with a small or large delegation, but that the Russian Side would need time to prepare answers. ¶11. (S) Returning to the report to the Presidents, Antonov did not have an issue with the title of the report; it could be a Joint Understanding, a statement, an aide-memoire, or another name. What was important to Russia was to know the content of the report and that the report address the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. Without an answer to that question, he could go no further. According to Antonov, before either of the two Sides takes a draft report to their respective Presidents, the delegations should coordinate their approach to the report. ¶12. (S) Antonov reminded Gottemoeller that the Russians had provided eight papers in Moscow on May 20 and that the United States had yet to provide a written response to those papers. He said that he will leave Geneva today without a single U.S. paper and that, for two weeks, his delegation would not have anything to do. Only on June 18 would the Russian Delegation have something to do. He said that he was not blaming either Side, nor did he want to create problems, he was only recognizing the realities of the interagency process in Washington and Moscow. He needs reciprocity from the United States on time to prepare answers to U.S. papers. He is willing to meet on June 18 and 19, but needs copies of the U.S. papers a few days in advance to work them in Moscow. He emphasized that he was not against work, the problem was how to deal with the issue. ¶13. (S) Gottemoeller complimented the Russian Delegation for its preparation for this round of talks and its "Vision" paper on the START Follow-on Treaty. She then reminded Antonov that, during the May 19 and 20 talks in Moscow, the United States had provided its "Elements" paper and that the Russian Delegation had had time this week to ask questions on the U.S. position. She added that the U.S. proposal to come to Moscow on June 18 was out of courtesy and concern with Antonov's travel schedule and to give the Russians a head start on preparing for talks in Geneva on June 22. She assured Antonov that she would do all she could to get papers to him in advance through diplomatic channels so that he would have time to prepare for the meetings. Antonov retorted that even then he would only have one day to think about a U.S. proposal. ¶14. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the U.S. Delegation could come to Moscow as soon as June 15, but she was trying to give Antonov an opportunity to clear his in-basket. She added that, if he preferred, she would just send the papers through diplomatic channels and leave it at that; however, it would be more useful to have experts in Moscow that week to get concepts on the table. Antonov responded that if she really wanted to give the Russian Delegation time to review any U.S. papers in time to meet in Geneva on June 22, then she should hand them over today. He went on to say that he did not understand the U.S. point of view. If the United States brings a paper on Friday (June 19),how can I react by Monday? Gottemoeller responded that both Sides are in the same bind to provide a report to our Presidents by July 6 and that we are in an intensive period of negotiations. In times like this, we may have to work on the weekends. ¶15. (S) Antonov denied any aversion to working on the weekend and reiterated his point that it was not fair for the U.S. Delegation to be prepared for a meeting and the Russian Delegation to not have time to prepare, especially since he would have no way to get his position cleared through the Foreign Minister. He suggested that the United States consider a practical approach, come to Moscow on June 18 and 19, or earlier, and the Russian Delegation would listen. The issue is not that he would read the U.S. papers, but whether there would be time for others in the Russian Government to read and clear them with their superiors. He added that the United States has the same interagency process and that if he started the clearance process on a Saturday, he would not be able to respond on a Monday. He said that we are dealing with "serious issues" and the Ministry of Defense needs more time. Antonov stressed that the Russian Delegation will work on weekends and will do everything possible to get the work done, but that it would not be ready to meet on June 22. He stated again that the U.S. Delegation was welcome to come to Moscow on June 15, June 18 or June 19, and he will ask Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov to meet with the United States and then we could meet again in Geneva on June 29. According to Antonov, the process needs discipline. ¶16. (S) Gottemoeller agreed that both Parties needed time to prepare for meetings, but that the report to the Presidents must be completed and that it was important that the U.S. position arrive in Moscow in time for the Russian Delegation to review it. Gottemoeller added that it would be useful for U.S. experts to come to Moscow the week of June 15; in her view the sooner the better. She assured Antonov that she would get the U.S. paper to him in advance. Antonov stated that there was no linkage between receiving a paper and meeting, he will meet with the United States anytime. Gottemoeller stated that it was important to have papers in writing and that the two delegations must focus on the reports to the Presidents, she does not want to leave Moscow with nothing to do. ¶17. (S) Gottemoeller then proposed that the delegations meet in Moscow on June 15 so that Antonov would have time to prepare for meetings in Geneva on June 22, reminding Antonov that both Sides were under pressure to meet the Summit deadline. Antonov tentatively agreed to this schedule; however, he noted that the Russian Delegation will have to resolve some logistic issues and that it can only stay in Geneva until June 24. He suggested that the agenda for the next Geneva meeting include a draft Joint Understanding for the Presidents and a separate paper that will go to ministers and then to the Presidents. Gottemoeller said that the U.S. Delegation would be prepared to discuss the report to the Presidents and asked whether the separate paper to ministers was just a transmittal memo. Antonov said he would think about it. Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that the key item is the report. ¶18. (S) Antonov asked, again, that the United States also respond in writing to the eight papers provided to the United States in Moscow. Gottemoeller stated the priority was the report to the Presidents for the Summit, nevertheless, the U.S Delegation would endeavor to respond to some of the eight Russian papers in writing. Antonov stated that Russia needed answers to its key concerns on the new treaty. Gottemoeller replied that many of those concerns would be worked out in preparing for the Presidential paper and that she did not see a need for separate papers. Antonov said that it was an issue of principle; the Russian Side needed written answers to work at home. He said that the Russian Delegation had provided written answers to U.S. papers and the Russian Delegation expected written answers to its papers. The Russian Delegation is especially interested in a response on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces, the conversion of strategic offensive arms (SOA) for non-nuclear armaments, and the deployment of SOA outside the continental portion of national territory. Again, he reminded the U.S. Delegation that it knows the Russian position on these issues but the Russian Delegation does not know the U.S. position. Antonov said that the Russian Delegation needs answers to its questions and that the United States had time to answer but just did not do so. ¶19. (S) Gottemoeller stated that it was true that the Russian Delegation provided a response to the U.S. "Elements" paper after ten days, but that the U.S. Delegation could not respond to the Russian paper in just two days in Geneva -- the U.S. Delegation is not made of supermen and superwomen. Antonov responded that he was not asking Gottemoeller to be a superwoman, but that the United States should not provide a paper on a Friday and expect a response on a Monday. Russia was asking for equal consideration. -------------- QUESTIONS POSED BY THE U.S. SIDE -------------- ¶20. (S) Elliott asked what the Russian Side meant by the "principle of equal security?" Antonov explained the principle by stating that the treaty should establish the same rights and obligations for each Party, and each country's security should be improved or strengthened through the treaty. He said that he could not imagine a situation in which it would be acceptable if Russian security was enhanced and U.S. security was diminished. The treaty should give the same level of security to both countries and should be of equal value. As an aside, he mentioned that the NATO-Russia council was a bit of an enigma to him, asking why should there be more security for NATO and less for Russia. He claimed that his U.S. colleagues had struck the notion (of equal security) while Russia had always included that thought in all forums. He asserted that he could think of no other policy for any arrangement where a Party would accept unequal security. He asked that the U.S. Side not try to read into the Russian proposal any double meaning. ¶21. (S) Elliott then asked what the Russian side meant by an obligation to reduce and limit strategic offensive arms "qualitatively," which appeared to be a change from what was contained in paragraph 1 of Article V of START that permitted, inter alia, modernization unless otherwise prohibited. Ilin responded that the Russian Side would have to provide that answer at a later time. Finally, Elliott asked whether the term "strategic delivery vehicles," as understood by the Russian side, included launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs as well as ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Ilin responded that it did not include launchers. ¶22. (S) Warner asked whether the Russian Side intended to use the term "strategic delivery vehicle" in the new Treaty, noting that it had not been used in START. Ilin stated that Russia would say "ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers," although he did not have anything against using the term in principle. Warner stated that the Sides needed to return to this matter later, noting that, in START, the key references in Article II are to "ICBMs and their associated launchers" and "SLBMs and their associated launchers." ¶23. (S) Warner asked what was intended by the new formulation regarding not basing SOA "beyond the continental portion...of each Party's national territory," which is different from what is contained in START. Ilin responded that the Russian Side would provide a more complete answer later, but acknowledged that it was different from what was in START and that it meant what it said. ¶24. (S) Warner posed the question of whether the proposal of the Russian Side to ban the stationing of heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the continental portion of national territory referred to heavy bombers that are "equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs" or did the ban refer only to heavy bombers that are actually loaded with long-range nuclear ALCMs? Ilin, noting that he was providing a quick answer at this point but could provide more detail later, said that it should cover all heavy bombers that are designed to deliver long-range nuclear ALCMs. ¶25. (S) Taylor noted the Russian concept of simplification of the notification regime and, citing the notification for flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, asked how that would differ from what is already required to be provided under the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement? Ryzhkov answered that the Russian Side had approached the issue of notifications by noting that most of the 154 different formats of notifications had never been provided, and that only about 20 are in normal use. He noted that the Russian paper had outlined the principle of data exchange and had not really looked carefully into the issue of launches in detail. He said that additional details, such as telemetry-related information provided under START, would not be provided under the new Treaty, although he admitted that this was the view "at this stage" and that "for the time being" Russia was not considering telemetry exchanges. ¶26. (S) Taylor asked the Russian Side to explain the difference between inspections, visits and exhibitions. Ryzhkov responded that he thought Antonov had already answered this question: inspections would concern deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, heavy bombers, deployed launchers, and the warheads on them; visits would concern non-deployed items; and exhibitions would be related to technical information on new types. Concerning the details of these various regimes would be the subject of negotiation. Taylor asked for clarification on the inclusion of launchers under inspections, and Ryzhkov confirmed that deployed launchers would be included. (Begin comment: Deployed launchers had not been included in the Russian vision paper under inspections. End comment.) Finally, Taylor asked whether the Bilateral Consultative Commission would have the authority to make the same type of "viability and effectiveness" changes as are provided for in START? Antonov responded that this was not really a question of principle, stating that it could be discussed. He cited the rich experience of the JCIC and proposed that the best of that experience be continued. He added, smiling, that Taylor would still have a job. ¶27. (S) Siemon noted that START recognized the inherent difficulty in effectively verifying mobile ICBMs. It contains extensive measures to facilitate verification, including perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, cooperative measures, designated deployment areas, and data exchanges covering deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers. What is different now? How would Russia's position provide for effective verification of mobile ICBMs? Ilin stated that, during START implementation, there had never been any problems with mobile ICBMs, adding that we have had much experience with mobiles, including notifications, but that there is now a new relationship between Russia and the United States; it is no longer the Cold War, and under the new conditions we do not need such strict control. He observed that submarines were essentially mobile and there was not the same type of control over them in START. Thus, the Russian Side did not see a need for a special regime for this type of arms. He also claimed that each country has sufficient NTM. Siemon stated that there had been no problems with mobiles during START implementation precisely because all of the additional provisions on mobiles had been included. ¶28. (S) Siemon posed the question as to why the Russian Side believed that telemetry was no longer important. Asking what was different now, he noted that telemetry provided data about throw-weight and the potential number of reentry vehicles, as well as the number of reentry vehicles tested, and that this data could be used to assess characteristics of new types. Ryzhkov acknowledged that the Russian document did not envision the use of telemetry, and further admitted that START did provide the three types of assessment data that Siemon had mentioned. But he noted that Russia and the United States had different tasks now and the treaty had another subject. He claimed that, since neither the Russian nor the U.S. document contained any reference to throw-weight, there was no need to make an assessment as to potential, all that had to be done is to count the number of warheads. Concerning the question of new types, this could be dealt with without telemetric data, such as by providing a different kind of technical data. In closing, Ryzhkov stated that the Russian side looked forward to comments and reactions from the U.S. Side. Siemon responded that we have to make certain that the treaty is effectively verifiable. -------------- DELEGATION ACCREDITATION WITH THE SWISS GOVERNMENT -------------- ¶29. (S) Antonov informed Gottemoeller that the Russian Federation had been informed by the Swiss Government that the Russian Delegation to START Follow-on negotiations would be granted special mission status in accordance with Swiss legislation. Antonov suggested that both delegations thank the Swiss and that the two delegations should agree to keep the delegations about the same size. Gottemoeller asked Brown to explain the results of his research on similar accreditation issues. Brown stated that he was certain that Russian lawyers had also researched previous U.S. practice in this regard. According to his research and understanding, the United States and the Russian Federation would craft identical notes and exchange them separately with the Swiss Government. He added that he would meet with the Russian Delegation legal advisor to compare texts, but he was still checking if the notes would be provided to the Swiss Government in Geneva or in Bern. Antonov thanked Brown for his work and said that he would consult with Russian legal experts to provide options. (Begin comment: Kotkova later informed Brown that the Swiss Government apparently did not require an exchange of notes because it had already sent a letter to the Russian Permanent Mission that offered special mission status to the Russian Delegation. The U.S. Delegation will seek to identify the requirements for the Swiss Government to offer the same to the United States. End comment.) ¶30. (S) Gottemoeller stated that the U.S. Delegation was also considering other venue options for the negotiations and that the Austrian Government had offered to host the delegations in Vienna. Antonov said he was unaware of any such offer by Austria and that the Russian Delegation was only considering Geneva and Moscow. Gottemoeller added that the Russian Delegation was also welcome in Washington. -------------- RUSSIAN PRESS RELEASE -------------- ¶31. (S) Antonov closed by providing the text of a press release that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will post on its website on June 4. Antonov said that the Russian Delegation had no plans for media interviews, but noted that members in the Conference on Disarmament would be interested in the START Follow-on talks. ¶32. (U) Documents exchanged. - Russia: -- Draft Press Release by Russian Delegation to START Follow-on Negotiations ¶33. (U) Participants. U.S. Ms. Gottemoeller Mr. Brown Mr. Buttrick LtCol Comeau Mr. Couch Mr. Dunn Mr. Elliott Mr. Fortier Col Hartford Mr. Johnston Mr. Kron Dr. Look Mr. Siemon Mr. Taylor Dr. Warner Ms. Gross (Int) Dr. Hopkins (Int) RUSSIA Amb Antonov Mr. Belyakov Mr. Ermakov Mr. Ilin Ms. Ivanova Mr. Izrazov Mr. Koshelev Ms. Kotkova Mr. Lychaninov Mr. Malyugin Col Novikov Col Ryzhkov Mr. Schevtchenko Mr. Semin Mr. Smirnov Mr. Trifonov Mr. Ubeev Mr. Vasiliev Col Zaytsev Ms. Brokhovich (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int) Mr. Lakeev (Int) ¶34. (U) Gottemoeller sends. STORELLA